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This thesis deals with the law of shared hydrocarbons – a body of general rules of international 
law governing the management of two categories of shared, common hydrocarbon resources: 
(a) hydrocarbon resources situated in maritime areas of overlapping claims, and (b) 
hydrocarbon resources straddling maritime boundaries between neighboring States. 
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hydrocarbons with particular emphasis on harm to the marine environment originating from 
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GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS4 
 
Term Definition Synonym(s) 
Decommissioning All work required in respect of the abandonment 
of the facilities used for exploration and 
exploitation of hydrocarbons 
 
Exploitation Activities that take place following discovery 
and delineation of commercial quantities of 
hydrocarbons and that aim at the extraction of 
discovered hydrocarbons from a reservoir, 
including, but not limited to, drilling of 
development wells, construction, placing and 
operation of all necessary facilities, injection, 
reinjection, treatment and storage of 
hydrocarbons and their transportation 
 
Exploration Search for hydrocarbons, including, but not 
limited to, such activities as surveys where 
magnetic, gravity, seismic reflection, coring or 
other systems are used to detect or imply the 
existence of hydrocarbons, and any drilling 
conducted for the purpose of finding commercial 
quantities of hydrocarbons and delineating a 
hydrocarbon reservoir in order to decide whether 
or not to proceed with its exploitation 
 
Facility Any equipment, installation and other accessory 
used for hydrocarbon activities, including, but 
not limited to, drilling vessels and rigs, fixed or 
floating platforms, storage units, flotels, well 
heads, intrafield pipelines5 and cables, but 
excluding supply and support vessels, ship that 
transport hydrocarbons, other pipelines and 
cables 
 
Hydrocarbons Natural organic compounds containing carbon 
and hydrogen and found in crude oil and natural 
gas, regardless of form (solid, liquid or gaseous), 





All activities associated with hydrocarbons, 
including, but not limited to, exploration for and 
exploitation of hydrocarbons, decommissioning, 




Indemnity A situation where one party undertakes to 
compensate damage instead of the other party 
 
                                                            
4 This Glossary is based on an examination of the relevant agreements and arrangements relating to shared 
hydrocarbon resources. See Appendix I. 
5 ‘Intrafield pipeline’ means any pipeline installed or to be installed for the purpose of exploiting a transboundary 
hydrocarbon field, connecting installations in the same transboundary field. See, for example, Markham UA, art. 
1 (f); Canada-France Agreement, art. 1, para. 6. 
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and, hence, protects the other party from 
liability/responsibility arising from such damage  
License An authorization or permit issued by a competent 
authority (e.g., governmental department or 
agency) to carry out hydrocarbon activities in a 
given block 
 
Licensee An entity holding a right given by a coastal State 




entity or actor, 
contractor 
Operator A company which, on behalf of licensees 
operating in the same block, is in charge of the 
day-to-day management of petroleum activities 
 
Reservoir A single structure of hydrocarbons in a 
geological unit limited by rock, water or other 
substances without pressure communication 








Transboundary hydrocarbon reservoirs and 





Any reservoir which extends across the maritime 
boundary between neighboring States and which 
is exploitable in whole or in part from both sides 






An agreement concluded between neighboring 
States for the joint exploitation of a discovered 




An agreement concluded between the licensees 
for the purpose of carrying out hydrocarbon 





                                                            
6 It is worth noting that some agreements dealing with transboundary hydrocarbon resources define the term 
‘unitization agreement’ as an agreement between the licensees pertaining to a transboundary hydrocarbon field. 
See, for example, Canada-France Agreement, art. 5 (while an agreement between the States is called ‘exploitation 
agreement’ (ibid., art. 4)); Cyprus-Egypt Framework Agreement, art. 4 (at the same time, article 10 refers to a 





























CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the research 
Through the impetus given to maritime boundary delimitation by the United Nations 
Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),7 many States have either agreed on the 
delimitation of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the continental shelf 
(CS) with their neighboring States, or resolved this issue by resorting to some form of dispute 
settlement procedure.8 Although the number of established maritime boundaries steadily 
increases, there are many cases where a maritime delimitation dispute between neighboring 
States remains unsettled.9 A large range of intricate legal (as well as political and technical) 
issues arise when there are proven or suspected offshore oil and gas resources that either 
straddle an already established maritime boundary between States or lie within an area of 
overlapping maritime claims. This thesis shall employ the common term ‘shared (offshore) 
hydrocarbon resources’ in relation to these instances.10 
One of the key legal questions in each instance of shared hydrocarbon resources concerns the 
rights and obligations of States that derive from the (possible) existence of a shared hydrocarbon 
resource. The International Law Commission (ILC) has discontinued its effort to develop the 
rules applicable to shared oil and gas resources.11 This thesis, however, argues that there are 
certain rights and obligations flowing from the presence of a hydrocarbon deposit shared by 
several States. 
Facing the presence of shared hydrocarbon resources, many coastal States have preferred to 
enter into cooperative arrangements and agreements in order to make the exploitation of those 
                                                            
7 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, EIF: 16 November 1994, 
1833 UNTS 397. 
8 Ibid., arts. 15 (delimitation of the territorial sea), 74 (delimitation of the exclusive economic zone) and 83 
(delimitation of the continental shelf) and Part XV (settlement of disputes). It is important to note that this thesis 
does not discuss the legal regime of every maritime zone in the law of the sea nor the methods of delimitation of 
maritime zones between opposite or adjacent coastal States. 
9 C. Sim, “Investment disputes arising out of areas of unsettled boundaries: Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire”, Journal of 
World Energy Law and Business, 2018, vol. 11 (1), p. 1: “[t]here are currently more than 150 unresolved interstate 
disputes concerning international boundaries on land or at sea”. Y. van Logchem, “The Status of a Rule of Capture 
Under International Law of the Sea with Regard to Offshore Oil and Gas Resource Related Activities”, Michigan 
State International Law Review, 2018, vol. 26 (2), p. 210: “[e]stimates, although there is a significant measure of 
variation between them, place the number of open maritime boundaries at around 200”. 
10 Chapter 2.2 examines the notion of shared hydrocarbon resources in detail. It is also important to note that this 
thesis uses synonyms to the terms ‘hydrocarbon’ and ‘resource’ (see Glossary of key terms).  




resources possible and uncontested.12 However, this does not safeguard States from the 
emergence of new legal difficulties in the pursuit of cooperative exploration and exploitation, 
particularly in case of (environmental) damage caused by these activities. This thesis explores 
whether the scenario in which multiple States involved in cooperative hydrocarbon activities 
contribute, through either their actions or omissions, to a harmful outcome that international 
law seeks to prevent, including damage to the environment, thus implies that they share 
responsibility in this respect. 
1.2 Research questions and their topicality 
This research addresses two questions: 
 What rights and obligations do States that share offshore hydrocarbon deposits have 
towards each other under international law? 
 Under what circumstances can States that have agreed to cooperate in exploring and 
exploiting shared offshore hydrocarbon deposits incur shared international 
responsibility for (marine) environmental harm13 that results or may result from these 
activities? 
The general rules governing the rights and obligations of neighboring States in shared 
hydrocarbon deposits are frequently discussed in the academic literature.14 However, while the 
main attention in the literature is paid to the duty to cooperate, its (emerging) customary status 
and how the lessons learned from the application of this duty in one geographical region may 
be applied in another region,15 other relevant rules, including the rule of fair apportionment16 
                                                            
12 See Chapters 3 and 4, and particularly Chapters 6 and 7. 
13 The terms ‘harm’ and ‘damage’ are used interchangeably in this thesis. See in detail Part III of the thesis. 
14 See, for example, R. Lagoni, “Oil and Gas Deposits Across National Frontiers”, American Journal of 
International Law, 1979, vol. 73, pp. 215-243; A. Szekely, “The international law of submarine transboundary 
hydrocarbon resources: legal limits to behavior and experiences for the Gulf of Mexico”, Natural Resources 
Journal, 1986, vol. 26 (4), pp. 733-768; D. M. Ong, “Joint Development of Common Offshore Oil and Gas 
Deposits: “Mere” State Practice or Customary International Law?”, American Journal of International Law, 1999, 
vol. 93 (4), pp. 771-804; J. L. Weaver and D. F. Asmus, “Unitizing oil and gas fields around the world: a 
comparative analysis of national, laws and private contracts”, Houston Journal of International Law, 2005, vol.28 
(1), pp. 3-197; P. Cameron, “The Rules of Engagement: Developing Cross-Border Petroleum Deposits in the North 
Sea and the Caribbean”, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2006, vol. 55 (3), pp. 559-586; A. E. 
Bastida et al., “Cross-border Unitization and Joint Development Agreements: an International Law Perspective”, 
Houston Journal of International Law, 2007, vol. 29 (2), pp. 355-422; V. Becker-Weinberg, Joint Development of 
Hydrocarbon Deposits in the Law of the Sea, Heidelberg: Springer, 2014; G. J. G. Sanchez and R. J. McLaughlin, 
“The 2012 Agreement on the Exploitation of Transboundary Hydrocarbon Resources in the Gulf of Mexico: 
Confirmation of the Rule or Emergence of a New Practice?”, Houston Journal of International Law, 2015, vol. 37 
(3), pp. 681-788. 
15 Ibid. 
16 See, for example, W. T. Onorato, “Apportionment of an International Common Petroleum Deposit”, 




and different aspects of the no-harm rule,17 are largely in shadow. Moreover, the features of the 
general rules applicable to shared oil and gas resources inherent to each category that falls under 
the concept of shared hydrocarbons have not been sufficiently discussed in the literature.18 
There is some literature on how to design an agreement dealing with shared hydrocarbons based 
on the structure of similar agreements that are already in place.19 However, when it comes to 
the issue of environmental protection as an important matter when negotiating and framing such 
an agreement, the literature is limited and mainly focuses on undelimited maritime areas.20 
Clearly, the topic of shared international responsibility is only beginning to see development in 
both the academic literature and in practice. The major contributions have been made by the 
SHARES project, which focused on shared responsibility in international law.21 This project 
looked at different scenarios in which shared responsibility (between multiple States and/or 
non-State actors) might arise, including within the law of the sea.22 Some legal commentators 
                                                            
an International Common Petroleum Deposit”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1977, vol. 26 (2), 
pp. 324-337; T. A. Reynolds, “Delimitation, Exploitation, and Allocation of Transboundary Oil & Gas Deposits 
between Nation-States”, ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law, 1995, vol. 1 (1), pp. 135-170; R. E. 
Swarbick, “Oil and Gas Reservoirs Across Ownership Boundaries: The Technical Basis for Apportioning 
Reserves”, in: G. H. Blake (ed), The Peaceful Management of Transboundary Resources, Graham & 
Trotman/Nijhoff Press, 1995. 
17 See Chapter 2.6 in this regard.  
18 Chapter 2.2 identifies two categories of shared hydrocarbon resources. 
19 See, for example, H. Fox et al., Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas: A Model Agreement for States for 
Joint Development with Explanatory Commentary, London: British Institute of International and Comparative 
Law, 1989; D. Lerer, “How to negotiate and structure a joint development agreement”, Oil & Gas Journal, 8 
September 2003, vol. 101 (34), pp. 38-40; C. B. Okafor, “Model Agreements for Joint Development: a Case 
Study”, Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law, 2007, vol. 25(1), pp. 58-102; P. Cameron, “The design of 
joint development zone treaties and international unitization agreements”, in: P. Daniel, M. Keen et al. (eds), 
International Taxation and the Extractive Industries, Routledge, 2017, pp. 242-263. 
20 See P. Birnie, “Protection of the Marine Environment in Joint Development” and A. D. Read, “Protection of the 
Marine Environment: A View from Industry”, in: H. Fox (ed), Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas, 
London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, vol. II, 1990, pp. 202 and 223; D. M. Ong, “The 
Progressive Integration of Environmental Protection within Offshore Joint Development Agreements”, in: M. 
Fitzmaurice and M. Szuniewicz (eds), Exploitation of Natural Resources in the 21st Century, Kluwer Law 
International, 2003, pp. 113-141; C. A. Low, “Marine Environmental Protection in Joint Development 
Agreements”, Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law, 2012, vol. 30 (1), pp. 45-74; Q. Hongdao and H. 
Mukhtar, “Joint Development Agreements: Towards Protecting the Marine Environment under International 
Law”, Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization, 2017, vol. 66, pp. 164-171; S. Wartini, “The Role of the Coastal 
States to the Protection of Marine Environment in Joint Development Agreement”, Indonesian Journal of 
International Law, vol. 14 (4), 2017, pp. 433-455. 
21 This project, which ended in 2015, had been carried out by the Amsterdam Center for International Law of the 
University of Amsterdam and resulted in a number of books, articles and doctoral theses. See, for example, A. 
Nollkaemper and I. Plakokefalos (eds), Principles of Shared Responsibility in International Law: An Appraisal of 
the State of the Art, Cambridge University Press, 2014; A. Nollkaemper and D. Jacobs (eds), Distribution of 
Responsibilities in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2015; A. Nollkaemper and I. Plakokefalos 
(eds), The Practice of Shared Responsibility in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2017. See more 
on the SHARES’s website: http://www.sharesproject.nl (last accessed January 2019). 
22 See, for example, Chapters 11-17 in A. Nollkaemper and I. Plakokefalos (eds), The Practice of Shared 




affirm that the context of shared hydrocarbons is one of the scenarios of shared responsibility.23 
However, the aspects of shared responsibility in that context remain unexplored.24 Given the 
fact that the number of cooperative arrangements and agreements relating to shared 
hydrocarbons25 constantly increases, more attention should be paid to the question of shared 
State responsibility in particular because States play a primary role in authorizing joint activities 
with respect to shared hydrocarbon deposits and they are the principal bearers of international 
obligations.26 It is also true that the topic of international responsibility of a State when 
exploring and exploiting its offshore hydrocarbon resources, outside the context of shared 
hydrocarbons, is poorly discussed. This research aims at filling these gaps. 
The following Chapters of the thesis will also explain the practical significance of the research 
questions identified in this section.27 
1.3 Research methodology and methodological challenges 
This research involves an analysis of the current state of the law of shared hydrocarbons and 
the regime of (shared) State responsibility in the context of shared hydrocarbons. The 
foundation of this research is the doctrinal approach, which seeks to determine the lex lata by 
interpretation of all the applicable sources of law listed in the next section of this Chapter.28 
                                                            
23 See C. Redgwell, “Shared International Responsibility for Transboundary Harm Arising from Energy 
Activities”, in: L. Barrera-Hernández et al. (eds), Sharing the costs and benefits of energy and resource activity: 
Legal change and impact on communities, Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 59-73; C. Redgwell, “Energy”, in: 
A. Nollkaemper and I. Plakokefalos (eds), The Practice of Shared Responsibility in International Law, Cambridge 
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this thesis. 
24 See Chapter 5. 
25 Supra note 12. 
26 See Chapter 5. 
27 See, for example, Introduction to Part III. 
28 See, for example, T. Hutchinson, “Doctrinal research: researching the jury”, in: D. Watkins and M. Burton (eds), 
Research Methods in Law, Routledge, 2013. It is important to note that the term ‘dogmatic’ is usually used in 
Norway. See E.-M. Svensson, “Boundary-Work in Legal Scholarship”, in: Å. Gunnarsson, E.-M. Svensson and 
M. Davies (eds), Exploiting the Limits of Law: Swedish Feminism and the Challenge to Pessimism, Ashgate, 
Aldershot, 2007. This term is also employed in a number of doctoral theses: S. V. Busch, Third State Involvement 
in the Context of Establishing the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf, Doctoral thesis, UiT The Arctic University 
of Norway, 2014, p. 10; K. Svendsen, Compensable damage ex delicto as a result of harm in the Barents Sea 
caused by petroleum spills from offshore installations: A Norwegian and Russian comparative legal analysis of 
conflict of laws, the concept of harm, losses suffered by third parties, and environmental damage and its valuation 
and calculation, caused by petroleum spills from offshore oil rigs and installations in the Barents Sea, Doctoral 





State practice plays an important role in this respect. State practice may clarify the content of 
the general rules applicable in the context of shared hydrocarbons, provide evidence of their 
status under customary international law29 and assist in answering specific questions raised by 
this research (e.g., is there any common procedure to determine whether a hydrocarbon deposit 
is transboundary?30). Regarding the study of relevant State practice, the world is divided into a 
number of geographical regions. Each geographical region corresponds to a maritime space 
(e.g., a sea or gulf) adjacent to several coastal States.31 The methodological approach used for 
identifying relevant State practice is “inductive”32 meaning that State practice is identified 
based on that referred to in the proceedings of formal dispute settlement (e.g., awards, 
judgments, advisory opinions, memorials submitted to international courts and tribunals, 
pleadings); included in databases (e.g., the United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS) and the 
Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS)); discussed in the legal literature 
(e.g., volumes of International Maritime Boundaries (IMB)); and, particularly for contemporary 
State practice, reported in news media and other secondary sources.33 
The study of State practice is limited to materials available in English. While most relevant 
materials examined in this thesis are published in English (being the original language of a 
document or the language of official translation), there are examples where this author has not 
been able to fully understand the content of some documents published in a language other than 
that which the author has good command of (namely, beyond the English, Russian and 
Norwegian languages).34 A striking example is the Advisory Opinion on the Environment and 
Human Rights delivered by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) in Spanish.35 
                                                            
29 See Chapter 1.4.2 in this regard. 
30 See in detail Chapter 4. 
31 See Chapter 1.4.6 in this regard. 
32 Report on the Obligations of States under Articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of UNCLOS in respect of Undelimited 
Maritime Areas, The British Institute of International and Comparative Law, June 2016, p. 40, para. 135, available 
at 
https://www.biicl.org/documents/1192_report_on_the_obligations_of_states_under_articles_743_and_833_of_u
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33 Ibid. UNTS’s website: https://treaties.un.org/pages/Content.aspx?path=DB/UNTS/pageIntro_en.xml. 
DOALOS’s website: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/index.htm (last accessed 
January 2019). 
34 The author would like to thank her colleagues that assisted in translation of some texts available in French and 
Spanish, particularly Eva Romée van der Marel and Maria Madalena das Neves. 
35 Advisory Opinion on the Obligations of States in Relation to the Environment in the Context of the Protection 
and Guarantee of the Rights to Life and to Personal Integrity – Interpretation and Scope of Articles 4 (1) and 5 (1) 




At the same time, this has not significantly affected the examination of the research questions 
outlined earlier in this Chapter because most of the key legal sources are available in English. 
It is important to emphasize that the English text of a treaty may be one of the treaty’s authentic 
texts (usually, when a treaty is concluded between an English-speaking country and a country 
having other official language(s) than English)36 or may be an official translation of the treaty’s 
text originally made in other languages.37 In the latter situation of translation, the English texts 
are considered with caution, with reference made to the authentic texts where possible and 
necessary. It is also worth noting that there may be interpretation difficulties related to a treaty 
authenticated in two or more languages.38 However, these difficulties in interpretation are not 
a significant barrier in dealing with the research questions relating to international law.  
Apart from the linguistic challenges, the non-accessibility of some applicable agreements is an 
issue that limits the compilation of a comprehensive list of relevant State practice concerning 
shared hydrocarbons, even in the geographical regions selected for study.39 The main reasons 
why these agreements are not available in the public domain are: (a) they are recently reached 
and not yet in force; and (b) they are protected from disclosure because of their commercial 
value for the Parties and licensees. For the latter reason, a number of this author’s requests to 
the official authorities for access to relevant agreements (particularly agreements dealing with 
transboundary hydrocarbons), including their supporting regulatory framework, were rejected 
(some of the requests were left unanswered). At this point, it is worth noting that applicable 
agreements that are not publicly available amount to a relatively small portion of the total 
number of available agreements.40 Moreover, one could argue that relevant provisions of the 
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Banda, “Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ Advisory Opinion on the Environment and Human Rights”, 
American Society of International Law, 10 May 2018, available at 
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36 See, for example, Canada-France Agreement, art. 21; US-Mexico Agreement, art. 25. However, there are 
example where non-English-speaking countries have concluded a treaty in the English and X languages where 
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Agreement of 2008, art. 10. See Chapter 1.4.6 in this respect. 
37 For example, Norway-Russia Treaty is concluded in the Norwegian and Russian languages having an official 
translation in English. See Chapter 1.4.6 in this respect. 
38 See, for example, I. Fodchenko, “Legal Aspects of the Russian–Norwegian Model for Cross-Border Unitization 
in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean”, Ocean Development and International Law, 2018, vol. 49 (3), pp. 265-268. 
Article 33 (1) of the VCLT stipulates that the text of a treaty done in two or more languages is “equally authoritative 
in each language, unless the treaty provides or the Parties agree that, in case of divergence, a particular text shall 
prevail” (see, for example, Norway-Iceland Agreement of 2008, art. 10, in this respect). If the treaty does not 
provide that one of the texts prevails, article 33 (4) of the VCLT applies. 
39 See Chapters 1.4.6, 6 and 7 in this regard. 




agreements that are not publicly available are framed similarly to those included in the 
agreements that are already available in the public domain.41 As shown further in this thesis, 
the non-availability of some relevant agreements has not been a substantial obstacle in 
establishing a clear picture regarding the first research question. However, the non-availability 
of a regulatory framework in addition to the relevant agreement in a number of instances has 
had an impact on the consideration of the second research question: namely, this has hampered 
the analysis of the character of the due diligence standard that is crucial for determining the 
likelihood of shared State responsibly in the context of shared hydrocarbons.42  
This research does not only focus on the lex lata, but also on de lege ferenda. The research 
seeks to identify gaps in the current legal framework and discusses what the law might be.43 
This thesis addresses some technical aspects of offshore oil and gas resource activities, which 
may contribute to shedding light on relevant legal questions. For example, Chapter 3 will 
discuss the question of what form of hydrocarbon activity might cause a serious physical 
modification of the marine environment and the considerations of this form that determine 
whether the activity is contrary to international law.  
1.4 Applicable legal sources 
The legal framework governing shared hydrocarbons is a “multi-layered framework of law”.44 
Broadly, the layers are: 
 sources of international law, including cooperative arrangements and agreements 
between States; 
 private contracts between the licensees involved; and 
 national laws and regulations.45 
This thesis primarily examines the first layer of this multi-layered legal framework for a number 
of reasons. First, the research questions raised in this thesis are considered from an international 
law perspective. Second, an examination of the last two layers across the globe is difficult 
within the scope of this research for the reasons outlined in the section above (namely, linguistic 
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limitations and more significant challenges with access to relevant documents than those that 
exist in relation to the first layer).46 
Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ’s Statute) is widely 
accepted as a formulation of the sources of international law.47 According to this article, there 
are three principal sources of international law: international conventions, international customs 
and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. Article 38 (1) contains no 
indication of a hierarchy between these sources. Judicial decisions and doctrinal teaching are 
mentioned as subsidiary means,48 and they are to be applied in a subsidiary manner because 
they do not generate rules of law, but rather provide evidence of their existence.49 As noted by 
Thirlway, “the judge, or the author of the textbook, will not assert that the rule stated is law 
because he has stated it; he will state it because he considers that it derives from one of the three 
principal sources indicted in paragraph (a) to (c) of Article 38”.50 
It is worth noting that article 38 of the ICJ’s Statute does not provide an exhaustive list of the 
sources of international law. Therefore, this thesis looks at additional sources. These additional 
sources include a number of outputs produced by the ILC.51 
1.4.1 International conventions 
The Convention on the Continental Shelf (CCS)52 and particularly the UNCLOS are the starting 
point for most discussions relating to shared hydrocarbons. This thesis also examines other 
relevant international conventions (e.g., Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses 
of International Watercourses and Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a 
Transboundary Context)53 that are able to shed light on specific questions.54 The Vienna 
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48 ICJ’s Statute, art. 38 (1) (d). 
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Model United Nations Journal, 2013, p. 185. 
50 Thirlway 2010, op. cit., p. 110. 
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52 Convention on the Continental Shelf, Geneva, 29 April 1958, EIF: 10 June 1964, 499 UNTS 311. 
53 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Espoo, 25 February 1991, EIF: 
10 September 1997, 1989 UNTS 309; Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, New York, 21 May 1997, EIF: 17 August 2014, UNGA’s resolution 51/229, annex, Official Records 
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Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is used throughout this thesis as the means of 
interpretation of relevant treaties.55 
1.4.2 Customary international law 
The value of customary international law is that it applies to all States, as opposed to treaties, 
which apply only to States parties to them. In other words, a State, which is not a party to the 
UNCLOS (e.g., Colombia and the United States of America (US)),56 may nevertheless be 
bound by a UNCLOS-based obligation that also reflects customary international law. 
International courts and tribunals have identified a number of norms as customary international 
rules that are relevant to this research. For example, the ICJ, in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
Opinion, affirmed that “[t]he general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond national 
control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment”.57 In 
Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire, the Special Chamber (SC) of the International Tribunal of the Law of the 
Sea (ITLOS) stated that draft article 1 of the draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) reflects customary international law.58 Nevertheless, 
the problem is that international courts and tribunals usually declare customary international 
law without engaging in an examination of State practice and opinio juris.59 State practice and 
opinio juris are the two elements of an international custom. These two constituent elements 
must be present to give rise to a customary rule: first, there must be a general State practice and, 
second, this practice must follow from the belief that such practice reflects international law.60 
                                                            
55 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 23 May 1969, EIF: 27 January 1980, 1155 UNTS 331, arts. 
31-33. The term ‘treaty’ is defined in article 2 (1) (a) of the VCLT. 
56 As discussed in below in this Chapter, Colombia and the US have concluded agreements with Jamaica and 
Mexico, respectively, concerning the management of shared hydrocarbon resources.  
57 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, para. 29. 
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Judgment, 25 September 1997, ICJ Reports 1997, para. 53. See Chapter 5 in detail. 
58 Dispute concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic 
Ocean (Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire), Case No. 23, ITLOS Judgment, 23 September 2017, para. 558. Article 1 of the 
ARSIWA provides that “[e]very internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of 
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Methodology between Induction, Deduction and Assertion”, European Journal of International Law, 2015, vol. 
26 (2), pp. 434-440. 





However, the process of identification of customary international law is not a straightforward 
task. At this point, it is worth noting the ongoing work of the ILC on the topic of “Identification 
of customary international law”.61 Draft conclusion 5 adopted by the ILC provides that “State 
practice consists of conduct of the State, whether in the exercise of its executive, legislative, 
judicial or other functions”.62 The requirement that State practice must be general means that it 
“must be sufficiently widespread and representative, as well as consistent”.63 The general State 
practice “must be undertaken with a sense of legal right or obligation” (opinio juris).64 The text 
of the ILC’s draft conclusions also provides a list of forms of State practice and opinio juris, 
including, but not limited to, diplomatic correspondence, decisions of national courts, 
legislative acts and official statements.65 The principal form of State practice analyzed in this 
thesis consists of physical acts, namely treaties between States.66 It should however be borne in 
mind that State practice may take a form of inaction.67 For example, Chapter 3 will discuss the 
question of whether an obligation to exercise restraint in undelimited maritime areas found in 
article 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS also reflects customary international law. 
This thesis considers many documents adopted by the United Nations (UN) system, including 
resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).68 UNGA resolutions can be 
evidence of, or be relevant to, customary law as they reflect the views of member States.69 At 
the same time, resolutions rarely receive unanimous support among all States. The usual 
situation is that while an overwhelming number of member States votes in favor of adoption of 
a resolution, some States either vote against the resolution or abstain from voting.70 A positive 
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62 Ibid. 
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64 Ibid., draft conclusion 9. 
65 Ibid., draft conclusions 6 and 10. 
66 See Chapter 1.4.6. 
67 Supra note 61, draft conclusion 6 (1). 
68 See Chapter 2. 
69 See, for example, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), Judgment, 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, para. 188, and Nuclear Weapons, para. 70: 
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International Law, supra note 61, draft conclusion 12. 
70 For example, Resolution on Cooperation in the Field of the Environment concerning Natural Resources Shared 
by Two or More States, UNGA Resolution 3129 (XXVIII) of 13 December 1973 was adopted with 77 votes in 
favor, 5 votes against (mostly Latin American countries) and 43 abstentions (industrialized countries). See Lagoni 
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vote of a State may imply the willingness of that State to act in conformity with the resolution, 
even though it is not legally bound to do so.71 Thereby, the resolution can be regarded as a 
desire of a large part of the international community to acknowledge a particular norm. 
However, it remains unclear whether States who either cast a negative vote or abstained should 
adhere to the view of the majority.72 It does not appear that such States share the attitude of the 
majority of States.73 A separate section of this Chapter will consider the role of the ILC in the 
development of customary international law.74 
1.4.3 General principles of international law 
There are a number of principles that are referred to in the literature as emerging or soft law 
principles.75 Those principles include the precautionary principle, the common but 
differentiated responsibility principle and the requirement of environmental impact assessment 
(EIA).76 As emphasized by Low, these principles ought to be considered in the negotiation of 
arrangements and agreements relating to shared hydrocarbons.77 This thesis, particularly 
Chapter 2, considers the principle of sovereign rights, the no-harm principle, the principle of 
good faith and the principle of equity. It is worth noting that an obligation under (customary) 
international law may also be regarded as a specific application of a certain general principle or 
a number of principles.78 
1.4.4 Case law and doctrinal writings 
As alluded to earlier, case law is a subsidiary source for the determination of rules of law.79 
Even though judicial decisions are “not governed by the principle of stare decisis”80 meaning 
that a decision of a court or tribunal is binding only on the parties to a case and in connection 
to that particular case,81 case law plays a significant role as authoritative evidence of the state 
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71 M. Dixon, Textbook on International Law, Oxford University Press, 7th edition, 2013, p. 51. 
72 J. Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law, Cambridge University Press, 2nd edition, 2009, 
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73 Ibid., pp. 190-191. 
74 See Chapter 1.4.5 in detail. 
75 Low 2012, op. cit., p. 56. 
76 Ibid., referring to other legal sources.  
77 Ibid. 
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79 ICJ’s Statute, art. 38 (1) (d). 
80 Bastida et al., op. cit., p. 362, referring to P. D. McHugh, “International Law-Delimitation of Maritime 
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of the law.82 International courts and tribunals invariably invoke previous jurisprudence in 
rendering a decision. 
Bastida et al. have summarized international case law (as of 2007) relevant for the law of shared 
hydrocarbons.83 This thesis refers to this case law and supplements it by subsequent judicial 
decisions.84 An analysis of the relevant case law serves different functions. For instance, case 
law may throw light on the customary status of a rule of international law (however, as noted 
above in this Chapter, some findings in that respect might be questionable)85 and may clarify 
the content of a treaty obligation86 or a rule of customary international law. In certain fields, 
case law has an even larger impact. For example, the law of maritime boundary delimitation 
has been mostly developed through case law.87 As discussed in Chapter 3, case law has 
contributed to the development of the legal requirements that must be met to prescribe 
provisional measures. 
It is also important to emphasize that the weight of a judicial decision depends on many factors, 
including whether the decision is unanimously adopted, whether the decision is consistent with 
the previous application of law, and whether the decision is clearly formulated.88 This thesis 
gives attention to dissenting and separate opinions to relevant judgments/awards.89 Moreover, 
this thesis considers other outputs of judicial bodies such as advisory opinions: for example, the 
ITLOS’s Advisory Opinion of 2011 dealing with responsibilities and obligations of States 
sponsoring persons and entities with respect to activities in the Area,90 and the ITLOS’s 
Advisory Opinion of 2015 addressing a request submitted by the Sub-regional Fisheries 
Commission.91 
                                                            
82 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, 2008, 7th edition, p. 19. 
83 Bastida et al., op. cit., Part III (A). 
84 See Table of Cases. 
85 Supra notes 57 and 58. 
86 See, for example, Chapter 3. 
87 See, for example, S. Fietta and R. Cleverly, Practitioner's Guide to Maritime Boundary Delimitation, Oxford 
University Press, 2016; A. Oude Elferink et al. (eds), Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Case Law, Is It 
Consistent and Predictable?, Cambridge University Press, 2018. 
88 Busch 2014, op. cit., p. 20. 
89 See Chapter 3 in this regard. 
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(Request for Advisory Opinion submitted to the Seabed Disputes Chamber), Advisory Opinion, 1 February 2011, 
ITLOS Reports 2011, p. 10 (ITLOS’s Advisory Opinion of 2011). 
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Another subsidiary source is “teaching of the most highly qualified publicists”.92 This thesis 
mainly uses relevant legal academic literature for the purpose of argumentation and assistance 
in establishing customary international law.93 
1.4.5 The ILC’s outputs as a source of international law 
Outputs produced by the ILC are usually considered to be a “subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law” pursuant to article 38 (1) (d) of the ICJ’s Statute.94 This section 
considers the validity of this assertion, particularly in light of the status of the Commission 
within the UN system. 
As noted above in this Chapter, an attempt of the ILC to deal with the issue of shared oil and 
gas resources has ended in failure.95 Efforts made by the ILC to establish general rules 
governing other fields of international law, including the law of State responsibility, were more 
successful. This thesis examines a number of final outputs produced by the ILC that have direct 
relevance to the topic, particularly to the second research question identified in Chapter 1.2. For 
example, it takes into account the draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA),96 draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
International Organizations (ARIO)97 and draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm 
from Hazardous Activities (AP).98 This Chapter earlier referred to the ILC’s draft conclusions 
on Identification of Customary International Law.99 
1.4.5.1 The ILC’s mandate 
In 1947, two years after the foundation of the UN, the UNGA adopted a resolution establishing 
the ILC as a permanent subsidiary organ.100  
                                                            
92 ICJ’s Statute, art. 38 (1) (d). 
93 See Bibliography, which includes the literature. 
94 See, for example, I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Oxford University Press, 2003, 6th edition, 
p. 24; D. D. Caron, “The ILC Articles on State Responsibility: the Paradoxical Relationship between Form and 
Authority”, American Journal of International Law, 2002, vol. 96 (4), p. 867; M. Peil, “Scholarly Writings as a 
Source of Law: A Survey of the Use of Doctrine by the International Court of Justice”, Cambridge Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, 2012, vol. 1 (3), pp. 148–149. 
95 Supra note 11. 
96 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Report of the ILC on the Work 
of its Fifty-third Session, UNGAOR, UN Doc. A/56/10, 2001. 
97 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, Report of the ILC on the Work of its Sixty-
third Session, UNGAOR, UN Doc. A/66/10, 2011. 
98 Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, Report of the ILC on the Work 
of its Fifty-third Session, UNGAOR, UN Doc. A/56/10, 2001. 
99 Supra note 61. 




The ILC’s Statute defines its goals as promoting the progressive development and codification 
of international law.101  Formally, the ILC’s Statute considers these goals to be distinct and 
thereby treats them differently. While codification means “the more precise formulation and 
systematization of rules of international law in fields where there already has been extensive 
State practice, precedent and doctrine”, progressive development is defined as “the preparation 
of draft conventions on subjects which have not yet been regulated by international law or in 
regard to which the law has not yet been sufficiently developed in the practice of States”.102  
Furthermore, the ILC’s Statute underscores the distinction between codification and 
progressive development by establishing different procedural rules for performing these tasks.  
Since such a distinction has proven to be elusive in practice, the ILC has proceeded on the basis 
of a consolidated procedure for codification and progressive development.  
Once the work on a particular topic is completed, the ILC submits its developed materials to 
the UNGA with a recommendation on what (if any) future actions concerning the texts should 
be taken.  Article 23 of the ILC’s Statute provides the Commission with four options. The ILC 
may propose to the UNGA to: (a) take no action; (b) take note of or adopt the report by 
resolution; (c) recommend the completed draft to Member States with a view to the conclusion 
of a convention; or (d) convene a diplomatic conference to conclude such a convention. 
Ultimately, the UNGA has the final word on the fate of the Commission’s final documents. 
1.4.5.2 The form of the ILC’s final outputs and their authority 
Throughout its history, the final outputs of the ILC were mainly packaged as ‘draft articles’.103 
Indeed, many sources considered in this thesis take the form of draft articles.104 As alluded to 
earlier, the UNGA makes a decision concerning an outcome of the ILC’s work by taking into 
consideration a recommendation of the ILC. Thus, any further actions in respect of the 
completed draft articles initially depend on the ILC’s recommendation submitted to the UNGA.  
                                                            
101 Statute of the International Law Commission, adopted by UNGA Resolution 174 (II) of 21 November 1947 
and amended by UNGA Resolutions 485 (V) of 12 December 1950, 984 (X) of 3 December 1955, 985 (X) of 3 
December 1955 and 36/39 of 18 November 1981, the current version available at 
http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/texts/instruments/english/statute/statute.pdf&lang=EF (last accessed January 
2019). 
102 Ibid., art. 15. 
103 Although draft articles are typical “products” of the ILC, the Commission has produced a number of ‘draft 
conventions’, ‘draft codes’, ‘draft principles’ and other documents. See J. Katz Cogan, “The Changing Form of 
the International Law Commissions’ Work”, in: R. Virzo and I. Ingravallo (eds), Evolutions in the Law of 
International Organizations, 2015, p. 276. 
104 See Bibliography. Except for the draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm 
Arising out of Hazardous Activities, Report of the ILC on the Work of its Fifty-eighth Session, UNGAOR, UN 





For most of its history, the ILC reported the draft articles to the UNGA with a recommendation 
to elaborate a convention (either by the Assembly or by a conference convened by the UNGA) 
based on them.105 However, over the last 15 years, the ILC’s practice has shifted away from 
‘legislative’ codification of international law in favor of ‘non-binding’ codification.106 The 
current trend of the Commission is, almost without exception, to not recommend that its draft 
articles be transformed into treaties in the near future.107 
Among the draft articles examined in this thesis, only two were recommended by the ILC for 
drafting into a convention.108 In relation to other draft articles, the ILC recommended to the 
UNGA to “take note” of the draft articles in a resolution and to “consider, at a later stage, […] 
the possibility of convening an international conference […] with a view to concluding a 
convention on the topic”.109 Except for the draft Articles on the Law of Non-navigational Uses 
of International Watercourses, no multilateral convention has yet arisen from other draft articles 
and principles.110 The UNGA has repeatedly taken note of the ARSIWA,111 AP and PAL,112 
and ARIO.113 Consequently, this elicits the question of the authority of the draft articles adopted 
by the ILC. 
As noted earlier in this section, draft articles completed by the ILC are traditionally considered 
to be a “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law” in the sense of article 38 (1) 
                                                            
105 Katz Cogan, op. cit., pp. 277-278. 
106 See in detail F. L. Bordin, “Reflections of Customary International Law: the Authority of Codification 
Conventions and ILC Draft Articles in International Law”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2014, 
vol. 63 (3), pp. 538-546; L. R. Helfer and T. Meyer, “Evolution of Codification: A Principal-Agent Theory of the 
International Law Commission’s Influence”, Duke Law Scholl Public Law & Legal Theory Series, No. 2015-16, 
pp. 9-16; Katz Cogan, op. cit. 
107 Katz Cogan, op. cit., p. 283. 
108 There are the draft Articles on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Report of 
the ILC on the Work of its Forty-sixth Session, UNGAOR, UN Doc. A/49/10, 1994, pp. 88-89, para. 219, and the 
AP, supra note 98, para. 94, p. 370. 
109 As regards the ARSIWA, supra note 96, paras. 72-73, p. 42. The same approach was used when the ILC 
completed its projects on the ARIO, supra note 97, para. 85, p. 53, and the draft Articles on the Law of 
Transboundary Aquifers, Report of the ILC on the Work of its Sixtieth Session, UNGAOR, UN Doc. A/63/10, 
2008, para. 49, p. 18. In the latter situation, the ILC additionally recommended “to States concerned to make 
appropriate bilateral or regional arrangements for the proper management of their transboundary aquifers on the 
basis of the principles enunciated in these articles” (ibid., para. 49 (b)). 
110 Watercourses Convention, supra note 53. 
111 Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, UNGA Resolutions: A/Res/56/83 of 12 December 
2001; A/Res/59/35 of 2 December 2004; A/Res/62/61 of 6 December 2007; A/Res/65/19 of 6 December 2010; 
A/Res/68/104 of 18 December 2013; and A/Res/71/133 of 13 December 2016. 
112 Consideration of prevention of transboundary harm from hazardous activities and allocation of loss in the case 
of such harm, UNGA Resolutions: A/Res/56/82 of 12 December 2001; A/Res/61/36 of 4 December 2006; 
A/Res/68/114 of 16 December 2013; and A/Res/71/143 of 13 December 2016. 
113 Responsibility of international organizations, UNGA Resolutions: A/Res/66/100 of 9 December 2011; 
A/Res/69/126 of 10 December 2014; and A/Res/72/122 of 7 December 2017. See also the UNGA Resolutions 
concerning the draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers: for example, UNGA Res. A/Res/68/118 of 




(d) of the ICJ’s Statute.114 At first glance, this characterization seems to be logical. The 
Commission is composed of 34 members elected by the UNGA on account of their recognized 
expertise in the field of international law.115 Hence, the ILC’s draft articles should pertain to 
the “teaching of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations”.116 This affirmation 
may nevertheless be called in question by virtue of the ILC’s legal status. As a UN organ, the 
work of the ILC has more authority than the work of those non-governmental professional 
associations that are also involved in the codification process, such as the International Law 
Association and the Institut de droit international.117 Thus, by this treatment of the ILC’s draft 
articles as scholarly writings, it is important to acknowledge that they thus occupy a higher 
standing within this category of sources of law. 
However, by revisiting the distinction between progressive development of international law 
and its codification,118 it appears that a draft article, which falls under the latter category of 
codification, would amount to an international custom. The difficulty is that the ILC does not 
usually identify which provision falls into which of these categories.119 As mentioned above, 
the Commission is guided in its work by a “composite notion” of progressive development of 
international law and its codification. 
International courts and tribunals have addressed this issue. For example, they have proclaimed 
that many provisions of the ARSIWA reflect customary international law.120 Nevertheless, as 
noted above in this Chapter, international judicial bodies often abstain from undertaking an 
examination of State practice and opinio juris. One possible explanation might be that these 
bodies trust the ILC’s extensive review of State practice and opinio juris.121 However, the ILC’s 
                                                            
114 Supra note 94. 
115 ILC’s Statute, supra note 101, arts. 2 and 3. 
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117 Bordin, op. cit., pp. 558-559. 
118 See Chapter 1.4.5.1 in this regard. 
119 There are some exceptions. For example, in accordance with the commentary to the ARSIWA, draft article 48 
(2) (b) has been incorporated as a measure of progressive development of law, commentary 12 to this draft article. 
120 See, for example, Noble Ventures. Inc. v. Romania, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, 12 October 2005, 
para. 69: “[w]hile [the ARSIWA] are not binding, they are widely regarded as a codification of customary 
international law”; Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. v. the United 
Mexican States, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/04/05, 21 November 2007, para. 116: “[the ARSIWA] 
represent in part the “progressive development” of international law – pursuant to its UN mandate – and represent 
to a large extent a restatement of customary international law regarding secondary principles of state 
responsibility”; ITLOS’s Advisory Opinion of 2011, paras. 169 and 178. See also supra note 58. 
121 S. Villalpando, “On the International Court of Justice and the Determination of Rules of Law”, Leiden Journal 
of International Law, 2013, vol. 26 (2), p. 247. Villalpando noted that “the Court’s finding that [the ILC’s draft 
articles’] provisions reflect customary international law is as brief and categorical as its own autonomous 





task is not limited to the codification of existing rules of customary international law. Talmon 
has noted that in the cases where the ICJ has found a draft article of the ILC to reflect customary 
international law, the Court did not enquire “whether the Commission was actually codifying 
international law or whether it was not perhaps progressively developing international law”.122 
There are also cases where international courts and tribunals referred to the ILC’s draft articles 
without touching upon their customary status.123 Although the usage of the draft articles and 
principles can be criticized, it is worth emphasizing that another credible alternative does not 
exist, particularly in relation to the law of State responsibility. As a result, the draft articles and 
principles produced by the ILC apply as a de facto source of international law to an issue once 
it arises before a court or tribunal. Part III of this thesis looks at a number of the ILC’s draft 
articles and principles that are relevant when examining the second research question outlined 
earlier in this Chapter.124 
1.4.6 State practice concerning shared hydrocarbons 
State practice plays a pivotal role when considering the research questions indicated in Chapter 
1.2. It is important to analyze not only how a treaty obligation or a rule of customary 
international law has been applied and interpreted by international courts and tribunals and 
academic scholars, but also how States behave in practice. State practice can provide 
information on how States conceive the substance of the rules of international law applicable 
to shared hydrocarbons and (shared) State responsibility. As noted above, multi- and bilateral 
treaties between States are the principal form of State practice in the context of shared 
hydrocarbons.125 
Relevant State practice includes maritime boundary delimitation treaties. This research does 
not aim at compiling a complete list of all existing delimitation treaties in the world. The 
delimitation treaties selected for study in this thesis are intended to represent a cross-section of 
many of those treaties currently in force.126 This thesis principally refers to a list of delimitation 
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125 See also Comments and Observations Received from Governments, Shared Natural Resources, Doc. 
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agreements contained in Annex II of the BIICL’s Report on Undelimited Maritime Areas 
because that list is sufficient for the purpose of this study.127 The thesis places special emphasis 
on delimitation agreements that go beyond the mere establishment of a maritime (EEZ and/or 
CS) boundary between the Parties and elaborate on the issue of shared hydrocarbons.128 
Relevant State practice also includes arrangements and agreements that are specifically 
concluded to deal with the topic of shared hydrocarbons. Whereas the succeeding Chapters of 
this thesis, including Appendix I, are based on forms of cooperative arrangements and 
agreements reached by States with respect to shared hydrocarbons (i.e., provisional 
arrangements in undelimited maritime areas, framework and unitization agreements),129 this 
section of Chapter 1 is organized around a number of geographical regions each of which is 
covered by different forms of such arrangements and/or agreements.130 This is done for two 
main reasons. First, the systematization of arrangements and agreements concerning shared 
hydrocarbons according to their forms does not provide information about the relevant region 
as a whole that can help, inter alia, to identify regional customs131 or establish more general 
patterns existing in this region. Second, the following Chapters will directly rely on the 
introduction to the relevant arrangements and agreements given in this section without 
describing them and their origin in detail. 
1.4.6.1 The North Sea 
The delimitation agreement between the United Kingdom (UK) and Norway concluded in 1965 
is the first agreement to include a special provision on transboundary mineral resources.132 
Based on this provision, the UK and Norway arrived at a number of unitization agreements133 
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128 See Chapter 4. 
129 See in particular Chapters 3 and 6, and Chapters 4 and 7. 
130 See also Chapter 1.3. 
131 Customs may be general (general customs are binding upon the international community as a whole) or 
regional/local (these customs apply to a group of States or two States). See, for example, V. Lowe, International 
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dealing with a number of transboundary hydrocarbon reservoirs including Frigg,134 Statfjord135 
and Murchison.136 In addition to these reservoirs, the Boa, Playfair, Enoch, Blane and Flyndre 
fields have been found to straddle the delimitation line between Norway and the UK.137 
In 2005, the UK and Norway signed a framework agreement addressing the issue of cross-
border hydrocarbon cooperation (UK-Norway Framework Agreement).138 The UK-Norway 
Framework Agreement is the first in a series of similar agreements that adopted the ‘framework’ 
approach.139 It allowed the discovered straddling hydrocarbon resources to be tied to existing 
infrastructure on either side of the UK-Norway delimitation line.140 The UK-Norway 
Framework Agreement has been supplemented with a set of joint Guidelines for Development 
of Transboundary Oil and Gas Fields (UK-Norway Guidelines).141 It is important to note that 
the UK-Norway Framework Agreement does not only apply to transboundary petroleum 
                                                            
134 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the Kingdom of Norway relating to the exploitation of the Frigg Field Reservoir and the 
transmission of gas therefrom to the United Kingdom, London, 10 May 1976, EIF: 22 July 1977, 1098 UNTS 3. 
The Agreement was amended by the Agreement of 25 August 1998 concluded in Stavanger, EIF: 30 June 2000, 
2210 UNTS 94, and the Exchange of Notes of 21 June 2001, Oslo, EIF: 21 June 2001, UK Treaty Series No. 43 
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135 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the Kingdom of Norway relating to the exploitation of the Statfjord Field Reservoirs and the offtake 
of petroleum therefrom, Oslo, 16 October 1979, EIF: 30 January 1981, 1254 UNTS 379. The Agreement was 
amended by the Exchange of Notes of 24 March 1995, Oslo, EIF: 24 March 1995, 1914 UNTS 509. The Statfjord 
field is still producing. 
136 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the Kingdom of Norway relating to the exploitation of the Murchison Field Reservoir and the 
offtake of petroleum therefrom, Oslo, 16 October 1979, EIF: 30 January 1981, 1249 UNTS 173. The Murchison 
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137 Exchange of notes, Oslo, 30 September 2004 and 4 October 2004, 2309 UNTS 217 (as regards the Boa and 
Playfair fields). See also a detailed map of Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) over the fields, available at 
http://factpages.npd.no/FactPages/default.aspx?nav1=field&nav2=PageView%7cAll&nav3=43658 (last accessed 
January 2019). 
138 Framework Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway concerning Cross-Boundary Petroleum Co-operation, Oslo, 4 
April 2005, EIF: 10 July 2007, 2491 UNTS 3. The UK-Norway Framework Agreement’s origins lie in a joint 
industry-government report entitled “Unlocking Value through Closer Relationships” and prepared by Pilot and 
Kon-Kraft groups (the UK-Norway Report), August 2002, available at 
https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/kilde/oed/rap/2002/0005/ddd/pdfv/159318-report_uk-
norway_workgroup_-final.pdf (last accessed January 2019). See UK-Norway Framework Agreement, Preamble, 
para. 7. 
139 See also Chapters 4 and 7. 
140 Unlike the Enoch, Blane and Flyndre fields (which were tied to existing infrastructure), the Governments of 
the UK and Norway agreed that the Boa field falls entirely within Norwegian jurisdiction and the Playfair field 
entirely within UK jurisdiction. See Cameron 2017, op. cit., p. 257. 
141 Guidelines for Development of Transboundary Oil and Gas Fields, 2010, available at 




deposits. This Framework Agreement also applies to oil and gas resources located within a “co-
operation corridor” 60 km either side of the UK-Norway delimitation line (Illustration No. 1).142 
The UK-Norway exemplar was adopted by the UK and the Netherlands with respect to the 
Markham gas field.143 In 1992, the UK and the Netherlands concluded an agreement concerning 
that transboundary field (Markham UA).144 The Markham field’s production ceased in 2016 
and decommissioning of some facilities has started.145 
1.4.6.2 The Norwegian Sea 
In 1981, following a Conciliation Commission’s Report,146 Norway and Iceland concluded a 
delimitation agreement (Norway-Iceland Agreement of 1981) according to which a joint 
development zone (JDZ) of approximately 45,470 km2 was created.147 The JDZ is located on 
both the Norwegian and the Icelandic side of the delimitation line (Illustration No. 2).148 In 
2008, the two States signed an agreement on transboundary hydrocarbon deposits (Norway-
Iceland Agreement of 2008).149 The latter agreement aims at elaborating on article 8 of the 
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143 See the map available at 
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Ireland relating to the exploitation of the Markham Field reservoirs and the offtake of petroleum therefrom, The 
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detailed video is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=173&v=gC6ojNiberY (last 
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Iceland Conciliation Commission), 37 UNRIAA, pp. 1-34, available at http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXVII/1-
34.pdf (last accessed January 2019). There is also Agreement between Norway and Iceland on Fishery and 
Continental Shelf Questions, Reykjavik, 28 May 1980, EIF: 13 June 1980, 2124 UNTS 223. 
147 Agreement between Norway and Iceland on the continental shelf between Iceland and Jan Mayen, Oslo, 22 
October 1981, EIF: 2 June 1982, 2124 UNTS 262, art. 2; Report of the Norway-Iceland Conciliation Commission, 
op. cit., section VII (1) and (2). See also Agreed Minutes concerning the right of participation pursuant to Articles 
5 and 6 of the Agreement of 22 October 1981 between Norway and Iceland on the continental shelf between 
Iceland and Jan Mayen, Reykjavik, 03 November 2008, EIF: 03 November 2008, 2959 UNTS, registration number 
37026. 
148 Report of the Norway-Iceland Conciliation Commission states that 72 % of the JDZ lies on the Norwegian side 
and 27 % on the Icelandic side of the delimitation line, op. cit., section VII (2). In the literature the proportion 
61%:39% has been provided, see, for example, C. Schofield, “Defining areas for joint development in disputed 
areas”, in: W. Shicun and N. Hong (eds), Recent Development in the South China Sea Dispute: The Prospect of a 
Joint Development Regime, Routledge, 2014, p. 81. 
149 Agreement between Norway and Iceland concerning transboundary hydrocarbon deposits, Reykjavik, 03 




Norway-Iceland Agreement of 1981 and applies to a hydrocarbon deposit that straddles: (a) the 
common EEZ/(outer) CS boundary; (b) the JDZ and the Icelandic shelf beyond the JDZ; and 
(c) the JDZ and the Norwegian shelf beyond the JDZ. The Norway-Iceland Agreement of 2008 
addresses these scenarios first by developing the rules for (a) and then stipulating that these 
rules apply mutatis mutandis to the (b) and (c).150 
While Iceland has already issued a number of exploration and production licenses in its part of 
the JDZ (known as the Dreki/Dragon Area),151 Norway is in the process of opening the 
Norwegian part of the JDZ.152 
1.4.6.3 The Barents Sea 
In 2010, Norway and Russia signed a delimitation treaty in the Barents Sea (Norway-Russia 
Treaty),153 which ended a 40-year dispute related to the specific coordinates of any such 
delimitation line and lifted the moratorium on exploration and exploitation of the CS. Although 
this Treaty is mainly aimed at establishing a maritime boundary between the two States, it also 
addresses the issue of straddling hydrocarbon resources.154 To date, no such resources have 
been discovered in the Barents Sea. However, there is a high probability that hydrocarbon 
deposits may straddle the established maritime boundary (Illustration No. 3).155 
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1.4.6.4 The Caribbean Sea 
In 2007, Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) and Venezuela entered into a framework treaty dealing 
with the issue of transboundary hydrocarbon deposits (Venezuela-T&T Framework Treaty).156 
Subsequently, they concluded a unitization agreement concerning the Loran-Manatee 
transboundary reservoir (Loran-Manatee UA).157 Besides the Loran-Manatee reservoir, there 
are also the Kapok-Dorado and Manakin-Cocuina fields that extend across the delimitation line 
(Illustration No. 4). In February 2015, a unitization agreement concerning the Manakin-
Cocuina field was signed.158 Text of this agreement is not publicly available. There is no 
information as to whether Venezuela and T&T have been able to reach a unitization agreement 
with respect to the Kapok-Dorado field. The only information is that the two States have 
authorized studies, which are being conducted by the Kapok-Dorado Joint Reservoir Technical 
Working Group.159 As of the end of 2018, production from the cross-border hydrocarbon 
reservoirs has not yet commenced.160   
The delimitation treaty between Jamaica and Colombia (Colombia-Jamaica Treaty)161 is worth 
mentioning briefly. Apart from establishing a Joint Regime Area (JRA) where the Parties were 
unable to agree on delimitation, this Treaty also drew a delimitation line (Illustration No. 5).162 
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Another treaty concluded in the Caribbean Sea is a treaty between Barbados and Guyana 
(Barbados-Guyana Treaty).163 This treaty created a cooperation zone in an area of overlap 
between the EEZs of the Parties (Illustration No. 6).164 
1.4.6.5 The Gulf of Mexico 
The US and Mexico signed a number of treaties establishing the maritime boundaries between 
them.165 There are two “gaps” of the CS beyond 200 nm: a “western gap” and an “eastern gap” 
(Illustration No. 7). In 2000, the US and Mexico concluded a treaty delimiting the extended CS 
in the western gap.166 This treaty recognized the possible existence of transboundary 
hydrocarbon reservoirs and established a 2.8 nm area (1.4 nm on each side of the boundary line) 
within which neither drilling nor exploitation had to be conducted during a period of 10 years.167 
The Parties had also committed themselves to seek to reach an agreement for the efficient and 
equitable exploitation of such transboundary reservoirs.168 In 2012, the US and Mexico adopted 
a legal framework dealing with transboundary hydrocarbon reservoirs (US-Mexico 
Agreement).169 It is important to note that the US-Mexico Agreement applies not only to 
hydrocarbon fields straddling the delimitation line in the western gap, but also to hydrocarbon 
deposits which extend across the maritime boundaries outside this gap, including the future 
boundary in the eastern gap.170 To date, no hydrocarbon reservoirs are determined to be 
transboundary in the terms of the US-Mexico Agreement.171  
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1.4.6.6 The North-west Atlantic 
Saint Pierre and Miquelon are two small French islands situated at a short distance from the 
south coast of Canada’s province of Newfoundland and Labrador. Being unable to delimit the 
EEZ, Canada and France agreed to submit this dispute to an ad hoc Arbitral Tribunal, which 
delivered its decision in 1992.172 The Tribunal established the permanent boundary between 
Canada and France for all purposes.173 Canada approached France in 1998 to suggest that the 
two countries enter into an agreement to manage possible transboundary hydrocarbon fields.174 
In 2005, Canada and France concluded an agreement governing the exploration and exploitation 
of transboundary hydrocarbon resources (Canada-France Agreement).175 According to article 
21, the Canada-France Agreement enters into force following notification that “all necessary 
internal requirements have been fulfilled”. While France has already ratified the Canada-France 
Agreement, Canada still has to complete its domestic requirements.176 However, it is evident 
that Canada puts licensees on notice of the terms of this Agreement.177 
The Canada-France Agreement deals with the likelihood of discovering hydrocarbon deposits 
straddling the maritime boundary between Canada and France.178 This maritime boundary 
represents the lines established by the Agreement between Canada and France on their Mutual 
Fishing Relations179 and the Tribunal’s Award of 1992180 and has the shape of a “key” or a 
“baguette” (Illustration No. 8).181 
It is worth noting that since the conclusion of the Canada-France Agreement, the two Parties 
have filed overlapping extended CS claims with the CLCS under article 76 (8) of the 
UNCLOS.182 
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1.4.6.7 The Timor Sea 
In December 1975, Indonesia occupied Timor-Leste.183 While Timor-Leste was under 
Indonesian control, in 1989, Australia entered into a treaty with Indonesia (Timor Gap 
Treaty).184 
Following the UN-sponsored referendum, on 20 May 2002, Timor-Leste (re)gained its 
independence.185 On the same day, Timor-Leste and Australia signed a treaty in the Timor Sea 
(Timor Sea Treaty or TST),186 which replaced the Timor Gap Treaty, and a Memorandum of 
Understanding concerning an International Unitization Agreement for the Greater Sunrise 
field.187 The TST established a Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA) to enable petroleum 
activities in a part of the Timor Sea where maritime claims of Australia and Timor-Leste 
overlapped(Illustration No. 9),188 in conjunction with a three-tiered administrative structure to 
govern this area.189 At the conclusion of the TST, the Parties were aware of the existence of 
two petroleum fields (the Sunrise and Troubadour gas fields, collectively known as ‘Greater 
Sunrise’) extending across the eastern boundary of the JPDA (Illustration No. 9).190 In 2003, 
Timor-Leste and Australia signed a unitization agreement concerning these straddling fields 
(Greater Sunrise UA).191 It is important to note that as of the end of 2018, the Greater Sunrise 
fields have not yet been developed. 
In 2006, Timor-Leste and Australia concluded a treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in 
the Timor Sea (CMATS Treaty) which, inter alia, divided revenues from the production of oil 
and gas deposits equally between the Parties (instead of the 90:10 basis (in favor of Timor-
Leste) under the TST) and imposed a 50-year moratorium on maritime boundary negotiations 
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or claims.192 Several years after the conclusion of the CMATS Treaty, Timor-Leste received 
information that Australia had interfered in the negotiation process.193 On that basis, Timor-
Leste notified Australia that it considers the CMATS Treaty to be null and void, and therefore 
the TST continues to operate unamended by the CMATS Treaty.194 Since Australia rejected the 
view of Timor-Leste, in 2013, the latter instituted arbitral proceedings against the former at the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), under paragraph (b) of Annex B to article 23 of the 
TST, seeking a declaration that the TST had not been modified by the CMATS Treaty.195 The 
second arbitration filed by Timor-Leste in September 2015 challenged Australia’s taxation 
rights over a subsea pipeline.196 
On 11 April 2016, Timor-Leste separately requested UNCLOS compulsory conciliation in 
relation to its maritime boundary with Australia.197 
In January 2017, Timor-Leste, Australia and the Conciliation Commission issued two joint 
statements.198 According to these statements, the Parties agreed on a series of actions in order 
to “facilitate the conciliation process and create the conditions conducive to the achievement of 
an agreement on permanent maritime boundaries in the Timor Sea”.199 As part of the actions, 
on 10 January 2017, Timor-Leste formally notified Australia of the termination of the CMATS 
Treaty. Consequently, the CMATS Treaty ceased on 10 April 2017 pursuant to its terms.200 The 
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statements also disclosed Timor-Leste’s decision to withdraw the two arbitrations initiated 
against Australia under the TST.201 As regards the TST, Timor-Leste and Australia agreed to 
retain it and its supporting regulatory framework in force until a final delimitation has come 
into effect.202 The States also confirmed their commitments to negotiating permanent maritime 
boundaries. 
The work of the Conciliation Commission resulted in the adoption of a maritime boundaries 
treaty between Australia and Timor-Leste in the Timor Sea (Timor Sea Boundary Treaty) in 
March 2018.203 This treaty established both an EEZ boundary and a CS boundary (Illustrations 
No. 10 and 11).204 The Timor Sea Boundary Treaty provides that the TST and the Greater 
Sunrise UA will terminate once it enters into force.205 It is interesting to note that the established 
CS boundary runs only through the Sunrise field (and not through the Troubadour field, per the 
JPDA’s former boundary).206 Nevertheless, a special regime created by the Boundary Treaty 
applies to both fields within a maritime area equal to the outline of the Greater Sunrise Unit 
Area established under the Greater Sunrise UA (called as “Greater Sunrise Special Regime 
Area”).207 
Pending the Timor Sea Boundary Treaty entering into force, the Parties have agreed that the 
TST and its regulatory framework continue to apply. It is also important to recall article 22 of 
the TST, which states that ongoing petroleum activities “shall continue even if the Treaty is no 
longer in force under conditions equivalent to those in place under the Treaty”.208 This provision 
is relevant in the context of the ongoing operations with respect to the Bayu-Undan gas field 
(currently located in the CS of Timor-Leste, but in the former JPDA). 
                                                            
201 On 20 March 2017, the PCA issued an order that terminated the arbitral proceedings under the Timor Sea 
Treaty. See the PCA’s termination order, 20 March 2017, available at https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2110 
(last accessed January 2019). 
202 Apart from that, the TST also provides that it may apply for 30 years from the date of its entry into force, 
namely until 2033. 
203 Treaty between Australia and the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste Establishing Their Maritime Boundaries 
in the Timor Sea, New York, 6 March 2018, EIF: not in force, available at http://dfat.gov.au/geo/timor-
leste/Documents/treaty-maritime-arrangements-australia-timor-leste.pdf (last accessed January 2019). In 
accordance with article 13 of this Treaty, the Treaty enters into force when Australia and Timor-Leste notify each 
other “in writing through diplomatic channels that their respective requirements for entry into force of this Treaty 
have been fulfilled”. See also Joint media release of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Resources 
and Northern Australia, “Bill introduced to implement Treaty with Timor-Leste”, 28 November 2018, available at 
https://www.minister.industry.gov.au/ministers/canavan/media-releases/bill-introduced-implement-treaty-timor-
leste (last accessed January 2019). 
204 Timor Sea Boundary Treaty, arts. 2- 4. 
205 Ibid., art. 9. 
206 Ibid., Annex C. 
207 Ibid., art. 7 and Annexes B and C. 




The entering into force of the Timor Sea Boundary Treaty will change the apportionment of 
hydrocarbons produced from the Greater Sunrise Special Regime Area and the regulatory and 
institutional landscapes in the Timor Sea. These issues are further discussed in Chapter 6 of this 
thesis. Although the TST will soon no longer be in force, it is a good example of the cooperative 
management of commercially exploitable hydrocarbon resources in an undelimited maritime 
area. As shown further in Chapter 6, Mauritius and the Seychelles have established the similar 
model of cooperation in an area of overlapping maritime claims.209 
1.4.6.8 The East China Sea 
In 1974, Japan and the Republic of Korea reached an agreement on the joint exploration and 
development of petroleum resources in a maritime area of their overlapping claims (Japan-S. 
Korea Agreement).210 In this area, the two States established a Joint Development Zone (JDZ) 
(Illustration No. 12).211 According to article XXXI (2), the Japan-S. Korea Agreement shall 
remain in force for a period of 50 years (i.e., until 2028) and shall continue to apply thereafter 
until it is terminated. Either Party may, by giving 3-year written notice to the other Party, 
terminate that Agreement at the end of the 50-year period or at any time thereafter.212 The only 
possibility of terminating the Japan-S. Korea Agreement before the end of the 50-year period 
is the acknowledgment by both Parties that the “natural resources [of the JDZ] are no longer 
economically exploitable”.213 To date, there is no information that Japan or S. Korea have 
expressed their desire to terminate the Agreement between them. It is however noteworthy that 
there is little commercial production in the JDZ due to the very poor petroleum potential.214 
Schofield and Townsend-Gault have noted that “the fact that China also claims part of the [JDZ] 
might well have proved to be a significant complication had seabed resources actually been 
discovered”.215 
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In June 2008, Japan signed an arrangement with another neighbor, China (China titles this 
arrangement as “principled consensus”, while Japan “joint press statement”).216 Japan and 
China established a small zone adjacent to the JDZ between Japan and S. Korea (Illustration 
No. 13) and committed themselves to continue negotiations further towards implementing the 
arrangement.217 Currently, there is little progress in this respect and no sufficient material is 
available for analysis. 
1.4.6.9 The Gulf of Thailand 
Several States bordering the Gulf of Thailand have reached arrangements in disputed maritime 
areas. These arrangements are Memoranda of Understanding between Thailand and Malaysia, 
including a subsequent agreement between them,218 between Malaysia and Vietnam,219 and 
between Thailand and Cambodia (Illustrations No. 14-17).220 They are considered in Chapter 6 
of this thesis. 
It is important to note that a relatively small area within the Joint Development Area established 
by Malaysia and Thailand is also claimed by Vietnam. Under Article 2 of the delimitation 
agreement between Thailand and Vietnam of 1997, the Parties are required to enter into 
negotiation with Malaysia in order to settle this tripartite overlapping continental claim area 
(TOCCA).221 Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam are currently in negotiation on the cooperative 
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management of the TOCCA.222 No arrangement providing, for example, for trilateral joint 
development is not yet reached. Pending a solution regarding the TOCCA, no activity is 
conducted in this area. 
1.4.6.10 The Gulf of Guinea 
In an area of overlapping claims to the EEZ, Nigeria and São Tomé and Príncipe (STP) signed 
a 45-year treaty on the joint exploration and exploitation of petroleum and other non-petroleum 
resources (Nigeria-STP Treaty).223 This Treaty established a Joint Development Zone (JDZ) 
and a two-tiered administrative structure (Illustrations No. 18 and 19).224 The legal regime of 
the JDZ comprises a number of instruments such as the mentioned Treaty between the two 
countries, tax and petroleum regulations,225 environmental regulations and production sharing 
contracts (PSCs).226 The JDZ is currently divided into nine blocks, with a total area of 8 429 
km2, of which six blocks are already allocated to petroleum companies.227 
Both Nigeria and STP are members of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI).228 The Second EITI Report concerning STP published in 2015229 shows that there are a 
number of PSCs concluded between the Authority and different companies with respect to the 
blocks.230 Usually a PSC in the JDZ has a term of 28 years, including 8 years of exploration 
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and 20 years of development and production.231 However, as underlined in the Second EITI 
Report, there is no available information on the status of petroleum activities conducted in these 
blocks or results achieved. Moreover, the full texts of the existing PSCs are not publicly 
accessible.232 
The Report also discloses that several petroleum companies have withdrawn from the JDZ 
because their findings were not in sufficient quantities to enable commercial production.233 
Nigeria and STP would appear to commit significant resource to making the JDZ attractive for 
carrying out petroleum activities.234 With no production in the JDZ, the main sources of revenue 
constitute, inter alia, signature bonuses, different fees and sales of seismic data. Since the 
establishment of the JDZ, 43% of all revenue earned from that zone has been spent on the 
operating costs of the Authority managing this zone.235 
In 2000, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea concluded a delimitation treaty, which created a “cut-
out” in the boundary line in order to leave a well related to a cross-border hydrocarbon field 
(Ekanga-Zafiro field) on the Nigerian side (Illustration No. 20).236 After the conclusion of this 
delimitation treaty, the States reached a protocol establishing the unitization principles for the 
Ekanga-Zafiro field (Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea Unitization Protocol).237 Subsequent 
commercial agreements between Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea are not publicly available. 
Angola (Cabinda Province) and the Republic of the Congo (Congo) also signed a unitization 
protocol (Angola-Congo Unitization Protocol) with respect to hydrocarbon fields straddling the 
blocks issued by Angola and Congo (mainly, in respect of the Lianzi oil field, see Illustration 
No. 21).238 Although that Protocol refers to the term ‘unitization’, there is no maritime boundary 
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and A-IMI, Luanda, 10 September 2001, EIF: Angola ratified on 21 May 2002, there is no record of the Republic 
of the Congo's ratification, reproduced in D.C. Smith and C. Dolan, “Angola-Republic of Congo”, Report No. 4-




established between the States.239 Angola and Congo entered into three additional agreements 
implementing the Unitization Protocol. However, these agreements are not publicly 
available.240 
Angola (Cabinda Province) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have not 
delimited their maritime boundaries. Instead, these States concluded an agreement (Angola-
DRC Agreement) and created a Common Interest Zone (Illustration No. 22).241 
1.4.6.11 The Indian Ocean 
In 2008, Mauritius and the Seychelles made a joint submission to the CLCS in respect of the 
Mascarene Plateau region, an area beyond 200 nm from the baselines from which the breadth 
of the territorial sea of the two states is measured.242 In 2011, the Commission adopted its 
recommendations confirming the maritime entitlements of both States to this area of the 
extended CS.243 In 2012, Mauritius and the Seychelles signed two treaties applicable to the 
shared extended CS (Illustration No. 23). The first treaty confirmed the intention of the two 
countries to exercise their sovereign rights to explore and exploit jointly.244 The second treaty 
(Seychelles-Mauritius Treaty)245 established a joint management area covering the shared 
extended CS.246 These two treaties are the world’s first dealing with the cooperative 
management of an area of overlapping claims to the CS beyond 200 nm. It is likely that other 
neighboring States with an undelimited extended CS will use the interim arrangements in the 
Indian Ocean as a model.247 
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242 See http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_musc.htm (last accessed January 
2019). 
243 Ibid. 
244 Treaty concerning the Joint Exercise of Sovereign Rights over the Continental Shelf in the Mascarene Plateau 
Region between the Government of the Republic of Mauritius and the Government of the Republic of Seychelles, 
Vacoas, 13 March 2012, EIF: 18 June 2012, Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 79, 2013, pp. 26-40. 
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1.4.6.12 The Mediterranean Sea and the Bay of Biscay 
In May 2006, Cyprus and Egypt signed a Framework Agreement concerning cross-border 
hydrocarbon resources (Cyprus-Egypt Framework Agreement).248 Cyprus is currently in 
negotiations in the context of concluding similar agreements with Israel and Lebanon.249 As of 
now, there is uncertainty related to the existence of transboundary hydrocarbon deposits. For 
example, Israel argues that the Aphrodite gas field discovered on the Cypriot CS extends into 
its CS,250 whereas Cyprus claims part of the Zohr gas field found on the Egyptian CS 
(Illustration No. 24).251 
In 1974, France and Spain signed two Conventions in the Bay of Biscay. The first Convention 
delimited the territorial sea and the contiguous zone between the Parties.252 The second 
Convention delimited the CS and established a joint zone straddling the CS boundary 
(Illustration No. 29).253 
1.4.6.13 The Persian Gulf and the Red Sea 
Saudi Arabia has concluded several agreements with its neighbors. In 1958, Saudi Arabia and 
Bahrain concluded an agreement (Saudi Arabia-Bahrain Agreement) delimiting the CS between 
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Cyprus mail, 15 September 2015, available at http://cyprus-mail.com/2015/09/15/in-next-days-cyprus-will-know-
if-gas-reserve-discovered-in-egypt-extends-into-islands-eez/#disqus_thread (last accessed January 2019). Eni 
SPA’s website contains no information that the Zohr gas field is transboundary 
(https://www.eni.com/enipedia/en_IT/international-presence/africa/enis-activities-in-egypt.page).  
252 Convention between the Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Spanish States on the 
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these States and establishing a maritime area called “Fasht bu Saafa Hexagon” (Hexagon) 
where the Parties agreed to share the revenues received from the exploitation of petroleum 
resources in this area equally (Illustration No. 25).254 An interesting feature of the Saudi Arabia-
Bahrain Agreement is that the Hexagon lies only on the Saudi Arabian side of the CS 
boundary.255 In 1965, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait reached an agreement (Saudi Arabia-Kuwait 
Agreement of 1965) creating an onshore and offshore neutral zone,256 and a supplementary 
agreement in 2000 (Illustration No. 26).257 
In the Red Sea, Saudi Arabia and Sudan have established a Common Zone in an undelimited 
maritime area (Illustration No. 27).258 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is divided into four parts. 
Part I consists of this Chapter and sets the stage for the further discussions. 
Part II includes three Chapters and deals with the first research question, which aims at 
considering the rules of public international law governing the rights and obligations of States 
with respect to shared hydrocarbon resources. Chapter 2 defines the term ‘shared hydrocarbon 
resources’ and provides for the general principles applicable to that category of shared natural 
resources. Subsequently, Part II provides more detailed information on each type of shared 
hydrocarbon resource. While Chapter 3 focuses on hydrocarbon resources located in areas of 
overlapping maritime claims, Chapter 4 looks at hydrocarbon resources that extend across 
maritime boundaries between neighboring coastal States. 
Part III includes three Chapters and addresses the second research question concerning the issue 
of shared State responsibility for (potential) environmental harm. After an analysis of the 
current state of the law on (shared) State responsibility given in Chapter 5, the following 
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Chapters of Part III examine the question of whether shared State responsibility might arise in 
the context of shared hydrocarbons: Chapter 6 explores shared State responsibility in the 
situation of sharing of hydrocarbons located in undelimited maritime areas, whereas Chapter 7 
deals with the situation of sharing of hydrocarbons transected by a maritime boundary. 
Part IV consists of one Chapter (Chapter 8) and summarizes the main findings of the thesis. 
This thesis includes two appendices. Appendix I contains a list of arrangements and agreements 
that deal with the issue of shared hydrocarbons.259 Appendix II includes illustrations relevant 
for the arrangements and agreements discussed in this research. 
  
                                                            







































This Part of the thesis consists of three Chapters and addresses the first research question 
identified in Chapter 1.2 dealing with the rights and obligations of States that share an offshore 
hydrocarbon deposit. In other words, Part II aims to examine general rules of international law 
governing the rights and obligations of States before they establish some form of cooperative 
management of a shared hydrocarbon deposit. At the same time, an analysis of cooperative 
arrangements and agreements regarding shared hydrocarbons may significantly assist in 
determining the existence and/or clarifying the content of those general rules. Part II also 
explores the features of the general rules applicable to shared hydrocarbons that are inherent in 









CHAPTER 2. THE BASIC PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE 
TO SHARED HYDROCARBONS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This Chapter identifies two categories of offshore oil and gas resources that are captured by the 
notion of shared hydrocarbons. The first category is hydrocarbon deposits situated in areas of 
overlapping maritime claims. The second category is hydrocarbon deposits transected by a 
maritime boundary agreed by neighboring States or determined by a court or tribunal. This 
Chapter examines the basic principles applicable to shared hydrocarbons, in particular those 
principles that stem from the characterization of the two categories of shared hydrocarbons as 
shared natural resources. The concept of shared natural resources entails certain rights and 
obligations of States. Those rights and obligations include, above all, a duty to cooperate in the 
management of shared natural resources (Chapter 2.4), a right to an equitable (and reasonable) 
share (Chapter 2.5) and a duty to prevent harm (Chapter 2.6). 
At the same time, the content of those rights and obligations may vary depending on what type 
of shared natural resource is the subject of inquiry. This Chapter looks at the extent to which 
characteristics of shared hydrocarbons affect the application of the general principles (in 
comparison with some other types of shared natural resources). The principle of sovereign 
rights over the CS and its natural resources is a core part of the law relating to shared 
hydrocarbons. Chapter 2.3 considers this principle. It is important to note that this thesis 
principally focuses on the EEZ and CS legal regimes because the probability of discovering 
shared offshore hydrocarbon resources under these regimes is higher than, for example, under 
the territorial sea regime.260 
This Chapter does not cover in detail other more general principles of international law such as 
the principle of good faith, the principle of good neighborliness and the principle to settle 
disputes peacefully. Nevertheless, these principles are also relevant in the context of shared 
hydrocarbons. For example, coastal States are required to make their maritime claims to an area 
of the EEZ/CS in good faith261 and in the event that their claims overlap, they are under an 
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obligation to negotiate a maritime boundary (and/or a provisional arrangement) in good faith.262 
The no-harm duty may be considered a specific application of the principle of good 
neighborliness.263 In other words, the rights and obligations of States examined in this thesis 
are based on a number of fundamental principles of general international law. 
2.2 The meaning of the terms ‘shared hydrocarbon resources’ and 
‘shared natural resources’ 
This thesis employs the term ‘shared hydrocarbon resources’ and furthermore argues that 
specific rights and obligations of States flow from the characterization of hydrocarbon resources 
as shared natural resources. Therefore, it is important to indicate what hydrocarbon resources 
can be regarded as ‘shared’. 
As regards the notion of hydrocarbon resources, this term covers chemical compounds with 
molecular chains composed of hydrogen and carbon atoms.264 Crude oil, natural gas and natural 
gas liquids contain hydrocarbon molecules in different proportions.265 The word ‘petroleum’ is 
also used in relation to hydrocarbon resources. Although in its literal sense this word refers only 
to crude oil, it is generally accepted that petroleum resources also include natural gas.266 Thus, 
in this thesis, the term ‘hydrocarbon/petroleum resources’ means oil and gas resources, 
regardless of form (solid, liquid or gaseous), including any mixture thereof, naturally occurring 
beneath the seabed. Many arrangements and agreements dealing with shared hydrocarbons, 
which are considered later in this thesis, include such a definition.267 It is worth noting that the 
thesis uses the words ‘resource’, ‘deposit’, ‘reservoir’, ‘field’, ‘pool’, ‘accumulation’ and 
‘reserve’ interchangeably. 
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The definition of the term ‘natural resources’ is contextual.268 This thesis refers to the definition 
of natural resources contained in article 2 (4) of the CCS and article 77 (4) of the UNCLOS.269 
These articles define natural resources of the CS as “mineral and other non-living resources of 
the sea-bed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species […]”. It 
logically follows that accumulations of hydrocarbons are natural resources in the context of the 
law of the sea. 
The key issue here is whether hydrocarbon resources under the two scenarios identified above 
(namely, those that are located in undelimited and delimited maritime areas) can be categorized 
as ‘shared natural resources’, with the particular legal implications thereof. 
No significant attempt has been made to define the concept of shared natural resources in a 
legal instrument and to identify natural resources that fall under this concept. Although the term 
‘shared natural resources’ is included in some UNGA Resolutions, there is no legal definition 
provided in the main body of these documents.270 It is only in the course of the preparatory 
work of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) on draft Principles of Conduct in 
the Field of the Environment (UNEP draft Principles) that two approaches to the concept of 
shared natural resources have been indicated.271 According to the stricto sensu approach, the 
notion ‘shared natural resources’ is used for natural resources which are situated in the territory 
of two or more States. Examples of these shared natural resources would be freshwater 
resources, fish stocks, atmospheric resources, forests and mountain chains.272 A second 
approach to the concept of shared natural resources includes natural resources shared by all 
States, the so-called international (global) commons. Natural resources of the sea and the seabed 
beyond national jurisdiction would offer an illustration of the latter category of shared natural 
resources. 
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More recently, the topic of shared natural resources was included in the program of the ILC’s 
work.273 Initially, the Commission considered the ‘shared natural resources’ phenomenon with 
reference to international watercourses.274 Subsequently, the ILC turned to the issues of 
transboundary groundwaters and oil and gas resources within the topic of shared natural 
resources.275 
Although the ILC eventually discontinued its codification work on petroleum resources,276 its 
deliberations shed some light on the question of what oil and gas resources fall under the 
category of shared natural resources. At first glance, it seems that the Commission referred 
solely to hydrocarbon resources straddling an already established maritime boundary. This 
conclusion follows from the fact that the ILC repeatedly used the phrase “transboundary oil and 
gas resources” in a number of documents, including the questionnaire on State practice 
circulated to Governments.277 At the same time, when replying to the ILC’s questions 
concerning transboundary hydrocarbons, some States included arrangements on hydrocarbon 
deposits situated in undelimited maritime areas (e.g., Australia, Jamaica and Thailand).278 In 
other words, one can assume that the Commission’s intention was to encompass the two types 
of petroleum resources under the ‘shared natural resources’ framework.279 
This thesis categorizes offshore oil and gas resources found in undelimited maritime areas, as 
well as straddling hydrocarbons, as shared natural resources. For example, the Conciliation 
Commission between Timor-Leste and Australia characterized the Greater Sunrise fields 
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straddling the maritime boundary between these States as a “shared resource”.280 As regards 
hydrocarbons situated in areas of overlapping maritime claims, they are also shared resources. 
For different reasons, States may have (or may mistakenly believe that they have281) a legal 
basis to claim sovereign rights over the same maritime area. Logically, while such an area is 
contested between States, these States share equally valid sovereign rights to explore this area 
and exploit its natural resources.282 
The situation of resource sharing is also related to the fact that some actions taken by one State 
may have adverse effects on the other State (e.g., migration of hydrocarbons).283 
Thus, the term ‘shared hydrocarbon resources’ used throughout this thesis covers two types of 
oil and gas fields: those that are found to lie across the delimitation line between neighboring 
States (interchangeably referred to as ‘transboundary’, ‘cross-border’, ‘cross-boundary’ and 
‘straddling’ resources) and those that are located in areas of overlapping maritime claims (called 
‘disputed’ resources). Both these types constitute shared natural resources.  
2.3 The principle of sovereign rights over shared hydrocarbons 
Article 2 of the CCS and article 77 of the UNCLOS codify the principle of sovereign rights. 
According to this principle, a coastal State “exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights 
for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources”,284 including hydrocarbon 
deposits.285 The UNCLOS also spells out specific forms of sovereign rights, such as the right 
to install structures on the CS,286 the right to “authorize and regulate drilling on the [CS] for all 
purposes”287 and the right to exploit the subsoil by means of tunneling.288 These sovereign 
rights are both exclusive and inherent. The exclusive nature means that if a coastal State decides 
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not to explore the CS or exploit its petroleum resources, no other State may do so without the 
explicit consent of the coastal State.289 Prior occupation of the CS or a proclamation is not a 
prerequisite to the exercise of the sovereign rights.290 Such rights exist ipso facto and ab 
initio.291 Nowadays, there is no doubt that the principle of sovereign rights has become part of 
customary international law292 and, therefore, it binds countries that are not parties to the 
UNCLOS. The UNCLOS provides a coastal State with the criteria for defining the outer limits 
of its CS beyond 200 nm from the baselines in certain circumstances stipulated in article 76. 
The sovereign rights of a State over petroleum resources are also attached to this State by virtue 
of the entitlements it has over an EEZ.293 Article 56 (3) of the UNCLOS states that in the 
exercise of EEZ rights with respect to the seabed and subsoil, a State shall act in accordance 
with the CS regime (Part VI of the UNCLOS). 
This thesis explores the operation of the principle of sovereign rights in two contrasting 
scenarios of oil and gas resource sharing: the first is the sharing of a hydrocarbon deposit located 
in an undelimited maritime area and the second relates to the sharing of a resource transected 
by a boundary line. As regards the first scenario, there is legal uncertainty as to the scope of the 
application of the principle of sovereign rights. Under the second scenario, the difficulty is that 
although the geographical scope of the principle’s application is clearly set, several States are 
entitled to exercise sovereign rights over a part of the same accumulation(s) of hydrocarbons 
and the competitive existence of such rights may entail certain negative consequences.294 A 
more detailed examination of the principle of sovereign rights in these two contexts is contained 
in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Both the CCS and UNCLOS provide coastal States with sovereign rights to explore for and 
exploit hydrocarbon resources without defining the content and nature of these activities. 
Nonetheless, this issue is important, for example, when considering the question of what type 
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of petroleum activity may lead to a permanent physical modification of the seabed and subsoil 
or may cause hydrocarbon resources to migrate from the other side of the maritime boundary.295 
The production-chain of petroleum resources consists of two parts: upstream and downstream 
parts.296 Whereas the upstream part includes exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbon 
resources, the downstream part refers to transportation, storage, refining, marketing, 
distribution and so forth.297 This research focuses on the upstream part, which can be divided 
broadly into two phases: exploration and exploitation. 
The goal of exploration is to identify maritime areas where commercial oil and gas deposits 
may be located, by using different methods, including seismic surveys and exploratory drilling. 
Seismic is used to identify the presence of a petroleum resource in the CS. The purpose of 
seismic exploration is to obtain information concerning the geophysical structure of the seabed 
and its subsoil by transmitting sound waves from a source. These sound waves travel down 
through the rock layers, which reflect them up to a sensor. This sensor records the acquired 
information to be interpreted by a scientist.298 
In order to confirm a potential accumulation of hydrocarbons, a wildcat well is to be drilled. If 
the well is found to be dry, it will be plugged and abandoned and offshore drilling equipment 
will typically be withdrawn. If exploratory drilling discovers a new reservoir, appraisal wells 
are then drilled to determine the size and geographical extent of the reservoir discovered by the 
wildcat well. The size of the reservoir needs to be determined to compute the amount of oil and 
gas that can be produced. If the deposit is significantly large, it may thus be economically 
justified to develop it further.299 
If exploration has proved the existence of a hydrocarbon deposit with commercial potential, 
exploitation of this deposit may then be commenced. Exploitation includes such activities as 
drilling recovery wells,300 and construction, placing and operation of installations. It is worth 
noting that the terms ‘exploitation’, ‘production’ and ‘development’ are usually used 
interchangeably and are rarely defined in the legal literature. While exploitation indeed 
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encompasses development and production stages, a distinction between these stages may be 
drawn. Development includes those activities that make the removal of hydrocarbons from a 
reservoir possible, production covers activities associated with this removal such as treatment 
and storage of hydrocarbons and other substances, transportation of hydrocarbons (by ship or 
pipeline) to shore.301 The last phase will typically include decommissioning when the 
production of the hydrocarbon resource has come to an end.302 
Exploration and exploitation operations are usually carried out by private actors authorized by 
coastal States to do so. 
2.4 General and specific obligations to cooperate 
This section explores whether the understanding of disputed and transboundary hydrocarbons 
as shared natural resources implies a duty to cooperate. 
2.4.1 The general duty to cooperate and its forms 
The general duty to cooperate constitutes a basic principle of public international law. Article 
1 (3) of the UN Charter sets out that one of the purposes of the UN as an international 
organization is to achieve international cooperation in order to solve problems of an economic, 
cultural or humanitarian character. Further, article 2 of the Charter contains the relevant legal 
principles to be respected by both the organization and its members for the achievement of the 
purposes enshrined in article 1. However, this general aim of cooperation is not reflected in 
article 2. On the other hand, Chapter IX of the Charter is wholly dedicated to the question of 
“international economic and social co-operation”. An array of issues, concerning which States 
pledge themselves to cooperate internationally in the socio-economic field, can include, for 
instance, those related to education, public health, environmental protection.303 
The UNGA has reaffirmed the general duty to cooperate by its Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States.304 The 
Declaration proclaims the duty to cooperate as one of the principles of international law, which 
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consequently applies to all States,305 including the non-members of the UN.306 The ICJ has 
highlighted that the unanimous approval of this Declaration has to be regarded as “an 
acceptance of the validity of the rule or set of rules declared by the resolution”.307 
According to the Declaration, States “have the duty to cooperate with one another, irrespective 
of the differences in their political, economic and social systems, in the various spheres of 
international relations, […]”.308 However, the Declaration employs the verb ‘should’ when it 
comes to cooperation in the economic, social and cultural fields, as well as in the domain of 
science and technology. Such usage does not correspond to the mandatory ‘shall’ contained in 
the initial part under the heading “The duty of States to co-operate with one another in 
accordance with the Charter”.309 Therefore, the Declaration does not make it clear whether 
States have recognized the legal duty to cooperate in the specific context of socio-economic 
issues. 
There is considerable debate in the literature as to customary status of the duty to cooperate.310 
It is noteworthy that since the 1970s, the general duty to cooperate has got an extensive follow-
up in multilateral treaty law. The general duty to cooperate is spelled out in many legal 
instruments regulating different fields of international law. Prior to the examination of the duty 
to cooperate in the field of shared natural resources, it is important to distinguish two types of 
this duty: a pactum de negotiando and a pactum de contrahendo. The main difference between 
them is that the former contains a mere obligation to negotiate in good faith, while the latter 
imposes an obligation to reach an agreement. Thus, the pactum de negotiando creates a weaker 
commitment than a pactum de contrahendo since it does not go so far as to require the 
conclusion of an agreement at any cost.311 The issue of whether a particular legal instrument 
constitutes a pactum de negotiando or a pactum de negotiando should be considered with 
caution.312 For instance, at first glance, it may appear that there is a pactum de contrahendo 
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concerning the delimitation of the EEZ and CS.313 Nevertheless, it is generally understood that 
these provisions establish a pactum de negotiando.314 
As observed below in this thesis, duties to cooperate in respect of shared hydrocarbons may 
take the form of both a pactum de contrahendo and a pactum de negotiando, although the latter 
form prevails.315 
2.4.2 The duty to cooperate with respect to shared natural resources 
A number of resolutions adopted by the UNGA include the duty of States to cooperate regarding 
shared natural resources. UNGA Resolution 3129 (XXVIII) underlines the necessity to 
establish “adequate international standards for the conservation and harmonious exploitation of 
natural resources common to two or more States”.316 It is further stressed that cooperation shall 
be developed “on the basis of a system of information and prior consultation”.317 This statement 
echoes with article 3 of the Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States that provides for 
cooperation between States sharing natural resources “on the basis of a system of information 
and prior consultation in order to achieve optimum use of such resources without causing 
damage to the legitimate interests of others”.318 Thus, the main message enshrined in these 
UNGA Resolutions is that States are expressly required to cooperate prior to any exploitation 
of a shared natural resource. 
The UNEP draft Principles urge States sharing a natural resource to cooperate in order to 
conserve and utilize it in a harmonious manner.319 The requirement to cooperate is further 
transformed into specific commitments, including the exchange of information, notification, 
and consultation between States that share natural resources.320 Moreover, the UNEP draft 
Principles reflect such modern obligations of States under international law as the duty to 
prevent transboundary harm and the duty to conduct an environmental impact assessment 
(EIA).321 
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More recently, the duty to cooperate is firmly established in the context of some categories of 
shared natural resources. One of the most sophisticated legal regimes in this respect relates to 
shared water resources. The duty to cooperate has been codified in a number of instruments 
dealing with international watercourses322 and shared groundwater resources.323 States are 
obligated to cooperate in order to attain equitable and reasonable utilization and adequate 
protection of these shared water resources.324 The process of cooperation among States is 
framed by specific requirements to exchange information, notify, conduct an EIA, consult and 
negotiate.325 
The management and conservation of shared fish stocks is also governed by the duty to 
cooperate.326 Unlike shared water resources, the duty of States to cooperate with respect to 
shared fisheries resources is formulated in more concrete manner. States are required to 
cooperate directly or through regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) or 
arrangements.327 It is notable that apart from the general procedural requirements encapsulated 
in the duty to cooperate, the institutional component of the duty to cooperate in the context of 
shared fisheries resources is strong. 
Thus, the development of the legal regimes governing the management of water and fisheries 
resources supports the argument that the duty to cooperate exists and includes concrete 
procedural requirements. Nevertheless, whereas the duty to cooperate has been enshrined in the 
context of shared water and fisheries resources, there are many other types of shared natural 
                                                            
322 Watercourses Convention, art. 8. Other legal instruments are described by M. M. Rahaman, “Principles of 
Transboundary Water Resources Management and Water-related Agreements in Central Asia: An Analysis”, 
Water Resources Development, 2012, vol. 28 (3), pp. 478-480. 
323 ILC’s draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, 2008, art. 7. See Chapter 1. 
324 It is worth to note that article 8 of the Watercourses Convention refers to “optimal utilization and adequate 
protection of an international watercourse” (emphasis added), while article 7 of the ILC’s draft articles on the Law 
of Transboundary Aquifers uses the wording “equitable and reasonable utilization and appropriate protection” 
(emphasis added) of a transboundary aquifer or aquifer system. These objectives of the general duty to cooperate 
appear to be equivalent. See C. Leb, Cooperation in the Law of Transboundary Water Resources, Cambridge 
University Press, 2013, p. 85. 
325 Pulp Mills, para. 81. See also Perrez 2000, op. cit., pp. 304-317; C. Leb, “One step at a time: International law 
and the duty to cooperate in the management of shared water resources”, Water International, 2015, vol. 40 (1); 
O. McIntyre, Environmental Protection of International Watercourses under International Law, 2013, pp. 221-
229; Leb 2013, supra note 324; O. McIntyre, “The Role of Customary Rules and Principles of International 
Environmental Law in the Protection of Shared International Freshwater Resources”, Natural Resources Journal, 
2006, vol. 46 (1), pp. 186-189. 
326 UNCLOS, art. 63; FSA, art. 5. The typologies of shared fish stocks: R. Churchill, “The Management of Shared 
Fish Stocks: the Neglected “Other” Paragraph of Article 63 of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea”, in: A. 
Stratu et al. (eds), Unresolved Issues and New Challenges to the Law of the Sea: Time Before and Time After, Brill 
Academic Publisher, 2005, p. 5; G. Munro et al., “The conservation and management of shared fish stocks: legal 
and economic aspects”, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 465, 2004; N. Oral, Regional Co-operation and Protection 





resources, such as air, forests and mountains, in respect of which no specific rules of 
international law exist.328 However, as discussed in Chapter 2.2, the mentioned resources are 
covered by the concept of shared natural resources and, consequently, it is reasonable to argue 
that the duty to cooperate also applies to such resources, including shared hydrocarbon 
resources. 
However, it is important to emphasize that each resource type within the concept of shared 
natural resources has its own (physical or geological) characteristics which make that type 
different from the others. This fact was clearly reflected by the example of the groundwater-oil 
and gas resources dichotomy.329 It suggests that the difference between characteristics of shared 
natural resources is likely to impact on the content of the legal rules governing the management 
of these resources. For instance, the objectives of the duty to cooperate may differ depending 
on whether a renewable or non-renewable shared natural resource is the subject of cooperation. 
A distinction can be made between the goals aimed at utilization of a shared natural resource 
and that directed to its conservation and protection. While cooperation in respect of shared 
renewable natural resources usually aims at achieving both objectives, States sharing a non-
renewable petroleum deposit are primary required to cooperate on the issue of economic 
exploitation of that deposit.330 One of the relevant characteristics of petroleum resources is that 
unlike, for example, solid mineral resources (e.g., polymetallic nodules), they can migrate when 
exploited.331 This characteristic is essential when considering the regime applicable to 
petroleum resources straddling maritime boundaries.332 
An interesting observation is that although the duty to cooperate has evolved significantly since 
the adoption of the UNEP draft Principles, its core procedural elements have remained 
unchanged. There are requirements to inform, notify, consult and negotiate in good faith that 
flow from the characterization of a particular natural resource as “shared”. Thus, States that 
share a natural resource shall, in giving effect to the duty to cooperate, comply with these 
procedural requirements in good faith. 
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2.4.3 The existence of a requirement to cooperate in respect of shared 
hydrocarbons 
As discussed above in this section, both disputed and transboundary hydrocarbon deposits fall 
under the concept of shared natural resources. Such classification gives rise to the duty on States 
sharing a hydrocarbon deposit to cooperate because this duty constitutes a fundamental 
principle of the body of norms applicable to the management of any shared natural resource. 
Thus, in the context of shared hydrocarbons, States are required to cooperate by means of 
information exchange, consultation and negotiation in good faith.333 
Many provisions of the UNCLOS stress the general duty to cooperate.334 The UNCLOS also 
contains provisions that can be read as referring to shared petroleum resources. As indicated in 
Chapter 3, one of the obligations set forth in articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS is a duty 
to cooperate with respect to petroleum resources located in undelimited maritime areas.335 
Chapter 4 however questions the applicability of these articles to transboundary hydrocarbons. 
In this respect, Chapter 4 will consider the question of whether article 142 of the UNCLOS 
could serve as a relevant provision since it concerns the analogous situation of resource deposits 
lying across the boundary between the Area and an area subject to national jurisdiction. 
This thesis also examines relevant State practice and case law in order to confirm that the duty 
to cooperate with respect to shared hydrocarbons exists. The existence of this duty enjoys 
substantial support in the legal literature.336 However, the question remains whether the scope 
of the duty to cooperate varies depending on whether there is a boundary line in place or not. 
With this in mind, Chapters 3 and 4 will consider the regimes of cooperation in both situations 
of petroleum resource sharing. 
2.5 The principle of equitable utilization 
The UNEP draft Principles affirmed the principle of equitable utilization and extended its 
application to shared natural resources.337 Today, it is generally recognized that this principle 
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is a fundamental rule of international law governing the use of shared freshwater resources.338 
It elicits the question of whether other types of shared natural resources, including shared 
hydrocarbons, are subject to the principle of equitable utilization. It has been observed that even 
though it might be useful to extend the principle of equitable utilization to as many shared 
natural resources as possible in order to protect them, there is a distinction between desire and 
reality.339 Arguably, the principle of equitable utilization does not apply to every natural 
resource that is, or may be classified as, shared.340 
The principle of equitable utilization rests on a foundation of equality of rights.341 This equality 
of rights stems from the sovereign equality of States.342 Thus, in the context of shared natural 
resources, it should be understood that all States sharing a natural resource have equal rights 
necessary for and connected with its exploration and exploitation. However, equality of rights 
over a shared natural resource does not mean that each State is entitled to an equal share of it. 
Instead, the principle of equitable utilization must be construed to entitle every State to an 
equitable share of the benefits to be derived from the use of a shared natural resource. The main 
issue is how to determine what share is equitable. In the context of shared water resources, the 
determination of equitable share(s) requires taking into account all relevant factors and 
circumstances.343 This makes the principle of equitable utilization flexible and sensitive to the 
particularities of each individual case. At the same time, the principle’s normative vagueness 
poses a risk of disputes between the States concerned regarding its application. In this respect, 
cooperation plays an important role in the implementation of the principle of equitable 
utilization because only through this process States can determine what constitutes equitable 
and reasonable utilization. The perception of equity and reasonableness by one State may 
diverge from the opinion of the other State(s) on that issue. Therefore, under the principle of 
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equitable utilization, the desired result would be an arrangement or agreement concluded 
between States in which each State’s share is specified. 
This thesis argues in favor of the applicability of the principle of equitable utilization to shared 
hydrocarbons. The Preamble of the UNCLOS stipulates that one of the objectives of the 
Convention is the “equitable and efficient utilization” of the resources of the seas and oceans.344 
The Convention does not specify what kind of resources it had in mind in respect of this 
objective. It is logical to assume that the natural resources of the CS, as well as of the EEZ, are 
to be included.345 In Guyana v. Suriname, the Tribunal noted that provisional arrangements of 
a practical nature concluded between States with respect to living and non-living resources 
“promote realization” of this objective.346 Indeed, the analysis of available provisional 
arrangements and agreements relating to shared hydrocarbons reveals that many of them 
include the principle of equitable utilization (or apportionment)347 in their Preambles.348 
Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing that even though the principle of equitable utilization is 
applicable to shared hydrocarbons, it does not mean that its application would be similar to that 
existing in the context of other shared natural resources. Moreover, the rules of equitable 
apportionment may differ depending on whether there is a transboundary deposit or a disputed 
deposit. This thesis further examines that issue in detail.349 
2.6 The no-harm principle: the environment and beyond 
A rule of international law, which prohibits a State from using its own territory in such a manner 
as to cause damage to others, is derived from the Latin maxim “sic utere tuo ut alienum non 
laedas”.350 This rule was enshrined for the first time in Trail Smelter.351 In connection with a 
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dispute concerning Canadian responsibility for damage arising from air pollution caused in the 
US by a smelter located in Canada, the Tribunal held that:  
under the principles of international law […] no state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory 
in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties of persons 
therein, when the cause is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing 
evidence.352 
Since Trail Smelter, the duty not to cause harm to other States (referred to below as the ‘no-
harm principle’) has principally been developed in the field of international environmental law. 
In general terms, this duty is currently formulated as one requiring States to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction and control do not cause harm to the environment of other States or of 
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.353 
The current research, however, argues that the scope of the no-harm principle shall not only be 
confined to the environment. In this respect, the Corfu Channel case is of particular 
importance.354 Although the factual matrix of Corfu Channel differs from what is examined in 
this thesis, the Court’s findings may be relevant in the context of shared hydrocarbons.  
In Corfu Channel, the ICJ held Albania responsible for loss of life and damage suffered by 
British warships when the vessels struck mines laid in Albanian territorial waters. In its 
Judgment, the Court has acknowledged that every State is obligated “not to allow knowingly 
its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States”.355 The ICJ has alluded to 
specific legal rights of the UK. The UK was entitled to the protection of its right of innocent 
passage through an international transit through which it should not be prohibited by a coastal 
State in time of peace,356 and the right to receive from another State treatment in accordance 
with elementary considerations of humanity.357 Albania, in its turn, had neither notified the 
presence of the mines nor warned the warships of the imminent danger they were 
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approaching.358 Thus, the Court referred to harm to “the rights of other States”. It is important 
to underline that the core issue considered in Corfu Channel did not concern an environmental 
problem.359 Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that the no-harm principle offers the protection 
of rights of third States, and not only the environment of other States or the environment of 
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.360 
A number of provisions of the UNCLOS reflect the principle not to cause harm to the rights of 
other States. For example, pursuant to article 56 (2), each coastal State exercising its rights and 
performing its duties in the EEZ “shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States”. 
In accordance with article 78 (2), each coastal State exercising its sovereign rights over the CS 
“must not infringe or result in any unjustifiable interference with navigation and other rights 
and freedoms of other States”.361 The regime of provisional measures considered in Chapter 3 
may also be viewed as a specific application of the no-harm principle. 
The existence of the no-harm principle in the context of rights may have legal implications for 
authorizing activities with respect to shared hydrocarbons. It would be internationally wrongful 
for a State to permit petroleum activities under its jurisdiction and control that entail a risk of 
causing damage to rights of other States. In other words, a State must abstain from conducting 
activities which might negatively affect (a) undisputed rights of another State (i.e., with respect 
to transboundary hydrocarbons) and (b) those rights that another State may have in an area of 
overlapping maritime claims. 
According to the Corfu Channel case, the no-harm principle is accompanied by the requirement 
of knowledge which a State has, or ought to have, of the unlawful activities being conducted 
within its jurisdiction and control.362 In reality, there can be very little doubt that a State would 
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not be aware of ongoing hydrocarbon activities, as the authorization of these activities is within 
its authority. Another question, however, is whether a State would know that the authorized 
petroleum activity is contrary to the (alleged) rights of the neighboring States. For instance, this 
issue may arise in a situation where State A has authorized hydrocarbon activities, while 
neighboring State B has not proclaimed its sovereign rights over the CS on which State A’s 
activities take place.363 Similarly, in the context of cross-border hydrocarbons, one can envisage 
a situation where a State is not initially able to identify that a field discovered on its side of the 
maritime boundary extends across this boundary. Chapters 3 and 4 will deal with those 
situations. 
Although in this section, the no-harm principle is discussed outside the context of the 
environment, its environmental dimension is worth emphasizing. Under international 
environmental law, States conducting unilateral and joint exploration and exploitation 
activities with respect to shared hydrocarbons (as well as other non-living resources) are 
required to ensure that these activities do not cause significant harm to the (marine) environment 
of other States and global commons areas (e.g., the high seas and the Area).364 It is important 
to note that this thesis argues that the obligation to prevent harm to the environment is not only 
limited to maritime areas where a State has legally established its sovereign rights to explore 
and exploit, but it also applies to areas where this State may have such rights.365 In other words, 
this means that a State shall protect and preserve the environment when permitting any 
hydrocarbon activity in an undelimited area because such activity always poses a risk of 
environmental harm, especially to its neighbors.366 Otherwise, international environmental law 
would fail to protect many areas of overlapping maritime claims which are not covered by 
provisional arrangements and where extensive hydrocarbon activities take place (such as the 
Gulf of Thailand and the South China Sea). Consequently, the obligation to prevent significant 
harm to the environment also applies in situations where several States carry out joint petroleum 
activities in undelimited areas.367 
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Thus, the no-harm principle’s application extends beyond the environmental context. 
Translated to the context of shared hydrocarbons, this principle would require State A to refrain 
from conducting those petroleum operations that might adversely affect the (alleged) sovereign 
rights of State B and, consequently, the potential benefits arising from the exercise of these 
rights. Chapter 5 of this thesis examines in detail the environmental aspect of the no-harm 
principle. 
2.7 Conclusions and observations 
This Chapter has examined the basic principles of international law applicable in the context of 
shared hydrocarbons. Starting with the principle of sovereign rights over shared hydrocarbons, 
the Chapter considered the principles that are inherent to the characterization of shared 
hydrocarbons as a type of shared natural resources. These principles require States that share a 
hydrocarbon field to: (a) cooperate in order to manage this field, including procedural 
commitments; (b) abstain from authorizing a hydrocarbon activity that might harm the rights 
of the other State, including potential rights in an area where a maritime boundary has not yet 
been established, and the (marine) environment; and (c) respect that each State is entitled to an 
equitable share of benefits derived from the exploitation of this field. 
However, as highlighted above, due to the specific characteristics of shared hydrocarbons, the 
content of these general principles in this regard is likely to differ from those principles related 
to other types of shared natural resources mentioned in this Chapter. Moreover, the regime 
governing each category within the framework of shared hydrocarbons may have an additional 
effect on the implementation of the general principles. For example, as noted in Chapter 2.3, 
the operation of the principle of sovereign rights is different depending on whether there is a 
disputed or cross-border petroleum deposit. Another example is that the application of the 
principle of equitable utilization/apportionment in the context of transboundary hydrocarbons 
may be dissimilar to that existing in the context of disputed hydrocarbons. While each State’s 
entitlement to an equitable share in a transboundary deposit appears to be unquestionable 
(although there is uncertainty as to the exact share), such an entitlement may be contested in 
the context of disputed hydrocarbons. Chapters 3 and 4 of Part II consider in more detail the 
regimes governing each category of shared hydrocarbons and discuss the features of applying 














This Chapter addresses the question of what obligations a State owes to its neighbor when 
permitting and/or conducting offshore petroleum resource activities in a maritime area that is 
also claimed, or may be claimed, by this neighboring State, and whether that State can 
commence those activities prior to the final determination of a maritime boundary or in the 
absence of some form of cooperation in this regard. As noted earlier in this thesis, there are 
many maritime areas of overlapping claims of several coastal States over the same EEZ and/or 
(extended) CS across different parts of the world.368 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the effect of the overlap between States’ EEZ and CS claims is that 
two (or more) sets of sovereign rights of claimant States apply to the same maritime area, 
including any offshore oil and gas resources contained therein. The UNCLOS, in paragraph 3 
of articles 74 and 83, seeks to regulate maritime areas of overlapping claims.369 Articles 74 (3) 
and 84 (3) of that Convention stipulate that States, pending a final delimitation of their EEZ 
and CS, “shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature 
and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final 
[delimitation] agreement”. Hereby, these provisions impose two obligations upon States parties 
to the UNCLOS in the context of a maritime boundary dispute. The first obligation is that States 
must make every effort to conclude a provisional arrangement of a practical nature. The second 
obligation is that States must make every effort not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a 
boundary agreement. Paragraph 3 of articles 74 and 83 also emphasizes that these two 
obligations shall be performed “in a spirit of understanding and cooperation”. 
Before considering the substantive scope and content of the mentioned obligations (Chapters 
3.3 and 3.4 below), the issue of their temporal scope is addressed in the following section. This 
                                                            
* Parts of this Chapter are based on my article: N. Ermolina, “Unilateral Hydrocarbon Activities in Undelimited 
Maritime Areas”, Indonesian Journal of International Law, 2018/2019 (forthcoming).  
368 See van Logchem 2018, op. cit., p. 210. There are several types of overlapping maritime claims. See more T. 
Davenport, “The exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbon resources in areas of overlapping claims”, in: R. 
Beckman et al. (eds), Beyond Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Legal Frameworks for the Joint 
Development of Hydrocarbon Resources, Edward Elgar, 2013, p. 99; D. Anderson and Y. van Logchem, “Rights 
and Obligations in Areas of Overlapping Maritime Claims”, in: S. Jayakumar, T. Koh and R. C. Beckman (eds), 
The South China Sea Disputes and Law of the Sea, 2014, pp. 194-195. 




issue is important because State responsibility may be triggered only when a State breaches an 
international obligation that is in force for that State at the time the breach occurs.370 However, 
it should be borne in mind that these treaty obligations might exist in the form of general rules 
of international law, which are also applicable to States that are non-parties to the UNCLOS. 
The two obligations contained in articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS could also derive 
from the general principles discussed in Chapter 2. This Chapter also examines the relationship 
between the “not to jeopardize or hamper” obligation and a more general duty of States to 
refrain from acts that might aggravate or extend a dispute in Chapter 3.6. 
3.2 The time frame of existence of the article 74 (3) and 83 (3) 
obligations 
Paragraph 3 of articles 74 and 84 of the UNCLOS begins with the phrase “pending agreement 
as provided for in paragraph 1”. Hereinafter, it introduces a second phrase “during this 
transitional period”. Logically, the first phrase relates to the obligation to enter into provisional 
arrangements, while the second phrase is directly linked to the obligation not to jeopardize or 
hamper.371 This section considers the meaning of these two phrases. 
3.2.1 “Pending [a maritime boundary] agreement” 
It is unclear when a future delimitation agreement is considered to be “pending”. A number of 
legal commentators have emphasized that the existence of the obligations does not depend on 
whether or not delimitation negotiations have been initiated.372 Indeed, the affirmation that the 
moment of the emergence is somehow associated with the negotiation process may detract from 
the significance of these obligations. It may be likely that there would be a considerable time 
difference between the moment when negotiations start and when the maritime claims of 
neighboring States (potentially) overlap. Being dependent on the commencement of the 
negotiations, the obligations would therefore not be in force, for example, at the stage when, or 
in circumstances when, one of the parties would have refused to negotiate, or if the negotiations 
reached a deadlock or were discontinued.373 
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If the point in time at which the obligations stemming from paragraph 3 emerge is tied to the 
time at which it is apparent that maritime claims to a particular area do, or might potentially, 
overlap,374 that elicits the question of the circumstances in which the existence of overlapping 
claims becomes clear. Unlike claims to an EEZ, States are not required to make an express 
claim to a CS.375 Undoubtedly, the obligations would arise when neighboring States, through 
diplomatic channels or by other means, have explicitly acknowledged that an area of 
overlapping maritime claims exists, giving rise to a need for delimitation.376 It also seems easy 
to establish the fact that States have overlapping maritime claims to a CS beyond 200 nm.377 
However, there is less clarity in the case when State A has made its claims known (e.g., enacted 
a relevant law) or has proceeded to exercise its (alleged) sovereign rights to explore and exploit, 
while State B has raised no objection to that.378 It is reasonable to assume that the absence of 
reaction does not activate the obligations under paragraph 3 because it is unlikely that State A 
can unilaterally identify where exactly maritime claims of State A and State B overlap. The 
question arises as to whether the obligations are triggered when State B, after a certain period 
of time, starts to contest the position and activities of State A (for example, because State A has 
discovered a large-volume petroleum resource or State B has not been able to protest) on the 
basis that State B was not obligated to proclaim its rights over the CS.379 The Ghana/Côte 
d’Ivoire case exemplifies this scenario. In that case, Ghana had authorized petroleum operations 
in a maritime area for a long time (since the 1960s) before Côte d’Ivoire started to react 
(beginning in 2009). Ghana did so in the belief that a de facto maritime boundary was 
established and Côte d’Ivoire tacitly consented to Ghana’s petroleum activities. Leaving aside 
the SC’s conclusions that there was no tacit delimitation agreement between Ghana and Côte 
d’Ivoire and that Côte d’Ivoire was not estopped from objecting,380 it is notable that the 
Chamber was of the view that Ghana’s obligation not to jeopardize or hamper clearly arose in 
2009 when the existence of a maritime delimitation dispute and the location of the disputed area 
became, or should have become, obvious to Ghana.381 In other words, it means that in a similar 
situation where State B breaks its silence and starts to object, State A must pay due attention to 
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the obligations set forth in articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS, even if State A believes 
that State B is estopped from objecting or has no entitlements. State B may indeed have good 
reasons why it could not react earlier (e.g., internal conflicts that prevented State B from 
focusing on delimitation issues). The subsequent issue relates to the legal consequences 
attached to the moment of triggering of paragraph 3: for example, whether State A would be 
compelled to halt its hydrocarbon activities in the contested maritime area or to share the 
benefits received prior to State B’s objection. The Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire case demonstrates that 
it may be difficult to suspend ongoing activities, but that it is possible to freeze new petroleum 
activities.382 
The opening phrase of paragraph 3 is also intended to determine the moment of termination of 
the obligation to seek provisional arrangements. The French and Russian texts of the UNCLOS 
clearly refer to the date of conclusion of a delimitation agreement.383 However, it may be a time 
difference between the date of conclusion of a treaty and its date of entry into force.384 
Moreover, there is also a risk that the adopted delimitation treaty will not come into force. In 
this respect, the rules stemming from the law of the treaties are applicable.385 A delimitation 
agreement may apply provisionally pending its entry into force.386 Article 18 of the VCLT 
imposes upon States an obligation to refrain from acts that might defeat the object and purpose 
of a treaty prior to its entry into force. In other words, if a delimitation treaty is signed, but not 
yet in force, the Parties to that treaty are bound by their accord on where the delimitation line 
lies. Following this logic, the obligations under paragraph 3 cease once a final delimitation 
agreement is reached as long as neither contracting Party attempts to withdraw from that 
agreement. Thus, paragraph 3 is not tied to the date of entry into force of a delimitation treaty.387 
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It is important to note that the term ‘agreement’ is employed in a broader context, covering not 
only the situation where States have agreed on a maritime boundary, but also where the 
delimitation dispute has been settled by a court or tribunal.388 The question is whether, in the 
latter situation, the obligation would cease once some form of dispute settlement procedure has 
been invoked, or once the court or tribunal has decided that it has jurisdiction, or only when the 
court or tribunal has delivered its final judgment on the merits.389 It seems reasonable to suggest 
that the obligations are terminated once the determination of a maritime boundary is made by a 
judicial body. However, there might be a situation where one of the Parties to a delimitation 
dispute does not accept the final decision.390 In this situation, it could be argued that the 
obligations of paragraph 3 continue to apply until the decision is fully implemented by the 
States involved. 
3.2.2 “During this transitional period” 
As regards the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper, articles 74 (3) and 84 (3) of the UNCLOS 
stipulate that this obligations lasts “during this transitional period”. The articles provide no 
explanation of what the phrase “during this transitional period” implies. 
The question is when the transitional period might be considered to conclude. The logical 
conclusion is that paragraph 3 refers to the period at which a maritime boundary is agreed by 
the Parties or is determined by a court or tribunal. The SC in Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire offered the 
similar reading of paragraph 3.391 At the same time, the SC drew a distinction between two 
scenarios within the transitional period: the scenario where a provisional arrangement is reached 
and the scenario where no such provisional arrangement exists.392 It is not clear what the SC 
desired to show by this distinction: whether the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper is 
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terminated once a provisional arrangement is concluded or whether the obligation not to 
jeopardize or hamper becomes supplementary where a provisional arrangement is in place. The 
latter interpretation is preferable for a number of reasons. 
A provisional arrangement rarely regulates all activities in the disputed maritime area and does 
not always apply to the entire area of overlapping claims. Logically, if a provisional 
arrangement solely covers fisheries activities or a part of a disputed area, the obligation not to 
jeopardize or hamper would be applicable to other activities, such as hydrocarbon exploration 
and exploitation activities, or to other parts of the contested area. Against this backdrop, 
Anderson and van Logchem assert that the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper applies while 
a provisional arrangement is in place, as well as before such an arrangement is concluded.393 
Their approach can be supported by the fact that no provisional arrangement can cover all acts 
which may amount to jeopardizing or hampering the reaching a final delimitation. 
Thus, it appears reasonable that the duration of the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper is 
equated with the temporal scope of the obligation to seek provisional arrangements. In other 
words, the obligations under articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS are triggered once State 
A has realized that a certain maritime area is also claimed by State B and cease when a 
delimitation agreement between State A and State B is concluded or when a maritime boundary 
is established by a judicial body (if neither State challenges the validity of its decision). There 
is no reason to attach a different meaning to the phrase “during this transitional period” only on 
the basis that the period it refers to is already covered by paragraph 3’s opening phrase.394  
3.2.3 Sovereignty disputes and disputes over the status of maritime features 
A more complex question arises as to whether the obligations stemming from paragraph 3 also 
apply in situations where the sovereignty over land territory generating maritime zones (e.g., 
the dispute between Ukraine and Russia over the Crimea),395 including over islands (e.g., the 
dispute between Argentina and the UK over the Falklands (Malvinas) Islands),396 or where the 
legal status of a maritime feature is disputed (e.g., whether a maritime feature is an island or a 
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rock as in the South China Sea case).397 In South China Sea, the Tribunal concluded that several 
features in the central part of the South China Sea do not generate maritime entitlements beyond 
the territorial sea and, therefore, there is no overlap of EEZ and CS requiring delimitation with 
the coasts surrounding the South China Sea.398 In other words, in an analogous situation where 
a particular maritime feature is to be considered a rock or low-tide elevation (like in South 
China Sea), the obligations laid down in articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS are not 
triggered. 
In the literature, there is no consensus on the applicability of articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) to the 
situations mentioned above in this section.399 Nevertheless, it is reasonable to argue that the 
obligations of paragraph 3 shall apply until a determination on the absence of overlapping 
entitlements is made (for example, by a judicial body). At the same time, such a determination 
may be difficult without dealing with the question of sovereignty (e.g., there is no overlap 
between Argentina and the UK if Argentina is indeed entitled to exercise sovereignty over the 
Falklands (Malvinas) Islands) that usually limits the jurisdiction of international courts and 
tribunals.400 At this point, it is worth recalling that obligations similar to those embedded in 
articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS may arise from more general principles of 
international law considered in Chapter 2 above.401 
3.3 The obligation to seek provisional arrangements of a practical 
nature 
This section considers the first obligation set forth in articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS 
according to which pending a final delimitation, States, in a spirit of understanding and 
cooperation, are required to “make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a 
practical nature”. 
3.3.1 The legal content of the obligation 
The language used in articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS indicates that there is no 
obligation to enter into a provisional arrangement of a practical nature. States are only obligated 
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to “make every effort” to arrive at such a provisional arrangement. The requirement to “make 
every effort” was considered in Guyana v. Suriname where the Tribunal acknowledged that this 
requirement “leaves some room for interpretation” either by States or by any dispute settlement 
body.402 Nevertheless, the Tribunal was of the view that the obligation is framed in a way that 
imposes on the parties “a duty to negotiate in good faith”,403 which requires “a conciliatory 
approach to negotiations, pursuant to which they would be prepared to make concessions in the 
pursuit of a provisional arrangement”.404 
However, it is well known that the duty to negotiate in good faith does not imply an obligation 
to reach an agreement.405 States are required to enter into negotiations with a view to concluding 
an agreement and not merely to go through a formal process of negotiation.406 The negotiations 
are to be “meaningful, which will not be the case when either of [the Parties] insists upon its 
own position without contemplating any modification of it”.407 Thus, the first obligation 
stemming from articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS constitutes a requirement to be 
involved in negotiations moving towards the reaching of a provisional arrangement of a 
practical nature, regardless of whether the negotiations would be fruitful or not. 
The concept of provisional arrangements of a practical nature is not further developed in the 
UNCLOS. It has been observed that the term ‘arrangement’ is employed to disassociate it from 
an ‘agreement’.408 The former term is used to indicate a document having other functions than 
the delimitation of a maritime boundary between neighboring States.409 An arrangement may 
take the form of both formal treaties between States, and informal documents such as notes 
verbales, exchange of notes, agreed minutes, memoranda of understanding.410 Thus, States may 
title a provisional arrangement as they determine, including the use of the term ‘agreement’ or 
‘treaty’. Articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS make it clear that a possible arrangement is 
intended to be temporary, namely until a maritime boundary is established. At the same time, 
nothing prevents States from continuing the application of the already concluded provisional 
                                                            
402 Guyana v. Suriname, para. 461.  
403 See also Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire Judgment, para. 627. 
404 Guyana v. Suriname, para. 461. 
405 North Sea Continental Shelf, para. 87. 
406 Ibid., paras. 85 (a) and 87. 
407 Ibid., para. 85 (a). 
408 Kim 2004, op. cit., p. 46. 
409 Ibid. 




arrangement (or some elements of this arrangement), even after the reaching of a final boundary 
agreement.411 
Articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS also contain the requirement that provisional 
arrangements should be “of a practical nature”. Although the articles provide no precision 
concerning the meaning of the phrase ‘of a practical nature’, it has been construed to mean that 
such arrangements are to provide practical solutions to problems which may arise regarding the 
use of a maritime area in dispute.412 In other words, neighboring States themselves shall 
determine whether it is appropriate to enter into negotiations relating to provisional 
arrangements. 
The last sentence of articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS provides that “[provisional] 
arrangements shall be without prejudice to the final delimitation”. Indeed, a large number of 
existing (and terminated) provisional arrangements include a clause identical to the said 
provision.413 The requirement of non-prejudice appears to imply that nothing contained in the 
provisional arrangement may affect the legal position and claims of a State in relation to the 
delimitation dispute.414 However, not every interim arrangement contains a “without prejudice” 
clause. Consequently, it elicits the question of whether the absence of such a clause (particularly 
in provisional arrangements concluded between States that are not parties to the UNCLOS) has 
any significant legal implications. Of course, its insertion is preferable for avoiding legal 
uncertainty. Nonetheless, even if a “without prejudice” clause is not included in a provisional 
arrangement, there is no reason to believe that this arrangement is inconsistent with the 
requirement of non-prejudice to a final delimitation. An interesting question relates to the 
inclusion in the (terminated) CMATS Treaty of a 50-year moratorium on discussing, 
negotiating or otherwise pursuing the settlement of maritime boundaries between Timor-Leste 
and Australia.415 Although the Conciliation Commission did not discuss the issue of whether 
this moratorium was compatible with the non-prejudice requirement existing under paragraph 
3 of articles 74 and 83 of the UNCLOS, one can suppose that in a similar situation such an issue 
might arise. However, it is worth noting that the Conciliation Commission did not interpret the 
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moratorium as precluding delimitation negotiations between the Parties, including under article 
298 (1) (a) (i) of the UNCLOS. 416 
In sum, the first obligation contained in articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS constitutes a 
duty to cooperate in respect of various practical issues that may arise in a disputed maritime 
area. Although this obligation leaves States with considerable discretion as to the extent of 
efforts that must be made and the type of provisional arrangement that should be concluded, its 
importance should not be completely dismissed.417 The obligation to make every effort to reach 
an interim arrangement is not merely a recommendation, but rather a binding rule “whose 
breach would represent a violation of international law”.418 The following section provides 
guidance on how to act in good faith in fulfilling the obligation to seek a provisional 
arrangement. 
3.3.2 The issue of breach 
In Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire, the SC held that the fact that Côte d'Ivoire had not requested Ghana to 
enter into negotiations on a provisional arrangement of a practical nature prevented Côte 
d'Ivoire from claiming that Ghana had violated the obligation to negotiate such an 
arrangement.419 In other words, the first step required of a State is a proposal to the other 
claiming State to establish a provisional arrangement in a disputed maritime area. This proposal 
triggers the other State’s duty to negotiate in good faith. 
The Guyana v. Suriname case is more informative as to what actions are required of a State to 
comply with its obligation to negotiate a provisional arrangement in good faith. In this case, 
Guyana and Suriname both claimed that the other party breached its duty to make every effort 
to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature.420 The Tribunal stated that the 
attempts of Guyana and Suriname to reach a provisional arrangement appear to have started in 
1989.421 In 1991, Guyana and Suriname concluded a MoU: “Modalities for Treatment of the 
Offshore Area of Overlap between Guyana and Suriname”.422 This MoU provided that further 
discussions would have to occur if any discoveries would be made.423 However, over the 
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following years, Suriname showed no particular interest in further discussions, despite several 
efforts made by Guyana.424 
The Tribunal drew a distinction between (in)action of Suriname prior to and after 8 August 
1998, which is the date when the UNCLOS came into force.425 The Tribunal stated that acts 
prior to 8 August 1998 could not form the basis of a finding that Suriname breached its 
obligation under the UNCLOS.426 In this respect, one can recall the rule of State responsibility 
according to which an act of a State constitutes a breach of an international obligation only 
when the State is bound by that obligation at the time the act occurs.427 Therefore, the Tribunal 
declared that only post-8 August 1998 conduct of Suriname was relevant to its consideration, 
while recognizing that pre-8 August 1998 conduct was also contrary to the duty to make every 
effort to conclude a provisional arrangement.428 Thus, the Tribunal focused solely on the issue 
of breach of the UNCLOS-based obligation to cooperate in disputed maritime areas without 
examining its status under customary international law.429 
The Tribunal found that Suriname violated its obligation to negotiate provisional arrangements. 
When Suriname became aware of Guyana’s authorization of exploratory drilling in the disputed 
area, instead of attempting to engage in a dialogue which could have led to a satisfactory 
solution for both Parties, it resorted to self-help in threating the drilling rig, in violation of the 
UNCLOS.430 Furthermore, the Tribunal stated that Suriname could have met its obligation if it 
would have actively attempted to bring Guyana to the negotiating table, or, at least, have 
accepted a last-minute invitation proposed by Guyana and negotiated in good faith.431 
As regards Guyana, the Tribunal concluded that it also breached the obligation to make every 
effort to enter into provisional arrangements.432 The Tribunal held that Guyana failed to inform 
Suriname directly of its plans for exploratory drilling, although such drilling had been prepared 
for some time before the incident (the notification in the press by way of CGX’s public 
announcements was not sufficient).433 Moreover, Guyana should have sought to engage 
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Suriname in discussions concerning the drilling at a much earlier stage.434 The Tribunal then 
illustrated the means by which Guyana could have complied with its duty under the UNCLOS, 
including “(a) giving Suriname official and detailed notice of the planned activities; (b) seeking 
cooperation of Suriname in undertaking the activities; (c) offering to share the results of the 
exploration and giving Suriname an opportunity to observe the activities; and (d) offering to 
share all the financial benefits received from the exploratory activities”.435 
Although the Tribunal found that both Guyana and Suriname violated their obligations to 
negotiate provisional arrangements in good faith, it also noted that after the CGX incident, the 
Parties acted in conformity with the obligation to make every effort to arrive at a provisional 
arrangement, even though the joint meetings had not resulted in reaching such an 
arrangement.436 
Thus, a number of conclusions follow from the foregoing. State A cannot invoke State B’s 
international responsibility for a violation of the obligation to seek a provisional arrangement 
in the event that State A has not attempted to propose State B such an arrangement. At the same 
time, once State B is requested to conclude a provisional arrangement, it is required to enter 
into negotiations concerning this matter. It is expected that both States actively participate in 
the negotiation process. However, if the negotiations between States have not proved to be 
fruitful, it does not mean that the obligation to seek a provisional arrangement is breached by 
failure to achieve a result. Neither does it mean that this obligation ceases. As discussed in 
Chapter 3.2 above, the obligation continues to apply until State A and State B reach a final 
agreement on delimitation or a court/tribunal determines a maritime boundary. 
It is interesting to note that among the steps Guyana could have taken in order to meet the 
obligation to make every effort to reach a provisional arrangement, the Tribunal listed the 
requirement to notify directly of unilateral drilling planned in the disputed area. It does not 
appear that the Tribunal based its statement upon the findings in relation to the obligation not 
to hamper or jeopardize, namely that Guyana’s unilateral exploratory drilling was contrary to 
this obligation.437 
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The Tribunal’s logic implies that when State A permits exploratory drilling (as well as other 
petroleum operations)438 in an area also claimed by State B, State A shall give State B an official 
notice of these operations. In light of the general principles examined in Chapter 2, the 
requirement to notify is reasonable and justified. This research does not involve a detailed 
analysis of State practice regarding notification in disputed maritime areas. However, from the 
examples available,439 it does not appear to be common for States to inform other States of their 
(unilateral) hydrocarbon activities. States usually find out necessary information in other 
sources (e.g., a press release published by a State based on a licensing round). One possible 
explanation for that might be that each State considers the CS on which hydrocarbon activities 
take place as appertaining to it. Therefore, it is not uncommon that States claiming sovereign 
rights over the same maritime area authorize competitive operations in this area without any 
notice, which often may result in tensions between them. 
Subsequent questions are: (a) how does a notification of a planned activity affect this activity; 
and (b) what are implications in the absence of such a notification? These questions are 
interlinked with the question of what hydrocarbon activities are permissible in disputed 
maritime areas that is addressed in the next sections of this Chapter. At the same time, it could 
be argued that even if a petroleum operation is indeed allowed (although the following section 
demonstrates the legal uncertainty concerning this issue), the absence of a notification of that 
operation may constitute a breach of the duty to cooperate and such general principles of 
international law as the principle of good faith and the principle of good neighborliness.440 
Articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS set forth two separate duties whose breach should 
be treated differently. 
3.3.3 Types of provisional arrangements of a practical nature 
As discussed above, paragraph 3 does not specify types of provisional arrangements that States 
may enter into. Consequently, many States have formulated a wide variety of interim solutions, 
which are likely to constitute provisional arrangements of a practical nature within the meaning 
of articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS. These interim solutions include a moratorium on 
all or specific activities within a disputed maritime area,441 joint exploitation of living and/or 
non-living marine resources, agreements on environmental cooperation, as well as agreements 
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on allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction.442 This thesis focuses only on one type of 
provisional arrangements that makes the exploration and/or exploitation of disputed 
hydrocarbons possible.443 Such provisional arrangements are often referred to as “joint 
development agreements”.444 Nevertheless, this thesis does not use that term because each 
example of joint development has its own features445 and, as indicated in Chapter 3.3.1, does 
not always take the form of an agreement. Chapter 6 will consider relevant provisional 
arrangements concluded between States in disputed maritime areas in detail. 
There is considerable debate in the legal literature on whether the duty to cooperate with respect 
to disputed hydrocarbons reflects customary international law. While some commentators are 
of the view that the duty to cooperate constitutes a rule of customary international law,446 other 
commentators oppose that view because State practice is far from being uniform and is 
conditioned not only by international law, but also by economic and social factors.447 At the 
same time, even if the duty to cooperate in respect of disputed hydrocarbons is a rule of 
customary international law, this duty does not require States to achieve a concrete result, 
namely the conclusion of a provisional arrangement, and does not dictate a particular form of 
an arrangement to be concluded between States. 
3.4 The obligation not to jeopardize or hamper final delimitation 
Along with the positive obligation to make every effort to arrive at provisional arrangements of 
a practical nature, articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS provide a negative obligation to 
make every effort not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a final agreement on delimitation. 
This section examines the latter obligation. The obligation not to jeopardize or hamper is 
particularly important when neighboring States have not been able to reach a provisional 
arrangement or have not even attempted to do so insofar as this obligation is designed to limit 
activities in a disputed maritime area.448 The importance of this obligation has increased in light 
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of the recent dictum of the SC in Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire. In paragraph 592 of its Judgment, the 
SC stated: 
maritime activities undertaken by a State in an area of the continental shelf which has been attributed to 
another State by an international judgment cannot be considered to be in violation of the sovereign rights 
of the latter if those activities were carried out before the judgment was delivered and if the area concerned 
was the subject of claims made in good faith by both States. 
Consequently, the SC held that the argument advanced by Côte d’Ivoire that Ghana’s 
hydrocarbon activities conducted in the disputed area constitute a violation of the sovereign 
rights of Côte d’Ivoire was not sustainable, even assuming that some of those activities took 
place in areas attributed to Côte d’Ivoire by the Judgment.449 This statement has far-reaching 
implications. When State A authorizes and carries out hydrocarbon activities in a disputed 
maritime area without State B’s permission, this would not be in breach of State B’s sovereign 
rights even if the maritime area (or its parts) where these activities were taken place would be 
attributed to State B (State A needs to demonstrate that it made its claims in good faith). The 
SC’s finding does not contribute to restrain States from conducting unilateral hydrocarbon 
activities in disputed maritime areas.450 On the contrary, this finding may trigger unilateralism 
in those areas.451 Thus, the negative obligation set forth in paragraph 3 of articles 74 and 83 of 
the UNCLOS appears to be the main “legal device” that can regulate the conduct of maritime 
activities, including hydrocarbon activities, in undelimited maritime areas.452 
3.4.1 The core content of the obligation and its significance 
From the outset, it is worth emphasizing that the requirement to “make every effort” also applies 
to the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper, not only to the obligation to seek provisional 
arrangements.453 It would be a significant difference if the UNCLOS had stipulated an absolute 
obligation not to jeopardize or hamper. However, for convenience, the considered obligation is 
abbreviated as ‘the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper’ in this thesis. The temporal scope 
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of this obligation and the meaning of the phrase ‘make every effort’ have been discussed in 
Chapters 3.2 and 3.3.1 above, respectively. 
Paragraph 3 does not define the terms ‘jeopardize’ and ‘hamper’. According to the Concise 
Oxford Dictionary, the verb ‘jeopardize’ means to “put (someone or something) into a situation 
in which there is a danger of loss, harm, or failure”, while ‘hamper’ means to “hinder or impede 
the movement or progress of”.454 Thus, the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper appears to 
mean that States having overlapping claims regarding a certain maritime area must make every 
effort not to engage in activities that might endanger the reaching of a final agreement on 
delimitation or impede the progress of negotiations to that end.455 
It is clear that the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper does not necessarily exclude all 
activities unilaterally conducted within undelimited maritime areas, but rather those that would 
jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a final delimitation agreement.456 However, it is unclear 
which types of activities are to be regarded as having the effect of jeopardizing or hampering. 
In the framework of this Chapter, the principal question relates to the nature of unilateral 
hydrocarbon activities that is likely to breach the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper.457 
Anderson and van Logchem, and van Logchem writing separately, affirm that the question of 
what type of conduct jeopardizes or hampers is not likely to be answered in the abstract. They 
argue that the assessment of whether a particular unilateral action amounts to jeopardizing or 
hampering is subjective.458 However, a court or tribunal dealing with a (putative) breach of the 
obligation not to jeopardize or hamper would be likely to apply an objective criterion, as the 
Tribunal in Guyana v. Suriname did (or attempted to do).459 The Tribunal introduced a standard 
of “(permanent) physical change to the marine environment” that in general terms implies that 
petroleum activities which satisfy this standard shall not be permitted in undelimited maritime 
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areas and those which do not, are to be allowed.460 This Chapter discusses the reasonableness 
of such an approach with respect to the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper. 
The existence of an objective standard as to what constitutes jeopardizing or hampering may be 
seen as also desirable for ensuring the stability of private petroleum companies’ activities in 
undelimited maritime areas and the investment flow. 
The issue of unilateral conduct is of a practical importance. There are a number of examples 
where States, despite the existence of a disputed maritime area, carry out unilateral exploration 
and/or exploitation activities in such area. The ongoing Somalia v. Kenya case exemplifies this 
scenario.461 In other situations, the legality of unilateral petroleum activities has not yet been 
challenged before a judicial body (for different reasons).462 
It is also important to note that there are examples where neighboring States have abstained 
from or suspended hydrocarbon activities in undelimited areas following an agreement or a 
protest from one of the States.463 In some cases, unilateral hydrocarbon activities resulted in the 
conclusion of provisional arrangements.464 This elicits the question of whether the duty of 
restraint embodied in the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper reflects customary international 
law. In 1984, Lagoni stated that articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS could be the basis 
for an emerging customary rule.465 His observation was based on the fact that paragraph 3 
represented an element of progressive development within the rules on delimitation that did not 
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in themselves go beyond existing customary international law.466 Can one now affirm that the 
duty of restraint is an international custom? 
States usually do not announce the legal motivation behind their decision not to conduct 
petroleum activities.467 Therefore, it is difficult to establish whether States consider themselves 
bound by the duty to exercise restraint in undelimited maritime areas (opinio juris), which is 
necessary for the formation of customary international law. It is also important to bear in mind 
that there are many examples where States continue hydrocarbon activities despite objections 
of their neighbors. Even if the duty of restraint has the status of customary international law, 
this does not provide a clear answer to the question of the extent to which a State shall exercise 
restraint in an undelimited maritime area. 
3.4.2 Guyana v. Suriname – the key case on the application of the obligation 
Guyana v. Suriname is the leading case in which the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper was 
considered in detail. Ten years after the Tribunal rendered its Award in Guyana v. Suriname, 
the ITLOS’s SC had an opportunity to elaborate the meaning of the obligation not to jeopardize 
or hamper in Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire. However, the SC did very little in this respect partly because 
of the submissions’ formulation of Côte d’Ivoire.468 Thus, Guyana v. Suriname remains the 
only one where the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper has been applied and interpreted in 
the context of unilateral hydrocarbon activities in disputed maritime areas. 
In Guyana v. Suriname, the Tribunal considered the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper in 
the context of the legality of exploratory drilling authorized by Guyana in an area where the 
maritime claims of Guyana and Suriname overlapped. When considering this obligation, the 
Tribunal heavily relied on a provisional measures Order indicated by the ICJ in Aegean Sea 
Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey).469 
It is worth noting that the regime of provisional measures has a different origin. The power to 
prescribe provisional measures is given, inter alia, to the ICJ and the ITLOS under provisions 
set forth in their constituent instruments.470 There are several requirements that must be met in 
order for these judicial bodies to exercise this power.471 Although the regime of provisional 
                                                            
466 Ibid., p. 368. See Chapter 1 on the dichotomy between progressive development and codification. 
467 BIICL’s Report on Undelimited Maritime Areas, op. cit., paras. 137-141. 
468 Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Judgment, para. 633. See Ermolina and Yiallourides, op. cit. See also Chapter 3.2.2. 
469 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Interim Protection, Order, 11 September 1976, ICJ Reports 
1976, p. 3. 
470 ICJ’s Statute, art. 41; ITLOS’s Statute, art. 25.  




measures is of a special nature, the legal requirements developed by international courts and 
tribunals for prescribing provisional measures may nevertheless provide some assistance in 
interpreting the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper.472 
The Tribunal underlined that the “exceptional” power to prescribe provisional measures is 
triggered only when activities carried out in disputed maritime areas might cause irreparable 
prejudice to the rights of the parties.473 However, the Tribunal stated that cases dealing with the 
prescription of provisional measures are informative as to what type of activities “should be 
permissible” in disputed areas pending a delimitation agreement or a provisional 
arrangement.474 It automatically means that the informative value of provisional measures is 
also contained in explaining which activities are to be prohibited in disputed maritime areas. 
The Tribunal further held that activities to which the prescription of provisional measures would 
be justified, “would easily meet the lower threshold of hampering or jeopardizing the reaching 
of a final agreement” on delimitation.475 In other words, the Tribunal characterized the threshold 
for prescribing provisional measures as being higher than the threshold for identifying activities 
that jeopardize or hamper under the meaning of articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS. 
Despite this observation, the criteria that guided the Tribunal in its analysis of whether a breach 
of the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper had occurred were those “used by international 
courts and tribunals in assessing a request for [provisional] measures, notably the risk of 
physical damage to the seabed or subsoil”.476 Hence, it is difficult to understand the extent to 
which the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper actually diverges from the regime of 
provisional measures.477 Moreover, it leaves open the question of whether activities that would 
not meet the standard for prescribing provisional measures, can nevertheless be regarded as 
jeopardizing or hampering the reaching of a final agreement.478 
While the Tribunal blurred the line between the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper and the 
regime of provisional measures, the practice of prescribing provisional measures seems to 
maintain this division. It clearly follows from Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire in which the SC made no 
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mention of articles 74 (3) and 84 (3) of the UNCLOS in its Order, even though both Parties 
mentioned those provisions in their submissions. One possible explanation might be that the 
Chamber considered these articles irrelevant in the context of provisional measures. Moreover, 
the circumstances surrounding Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire differed significantly from those in 
Guyana v. Suriname. 
Thus, the conditions for prescribing provisional measures could contribute to the clarification 
of the content of the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper. However, considering that the 
regime of provisional measures has been established independently from paragraph 3, it is 
debatable whether findings of a dispute settlement body on the obligation not to jeopardize or 
hamper would significantly influence the development of the requirements within the institution 
of provisional measures. This suggests that there may be a one-sided relationship between the 
regime of provisional measures and paragraph 3.479  
3.4.3 The Tribunal’s interpretation of the obligation 
This section looks at how the Tribunal in Guyana v. Suriname applied and interpreted the 
obligation not to jeopardize or hamper in the context of unilateral hydrocarbon activities in a 
maritime area in dispute. 
3.4.3.1 The adoption of the standard of “(permanent) physical change to the marine 
environment”  
Although Guyana v. Suriname concerned exploratory drilling in an area claimed by both 
Parties, the Tribunal made statements of a general character on the question of what types of 
unilateral conduct would breach the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper. 
The Tribunal distinguished two categories of unilateral activities: those that “do not cause a 
physical change to the marine environment” and those that “do cause [such a] physical 
change”.480 The Tribunal further stated that the first category would “generally” not be 
considered as jeopardizing or hampering the reaching a final maritime boundary agreement, 
whereas the second category would have the effect of jeopardizing or hampering.481 The 
Tribunal found support for this distinction in the international jurisprudence of prescribing 
provisional measures, in particular in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf.482 The Tribunal’s reliance 
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on the Aegean Sea Order elicits the questions of whether it was appropriate for the interpretation 
of the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper and whether it was in line with the regime of 
provisional measures (also taking into account the recent Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Order).483 
It is noteworthy that the Tribunal also introduced an additional element of permanence into the 
phrase ‘physical change to the marine environment’.484 Arguably, the latter phrase covers a 
range of activities wider than those that fall within the definition of ‘permanent physical change 
to the marine environment’.485 Thus, the word ‘permanent’ logically excludes activities that 
would have only a temporal physical impact on the marine environment.486 
Subsequently, the Tribunal gave four other definitions of activities that are likely to jeopardize 
or hamper the reaching a final delimitation agreement: activities with a risk of “physical damage 
to the seabed or subsoil”;487 activities that “might affect the other party’s rights in a permanent 
manner”;488 “activities having a permanent physical impact on the marine environment”;489 and 
activities that “might cause permanent damage to the marine environment”.490 
It is apparent that activities affecting the rights of the parties in a permanent way differ from 
activities having a (permanent) physical change or damage to, or having a (permanent) physical 
impact on, the marine environment. While activities within the latter category are broadly 
similar, although they may differ as to the degree of permanency or otherwise of their adverse 
effects, activities in the first category are conceptually quite different.491 However, as discussed 
below in this Chapter, all definitions employed by the Tribunal generally refer to the provisional 
measures stage and are the necessary requirements for the prescription of provisional measures. 
Thus, contrary to what the Tribunal stated about the difference between the thresholds, it 
actually applied a standard higher than that applicable under articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the 
UNCLOS in relation to jeopardizing or hampering the reaching of a final agreement. Therefore, 
one can conclude that the standard adopted in Guyana v. Suriname may be considered too strict 
in determining whether the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper has been violated. 
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Arguably, the question of whether a particular activity jeopardizes or hampers the reaching of 
a final delimitation agreement should be examined not on the basis of its physical effects on the 
seabed or subsoil, but rather on the basis of its potential adverse effects on the likelihood of 
reaching of a delimitation agreement. Moreover, as further discussed in Chapter 3.5, the 
requirement of (permanent) physical damage does not seem to be the only standard applicable 
in assessing a request for provisional measures.  
3.4.3.2 The meaning of the standard of “(permanent) physical change to the marine 
environment” 
Pursuant to the Tribunal’s reasoning, the standard of “(permanent) physical change to the 
marine environment” appears to be decisive in identifying hydrocarbon activities that may 
jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a final agreement on delimitation. The Tribunal did not 
clarify the meaning of this standard. However, it is reasonable to assume that the Tribunal meant 
unilateral activities that may result in a (permanent) modification of a physical character of the 
marine environment and its components, including the seabed and subsoil. It is notable that the 
Tribunal defined the marine environment as the object to which physical damage shall not be 
caused and has thereby broadened the scope of the criterion used by the ICJ in the Aegean Sea 
Order.492 The Aegean Sea Order referred only to “the seabed or subsoil or to their natural 
resources”.493 
The Tribunal further explained the adoption of the standard by commenting that activities 
having a (permanent) physical change to the marine environment might alter the status quo494 
or prejudice the position of a party in a delimitation dispute.495 
However, the Tribunal’s explanation is not quite clear. For example, modern seismic 
exploration techniques may allow an effective means of assessing the resource potential of the 
CS without permanent physical change to the marine environment and can reliably inform a 
State what parts of an undelimited maritime area are potentially rich in hydrocarbon 
resources.496 In his analysis of the Guyana v. Suriname Award, Fietta has emphasized that: 
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unilateral seismic exploration could, therefore, in some circumstances, significantly alter the status quo as 
regards the comparative levels of knowledge of two neighboring states about the value of all (or part) of a 
disputed maritime area. Such a disequilibrium in knowledge between two states could, in many cases, make 
a final delimitation agreement more difficult to obtain.497 
Thus, while seismic exploration could somehow change the status quo or affect the outcome of 
delimitation negotiations, this activity is unlikely to cause any permanent physical change to 
the marine environment.498 
3.4.3.3 (Unilateral) hydrocarbon activities that (are likely to) fall under the scope of the 
standard  
In the view of the Tribunal, seismic exploration is not a type of activity that might lead to a 
(permanent) physical change or damage to the marine environment and, therefore, “should be 
permissible in a disputed area”.499 It is important to emphasize here that the Tribunal made this 
statement against the background that neither State had raised an objection to seismic testing 
authorized by the other State in the disputed maritime area.500  The Tribunal thus arrived at the 
conclusion that “in the circumstances at hand”, unilateral seismic testing conducted by a Party 
in the disputed area is not inconsistent with its obligation not to jeopardize or hamper.501 
Following the logic of the Tribunal, it could be argued that in certain circumstances, unilateral 
seismic exploration can nonetheless constitute a breach of the obligation not to jeopardize or 
hamper. The main question is what these circumstances are. Even assuming that the legality of 
seismic exploration in an undelimited area is called into question, it is very unlikely that this 
activity would satisfy the standard of permanent physical damage to the marine environment502 
and, thereby, would not amount to a breach of the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper. It 
remains unclear why the Tribunal, instead of adopting a uniform standard that unilateral seismic 
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activity by its very definition is allowed in disputed maritime areas, whatever the circumstances, 
used the phrase ‘should be permissible’.503 
Saying that seismic testing does not involve any physical modification of the CS and its natural 
resources, it could nevertheless be argued that this activity may have (although not permanent) 
physical effects on the marine environment. For example, sonic waves can negatively affect 
living marine resources, i.e., cause a change of fish migration routes or result in hearing 
impairment of marine mammals.504 
As regards exploratory drilling, the Tribunal declared that “some exploratory drilling might 
cause permanent damage to the marine environment”.505 However, the Tribunal did not clarify 
what kind of exploratory drilling it conceived as likely to fall into this category. It nevertheless 
appears reasonable to assume that all exploratory drilling operations could result in an 
irreversible physical change to the CS and, hence, should not be permissible in the absence of 
either a delimitation agreement or a provisional arrangement. Drilling is an activity which 
involves crushing the rock on and beneath the seabed.506 
The Tribunal abstained from concluding as to whether unilateral exploratory drilling authorized 
by Guyana in the disputed maritime area was consistent with that State’s obligation not to 
jeopardize or hamper and merely alluded to remedies envisaged by Part XV and Annex VII of 
the UNCLOS.507 However, it appears that the authorization of concession holders to carry out 
exploratory drilling in the disputed area was considered by the Tribunal as an act that 
jeopardized or hampered the reaching of a final delimitation treaty. Whereas the Tribunal held 
that Suriname breached its obligation not to jeopardize or hamper by the use of a threat of force 
against Guyana’s exploratory drilling, it also concluded that Guyana violated the obligation not 
to jeopardize or hamper.508 It is logical to infer that unilateral exploratory drilling of Guyana 
was the reason for the latter statement. The most likely explanation for the Tribunal’s hesitation 
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might be that the Tribunal decided to attribute the area where Guyana authorized its exploratory 
drilling operations to Guyana.509 
Unlike seismic exploration and some exploratory drilling, the Tribunal stated that unilateral 
exploitation of oil and gas resources in a disputed area would undoubtedly jeopardize or 
hamper.510 Although neither Guyana nor Suriname had conducted exploitation of hydrocarbon 
reservoirs in the disputed area, the Tribunal found that such activities are to be prohibited, since 
they always lead to a permanent physical change to the marine environment.511 
3.5 The relationship between the obligation not to jeopardize or 
hamper and the regime of provisional measures 
As noted earlier in this Chapter, the regime of provisional measures and the obligation not to 
jeopardize or hamper have different origins.512 However, the requirements developed by 
international courts and tribunals for prescribing provisional measures are often considered a 
source that may inform the determination of what acts would have the effect of jeopardizing or 
hampering.513 In Guyana v. Suriname, the Tribunal stated that activities that warrant the 
prescription of provisional measures would also breach the obligation not to jeopardize or 
hamper.514 This section examines what unilateral petroleum operations in a disputed area might 
justify the prescription of provisional measures. At the same time, it is important to bear in 
mind that activities might still amount to jeopardizing or hampering even if they do not trigger 
the power to prescribe provisional measures.515 
This section focuses on two provisional measures orders: in the Aegean Sea and Ghana/Côte 
d’Ivoire cases. Similar to Guyana v. Suriname, these two cases were concerned with the issue 
of certain hydrocarbon activities undertaken unilaterally in areas of overlapping maritime 
claims. It is also important to note that the Aegean Sea Order was indicated by the ICJ, while 
the Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Order was prescribed by a Chamber of the ITLOS. Although both 
institutions are largely guided by the same set of requirements,516 the ICJ’s regime of 
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provisional measures517 has been established independently from the regime of provisional 
measures under the UNCLOS. The common feature of these two regimes is that a party to a 
dispute may resort to the procedure of requesting provisional measures only when the dispute 
has been submitted to the ICJ or ITLOS. However, two points of difference between the regimes 
are worthy to mention. 
The first is that in accordance with the ICJ Rules, the Court may exercise its power to indicate 
provisional measures, regardless of whether a request has been submitted or not.518 Unlike the 
ICJ, article 290 (3) of the UNCLOS empowers the ITLOS to prescribe provisional measures 
only when one of the parties to a dispute has made a written request. The ITLOS Statute 
stipulates that the ITLOS has the power to “prescribe” provisional measures,519 whereas the ICJ 
Statute employs the verb ‘indicate’.520 The question of whether provisional measures indicated 
by the ICJ are mandatory was resolved in favor of their binding nature in the LaGrand case.521 
The second is that article 290 (1) of the UNCLOS sets forth that the prescription of provisional 
measures may be justified on two different legal grounds: in order to preserve the rights of 
either party to the dispute or in order to prevent serious harm to the marine environment. 
Although article 41 (1) of the ICJ Statute does not refer to the latter, it is reasonable to conclude 
that the power of the ICJ to indicate provisional measures may also have as its object the 
protection of the marine environment. Article 290 of the UNCLOS applies to the ICJ, along 
with the ITLOS, and relevant international tribunal, when it exercises jurisdiction under the 
UNCLOS. 
3.5.1 The legal requirements for the prescription of provisional measures and 
their applicability to the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper 
The jurisprudence of both the ICJ and the ITLOS establishes that several legal conditions must 
be met in order to prescribe provisional measures. The first prerequisite for prescribing 
provisional measures is that the relevant court or tribunal must satisfy itself that it has prima 
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facie jurisdiction over the dispute.522 Once prima facie jurisdiction is established, the objectives 
pursued by a requested party shall be considered. 
The next two legal conditions under which a court or tribunal can exercise its power to prescribe 
provisional measures are intertwined. One is the requirement of urgency and the other is the 
requirement of a risk that irreparable prejudice might be caused to the rights of the parties to 
the dispute before a final decision on the merits is delivered. The former requirement is 
generally considered in the context of the rights that are to be preserved. Therefore, it appears 
logical to examine the question of whether there is a risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights 
at stake, before moving to the issue of urgency. Both the ICJ and the ITLOS are of the view 
that provisional measures may be prescribed only if there is “a real and imminent risk that 
irreparable prejudice may be caused to the rights of the parties to the dispute”.523 Interestingly, 
neither the ICJ Statute nor article 290 of the UNCLOS refer to the concept of irreparable 
prejudice. Nevertheless, under the regime of provisional measures, this concept is generally 
understood as a harm that cannot be fully compensated by way of financial reparations.524 
While the first paragraph of article 290 of the UNCLOS does not mention the requirement of 
urgency for the prescription of provisional measures, the fifth paragraph expressly refers to “the 
urgency of the situation”. The latter paragraph applies when a dispute has been submitted to an 
arbitral tribunal, which has not yet been constituted. In such a case, paragraph 5 authorizes any 
court or tribunal agreed upon by the parties to the dispute, the ITLOS or, in respect of activities 
in the Area, the Seabed Disputes Chamber, to prescribe provisional measures.525 Although 
paragraph 1 contains no reference to “urgency”, it is generally understood that the ITLOS, the 
ICJ or an arbitral tribunal may issue an order for provisional measures only in a case of 
urgency.526 The standard of urgency implies that there is “the need to avert a real and imminent 
risk that irreparable prejudice may be caused to [the] rights at issue before the final decision is 
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delivered”.527 It has been observed that the requirement of urgency is stricter when an applicant 
requests provisional measures under paragraph 5 of article 290 than it is when provisional 
measures are requested under paragraph 1.528 
The next legal requirement, which shall be fulfilled for the prescription of provisional measures, 
is that the provisional measures requested by a party must be linked to the rights it claims.529 In 
addition to the requirements discussed above, recently both the ICJ and the ITLOS have started 
to apply a new standard: the standard of plausibility.530 The application of the plausibility test 
means that prior to the prescription of provisional measures, a court or tribunal has to satisfy 
itself that the rights, which a party claims on the merits and seeks to preserve, are at least 
plausible.531 
While exercising its power, a relevant court or tribunal may prescribe provisional measures that 
are in whole or in part different from those requested by a party.532 
It remains worth emphasizing that by means of a provisional measures order, particular 
transitory obligations may be imposed upon States while a final decision on the merits is 
pending. States must comply with the interim obligations imposed on them by a provisional 
measures order in good faith. Hence, States may incur the international responsibility for a 
breach of these obligations.533 
The regime of provisional measures has been established and thereafter developed in order to 
preserve the potential rights of the parties to a dispute pending a final decision on the merits. 
Similarly, the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper is intended to confine activities for the 
purpose of protecting the putative rights of each party pending the establishment of a maritime 
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boundary,534 which also corresponds the no-harm principle discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
Therefore, it could be argued that some requirements existing in the context of provisional 
measures may apply by analogy to the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper. There are two 
requirements that directly aim at protecting the rights: the requirement of irreparable prejudice 
and the requirement of plausibility.535 The first requirement seems to be the most applicable to 
the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper. 
Against this background, the statement of the Tribunal in Guyana v. Suriname can be recalled. 
The Tribunal held that activities that would satisfy the condition of irreparable prejudice would 
automatically constitute a violation of the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper.536 
Consequently, the following sections of this Chapter examine the question of what kinds of 
hydrocarbon activities are likely to result in irreversible prejudice to the rights of parties to a 
delimitation dispute. 
As regards the second requirement, its incorporation into the obligation not to jeopardize or 
hamper would significantly limit the scope of this obligation. In addition to the fact that the 
plausibility requirement is controversial and vague, the allegation of one State that the sovereign 
rights claimed by the other State are not plausible might affect the credibility of its own legal 
position.537 At the same time, the practice of prescribing provisional measures has established 
a low threshold for meeting the plausibility condition. For example, in Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire, 
the SC found that Côte d’Ivoire had sufficiently demonstrated that the rights it claimed and 
sought to protect in the disputed area were plausible,538 while at the stage of merits the Chamber 
decided to allocate (most of) the disputed area to Ghana.539 
3.5.2 The requirement of irreparable prejudice in the Aegean Sea Order 
In the course of litigation on the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, Greece requested the ICJ 
to indicate provisional measures in respect of unilateral seismic exploration authorized by 
Turkey in areas of the CS claimed by both countries. In particular, Greece sought provisional 
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measures requiring Turkey to refrain from all exploration activity or any scientific research 
within the disputed areas in order to preserve the sovereign rights of Greece to research, explore 
and exploit the CS appertaining to it.540 
The ICJ declined to indicate the provisional measures requested by Greece, citing three reasons 
in doing so. First, Greece made no claim that seismic exploration undertaken by Turkey – 
although it required small explosions under water for the purpose of sending sound waves 
through the seabed to obtain relevant information concerning its geophysical structure – 
involved “any risk of physical damage to the seabed or subsoil or to their natural resources”.541 
Second, Turkish seismic exploration was of a transitory character and did not involve “the 
establishment of installations on or above the seabed of the continental shelf”.542 Third, Turkey 
did not embark upon operations involving “actual appropriation or other use of the natural 
resources” located in the disputed areas of the continental shelf.543 
The ICJ reaffirmed that its power to indicate provisional measures is triggered only when the 
circumstances of a case reveal that there is a risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights of the 
parties in a dispute.544 However, the Court found that Turkish seismic exploration in the 
disputed areas constituted no risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights claimed by Greece.545 
The ICJ held that the damage caused by the acquisition of information on the natural resources 
of the disputed areas was compensable, even if the Court, in its judgment on the merits, would 
find that these areas belonged to Greece.546 Judge Stassinopoulos, in his dissenting opinion, 
argued that the gathering of information regarding the resource potential of the disputed areas 
and its possible disclosure created a risk of irreparable harm to the rights of Greece.547 His 
argument would appear to be reasonable, particularly in light of the Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Order. 
Although the Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Order is subject to scrutiny in the next section of this 
Chapter, it is worth noting that the SC has applied an approach slightly different from that of 
the ICJ in the Aegean Sea Order.548 
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The ICJ’s reasoning raises the question of whether the Court would have reached a different 
conclusion, had Greece made a claim concerning the harmful nature of Turkish seismic 
exploration. The wording of paragraph 30 seems to imply that if Greece would have provided 
sufficient material to show that Turkish activity had entailed a risk of physical harm to the 
marine environment, it would, arguably, have warranted the indication of provisional measures 
under article 41 of the ICJ’s Statute.549 Against this background, it is important to emphasize 
that the Court by no means focused on the environmental component of seismic exploration. 
At the time when the ICJ considered the request of Greece, the UNCLOS had not yet been 
adopted. Hereby, the Court was guided solely by the content of article 41 of the ICJ Statute, 
which does not include the protection of the marine environment as its objective. 
The other conclusion that follows from the wording of paragraph 30 of the Aegean Sea Order 
is that activities involving the establishment of installations or the actual exploitation of natural 
resources of a disputed maritime area are likely to be viewed as prejudicing in an irreparable 
manner. Although Turkey conducted no such activities in the disputed areas, it could 
nevertheless be assumed that if it had been the case, the Court would have been able to exercise 
its power to indicate provisional measures. 
Thus, Turkish seismic activities did not meet the condition of irreparable prejudice for granting 
of provisional measures. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that, in paragraph 32, the Court 
clearly acknowledged that seismic exploration conducted by Turkey without the consent of 
Greece could possibly cause a prejudice (although not irreparable) to the exclusive exploration 
rights of Greece, should the ICJ uphold the claims of Greece on the merits. This suggests that 
even if such a prejudice would not count as ‘irreparable’, it could be argued that unilateral 
seismic exploration in a disputed maritime area can nevertheless be categorized as jeopardizing 
or hampering. As noted above in this Chapter, in respect of the obligation not to jeopardize or 
hamper the threshold should be lower than the threshold justifying the prescription of 
provisional measures.550 
                                                            
549 Aegean Sea Order, para. 30: “no complaint has been made that this form of seismic exploration involves any 
risk of physical damage to the seabed or subsoil or to their natural resources”.  
550 The dispute between Greece and Turkey concerning the delimitation of the CS in the Aegean Sea is still a 
source of tensions between these States. See, for example, a note submitted by Greece to the UN protesting 
hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation licenses issued by Turkey in the Aegean Sea, 20 February 2013, 





3.5.3 The requirement of irreparable prejudice in the Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire 
Order 
In the course of the litigation in Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire, Côte d’Ivoire filed a request for the 
prescription of provisional measures under article 290 (1) of the UNCLOS with the SC.551 In 
its request, Côte d’Ivoire raised the issue of unilateral exploration and exploitation activities 
undertaken by Ghana in an area of overlapping claims.552 As indicated in the request, activities 
authorized by Ghana had already gone beyond simple seismic survey of the disputed area.553 
Ghana permitted a number of drilling operations and had even moved to the exploitation 
phase.554 Therefore, Côte d’Ivoire requested that Ghana be ordered, inter alia, to cease all 
ongoing oil exploration and exploitation activities in the disputed area and abstain from issuing 
any new permits for oil exploration and exploitation in this area.555 
The Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire case appears to be unusual, although not unprecedented, in terms 
of the significant exploration and investment that had occurred in the disputed area before the 
dispute was submitted to the Tribunal.556 The reason for this is that according to Ghana, it had 
acted in the belief that the Parties had mutually accepted and applied a boundary line between 
them, and that for more than 40 years (until 2009), Côte d’Ivoire did not object to Ghana’s 
hydrocarbon activities and did not inform Ghana of the existence of a different position 
concerning the delimitation issue.557 
According to article 290 (1) of the UNCLOS, pending a final decision on the merits, the SC has 
the power to prescribe provisional measures in order to preserve the respective rights of the 
parties to the dispute or to prevent serious harm to the marine environment. Therefore, a request 
for the prescription of provisional measures shall at least be based on one of the legal grounds 
mentioned in article 290 (1) of the UNCLOS. Côte d’Ivoire in its request argued that provisional 
measures had to be prescribed since there was the need both to preserve the respective rights 
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and to protect the marine environment. Côte d’Ivoire claimed that provisional measures were 
required in order to preserve three categories of its “exclusive sovereign rights … arising under 
the UNCLOS”, namely: 
• “the right to explore for and exploit the resources of Côte d’Ivoire’s seabed and the 
subsoil thereof by carrying out seismic studies and drilling, and installing major 
submarine infrastructures” in the disputed area; 
• “the right to exclusive access to confidential information” about Côte d’Ivoire’s natural 
resources in the disputed area; 
• “the right to select the oil companies to conduct exploration and exploitation operations 
and freely to determine the terms and conditions in its own best interest and in 
accordance with its own requirements with respect to oil and the environment”.558 
Moreover, Côte d’Ivoire also alleged that exploration and exploitation activities authorized by 
Ghana in the disputed area were causing serious harm to the marine environment.559 This 
allegation was used in support of Côte d’Ivoire’s claim under the protection of the marine 
environment object of article 290 (1) of the UNCLOS. 
When prescribing provisional measures, the SC stated that all legal conditions necessary for 
granting of provisional measures had been met.560 This section focuses on the changes that the 
Chamber made with respect to the requirement of irreparable prejudice. 
In its Order, the Chamber has confirmed that it prescribes provisional measures only when there 
is a real and imminent risk of causing irreparable prejudice to the rights of the parties to a 
dispute before a final decision on the merits is handed down.561 The Chamber held that a risk 
of irreparable prejudice exists where, in particular, “activities result in significant and 
permanent modification of the physical character” of an area in dispute, and where “such 
modification cannot be fully compensated by financial reparations”.562 
Côte d’Ivoire claimed that the continuation of Ghana’s unilateral activities in the contested area 
would cause irreversible damage to its sovereign rights.563 Ghana in its reply stated that the 
harm claimed by Côte d’Ivoire cannot be regarded as “irreparable” because it might be 
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addressed through an appropriate award of damages and by delivery of information acquired 
by Ghana.564 
The Chamber agreed with Ghana that “the alleged loss of the revenues derived from oil 
production could be the subject of adequate compensation in the future”.565 However, the 
Chamber took the view that the ongoing exploration and exploitation activities conducted by 
Ghana in the disputed area were of a distinctive character. Such activities were likely to “result 
in a modification of the physical characteristics of the [CS]”566 and “any compensation awarded 
would never be able to restore the status quo ante in respect of the seabed and subsoil.”567 
As regards the exclusive right to access to confidential information about the natural resources 
of the continental shelf, the Chamber took into account Ghana’s statement that the gathered 
information on the natural resources of the disputed area will be duly recorded and that Ghana 
will be able to provide this information to Côte d’Ivoire, if it will be required to do so at the 
conclusion of the dispute.568 Although the Chamber accepted the undertaking given by Ghana, 
it also held that the right claimed by Côte d’Ivoire required protection.569 
The Chamber stated that “the acquisition and use of information about the resources of the 
disputed area would create a risk of irreversible prejudice to the rights of Côte d’Ivoire”, if the 
Chamber, in its judgment on the merits, would rule that all or any part of the disputed area 
pertains to Côte d’Ivoire.570 Therefore, dealing with a matter similar to that raised in the Aegean 
Sea Order, the Chamber arrived at the opposite conclusion.571 The Chamber’s finding seems to 
imply that the condition of irreparable prejudice can be met even if there is no risk of physical 
change to the seabed and subsoil. Support for this interpretation is to be found in the formulation 
of paragraph 89 of the Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Order, which by the inclusion of the adverb ‘in 
particular’, indicates that the requirement of physical change is not the only one to satisfy the 
condition of irreparable prejudice.572 
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In sum, the Chamber accepted that an imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to the sovereign 
and exclusive rights of Côte d’Ivoire existed.573 In other words, it concluded that the exploration 
and exploitation activities planned by Ghana in the disputed area required the prescription of 
provisional measures. At the same time, the Chamber prescribed provisional measures different 
from those requested by Côte d’Ivoire. In doing so, the Chamber relied upon two main aspects: 
the preservation of Ghana’s rights and the protection of the marine environment. The Chamber 
stated that in the event that Ghana would be ordered to suspend its activities, especially in 
respect of which drilling had already taken place, it would “cause prejudice to the rights claimed 
by Ghana and create an undue burden on it” and it could also result in a “harm to the marine 
environment.”574 
A two-pronged approach of this type can be explained with the reference to the wording of 
article 290 of the UNCLOS. This article aims at preserving the respective rights of both parties 
to a dispute, not only the rights of the requesting party. Hence, the Chamber attempted to reach 
a delicate balance between the competing rights of the Parties under the regime of provisional 
measures.575 The special circumstances of the Ghana v. Côte d’Ivoire case should also be borne 
in mind. It seems that the Chamber took into account that Côte d’Ivoire was not particularly 
active to contest Ghana’s exploration and exploitation activities in the disputed area prior to 
2009, which led to Ghana’s extensive petroleum activities with accompanying massive 
financial investment in this area.576 At the same time, as underlined above in this Chapter, at 
the merits stage the Chamber paid little attention to the fact that Ghana had intensified its 
petroleum activities in the disputed area from 2009 until April 2015 when the Chamber 
prescribed the provisional measures. 
3.5.4 Some conclusions concerning the impact of provisional measures on the 
threshold of jeopardizing or hampering 
The Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire case is the second case, following the Guyana v. Suriname case, in 
which the duty of restraint embedded in the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper set forth in 
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articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS was considered by the judiciary. Unfortunately, the 
SC in Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire did very little to clarity the meaning and scope of the obligation not 
to jeopardize or hamper in the context of unilateral petroleum activities in disputed maritime 
areas. On the contrary, the SC concluded that petroleum activities carried out by State A 
unilaterally in an area also claimed by State B in good faith cannot be considered a violation of 
the sovereign rights of State B even if this area will be attributed to State B by an international 
judgment.577 Moreover, the SC did not examine the validity of the standard of “(permanent) 
physical change to the marine environment” developed by the Tribunal in Guyana v. Suriname 
for identifying what type and form of unilateral hydrocarbon activity is likely to be inconsistent 
with the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper. Thereby, this standard is still the only guide 
that exists when dealing with the issue of unilateral hydrocarbon activities in disputed maritime 
areas. 
When adopting the standard of “(permanent) physical change to the marine environment” as a 
threshold of jeopardizing or hampering, the Tribunal relied heavily on the criterion laid down 
by the ICJ in the Aegean Sea Order. In the view of the ICJ, maritime activities that pose a risk 
of physical damage to the seabed or subsoil, or to their natural resources might cause irreparable 
prejudice to those rights that are the subject of a dispute.578 The Tribunal however modified the 
ICJ’s criterion by including such additional component elements as “permanent” and “the 
marine environment”. Nevertheless, one can agree with a number of legal scholars that the 
benchmark used by the Tribunal was not fully justified with respect to the obligation not to 
jeopardize or hamper.579 In the opinion of this author, the Tribunal should have applied a less 
strict threshold for finding a breach of the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper, rather than 
referring to that used for triggering the power to prescribe provisional measures. Moreover, as 
discussed above in this Chapter, the SC in the Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Order seems to have 
changed the content of the irreparability requirement. In the context of the right to information 
about resources of the disputed maritime area, it appears that the Chamber did not consider the 
standard of permanent physical change to the marine environment as a necessary condition to 
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meet the requirement of irreparable prejudice.580 Thus, the formula provided by the Tribunal in 
Guyana v. Suriname should be revisited in light of the Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire Order. 
If one assumes that the standard of permanent physical damage is indeed a general rule of 
international law defining what unilateral hydrocarbon activities are or are not consistent with 
the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper, the question is what phases of the exploration and 
exploitation are most likely to come under the scope of this standard. The standard would 
definitely apply to activities involving the placement of permanent installations and structures 
on the seabed, or activities aimed at extracting of petroleum resources located in areas of 
overlapping maritime claims. As follows from the discussions in Chapter 3.4.3.3, all drilling 
operations entail a risk of permanent physical damage to the seabed and subsoil and, therefore, 
are likely to be contrary to the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper. The answer to the 
question of the applicability of the assumed standard to seismic testing is less certain. Seismic 
exploration would hardly meet such a high threshold for finding a violation of the obligation 
not to jeopardize or hamper. 
Moreover, the question arises as to whether the same standard should be applicable in the 
context of other unilateral activities carried out in disputed maritime areas (e.g., fisheries 
activities). It seems inappropriate to apply this standard to activities of a different nature. 
Otherwise, it would lead to the situation in which a wide range of activities cannot be 
categorized as jeopardizing or hampering. 
However, it is important to bear in mind that based on the analysis conducted in this Chapter, 
this thesis concludes that the application of the standard of permanent physical change is not 
justified for finding a breach of the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper. It argues that even 
if the mentioned standard cannot be met in the context of a particular hydrocarbon activity, it 
does not mean that this activity is in line with the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper. As 
noted above, the emphasis should be placed not on the physical effects of a hydrocarbon activity 
on the marine environment and its components, including the seabed and subsoil, but on its 
effects on the process of reaching a maritime boundary agreement. Thus, for example, seismic 
survey operations could have a jeopardizing or hampering effect on that process by providing 
one of the parties to a dispute with a considerable advantage in delimitation negotiations. A 
State’s (even erroneous) perception of an undelimited maritime area as rich in oil and gas 
resources may make that State less flexible in its negotiations with the other State. In other 
                                                            




words, State A arguing that a petroleum operation carried out by State B in an area, which is 
subject to overlapping claims made in good faith by both State A and State B, is in breach of 
the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper would need to substantiate the effect of this operation 
upon the delimitation negotiations between States A and B. 
3.6 The obligation to abstain from aggravating or extending a 
dispute 
Chapter 3.4 showed that articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS equip States with a tool to 
question the legality of hydrocarbon activities unilaterally conducted in disputed maritime 
areas: the negative obligation contained in paragraph 3 embodies a duty of States to exercise 
(mutual) restraint in these areas. However, a potential difficulty in submitting issues concerning 
the non-compliance with the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper (as well as with the 
obligation to seek provisional arrangements) may lie in the possibility for States to exclude 
certain categories of disputes from compulsory procedures entailing a binding decision. In 
particular, a State may issue a declaration under article 298 (1) (a) of the UNCLOS excluding 
“disputes concerning the interpretation or application of article 15, 74 and 83 relating to sea 
boundary delimitation […]”. Logically, all issues related to the obligations contained in 
paragraph 3 of articles 74 and 83 are covered by this opt-out provision.581 
The literature suggests that the duty of restraint in disputed maritime areas derives not only 
from the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper under articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS, 
but also from the obligation not to engage in acts that might aggravate or extend a dispute (as 
well as from more general principles of international law considered in Chapter 2).582 This 
section examines the extent to which the obligation not to aggravate or extend a (maritime 
boundary) dispute may influence the possibility of States to unilaterally conduct hydrocarbon 
activities in disputed maritime areas. 
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The South China Sea Arbitration is notable in this respect. Prior to the South China Sea Award, 
the obligation not to aggravate or extend a dispute had been articulated only under the umbrella 
of provisional measures. This fact did not go unnoticed by the Tribunal,583 when the Philippines 
claimed that by conducting a number of activities China had aggravated and extended the 
Parties’ disputes.584 However, the Tribunal stated that the extensive jurisprudence on 
provisional measures must be understood as recalling an already existing obligation beyond the 
purview of provisional measures to abstain from aggravating or extending a dispute or 
disputes.585 The Tribunal considered the obligation not to aggravate or extend as corollary to 
the obligation to settle disputes peacefully included, inter alia, in the UNCLOS and UN 
documents.586 The Tribunal also linked the obligation not to aggravate or extend with the 
principle of good faith, which is “no less applicable to the provisions of a treaty relating to 
dispute settlement”.587 Moreover, the obligation not to aggravate or extend may be seen as a 
specific application of the more general principle not to harm examined in Chapter 2 above. 
Thus, the Tribunal’s finding implies that the obligation not to aggravate or extend a dispute 
exists by the very fact of such a dispute and does not depend on whether a court or tribunal has 
issued an order imposing non-aggravation or extension provisional measures. 
3.6.1 The obligation’s substantive scope 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines the verb ‘aggravate’ as “make (something) worse or more 
serious” and the verb ‘extend’ as “cause (something) to last longer”.588 In other words, it means 
that when there is a maritime boundary dispute between States, they must not engage in 
acts/activities that would increase the gravity of this dispute or lead to an additional time for its 
settlement. The main question here is what type of conduct might exacerbate or extend a 
maritime delimitation dispute. 
It is interesting to note that when addressing the issue of whether China’s actions in the context 
of the South China Sea case such as dredging, artificial island-building and other construction 
activities had aggravated and extended the disputes between the Parties,589 the Tribunal did not 
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use the jurisprudence on provisional measures. Although the Philippines did not request non-
aggravation or extension provisional measures, this fact, for example, did not prevent the 
Tribunal in Guyana v. Suriname from applying the criteria developed in the context of 
provisional measures at the merits stage.590 One possible explanation might be that the Tribunal 
in South China Sea attempted to avoid the controversial issue concerning the threshold for 
indicating provisional measures aimed at preventing the aggravation or extension of a dispute, 
which is harder to crystallize than the threshold considered in the preceding section of this 
Chapter.591 Another explanation might be that the Tribunal desired to distinguish the issue of 
aggravation as a claim at the merits stage from that existing in the context of provisional 
measures.  
The Tribunal in South China Sea held that “actions [which may aggravate or extend a dispute] 
must have a specific nexus with the rights and claims making up the parties’ dispute in order to 
fall foul of the limits applicable to parties engaged in the conduct of dispute resolution 
proceedings”.592 Further, the Tribunal stated that a party to a dispute (within the meaning given 
by the Tribunal to the term ‘dispute’ mentioned below in this section) may aggravate this 
dispute by: (a) continuing with actions that “are alleged to violate the rights of the other [party], 
in such a way as to render the alleged violation more serious”; (b) “taking actions that would 
frustrate the effectiveness of a potential decision, or render its implementation by the parties 
significantly more difficult”; or (c) “rendering the work of a court or tribunal significantly more 
onerous or taking other actions that decrease the likelihood of the proceedings in fact leading 
to the resolution of the parties’ dispute”.593 By applying these criteria, the Tribunal concluded 
                                                            
590 See Chapter 3.4 
591 The essence of this issue lies in the fact that in a number of cases, the ICJ has stated that it possesses the power 
to indicate provisional measures in order to prevent the aggravation or extension of a dispute (along with the power 
to prescribe provisional measures with a view to preserving specific rights of the parties). It raised the question of 
whether the indication of the former type of provisional measures is subject to the same conditions that must be 
met when the latter type of provisional measures is sought. In Pulp Mills, the ICJ dismissed Uruguay’s request for 
provisional measures because it found that there was no imminent risk of irreparable harm to the rights. Based on 
this finding, the Court declined to indicate provisional measures aiming merely at the non-aggravation or extension 
of the dispute (see Pulp Mills Order, para. 50). See also P. Palchetti, “The Power of the International Court of 
Justice to Indicate Provisional Measures to Prevent the Aggravation of a Dispute”, Leiden Journal of International 
Law, 2008, vol. 21(3), pp. 623-642; S. Forlati, The International Court of Justice: An Arbitral Tribunal or a 
Judicial Body, Springer, 2014, Chapter 7; K. Oellers, “Provisional Measures in Interpretation Proceedings – A 
New Way to Extend the Court’s Jurisdiction? The Practice of the Court in the Avena and Temple of Preah Vihear 
Cases”, in: C. C. Jalloh and O. Elias (eds), Shielding Humanity: Essays in International Law in Honour of Judge 
Abdul G. Koroma, Brill Nijhoff, 2015. 
592 South China Sea, para. 1174. 




that China had aggravated and extended a number of disputes through its activities conducted 
in the South China Sea.594 
Thus, the analysis in this section suggests that the obligation not to aggravate or extend a dispute 
imposes a requirement upon States to exercise restraint in disputed maritime areas, that is to 
say, to refrain from activities that could make the resolution of the dispute difficult. This 
requirement of restraint links the obligation not to aggravate or extend a dispute with the 
obligation not to jeopardize or hamper which, at its core, aims to limit activities that might 
jeopardize or hamper the reaching of a final delimitation. It seems that the latter obligation 
derives from the former obligation having a more general character. However, as follows from 
the Tribunal’s reasoning in South China Sea, the threshold for finding a violation of the 
obligation not to aggravate or extend a dispute is lower than in respect of the obligation not to 
jeopardize or hamper. Therefore, a State engaged in unilateral hydrocarbon activities in a 
disputed maritime area may easier fall short of the obligation not to aggravate or extend a 
dispute, in contrast with the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper. 
3.6.2 The obligation’s temporal scope 
One of the issues that arises is the point in time at which the obligation not to aggravate or 
extend a dispute is triggered. In the view of the Tribunal in South China Sea, this obligation 
lasts during the pendency of the dispute settlement proceedings.595 In other words, the 
obligation arises when the proceedings are initiated and ceases when a court or tribunal delivers 
its final decision on the merits. The obvious explanation as to why the Tribunal reached this 
view is the formulation of the Philippines’ submission No. 14. The Philippines argued that 
China had aggravated and extended the disputes “since the commencement of [the] arbitration 
in January 2013”.596 Although the duration of the obligation identified by the Tribunal is 
justified insofar as an adjudicative process may typically take a number of years, it is worth 
noting that the obligation is being linked to the notion of dispute in general. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to argue that the temporal scope of the obligation is broader than the life cycle of a 
dispute under a dispute settlement mechanism, and the obligation lasts as long as a dispute 
exists. Consequently, the question is when a particular situation constitutes a dispute. For 
example, the BIICL’s Report on Undelimited Maritime Areas drew a distinction between 
“undelimited” and “disputed” areas where maritime areas falling under the latter category are 
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actively disputed by States.597 Chapter 3.2 discussed the factors which may assist to identify 
that there is a maritime area of overlap between two or more States, but what does it mean that 
States have a dispute? 
At first sight, it may appear to be relatively easy to determine whether a dispute exists or not. 
However, it is not uncommon for one of the parties to a dispute to contest the existence of the 
dispute.598 Although many legal instruments, including Part XV of the UNCLOS and article 33 
of the UN Charter, presuppose the existence of a dispute, they do not provide the definition of 
a dispute. 
International case law has developed certain criteria in the determination of the existence of a 
dispute: 
1. The ICJ and its predecessor define a dispute as “a disagreement on a point of law or 
fact, a conflict of legal views or interests” between parties;599 
2. Whether there exists a dispute “is a matter for objective determination”.600 A mere 
denial of the existence of a dispute does not prove its non-existence.601 A mere assertion 
that a dispute exists is not sufficient to constitute a dispute;602 
3. “It must be shown that the claim of one party is positively opposed by the other”.603 
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Thus, one can observe that the threshold for establishing the existence of a dispute is relatively 
low.604 The presence of divergent views is sufficient to constitute a dispute. Ideally, the 
existence of a dispute presupposes a certain degree of communication demonstrating a conflict 
of legal views. Nevertheless, as the ICJ has noted in Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea 
Intervening and Georgia v. Russia, a State’s failure to respond does not exclude the existence 
of a dispute in circumstances where such a response is called for.605 A key question in respect 
of maritime delimitation disputes concerns the legal implications attached to the absence of a 
State’s reaction.606 
In the context of this thesis, a disagreement between neighboring States as to where a maritime 
boundary shall lie clearly constitutes a dispute.607 Reservations made by States under the 
UNCLOS in order to exclude the jurisdiction of courts and tribunals over these categories of 
disputes do not mean the absence of a dispute. This is evident in the delimitation case between 
Timor-Leste and Australia.608 Moreover, the intentional non-characterization by the parties of 
a situation as a dispute does not prove its non-existence.609 
Thus, the existence of a dispute does not presuppose that a maritime area of overlapping claims 
is to be actively disputed. The duty of restraint embedded in the obligation not to aggravate or 
extend a dispute applies until the conclusion of a delimitation agreement or the determination 
of a maritime boundary by a court or tribunal (if the latter option is relevant in the 
circumstances). In other words, the duration of the obligation not to aggravate or extend a 
dispute is similar to the temporal scope of the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper discussed 
in Chapter 3.2. Consequently, as underlined in Chapter 3.2, the obligation not to aggravate or 
extend a dispute, like the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper, continues to apply in a 
situation where one of the parties to a delimitation dispute does not accept or recognize the final 
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decision of an international court or tribunal because this dispute cannot be considered 
resolved.610  
3.7 Conclusions and observations 
(Customary) international law requires claimant States to cooperate with respect to the 
management of (possible) petroleum resources located in a maritime area that is subject to their 
overlapping claims.611 However, practice shows that the process of negotiating provisional 
arrangements in maritime areas of overlapping claims is as difficult as dealing with the issue of 
delimitation. For a number of different reasons, many States are unable or unwilling (e.g., 
because State A considers the claim of State B as having no legal basis under international law) 
to agree on provisional arrangements. The likelihood of such an arrangement in some disputed 
maritime areas (e.g., between several States bordering the South China Sea and the 
Mediterranean Sea,612 and between Ukraine and Russia in the Black Sea) is extremely limited 
at the time of writing. Therefore, this Chapter paid special attention to the problem of unilateral 
petroleum activities in disputed maritime areas. 
This Chapter concluded that States are required to exercise restraint when engaging in 
hydrocarbon activities in disputed maritime areas. This requirement derives from the obligation 
not to jeopardize or hamper contained in paragraph 3 of articles 74 and 83 of the UNCLOS, the 
obligation not to aggravate or extend a dispute and the general principles of international law 
such as the no-harm principle and the principle of good neighborliness considered in Chapter 
2. However, the existence of the requirement of restraint does not answer the question of the 
extent to which States shall exercise restraint. As discussed in this Chapter, unilateral petroleum 
activities and other operations associated with those activities aimed at extracting oil and gas 
reserves located in disputed maritime areas would certainly be inconsistent with international 
law and, for that reason, should not be conducted pending a provisional arrangement or 
delimitation agreement. It remains, however, difficult to draw a general conclusion regarding 
other types of unilateral petroleum activities preceding the exploitation phase. As argued in this 
Chapter, the threshold of “(permanent) physical change to the marine environment” as 
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established in Guyana v. Suriname is not particularly suitable for defining the scope of 
unilateralism in disputed maritime areas and, consequently, petroleum activities not meeting 
this threshold, including seismic survey operations, could also be not in compliance of the 
requirement of restraint. 
The absence of a universal threshold or test that can apply in assessing whether a hydrocarbon 
activity is allowed or not as a matter of international law provides a high degree of uncertainty, 
in particular for petroleum companies.613 One of the recommendations to petroleum companies 
is that they shall first check the status of the contract area and evaluate the risks associated with 
its contested character.614 Petroleum companies may also consider the possibility of contracting 
with both claimant States.615 In practice, however, this is often not a realistic option.616 
The Guyana v. Suriname and Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire (although to a limited extent) cases provide 
coastal States with indications of certain important steps that they should take in disputed 
maritime areas. State A authorizing a petroleum activity in a maritime area also claimed by 
State B (and State A is aware of State B’s claims) should inform State B directly of this activity. 
State B should abstain from using force against State A’s petroleum activities in the disputed 
area and should opt for a peaceful course of action, including objecting to these activities, 
insisting on their cessation and seeking cooperation with State A in undertaking the activities 
on a joint basis. State A should engage in negotiations with State B in good faith (on the 
establishment of a maritime boundary and/or the adoption of a provisional arrangement 
covering the disputed area) and it should not wait until State B takes the initiative in this regard. 
The steps described do not guarantee that the issues associated with a disputed area will be 
resolved, but they may contribute to their resolution. 
It is also important to note article 82 of the UNCLOS in the case of exploitation of non-living 
resources of the CS beyond 200 nm. Insofar as one of the conclusions made in this Chapter is 
that exploitation activities with respect to hydrocarbon resources located in an area of 
overlapping claims, including overlapping claims of coastal States to the same area of CS 
beyond 200 nm,617 would be in breach of international law, exploitation of hydrocarbon (and 
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other non-living) resources situated in such a disputed area of extended CS is to be carried out 
on a cooperative basis. Consequently, the obligation to make payments or contributions in kind 
under article 82 of the UNCLOS becomes a joint obligation of the cooperating States. To date, 
there is one example, the Seychelles-Mauritius example, where two States have agreed on the 
cooperative management of an overlapping area of CS beyond 200 nm.618 The Seychelles-
Mauritius example is subject to consideration in Chapter 6.12 of this thesis. However, the 
implementation of article 82 will not be discussed in detail and the practical import of this 
article remains to be seen in the context of cooperative resource exploitation in maritime areas 
of overlapping extended CS claims.619 
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The previous Chapter dealt with the regime governing hydrocarbon resources located in areas 
of overlapping maritime claims. This Chapter examines the obligations and rights of States with 
respect to hydrocarbon resources straddling an already established maritime boundary where 
these resources can be exploited, wholly or in part, from either side of that boundary.620 
It is worth noting that the findings of this Chapter are also relevant in a situation where State A 
unilaterally (namely, in the absence of a formal delimitation agreement with State B or of a 
boundary determined by a judicial body) determines the location of its maritime boundary 
running across a petroleum field. The Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire case illustrates this situation. In that 
case, the line applied by Ghana actually traversed a number of petroleum deposits.621 Although 
the Special Chamber did not discuss the obligations of Ghana owed to Côte d'Ivoire in this 
respect, it does not mean that such obligations do not exist.622 
It is important to emphasize that the twin obligations set forth in articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of 
the UNCLOS (i.e., the obligation to make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements 
of a practical nature and the obligation to make every effort not to jeopardize or hamper the 
reaching of a final delimitation agreement) no longer apply once a boundary line between 
neighboring States is established.623 The final delimitation clears up the matter of what part of 
the EEZ/CS appertains to each State and in which maritime area it is fully entitled to exercise 
its sovereign rights to explore and exploit natural resources.624 However, it is possible that a 
single accumulation of hydrocarbons lies on both sides of a maritime boundary. Despite the fact 
that States saw this as a real possibility, neither the CCS nor the UNCLOS contain any provision 
on States’ reciprocal obligations when a hydrocarbon field straddles the boundary.625 Except 
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for the general duties to cooperate, the UNCLOS includes no specific requirement to cooperate 
with respect to transboundary hydrocarbons.626 
As concluded in Chapter 2, certain duties, in particular the duty to cooperate and the duty to 
exercise restraint, derive from the characterization of shared hydrocarbons as shared natural 
resources. Chapter 3 examined the temporal, geographic and substantive scope of those duties 
in the context of disputed hydrocarbons. This Chapter focuses on the scope of relevant duties 
in the context of transboundary hydrocarbons. As noted earlier in this thesis, each scenario of 
petroleum sharing has its own features that are likely to impact the content of the obligations 
applicable in that scenario. 
Dissimilar to disputed hydrocarbons, the UNCLOS does not explicitly require neighboring 
States to refrain from unilateral activities with respect to a transboundary petroleum resource 
pending a further agreement on that issue. It seems that, on the contrary, the principle of 
sovereign rights countenances unilateral exploration and exploitation. At the same time, taking 
into account the general principles of international law discussed in Chapter 2 (e.g., the 
principle of good neighborliness and the no-harm principle), this Chapter will consider whether 
international law nevertheless imposes particular constraints on a coastal State when it explores 
for and/or exploits (or prepares to do either) a cross-border field, especially when these 
operations may result in negative effects for its neighbor. 
This Chapter will examine State practice regarding transboundary hydrocarbons in detail for 
two reasons: first, to confirm (or disprove) the existence of certain rules governing the rights 
and obligations of States in a transboundary hydrocarbon deposit; and, second, to analyze the 
content of these rules and their features in contrast to disputed hydrocarbons. As noted in 
Chapter 1 of this thesis, maritime boundary delimitation treaties and other related agreements 
dealing with the issue of straddling hydrocarbons are referred to as the main sources of State 
practice. 
4.2 The requirement to cooperate with respect to transboundary 
hydrocarbons 
This section focuses on two questions: first, whether States that share a transboundary deposit 
are required to cooperate with respect to the management of this deposit under international 
                                                            




law; and, second, whether the scope of the requirement to cooperate in the context of 
transboundary hydrocarbons differs from that existing in the context of disputed hydrocarbons. 
4.2.1 The inclusion of a ‘transboundary mineral resource’ clause in a 
delimitation agreement 
Treaty practice of many States has responded to the geological reality of straddling 
hydrocarbons by the inclusion of so-called ‘transboundary mineral resource’ clauses in 
maritime delimitation treaties.627 This section examines the core content of such clauses and 
their significance in the formation of the requirement to cooperate with regard to transboundary 
hydrocarbons. 
4.2.1.1 The key elements of the ‘typical’ clause 
A ‘transboundary mineral resource’ clause was first included in the UK-Norway delimitation 
agreement of 1965.628 Subsequently, it has been incorporated into a considerable number of 
other delimitation agreements beyond the North Sea region.629 
Generally, a typical transboundary mineral deposit clause included in many delimitation 
agreements after 1965 (it is also worth noting that such a clause is often incorporated into 
provisional arrangements examined in Chapter 6) states that if any single mineral resource 
deposit extends across the delimitation line and that part of this deposit is exploitable from 
either side of this line, the Parties shall seek to reach an agreement on the manner of its most 
effective exploitation and the apportionment.630 Thus, the typical clause contains five 
fundamental elements.  
First, the clause refers to all mineral resources that straddle the delimitation line. However, in 
practice no maritime examples of straddling mineral resources, other than hydrocarbons, appear 
to exist.631 
Second, the clause is triggered in the event that a mineral deposit extends across the delimitation 
line. However, delimitation agreements contain nothing that may assist the Parties in 
determining whether any particular accumulation of hydrocarbons is, or might be, straddling. 
Every delimitation agreement is simply premised on the already established existence of such 
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an accumulation. Given the importance of this issue, Chapter 4.2.2 will examine subsequent 
(framework and unitization) agreements on the subject of whether they establish a common 
procedural framework within which the Parties and their licensees may identify when a 
hydrocarbon field extends or does not extend across the delimitation line.632 
Third, the clause applies only to those straddling mineral resources that are exploitable, wholly 
or in part, from either side of the delimitation line. In other words, the clause is triggered when 
State A, from its side of the delimitation line, may exploit a portion of the transboundary mineral 
resource which is also located in the CS of State B and vice versa. Although the clause does not 
indicate how the mineral resource may be exploited from the other side of the boundary, it is 
reasonable to assume that the criterion of exploitability would be met when State A has drilled 
a well on its CS and this well is capable of producing a resource that migrates from under State 
B’s CS to State A’s CS, for example.633   
The fourth element of the typical clause is the obligation of the Parties to seek to conclude an 
agreement. The fifth element relates to the content of any subsequent agreement, namely that it 
should address the most effective way to exploit the straddling mineral deposit and the 
apportionment of the proceeds of production.  
The language in which the obligation contained in the clause is framed only imposes upon the 
Parties a duty to negotiate with a view of setting the terms applicable to the cooperative 
exploitation of a mineral deposit lying across the delimitation line. In other words, the Parties 
do not commit themselves to conclude an agreement in the event of a cross-border petroleum 
deposit being discovered.634 Although most of the transboundary mineral deposit clauses are 
phrased in the manner mentioned above, there are some delimitation agreements that use 
language that goes beyond a mere duty to negotiate in good faith. These delimitation 
agreements envisage that an agreement concerning the development of transboundary 
hydrocarbons shall be reached at the request of one of the Parties.635 Thereby, it can be regarded 
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as a pactum de contrahendo, not a pactum de negotiando.636 However, the provision which 
places on the Parties a duty to enter into an agreement is the exception rather than the rule. The 
general reluctance of States to include a duty of this nature in their delimitation agreements is 
quite understandable. Requiring that an agreement is be concluded would mean the power of a 
State to impede legitimate unilateral actions of its neighbors in the event of a failure to reach 
such an agreement.637 
In other words, the transboundary mineral resource clause typically used in delimitation treaties 
contemplates that the Parties have to make strong efforts to achieve a further agreement on the 
exploitation of a transboundary hydrocarbon deposit. Most of the clauses do not require the 
Parties to reach any specific type of subsequent agreement. As discussed below in this Chapter, 
States have negotiated different forms of cooperative agreements to deal with the topic of 
transboundary hydrocarbons.638  
Thus, it appears that the content of the duty to cooperate set forth in the typical transboundary 
mineral deposit clause is similar to that contained in articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS, 
namely that States are required to make every effort to arrive at an arrangement/agreement. 
However, unlike articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS, the typical clause establishes no 
additional duty to abstain from some unilateral actions pending the conclusion of a subsequent 
agreement.639 
Also, the typical clause, while explicitly providing for the duty to seek an agreement, does not 
require the Parties to notify, inform or consult one another in the event of the discovery of a 
(potential) transboundary accumulation of hydrocarbons. However, as discussed further in this 
Chapter, such procedural duties are clearly reflected in subsequent agreements on 
transboundary hydrocarbons. It has also been noted in Chapter 2 that these duties can be 
regarded as integral parts of the duty to negotiate.640 The statement of the Arbitral Tribunal in 
the Eritrea/Yemen case supports the existence of procedural duties in the context of 
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transboundary hydrocarbons. The Tribunal in this case was of the view that the Parties were 
obligated to inform and consult one another on any hydrocarbon or mineral resources which 
may straddle the established maritime boundary or which may exist in its immediate vicinity.641 
4.2.1.2 Variations in the content of transboundary mineral deposit clauses 
While the typical clause examined in the previous section serves as a baseline, various 
additional elements can be found in delimitation agreements. As discussed below in this 
Chapter, some delimitation agreements include a prohibition on hydrocarbon activities within 
a narrow strip along the maritime boundary.642 A number of delimitation agreements provide 
that if a cross-border deposit has been exploited prior to the conclusion of any agreement, the 
State whose sovereign rights have been affected is entitled to compensation.643 Other 
delimitation agreements refer to the concept of unitization644 or some form of dispute resolution 
procedure to which the Parties may resort in cases when they are unable to agree on the manner 
of exploitation or apportionment.645 Many delimitation agreements are completely silent on the 
involvement of licensees operating on both sides of the boundary in the process of reaching a 
further agreement. 
These examples illustrate that the content of transboundary mineral resource clauses 
incorporated into delimitation treaties may vary, although the key elements considered in the 
preceding section remain largely unchanged. It is perhaps not surprising that the clauses are not 
identical. The content of each delimitation treaty and its provisions is usually determined by the 
realities of what is viable in a particular negotiating context.646 However, despite the existence 
of different elements and formulations, this form of clause is typically relatively simple. Many 
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recent delimitation agreements still follow this pattern,647 while other agreements have moved 
beyond the simplest version of the clause and have adopted a more sophisticated transboundary 
mineral deposit clause.648 
4.2.1.3 Significance of the clauses 
As explained earlier, the typical transboundary mineral resource clause is incorporated into a 
large number of delimitation agreements concluded by States in all parts of the world. At the 
same time, Bankes has noted that there are also many delimitation agreements across the globe 
that are silent on the issue of transboundary hydrocarbons.649 The potential rationales for this 
choice might be poor hydrocarbon potential of a particular maritime area, the desire of the 
negotiators not to complicate the negotiating process,650 or the belief of States that general rules 
governing transboundary hydrocarbons exist under international law. 
It could be argued that the silence of a delimitation agreement is not decisive as to the 
obligations of States with regard to a transboundary petroleum deposit if such a deposit is 
discovered after this agreement has been ratified. Much evidence supports the conclusion that 
States are required to cooperate in respect of transboundary hydrocarbons, including the general 
principles considered in Chapter 2 (particularly those reflected in the UNGA Resolutions), the 
existence of a similar requirement to cooperate in the context of disputed hydrocarbons,651 
several judicial decisions,652 relevant State practice and doctrinal writings discussed in this 
Chapter. Several legal scholars have concluded that the requirement to cooperate is now a rule 
of customary international law applicable to both disputed and transboundary hydrocarbons.653 
Other commentators are more guarded and have suggested that there is a regional customary 
international rule applicable to States bordering, inter alia, the North Sea and the Persian 
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Gulf.654 It is true that the analysis of delimitation agreements reveals that whereas countries 
situated in certain geographic regions usually include a typical transboundary mineral deposit 
clause (which encapsulates the requirement to cooperate) in their delimitation agreements, the 
practice of other States from the same region does not deal with the topic of transboundary 
hydrocarbons at all.655 It is also true that the inclusion of a transboundary mineral deposit clause 
in delimitation agreements is more common now than before. Consequently, one could 
conclude that this points to evidence for the consistency of State practice (at least, bilateral 
treaty practice) and opinio juris necessary to create a rule of customary international law 
requiring cooperation of States in the management of transboundary hydrocarbons.656 
At the same time, the requirement to cooperate does not constitute a requirement to arrive at an 
agreement. States have a mere duty to attempt to agree on some sort of cooperative management 
in order to facilitate the development of a transboundary deposit. They are not obligated to 
reach a specific type of agreement, such as an agreement that adopts a unitization approach. 
This does not also exclude a situation where two States sharing a transboundary deposit agree 
that only one State will exploit this deposit from its side of the maritime boundary.657 
4.2.2 Agreements based on the clauses requiring cooperation in respect of 
transboundary hydrocarbons 
This section looks at how the requirement to cooperate included in the typical clauses has 
developed through subsequent agreements, particularly in the domain of procedural aspects of 
cooperation. These subsequent agreements include framework and unitization agreements. 
4.2.2.1 Framework agreements 
More recently, several States have reached framework agreements dealing with transboundary 
hydrocarbons. In this thesis, seven agreements adopted since 2005 are categorized as 
framework agreements.658 Each framework agreement is premised on the already existing 
delimitation agreement and makes a clear reference to the transboundary mineral resource 
clause included in that delimitation agreement. However, these framework agreements go far 
beyond the general content of the clause. They establish specific rules and procedures that may 
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assist the Parties in identifying transboundary hydrocarbons, facilitating their joint development 
and settling potential disputes. 
Nevertheless, there is one important distinction between the first framework agreement and 
those that followed: while Norway and the UK already have considerable experience with inter-
State cooperation regarding straddling hydrocarbons and have concluded some unitization 
agreements in the past,659 the other States have a very limited (or no) history related to 
transboundary hydrocarbon activities.660 Consequently, the context underpinning the 
conclusion of these framework agreements are different. Whereas the UK-Norway Framework 
Agreement was negotiated in order to facilitate the development of marginal fields situated 
within a 60 km wide corridor either side of the delimitation line,661 the six latter agreements 
aim at providing certainty by establishing a set of ground rules governing the exploration and 
exploitation of (possible) straddling hydrocarbon resources. Thus, while the other framework 
agreements are confined to hydrocarbon deposits straddling the maritime boundaries, the UK-
Norway Framework Agreement has a wider objective of dealing with resources lying in a broad 
corridor next to the delimitation line. 
All framework agreements are very sophisticated. They address a large number of different 
topics, including the scope of the agreement, its purpose and objectives, identification of 
transboundary reservoirs, determination and redetermination of reserves and their allocation, 
fiscal issues, infrastructure issues, environmental issues, institutions and dispute resolution 
procedure, decommissioning, duration of the agreement and many other issues.662 However, 
throughout this thesis, only some elements of these framework agreements will be examined, 
inter alia: the procedure by which the Parties to the framework agreement identify whether any 
particular accumulation of hydrocarbons is transboundary, the issue of whether one Party may 
authorize development of a transboundary deposit without an agreement of the other Party, and 
the design of the standard of due diligence.663 
4.2.2.2 Unitization agreements 
There are a number of examples where transboundary hydrocarbon fields have been discovered 
and States have negotiated unitization agreements (UAs) to deal with these fields. UAs are 
fundamentally different from the agreements establishing JDZs discussed further in this 
                                                            
659 See Chapter 1 in more detail. 
660 Bankes 2014, op. cit., p. 669. 
661 UK-Norway Report, op. cit. See also Bankes 2014, op. cit., p. 670. 
662 Bankes 2014, op. cit., p. 671. 




Chapter. While a joint zone agreement normally covers a relatively large maritime area, a UA 
is usually limited to the geographical and geological extent of a particular transboundary 
accumulation of hydrocarbons and aims at the efficient development of that accumulation as a 
single unit.664 It is important to note that a UA may be concluded not only in relation to a 
hydrocarbon deposit which lies across the delimitation line, but also with respect to a deposit 
which straddles the boundary between a JDZ665 and the area under national jurisdiction of either 
Party. 
The first UA was the Agreement between Norway and the UK concerning the Frigg field 
reservoir signed in 1976.666 This was followed by two other agreements between those countries 
relating to the exploitation of the Statfjord and Murchison field reservoirs (both in 1979).667 
The unitization approach was extended to the Netherlands with the conclusion of the Markham 
UA between the UK and the Netherlands in 1992668 and subsequently was adopted by countries 
outside the North Sea region. Other examples of cross-border hydrocarbons with respect to 
which States have adopted (or are in the process of adopting) UAs include the Zafiro-Ekanga 
field between Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea, the Loran-Manatee, the Kapok-Dorado and the 
Manakin-Coquina fields between Venezuela and T&T, the Lianzi field between Angola and 
Congo, and the Greater Sunrise fields between Australia and Timor-Leste.669 
4.2.2.3 Procedure for the identification of a hydrocarbon deposit as transboundary and 
the procedural duties arising from its (possible) existence 
As alluded to earlier, the typical transboundary mineral resource clause incorporated into a large 
number of delimitation treaties is only triggered when a hydrocarbon deposit extends across the 
delimitation line. Nonetheless, none of the delimitation agreements include a procedure 
according to which the Parties may identify that a particular accumulation of hydrocarbons is, 
or might be, a transboundary field. This section examines framework and unitization 
agreements in order to give insight into whether there is any common procedure that might be 
used in identifying a transboundary hydrocarbon deposit. This issue is important not only to 
determine the moment of the emergence of the duty to cooperate, but also to understand how 
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likely it is that a State might authorize development of a hydrocarbon deposit without the 
knowledge that the deposit extends into the CS of its neighbor.670 
The importance may be demonstrated by an example of the Aphrodite gas field. As noted in 
Chapter 1, Israel claims that this field found on the Cypriot CS extends into its EEZ (Illustration 
No. 24), which would activate the obligation of the Parties (in particular Cyprus) to cooperate 
in the joint exploitation of the field in accordance with article 2 of the delimitation agreement 
between these two States.671 Chapter 1 also mentioned other similar examples.  
The UK-Norway Framework Agreement does not go further than incorporation of the 
transboundary mineral deposit clause included in the UK-Norway delimitation agreement of 
1965.672 This Framework Agreement is premised on the mutual understanding of the two 
governments that there is a transboundary petroleum reservoir which should be exploited as a 
single unit.673 The UK-Norway Guidelines take a step further providing that if the licensees 
wish to start development of a petroleum structure that is considered, through 
geological/geophysical mapping, to extend across the delimitation line, they should inform the 
authorities of their home country.674 As necessary, the authorities discuss and hold meetings to 
review the potential extent of the petroleum structure across the delimitation line.675 
The Venezuela-T&T Framework Treaty similarly refers to the transboundary mineral deposit 
clause of the delimitation agreement concluded between them in 1990.676 The Framework 
Treaty declares that both Parties should hold appropriate technical consultations in order to 
identify the existence of a cross-border hydrocarbon deposit.677 In the subsequent Loran-
Manatee UA, the Parties made it clear that, by virtue of exploration activities on both sides of 
the delimitation line, they have identified seven hydrocarbon reservoirs.678 Six of them were 
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identified as transboundary, while the final gas reservoir was determined to be located solely 
within the CS of Venezuela.679 
The Norway-Iceland Agreement of 2008 goes more deeply into this issue. It stipulates that if a 
hydrocarbon reserve is found on the CS of one of the Parties and the other Party is of the view 
that it might extend to its CS, the latter may initiate discussions on the limits of this reserve and 
the possibility for its development as a unit.680 The initiating Party is obligated to prove its 
opinion by submitting the geological and/or geophysical data, including any existing drilling 
data.681 If the Parties have concluded that the discovered hydrocarbon deposit is of a 
transboundary nature or its exploitation by one Party would affect the possibility of exploitation 
by the other Party, they shall reach a UA at the request of either Party.682 An identical procedure 
is also established under the Norway-Russia Treaty.683 
The Canada-France Agreement contains an even more sophisticated procedure. Article 2 (1) 
(a) requires a Party, authorizing any exploratory drilling within 10 nm of the maritime 
boundary, to provide the other Party with the information, results and data prescribed in Annex 
I within 60 days of receiving such information from its license-holders. In the event that the 
information provided allows one of the Parties to conclude that a hydrocarbon reservoir does 
or does not exist, the other Party must be notified forthwith.684 Such a notice shall specify, inter 
alia, whether there is reason to consider the reservoir as transboundary.685  The conclusion of 
the notifying Party that the discovered hydrocarbon resource does not extend beyond its CS 
shall be supported by evidence from the technical information received.686 However, if the other 
Party disagrees with the conclusion set forth in the notice, it may refer this issue to a single 
expert, whose decision shall be final and binding on both Parties.687 Once the expert has 
determined, or the Parties have agreed, that a transboundary accumulation of hydrocarbons 
exists, each Party is obligated to provide additional information prescribed in Annex II.688 In 
these circumstances, a Party, informed about a licensee’s intention to start production from the 
transboundary field, shall give notice to the other Party “in writing forthwith” and request that 
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Party to conclude an exploitation agreement.689 If the Parties have failed to reach such 
agreement, either Party may refer its finalization to an arbitral tribunal.690 
It is interesting to note that in the event when a second well on the same geological structure 
has been drilled and a Party, authorizing such activity, has not informed the other Party of it 
within one year, the latter has the right to request the establishment of a technical working group 
to examine the matter.691 The Party carrying out the drilling “shall show the other Party the 
information it has derived from the drilling and explain why the information is insufficient to 
provide” a notice.692 The Canada-France Agreement further requires each Party to notify the 
other Party “in any event” no later than one year after three exploration wells have been drilled 
on the same geological structure.693 
The US-Mexico Agreement mainly relies on an earlier maritime delimitation agreement 
between these two countries, which recognizes the possible existence of hydrocarbon deposits 
that straddle the delimitation line.694 Article 4 (1) of the US-Mexico Agreement requires the 
Parties to consult in respect of exploration and exploitation activities695 undertaken within 3 
statute miles of the delimitation line and to exchange all relevant and available geological 
information resulting from such activities. Moreover, each Party is obligated to give the other 
Party notice when it has approved or received from a licensee a plan to conduct seismic survey, 
drilling or production activities within the mentioned area, and when it has become aware of 
the likely presence of a transboundary hydrocarbon accumulation696 and the discovery of any 
hydrocarbon occurrence close to the delimitation line.697 Within 30 days of receipt of the notice, 
both Parties, through their designated agencies, shall initiate consultations with a view to 
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determine whether a transboundary hydrocarbon reservoir indeed exists.698 In the case of failure 
to agree on such determination, the matter may be submitted to a joint commission.699 
In summary, there are few agreements that establish a procedure through which the Parties and 
their licensees may agree on whether or not an accumulation of hydrocarbons is transboundary. 
Out of all of the agreements considered above, the Canada-France Agreement contains the most 
comprehensive treatment of that issue.700 The examination of these agreements has shown that 
the possible existence of a straddling petroleum deposit generates mutual duties of States. These 
agreements reinforce the duty to cooperate, including its procedural components, with respect 
to transboundary hydrocarbons. They also make it clear that (a) the process of reaching the 
conclusion that a particular deposit extends across the boundary is difficult and multistage, and 
that (b) if one of the States has information indicating that a deposit is potentially transboundary, 
this State shall comply with procedural duties towards the other State in good faith. Some cases, 
however, illustrate that it is possible that a State may be initially unaware of the prospect of a 
reservoir’s straddling nature.701 At the same time, if State A assumes and argues that the 
reservoir straddles, or is likely to straddle, the maritime boundary between State A and State B, 
State B shall pursue cooperation in order to confirm or refute this assumption.  
4.2.3 The establishment of a joint development zone as part of the 
delimitation 
The establishment of a joint development zone (JDZ) as part of the negotiation of a delimitation 
agreement is usually considered a method of dealing with transboundary hydrocarbons.702 
However, agreements creating such zones typically contain no indication that this is their main 
objective as they are generally aimed at regulating activities in respect of non-living (and/or 
living) marine resources within these zones.703 
It is important to emphasize that this thesis makes a distinction between two types of JDZs: 
those that have been defined in association with the delimitation of a maritime boundary and 
those that have been established in areas where neighboring States are unable to agree on a 
delimitation line. As noted in Chapter 3, the latter category is likely to constitute provisional 
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arrangements of a practical nature within the meaning of articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the 
UNCLOS. 
There are a number of JDZs created in conjunction with maritime boundaries for purposes 
related to the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbon resources. Chapter 7 will examine 
all these JDZs. Although these agreements are not provisional arrangements under articles 74 
(3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS, they include some elements similar to those incorporated into 
provisional arrangements: for example, the designation of a JDZ, the determination of the 
jurisdiction(s) applicable within the zone, and the identification of proportions in which costs 
and profits shall be divided between the Parties. However, it is worth noting that it is less 
common to find the establishment of a JDZ where there is already a delimitation line than where 
there is no such line. Neighboring States are more inclined to conclude UAs with respect to 
specific hydrocarbon fields that straddle a delimited boundary.704 
It is noteworthy that many agreements creating JDZs in both delimited and undelimited 
maritime areas also include a provision concerning the possible existence of hydrocarbon fields 
extending across the boundaries of these zones.705 The wording of this type of provision is often 
very similar to the content of a typical transboundary mineral deposit clause considered above 
in this Chapter. 
4.2.4 The insertion of a provision prohibiting hydrocarbon activities in the 
vicinity of the maritime boundary 
One of the approaches in dealing with the issue of transboundary hydrocarbons is the inclusion 
in delimitation treaties of a provision according to which certain hydrocarbon activities are 
limited within a defined area surrounding the delimitation line. The reasons for this may be 
different. The most obvious one is that the negotiators believed that hydrocarbon reservoirs are 
likely to be discovered near/across the delimitation line, and they wished to avoid any tensions 
that might follow from their detection. Additionally or alternatively, this provision could also 
be included in delimitation agreements on account of any number of other considerations such 
as those discussed in Chapter 4.3 below. 
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Such a prohibition provision appears in a number of delimitation agreements concluded by Iran 
with its neighbors in the Persian Gulf and forbids drilling operations close to the maritime 
boundary.706 
The Australia-Papua New Guinea Treaty707 establishes a broad protected zone encompassing 
the Torres Strait708 within which the Parties agree not to conduct drilling and mining of the 
seabed during a period of ten years from the date of entry into force of that Treaty.709 Rather 
than a mere limit to the identification of potential oil and gas resources, the objective of 
including such a moratorium is founded in the desire to protect the livelihood and traditional 
way of life of the traditional inhabitants and to preserve the marine environment and indigenous 
fauna and flora of the zone.710 
A provision similar to that existing in the Australia-Papua New Guinea Treaty can be found in 
the US-Mexico delimitation treaty of 2000.711 This agreement set forth a period of ten years, 
starting from the date of its entry into force (until January 2011), during which neither drilling 
nor any exploitation shall be permitted within 1.4 nm on either side of the boundary line.712 In 
contrast to the Australia-Papua New Guinea Treaty, the US-Mexico delimitation treaty clarifies 
that such a moratorium is introduced in order to determine the possible existence and 
distribution of transboundary resources in the area along the boundary line.713 Once either Party 
has discovered that any particular hydrocarbon deposit is or might be transboundary, it is 
required to notify the other Party.714 Moreover, the Parties committed themselves to seek to 
reach an agreement for the efficient and equitable exploitation of transboundary resources.715 
As noted in Chapter 1, the US-Mexico Framework Agreement was signed in 2012. This 
Framework Agreement will be examined in detail in Chapter 7. The US-Mexico delimitation 
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treaty of 2000 also provides that even after the expiry of ten years, the Parties agree to inform 
each other about activities conducted in the area.716 
Thus, the analysis in this section reveals that delimitation treaties rarely include a provision 
prohibiting the conduct of some hydrocarbon activities within a narrow strip along the maritime 
boundary. The following sections of this Chapter will return to these prohibition provisions and 
their significance in the context of unilateralism with respect to transboundary hydrocarbons.  
4.3 Implications of a failure to agree 
As follows from the above discussions, international law requires States to perform certain 
substantive and procedural obligations – to inform, consult and seek an agreement – in relation 
to hydrocarbon resources that straddle a delimitation line, even if the delimitation agreement 
establishing this delimitation line is silent on the issue of straddling hydrocarbons. However, 
for one reason or another, the required cooperation may not materialize. Neighboring States 
may be unable to agree upon the framework governing the management of a straddling 
hydrocarbon deposit or the terms of its apportionment. This elicits the question of what 
consequences arise from a failure to agree: whether, in other words, a State may unilaterally 
proceed to explore and exploit a transboundary field when the negotiations with its neighbor 
have reached an impasse or dragged on for a long period. As Cameron noted, in such 
circumstances, even the most responsible government would consider whether some form of 
unilateral actions is an appropriate alternative.717 Another relevant question arising from the 
foregoing is whether petroleum activities, which have already been commenced, with respect 
to a transboundary deposit must be ceased: for example, in a situation where State A has 
proceeded with exploitation of a deposit which has later been declared transboundary. 
In other words, this section examines the extent to which a State (and, accordingly, petroleum 
companies under the approval of that State) can take unilateral acts in relation to a 
transboundary hydrocarbon deposit. 
4.3.1 Clarifying the essence of the rule of capture 
As concluded in Chapter 3, even seismic surveys, not to mention exploratory drilling and 
extractive activities, unilaterally conducted in undelimited maritime areas are likely to breach 
international law. However, the situation where States have already established a maritime 
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boundary differs from a situation where the boundary line itself is still contested. Each State on 
its side of the maritime boundary acquires exclusive sovereign rights to explore the respective 
CS, to drill for and exploit petroleum resources located within the limits of that CS.718 The 
difficulty associated with transboundary petroleum resources is that due to their fugacious 
properties, State A’s drilling into a cross-border reservoir will lead away the oil and gas 
resources in this reservoir, including those that are located on the side of State B, to the point 
where the reservoir is pierced by the drilled well of State A.719 In other words, one State may 
in fact be able to take any or all of the oil and gas resources also situated on the other State’s 
side of the maritime boundary.720 
There is a considerable debate in the legal literature as to whether international law adopts a so-
called ‘rule of capture’ in relation to transboundary hydrocarbons. The rule of capture has its 
origin in the maxim “cuius est solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad infernos” (whoever owns 
the soil also owns the air above and the depths below).721 In the municipal context, there is 
extensive practice concerning common onshore hydrocarbon deposits which underlie different 
landholdings. Development of such deposits was built upon the rule of capture according to 
which the owner of a certain tract of land possesses hydrocarbon resources that could be found 
within this area.722 In the event that activities of an adjoining or distant owner cause the deposit 
to migrate towards its land or control, the “former” owner incurs no damage.723 The only 
remedy of the “former” owner is to engage in competitive drilling on its own land in order to 
recapture the deposit.724 In other words, the existence of the rule of capture means that owner 
A is not liable if its activities cause hydrocarbons to migrate from owner B’s land to owner A’s 
land. 
The existence of an international rule of capture applicable to transboundary offshore 
hydrocarbon deposits has been widely disputed. As follows from the literature review regarding 
this issue, the majority of legal scholars rejects the applicability of the rule of capture at the 
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international level.725 Meanwhile, the CS regime established under the CCS and UNCLOS is 
rarely mentioned in these debates, although it provides a clear-cut path to the conclusion that 
the rule of capture is not applicable in the context of transboundary offshore hydrocarbons.726 
Chapter 4.3.2 below will show that the CS regime establishes limitations on the ability of State 
A to negatively affect State B’s sovereign rights over the same hydrocarbon deposit. Further, 
Chapter 4.3.3 will examine State practice in order to confirm the non-applicability of the rule 
of capture to transboundary offshore hydrocarbons. 
4.3.2 The regime of the continental shelf and unilateralism 
The essential starting point is that both the CCS and UNCLOS confer sovereign rights upon a 
coastal State “for the purpose of exploring [the CS] and exploiting its natural resources”.727 
Thus, the CCS and UNCLOS establish a rule according to which every coastal State is entitled 
to explore for and exploit hydrocarbon resources located within the limits of its CS. This rule 
equally applies to States that share an accumulation of hydrocarbons. In other words, once the 
EEZ/CS is delimited, the oil and gas bedded in a cross-border deposit on each side of the 
maritime boundary is subject to the sovereign rights of the State of whose shelf it forms part. 
These sovereign rights are exclusive in the sense that if a State does not explore the CS and 
exploit its resources, it is only with its express consent that anyone else may do so.728 
Therefore, the question is whether a State authorizing hydrocarbon activities to be conducted 
with respect to its portion of a transboundary deposit in its CS is required to obtain the consent 
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of the neighboring State in the CS of which this deposit is also located. It seems inappropriate 
to apply the requirement of consent to seismic surveys and exploratory drilling. These activities 
are primarily aimed at identifying the resources located in the CS, estimating their volumes and 
determining their geographical extent, including the likelihood of extension across the maritime 
boundary.729 On the other hand, the question of applying this requirement is crucial at the 
exploitation stage.730 If State A commences the development of a straddling reservoir from its 
side of the boundary, State B would inevitably lose the volumes of petroleum, which amounts, 
inter alia, to a loss of revenue thereof, (the reservoir’s depletion is also possible) that were prior 
to the development located in the CS of State B and in respect of which State B is entitled to 
exercise its exclusive sovereign rights. Thus, it could be argued that exploitation activities 
carried out by one State with respect to a transboundary accumulation of hydrocarbons without 
the agreement with its neighbor constitute a violation of the latter’s sovereign rights. In other 
words, although there is no provision in the UNCLOS that directly deals with transboundary 
hydrocarbons, the exclusive character of sovereign rights can be considered a limitation on the 
right of a State to exploit such resources unilaterally, without the consent of the adjacent or 
opposite State. It is worth emphasizing that apart from in the context of transboundary 
hydrocarbons, the regime of exclusivity also prohibits States from directional drilling into 
neighboring States’ subsoil, or drawing hydrocarbons from the subsoil of a neighboring State 
by other means without permission.731 
Article 142 of the UNCLOS may also serve as a relevant provision since it concerns the 
analogous situation when resource deposits straddle the Area and a coastal State’s (extended) 
CS. This article provides that activities in respect of these straddling (hydrocarbon or other 
mineral) deposits shall be carried out “with due regard to the rights and legitimate interests” of 
the relevant coastal State and that consultations, including a system of prior notification, shall 
take place in order to avoid trespassing on such rights and interests.732 Furthermore, article 142 
(2) requires the prior consent of the coastal State concerned in the event that activities in the 
Area may result in the exploitation of resources located within national jurisdiction.733 
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Consequently, the question is whether the requirement of prior consent applies by analogy to 
similar circumstances involving two (or more) sovereign States that share a transboundary 
petroleum deposit. 
According to article 142 (2), the duty to obtain consent is solely imposed upon the one who 
carries out exploitation activities in the Area, although it is not altogether clear who shall ask 
for consent: the Enterprise of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) pursuant to Annex IV 
of the UNCLOS, the sponsoring State(s) or contractor(s). Article 142 (2) contains no reciprocal 
obligation of a coastal State to request or receive the consent of the ISA in the case where it 
plans to exploit a deposit that extends, or may extend, beyond the limits of its national 
jurisdiction. In other words, this provision seems to imply that while the coastal State can 
unilaterally exploit a straddling deposit, the ISA is not entitled to do so.734 However, against 
the background of the discussions in this thesis, it is inappropriate to place no duties on the 
coastal State with respect to such a deposit. The duties to cooperate and exercise mutual restraint 
would also apply to the coastal State, not only to the ISA.735 Moreover, the coastal State’s 
unilateral exploitation is likely to be in violation of article 78 (2) of the UNCLOS, since the 
development of the Area’s resources always involves rights of third States. To the same extent, 
this affirmation may also refer to unilateral exploitation of hydrocarbon resources lying in the 
CSs of several States. 
According to article 78 (2) of the UNCLOS, a coastal State in exercising its rights over the CS 
“must not infringe or result in any unjustifiable interference with navigation and other rights 
and freedoms of other States as provided for in [that] Convention”. By means of using the words 
‘must not’, the obligation is of a definitive character.736 The phrase ‘other States’ is used as 
opposed to the specific phrase ‘coastal State’ and, therefore, covers all States besides the 
respective coastal State, including its neighboring States, flag States and sponsoring States.737 
Furthermore, article 78 (2) emphasizes that the obligation is intended to protect “navigation and 
other rights and freedoms of other States” (emphasis added). Nevertheless, paragraph 2 does 
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not specify which rights and freedoms of third States are to be included in the category of 
‘other’, except that they should be provided for in the UNCLOS. Therefore, the reference to 
“other rights and freedoms of other States” includes, inter alia, the right to lay submarine cables 
and pipelines, the freedom of fishing, the freedom of scientific research, and the right to conduct 
marine scientific research.738 The wording of article 78 (2) indicates that all other rights and 
freedoms, provided for elsewhere in the UNCLOS, may fall under its application. Thus, article 
78 (2) also offers protection to sovereign rights of neighboring States with regard to a cross-
border petroleum field and may prevent the conduct of unilateral extractive activities in respect 
of such a field. Arguably, unilateral exploitation of a straddling resource might be inconsistent 
with the obligation not to infringe or cause an unjustifiable interference with other (exclusive 
sovereign) rights of other (neighboring) States. Although article 78 (2) does not provide any 
particular steps to avoid infringement of other rights,739 the requirement of consent seems to be 
reasonable, at least, for activities that may result in the exploitation of oil and gas resources 
located on the other side of the delimitation line. At the same time, article 78 (2) can be read as 
requiring a coastal State to exercise due regard to the rights and freedoms of other States. 
However, one can note that in contrast with article 56 (2) of the UNCLOS (dealing with the 
EEZ), article 78 (2) is formulated differently and does not include a due regard requirement. 
Unilateral exploitation of a transboundary field would also be contrary to the general principles 
of international law discussed in Chapter 2, in particular the no-harm principle that is interlinked 
with the principle of good neighborliness. As noted in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the provisions 
of articles 56 (2) and 78 (2) of the UNCLOS are based on the no-harm principle. 
Thus, several provisions of the UNCLOS examined in this section may support the notion that 
one State must not authorize exploitation of a transboundary hydrocarbon deposit on its side of 
the maritime boundary, without the other State’s consent. However, this appears to go far 
beyond the duty to cooperate in the context of transboundary hydrocarbons. As discussed 
earlier, the duty to cooperate with respect to transboundary hydrocarbons does not specifically 
require one State to obtain the consent of the other State before commencing with the unilateral 
exploitation of a transboundary hydrocarbon deposit. Moreover, the existence of the 
requirement to obtain consent may have significant implications. This requirement implies that 
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a State may refuse to give or proceed for a long period of time without giving its consent (e.g., 
for environmental reasons or due to the unstable political situation) and, thereby, may freeze – 
for an indefinite period – hydrocarbon activities of its neighbor in respect to a straddling field. 
Similar concerns were expressed in the Award in Guyana v. Suriname. The Tribunal noted that 
“international courts and tribunals should be careful not to stifle the parties’ ability to pursue 
economic development in a disputed [maritime] area […], as the resolution of [the boundary 
dispute usually is] a time-consuming process” (emphasis added).740 All this raises certain 
doubts as to whether State A can suspend the development of a cross-border petroleum deposit 
planned by State B by failing to enter into an agreement on the cooperative management of this 
deposit, including its apportionment, and subsequently by refusing to give its consent. 
Nevertheless, even if there is no requirement of consent in the context of transboundary 
hydrocarbons, it is important to bear in mind that State A, like State B, has an equal legal right 
to exploit the deposit and is entitled to an equitable share of it.741 
In summary, the principle of sovereign rights clearly represents a limitation on the possibility 
of States to exploit a transboundary accumulation of hydrocarbons unilaterally. However, it is 
difficult to establish the precise parameters of that limitation. It seems that the interpretation of 
the principle of sovereign rights as requiring another State’s consent is quite stringent. At the 
same time, it does not mean that State A may commence unilateral exploitation of a 
transboundary deposit without trying to reach an agreement concerning the management of this 
deposit with State B.742 
It appears that the regime on the protection of sovereign rights is stronger in the context of 
transboundary hydrocarbons than in the context of disputed hydrocarbons. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, the Chamber, by its controversial conclusion in Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire that State A 
does not violate the sovereign rights of State B when it authorizes hydrocarbon activities in an 
area claimed by State A and State B in good faith, even if this area will be later attributable to 
State B,743 has significantly undermined the value of the principle of sovereign rights in the 
context of disputed hydrocarbons. The strength of the principle of sovereign rights in the 
context of transboundary hydrocarbons might be explained by the fact that the existence of 
                                                            
740 Guyana v. Suriname, para. 470. The Tribunal also noted that “[the obligation to make every effort to enter into 
provisional arrangements of a practical nature (under articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS)] constitutes an 
implicit acknowledgment of the importance of avoiding the suspension of economic development in a disputed 
maritime area, as long as such activities do not affect the reaching of a final agreement” (ibid., para. 460). 
741 See Chapter 4.4. 
742 See Chapter 4.2. 




equal sovereign rights of two States to a transboundary field is apparent and can hardly be 
contested. 
4.3.3 State practice and unilateralism 
As observed earlier in this Chapter, many States commit themselves to cooperate with respect 
to the management of transboundary hydrocarbons. However, the widespread inclusion of 
transboundary mineral deposit clauses in delimitation agreements does not of itself tell us 
anything about whether the Parties believed that the rule of capture is part of international 
law.744 For example, States may have undertaken to cooperate in order to avoid potential 
adverse effects associated with the application of the rule of capture or any uncertainty about 
its legal status resulting in future discussions.745 It is also possible that one Part being less 
confident in its technical capacity to exploit cross-border mineral deposits wished to ensure that 
it would have means to resist the other Party’s relative technological superiority.746  
On the other hand, one may conclude that the reason behind the insertion of transboundary 
mineral deposit clauses was the opposite: that the Parties believed in the non-applicability of 
the rule of capture and that one State would, therefore, be able to paralyze hydrocarbon 
development of its neighbor, unless the delimitation agreement imposed an obligation to seek 
an agreement on this issue.747 Moreover, it may be assumed that a number of Parties to some 
delimitation agreements are likely to have been guided by any other reasons. It is also worth 
noting that many delimitation agreements are silent on the topic of transboundary 
hydrocarbons.748 
Inasmuch as it is uncertain whether delimitation agreements reject or support the applicability 
of the capture rule to transboundary hydrocarbons, subsequent framework and unitization 
agreements may shed light on that issue.749 Most of these agreements stipulate that no 
production from a transboundary reservoir may commence in the absence of an agreement. For 
instance, the Norway-Russia Treaty provides that exploitation of any cross-border hydrocarbon 
deposit may only begin under the terms of a UA.750 If the Parties fail to conclude such an 
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agreement, the Treaty provides a special procedure for resolving this disagreement.751 Identical 
provisions are included in the Norway-Iceland Agreement of 2008.752 Likewise, according to 
the UK-Norway Framework Agreement, the Governments shall not permit the commencement 
of production from a transboundary deposit until they have jointly approved the Licensees’ 
Agreement, the appointment of the unit operator, and the development plan (unless otherwise 
agreed).753 The existing UAs between the UK and Norway concerning three transboundary 
hydrocarbon fields address the issue of a failure to agree on their apportionment. Pending such 
agreement, production from these fields shall commence on a provisional basis.754 In other 
words, while production can move forward even without an agreement on apportionment, it 
must be done pursuant to provisional shared production and compulsory third party dispute 
settlement procedure. 
The Canada-France Agreement similarly provides that no commercial production of a 
transboundary deposit shall commence until the Parties have concluded an exploitation 
agreement, and the unit operator has submitted a development plan and a benefits plan which 
both Parties shall have approved.755 The Cyprus-Egypt Framework Agreement contains no 
express prohibition on production in the absence of a UA. Nevertheless, this Framework 
Agreement in its entirety is premised on the idea that the Parties shall develop a cross-border 
hydrocarbon reservoir jointly.756 Therefore, it is unlikely that the Cyprus-Egypt Framework 
Agreement is framed in favor of unilateral exploitation of transboundary hydrocarbons. The 
practice of these States also supports this conclusion. For example, the production from the 
Zohr gas field discovered on the Egyptian CS in 2015 (Illustration No. 24) has not started before 
Egypt and Cyprus reached an agreement that this field does not extend into the CS of Cyprus.757 
The Venezuela-T&T Framework Treaty stipulates that production from a transboundary 
hydrocarbon deposit may only commence when a development plan is approved by the 
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754 Frigg, Statfjord and Murchison UAs, art. 2 (3). The meaning of the term ‘provisional basis’ under each UA is 
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Parties.758 However, in the event that the Parties are unable to agree upon the apportionment of 
a particular field, “the unitized exploitation may proceed on a provisional basis […] without 
prejudice to the position of either Party”.759 However, in contrast to the UAs between the UK 
and Norway, the Venezuela-T&T Framework Treaty does not clarify how such provisional 
allocation shall occur. The conclusion of subsequent UAs concerning the Loran-Manatee and 
Manakin-Cocuina fields evidences that the production may commence only when a UA is in 
place. It is also evident from the examples of such petroleum reservoirs as the Aphrodite 
(potentially straddling the boundary between Cyprus and Israel), Kapok-Dorado (straddling the 
boundary between Venezuela and T&T) and Greater Sunrise (straddling the boundary between 
Australia and Timor-Leste) fields that none of the States involved favor unilateral exploitation 
of these fields.760 
Although the US-Mexico Agreement is premised on the idea that any activity regarding a 
transboundary field should be pursuant to a UA approved by the Parties,761 the language of 
article 7 suggests that this is not an affirmative requirement. The implication of a failure to 
agree is that each Party can authorize its licensee(s) to proceed with exploitation of 
transboundary reservoirs, subject only to the requirement to exchange production data on a 
monthly basis.762 
It is notable that many provisional arrangements covering undelimited maritime areas also 
restrict the ability of the Parties to exploit petroleum deposits straddling the JDZ’s boundaries 
unilaterally. Although the TST imposes no explicit prohibition on exploitation of petroleum 
deposits extending across the JPDA’s boundaries in the absence of a UA,763 the Parties have in 
fact acknowledged that it may only be done pursuant to such an agreement.764 In a similar 
situation, the Nigeria-STP Treaty provides that if a UA is not reached within nine months after 
giving notice on the presence of a straddling petroleum deposit, there shall be made a fair and 
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761 US-Mexico Agreement, art. 6 (1). 
762 Ibid., art. 7 (5). The conclusion that the US-Mexico Agreement deviates from the general practice of non-
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reasonable allocation of the petroleum taken from this deposit.765 One can assume that the issue 
of straddling hydrocarbons in the case where the JDZ is established might be resolved quickly 
because the cooperative management mechanism is already in place. 
Thus, it may be inferred that in accordance with most of the examined agreements, the rule of 
capture is not applicable to transboundary hydrocarbons.766 Among the agreements prohibiting 
the development of a transboundary reservoir without the confirmation of approval from the 
other State, the US-Mexico Agreement is exceptional in this regard and is perhaps unlikely to 
be followed in other agreements.767 However, it is worth noting that some agreements allow the 
development of a transboundary hydrocarbon field on an interim basis, in particular where the 
Parties have difficulties in reaching an agreement on its apportionment. 
4.4 The principle of equitable apportionment as a prevailing rule 
As emphasized in Chapter 2.5, the principle of equitable apportionment is applicable to shared 
hydrocarbon resources and many agreements dealing with those resources, particularly with 
transboundary resources, refer to that principle. As also noted in Chapter 2.5, the application of 
the principle of equitable apportionment in the context of shared hydrocarbons is not necessarily 
similar to the application of this principle within other categories of shared natural resources. 
This section of the Chapter principally addresses the content of the principle of equitable 
apportionment in the context of transboundary hydrocarbons. 
States that share a hydrocarbon resource must take into account that each of them is entitled to 
a share of the resource located in its CS. The process of apportionment of hydrocarbon volumes 
in transboundary fields is crucial for the Parties and usually time consuming,768 usually 
involving the participation of experts. This section examines the question of how the equitable 
share of each State in a transboundary hydrocarbon reservoir can be determined: in other words, 
whether this is exclusively a technical rule or other factors may be incorporated into the process 
of apportionment. This section focuses on analyzing agreements concerning already detected 
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straddling hydrocarbons because agreements of this type provide more detailed information on 
the issue of apportionment than those that deal only with the likelihood of discovering such 
resources in the future. Joint zone agreements are also considered, however, only to the extent 
they address the possibility of hydrocarbon resources straddling the JDZ and a maritime area 
of one of the States party to such an agreement or a third State. 
The UAs between Norway and the UK provide that the distribution of the cross-border 
hydrocarbon fields should occur pursuant to an agreement between the Parties.769 This 
agreement should be concluded prior to the start of production from the fields.770 In the event 
of a failure of the Parties to agree on the allocation issue before that date, the reserves shall be 
provisionally apportioned on the basis of a proposal submitted by the licensees or, if no such 
proposal is submitted, on the provisional basis of equal shares.771 As compared with the Frigg 
UA, the possibility of equal provisional apportionment was included neither in the Statfjord UA 
nor in the Murchison UA.772 
Although the mentioned UAs provide no indication of factors that were taken as a basis for the 
apportionment, subsequent practice has shown that the apportionment of each of the 
transboundary hydrocarbon fields was based on the ratio in which these fields were situated on 
each side of the delimitation line.773 The UK-Norway Framework Agreement also enshrines an 
obligation on the licensees on both sides of the delimitation line to enter into an agreement 
defining how a transboundary hydrocarbon deposit should be distributed.774 The criteria used 
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for the distribution of the Markham field straddling the UK-the Netherlands maritime border 
were similar to those applied by the UK and Norway.775  
The Preamble of the Canada-France Agreement underlines the Parties’ desire to exploit 
transboundary hydrocarbon deposits in an equitable manner and for the benefits of their 
peoples. Moreover, the Preamble stipulates that transboundary hydrocarbons shall be 
apportioned according to the proportions in which they are situated within each Party’s 
respective jurisdiction. 
Apart from the commitment to agree on the apportionment of estimated volumes of 
hydrocarbons stored in each transboundary reservoir prior to production,776 the Venezuela-T&T 
Framework Treaty contains no more detail to assist a detailed understanding of the allocation 
process. Nonetheless, the Parties were able to reach an agreement on the distribution of the 
volumes comprised in the Loran-Manatee gas field as 73.06%:26.94% in favor of Venezuela.777 
According to this Agreement, such apportionment is characterized as “equitable”.778 Based on 
the available information concerning the other two cross-border hydrocarbon fields, one can 
conclude that their allocation also occurs in accordance with the proportions located on each 
side of the delimitation line.779 
Under the Norway-Russia Treaty, the Parties have committed themselves to reach a UA, 
including the matter of the apportionment of a transboundary hydrocarbon reserve.780 In the 
event that Norway and Russia are at variance on how the reserve should be apportioned, they 
shall appoint an independent expert to resolve this issue.781 The decision of that expert is 
binding upon the Parties.782 
The Preamble of the US-Mexico Agreement indicates that the Parties are guided by the 
principle of equitable and reasonable utilization of transboundary hydrocarbon deposits. The 
Agreement provides that, 60 days before the start of production from a transboundary 
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accumulation of hydrocarbons, the unit operator is required to initiate consultations on the 
distribution of production by submitting a proposal regarding this matter to the Parties’ 
Executive Agencies.783 The proposal is subject to approval by the Agencies.784 In the case of a 
failure of such Agencies to agree upon the initial allocation of production within 30 days 
following the initiation of consultation, the Joint Commission shall examine the issue.785 While 
the Parties have committed themselves to endeavor to ensure that re-allocation of production 
of each transboundary reservoir would be fair and equitable,786 the US-Mexico Agreement does 
not contain an identical provision related to the initial allocation. However, as follows from the 
Preamble of this Agreement, the principle of equitable apportionment appears to be guiding for 
the entire process of resource allocation between the US and Mexico. 
The Jamaica-Colombia Treaty provides that the distribution of the volumes of a transboundary 
hydrocarbon resource is proportional to the volume of this resource found on either side of the 
maritime boundary.787 
The Timor Sea Boundary Treaty stipulates that any petroleum deposit straddling the maritime 
boundary is to be shared equitably.788 This provision echoes article 9 (b) of the TST which 
addressed petroleum deposits extending across the boundary of the former JPDA.789 The 
equitable sharing of a straddling petroleum deposit seems to imply that the apportionment is to 
be determined according to the ratio of the portions of this deposit which lie on either side of 
the maritime boundary. This clearly follows from the Greater Sunrise UA.790 At the same time, 
as noted in Chapter 1, the maritime boundary established in the Timor Sea in 2018 does not 
coincide with the JPDA’s boundary (Illustration No. 11) and, consequently, the larger portion 
of the Greater Sunrise is now located in the CS of Timor-Leste, not of Australia. However, it 
does not appear that the apportionment ratio established under the Timor Sea Boundary Treaty 
reflects the ratio in which the Greater Sunrise is located on each side of the boundary. The 
apportionment of the Greater Sunrise depends on which of the Parties any pipeline from these 
fields goes to (80:20 or 70:30 in favor of Timor-Leste).791 In other words, the Timor Sea 
                                                            
783 US-Mexico Agreement, art. 8 (1). 
784 Ibid. 
785 Ibid., art. 8 (3). 
786 Ibid., art. 9 (1). 
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788 Timor Sea Boundary Treaty, art. 8. 
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example shows that States may take into account other factors in the allocation of a 
transboundary hydrocarbon deposit than the proportion in which such a deposit lies on either 
side of the maritime boundary. 
A notable feature of the Norway-Iceland Agreement of 1981 is the treatment of possible 
straddling hydrocarbons. This Agreement stipulates that if a hydrocarbon deposit extends 
beyond the JDA into the Norwegian CS, it would wholly be considered as lying inside the 
JDA.792 At the same time, the Agreement does not provide for a similar provision in the event 
where a hydrocarbon deposit straddles either the delimitation line between the Parties or the 
boundary between the JDA and the CS of Iceland.793 Such apportionment in favor of Iceland 
was due to special factors which were taken into consideration. The Conciliation Commission 
has emphasized the very low hydrocarbon potential of the Icelandic CS and accordingly the 
needs of Iceland for hydrocarbon resources.794 In the case of a straddling petroleum deposit, 
article 8 (1) of the Norway-Iceland Agreement of 1981 states that “the usual unitization 
principles for the distribution and exploitation of the deposit shall apply” meaning that the 
deposit should be apportioned in accordance with a fair expert assessment.795 The Norway-
Iceland Agreement of 2008 does not focus in any more detail on the issue of apportionment. It 
simply contains a duty of the Parties to agree on the manner in which a transboundary reserve 
and proceeds thereto shall be allocated.796 
The analysis conducted above reveals that equity is a central consideration in the apportionment 
of transboundary hydrocarbons. The equitable shares are usually measured by reference to the 
proportion of those petroleum reserves of a transboundary reservoir that are actually located 
within the jurisdiction/CS of each State. Such method of apportionment serves as a basic rule 
and it is likely to be applied to other situations involving transboundary hydrocarbons. Its 
adoption is not surprising. This approach is borrowed from the industry practice of many States 
on the apportionment of petroleum fields that straddle the boundaries of several concession 
blocks within the jurisdiction of one single State.797  
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However, one cannot exclude that States sharing a hydrocarbon resource may take into account 
other factors which in their opinion are relevant for the process of resource allocation. The 
relative needs of each State could bring about distributive justice by using the capacity of a 
petroleum resource to ameliorate the per capita wealth of each neighboring nation.798 
Nonetheless, apart from the Norway-Iceland case, there are no such examples. 
What also follows from the analysis of existing agreements is the recognition that (a) each State 
is entitled to an equitable share of hydrocarbon resources comprised in a transboundary 
reservoir, which means an equitable share of revenue derived from the commercial exploitation 
of this reservoir, and that (b) each State’s share can only be determined by an agreement 
between the States. However, as noted above in this Chapter, there are certain doubts whether 
one State can restrict the ability of the other State to exploit a transboundary field in a situation 
where there is difficulty in reaching an agreement on the terms of apportionment of this field. 
If States fail to agree upon apportionment, production may commence on, say, the basis of equal 
shares, while this matter is referred to one of the compulsory dispute settlement procedures. 
Consequently, the final apportionment may then be substituted retroactively for the existing 
provisional apportionment. In other words, State A cannot disregard the fact that State B has 
also the right to a certain share in a cross-border petroleum field arising from State B’s 
sovereign rights to this field. As alluded to earlier, States usually postpone the production of 
petroleum from transboundary fields until each State’s initial share is determined.799 
Dissimilar to transboundary hydrocarbons, disputed hydrocarbons are generally apportioned 
equally between the States involved (50 % to State A and 50 % to State B).800 This can be 
explained by the fact that these States recognize that they have an equal basis for the existence 
of their sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the same maritime area under international law.801 
There is only one current example, the Nigeria-STP example (60:40 in favor of Nigeria), which 
deviates from the general practice of equal sharing of the benefits arising from activities with 
respect to disputed hydrocarbons and which is considered in detail in Chapter 6 of this thesis.802 
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It is however important to note that the (equal) apportionment of disputed hydrocarbons within 
the JDZ does not necessarily apply to the apportionment of petroleum deposits extending 
beyond this zone into the CS of one of the States.803 The basic rule of the apportionment of 
transboundary hydrocarbons examined above in this section is likely to apply. 
Thus, the application of the principle of equitable apportionment in the context of disputed 
hydrocarbons differs from the application of this principle in the context of transboundary 
hydrocarbons. While the apportionment of hydrocarbon resources in the latter context is 
essentially a technical matter, the apportionment of disputed hydrocarbons is mainly based on 
the concept of equality. 
4.5 Conclusions and observations 
This Chapter has examined the international obligations owed by State A to State B (and vice 
versa) in a situation where an accumulation of hydrocarbons straddles, or may straddle, the 
maritime boundary between State A and State B.804 
It is generally accepted that international law obligates States to cooperate with respect to 
(potential and actual) transboundary hydrocarbons, including procedural requirements to notify, 
exchange relevant information and seek to reach an agreement concerning the cooperative 
management and exploitation of those hydrocarbons. Although the obligation of State A and 
State B to cooperate does not generally imply a duty to reach an agreement, there are no cases 
where States concluding that a deposit is straddling have rejected to enhance their cooperation 
in order to find suitable modalities for the management of that deposit. Even in situations of 
uncertainty as to whether a deposit is transboundary, States usually cooperate in order to verify 
the status of that deposit. Consequently, one could argue that the requirement to cooperate is 
stronger in the context of transboundary hydrocarbons than in the context of disputed 
hydrocarbons. 
There are also other rules of international law that contribute to the strength of the requirement 
to cooperate in the context of transboundary hydrocarbons. A number of the provisions of the 
UNCLOS and the State practice examined in this Chapter support the existence of mutual 
restraint over the unilateral exploitation of transboundary hydrocarbons. A State’s failure to 
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exercise restraint is likely to constitute a violation of the principle of good neighborliness, the 
no-harm principle and the other State’s sovereign rights. As discussed in this Chapter, the equal 
nature of the sovereign rights State A and State B have over a transboundary petroleum deposit 
entails that each State is entitled to an equitable share of the benefits arising from the 
exploitation of this deposit which the other State shall respect. 
This Chapter primarily considered the issue of transboundary hydrocarbon deposits located 
within 200 nm. However, one may envisage a scenario in which a hydrocarbon deposit straddles 
the boundary delimiting the CS beyond 200 nm.805 In this scenario, apart from the obligations 
already examined in this Chapter, States shall observe article 82 of the UNCLOS according to 
which they are required to make payments and contributions with respect to the exploitation of 
such a transboundary deposit.806 However, the implementation of article 82 in the context of 
joint exploitation of transboundary hydrocarbons located in the extended CS is not further 
discussed in this thesis. Neither does this thesis deal in detail with the regime governing 
petroleum deposits straddling the boundary between a State’s (extended) CS and the Area. It 
has been observed that the prospect of finding this type of straddling petroleum is low, unlike 
other straddling mineral resources that have their own characteristics different from oil and gas 
resources (e.g., solid mineral resources are not mobile when extracted).807 Nevertheless, the 
regime of straddling mineral resource deposits established under article 142 of the UNCLOS 
serves as an important indicator that the unilateral exploitation of a shared deposit may infringe 
the other State’s sovereign rights.808 
  
                                                            
805 For example, the US-Mexico example in the western gap. See Chapter 1 and Illustration No. 7. 
806 The same true also applies to hydrocarbon fields straddling the 200 nm “boundary” between the inner and 
extended CS within the jurisdiction of a single coastal State. See Mossop 2016, op. cit., pp. 138-139. 
807 Ibid., pp. 139 and 146-147. 



























Part III consists of three Chapters and addresses the second research question outlined in 
Chapter 1. This question concerns the probability of shared (joint) State responsibility in a 
scenario in which States conduct cooperative activities with respect to shared hydrocarbons. 
Part III mainly focuses on the issue of damage (harm) to the environment.809 Of course, damage 
to vessels (e.g., a vessel collides with a facility)810 and/or natural or legal persons (e.g., a person 
can lose its life or be injured)811 may occur. However, these types of damage are less frequent 
than (marine, in particular) environmental damage and generally do not trigger as many 
practical difficulties as may arise in the event of damage to the environment. Hence, Part III 
pays less attention to (shared) State responsibility for non-environmental damage, but does not 
completely exclude such a scenario (e.g., a State responsibility claim brought by a flag State or 
a State of the nationality of a person who suffered damage). 
Part III addresses (marine) environmental damage to a third party arising from hydrocarbon 
activities carried out by two States in cooperation (currently, there are no examples of trilateral 
cooperation between States in the context of shared hydrocarbons).812 The terminology of ‘third 
party’ in Part III primarily refers to States: States directly affected by environmental damage 
and those States that may invoke the international responsibility on behalf of other States and 
the international community (e.g., where pollution extends to the high seas and/or the Area).813 
One of the questions is whether international organizations (e.g., the ISA, RFMOs and other 
organizations) may invoke (shared) State responsibility. Currently, there are significant 
limitations related to the access of international organizations to international litigation. At the 
same time, given the development of the law of international organizations (IOs) and the fact 
                                                            
809 See Chapter 5.4 in detail. 
810 For example, in 2009, the vessel Big Orange XVIII collided with the water injection facility Ekofisk 2/4-W 
situated on the Norwegian CS. See Investigation Report of the Petroleum Safety Authority of Norway, 2009, 
available at 
http://www.ptil.no/getfile.php/138073/Tilsyn%20på%20nettet/tilsynrapporter%20pdf/granskingsrapport-
kollisjon%20Big%20Orange-eng.pdf (last accessed January 2019). 
811 For example, 11 persons lost their lives on the Deepwater Horizon rig. See Report of the National Commission 
on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling to the President, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster 
and the Future of Offshore Drilling, January 2011, available at https://www.nrt.org/sites/2/files/GPO-
OILCOMMISSION.pdf (last accessed January 2019). 
812 As noted in Chapter 1, there is the potential for a trilateral joint arrangement between Malaysia, Thailand and 
Vietnam. However, such an arrangement is not yet concluded.  
813 See ARSIWA, draft arts. 42 and 48; ITLOS’s Advisory Opinion of 2011, paras. 179-180. See also R. L. 
Johnstone, Offshore Oil and Gas Development in the Arctic under International Law: Risk and Responsibility, 
Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2015, pp. 211-217, and R. Beckman, “State responsibility and transboundary marine 
pollution”, in: S. Jayakumar et al., Transboundary Pollution: Evolving Issues of International Law and Policy, 




that they are vested with standing in advisory proceedings,814 the situation may change in the 
future.        
In the context of shared hydrocarbons, (possible) environmental damage has certain core 
features. In undelimited maritime areas, any environmental damage is transboundary by 
definition because it simultaneously affects the two cooperating States.815 In the case of cross-
border hydrocarbon deposits, a risk of transboundary environmental damage is higher than if 
hydrocarbon activities were carried out at a considerable distance from the maritime boundary: 
facilities are generally located close to the boundary. As discussed in more detail below in this 
Chapter, these features have an effect on the required standard of care to be exercised by 
States.816 Nevertheless, this thesis does not deal with the issue of the responsibility owed by 
cooperating State A to cooperating State B.817 It focuses on a shared State responsibility claim 
that a third party may bring against two cooperating States for environmental damage that is 
caused, or may be caused, to it by activities with respect to shared hydrocarbons. The 
probability of causing transboundary environmental damage depends on many factors: the 
extent of damage, the wind direction, ocean currents and the proximity (or remoteness) of other 
States or global commons areas. While such a probability is relatively low in some geographical 
regions (e.g., the Gulf of Mexico and the North Sea (the UK and Norway), it is high in others 
(e.g., the Gulf of Thailand, the Gulf of Guinea and in the situations of hydrocarbon cooperation 
on the extended CS).818 
  
                                                            
814 See ARIO. For example, the ISA and the Sub-regional Fisheries Commission requested an advisory opinion 
from the ITLOS (ITLOS’s Advisory Opinions of 2011 and 2015). The UNGA requested an advisory opinion from 
the ICJ on the legal consequences of the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, pending, 
latest developments are available at https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/169 (last accessed January 2019). It is 
important to note that the ITLOS may handle complaints involving IOs for violations of the UNCLOS’s provisions. 
See, for example, Case concerning the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the 
South-Eastern Pacific Ocean (Chile/European Union), ITLOS, Case No. 7. See also P. Schmitt, Access to Justice 
and International Organizations: The Case of Individual Victims of Human Rights Violations, Edward Elgar 
Publishing Ltd., 2017, Chapter 4. 
815 Draft article 2 of the AP defines ‘transboundary’. 
816 See Chapter 5.5.2.3. 
817 See Chapter 8.4 in this regard. 




CHAPTER 5. THE REGIME OF (SHARED) STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE COURSE OF 
HYDROCARBON ACTIVITIES IN RESPECT OF 
SHARED OIL AND GAS RESOURCES 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The main conclusion following from Part II is that States sharing oil and gas resources819 are 
required to undertake hydrocarbon activities in cooperation with respect to such resources, in 
particular when it comes to the exploitation of those resources. As noted in the preceding 
Chapters, many coastal States facing the presence of shared hydrocarbons have adopted some 
form of cooperation on the joint management of these resources. The number of agreements 
and arrangements dealing with shared hydrocarbons constantly increases.820 However, it is well 
known that all stages of petroleum exploration and exploitation entail a risk of damage, 
particularly to the environment. The environmental impacts range from temporary to long-term 
harm, arising from the accidental or operational release into the marine environment of oil, 
chemicals used in the drilling process, heat or waste streams.821 The impacts are not limited to 
the marine environment, but may be terrestrial, in the case of an oil slick washing ashore, or 
atmospheric, in the case of venting or flaring of natural gas.822 
In addition, there is always the potential for an incident involving large volumes of oil. Two 
well-known incidents, which occurred on the Montara Wellhead platform (in 2009) and on the 
Deepwater Horizon drilling rig (in 2010), demonstrate this potential.823 While the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill stayed within the waters of the US,824 Indonesia claims that the Montara oil 
spill has extended beyond the jurisdiction of Australia and affected, inter alia, Indonesian 
                                                            
819 This thesis looks at two scenarios of hydrocarbon resource sharing: the sharing of resources of an undelimited 
maritime area and the sharing of a single petroleum deposit transected by a maritime boundary. See Chapter 2.2.  
820 For example, since 1989 (see Fox et al., op. cit., pp. 3-5), one can observe a considerable increase in the number 
of (unitization) agreements dealing with cross-border hydrocarbon deposits. See Appendix I. 
821 Low 2012, op. cit., p. 46, citing S. Kloff and C. Wicks, “Environmental Management of Offshore Oil 
Development and Maritime Oil Transport: A Background Document for Stakeholders of the West African Marine 
Eco Region”, IUCN Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy, October 2014, pp. 25-28. 
822 Ibid. 
823 See, for example, B. Soyer, “Compensation for Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for and 
Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources”, in: B. Soyer and A. Tettenborn (eds), Pollution at Sea: Law and 
Liability, Informa Law, 2012, p. 59. Other examples can be found in A. A. Sheau Ye, “Liability and compensation 
regime for transboundary oil pollution damage”, Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs, 2013, vol. 5 
(2), p. 64, endnote 4. 




fishermen and seaweed farmers (this claim is however rejected by the operator).825 A similar 
situation of environmental damage may occur in the course of hydrocarbon activities conducted 
by several coastal States in respect of shared oil and gas resources. This situation is not only 
hypothetical. Chapters 6 and 7 will give examples of pollution incidents that resulted from 
operations with respect to shared hydrocarbons. 
Any harm, including harm to the (marine) environment, arising out of petroleum operations and 
other activities associated with those operations is traditionally addressed through the 
mechanism of civil liability attached to a licensee/operator (under the polluter pays 
principle).826 However, the national civil liability regimes of some States are not sufficiently 
developed or might have severe limitations.827 At the same time, States are generally unwilling 
to accept any form of responsibility and liability for environmental harm.828 Such unwillingness 
is so deeply rooted that sometimes States affected by environmental harm are reluctant to make 
claims against the State of origin of this harm.829 Nonetheless, the reluctance does not mean 
that States are exempt from being held responsible/liable for (environmental) damage arising 
out of hydrocarbon activities conducted under their jurisdiction or control. The civil liability of 
operators and international State responsibility/liability exist in parallel. In other words, a civil 
                                                            
825 This Chapter will consider some relevant aspects of the Montara case. See Y. Lyons, “Transboundary pollution 
from offshore activities: a study of the Montara offshore oil spill”, in: S. Jayakumar et al. (eds), Transboundary 
Pollution: Evolving Issues of International Law and Policy, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015, pp. 162-189. See also 
Report of the Australian Lawyers Alliance, “After the Spill: Investigating Australia’s Montara Oil Disaster in 
Indonesia”, July 2015, available at https://www.lawyersalliance.com.au/documents/item/412 (last accessed 
January 2019). 
826 See, for example, Johnstone 2015, op. cit., p. 261. 
827 See, for example, “Environmental Governance in Oil-producing Developing Countries - Findings from a 
Survey of 32 Countries”, managed by E. Mayorga Alba, Extractive Industries for Development Series #17, June 
2010, World Bank, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTOGMC/Resources/336929-
1266963339030/eifd17_environmental_governance.pdf (last accessed January 2019). It is also important to note 
that currently there is no international liability regime for transboundary damage from offshore petroleum 
exploration and exploitation activities. However, some steps towards this have been made. See, for example, S. P. 
Klein, Liability and Compensation due to Transboundary Pollution Caused by Offshore Exploration and 
Exploitation: IMO Competence and Development of Guidelines, Doctoral thesis, World Maritime University, 
2016, available at https://commons.wmu.se/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1530&context=all_dissertations (last 
accessed January 2019). 
828 There are a limited number of cases where States had accepted their responsibility. For example, the Swiss 
Government acknowledged responsibility for lack of due diligence in preventing pollution of the Rhine through 
adequate regulation of the pharmaceutical industry. See AP, draft art. 3, commentary 8; E. Morgera, Corporate 
Accountability in International Environmental Law, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 37-38. 
829 T. Scovazzi, “State Responsibility for Environmental Harm”, Yearbook of International Environmental Law, 
2002, vol. 12 (1), p. 56. Scovazzi gives an example of the Chernobyl accident where many States refrained from 




claim against the operator does not preclude a State claim against another State under the law 
of State responsibility.830 
As indicated in the general introduction to Part III, this Part addresses the question of whether 
two States cooperating with respect to disputed and transboundary hydrocarbon resources may 
share international responsibility for (potential or actual) environmental harm. The 
circumstances under which shared State responsibility may be triggered follow from the law of 
State responsibility. This Chapter examines the legal conditions that must be met to hold any 
coastal State responsible for environmental harm arising out of offshore hydrocarbon activities 
conducted under its jurisdiction or control. These conditions will assist in identifying basic 
criteria for shared State responsibility that will be used later in the consideration of each 
scenario of resource sharing (Chapters 6 and 7). Another reason why Chapter 5 mainly focuses 
on the responsibility of a single State is that even in the situation of shared State responsibility, 
an injured State may opt to bring a claim against one of the responsible States in order to avoid 
difficulties in the invocation of shared State responsibility.831 This does not, however, mean 
that shared State responsibility is absent and cannot be triggered. 
It is important to emphasize that the question of whether two States may share international 
responsibility is different from the question of the ratio in which States share that responsibility 
and of how an injured State may invoke shared State responsibility. As noted above, Part III 
primarily considers the likelihood of shared State responsibility in the context of shared 
hydrocarbons. At the same time, the latter question is also touched upon in this Part and in 
Chapter 8.  
Before considering the question at hand, Chapter 5.2 proceeds to clarify the meaning of the 
terms ‘responsibility’ and ‘liability’ due to confusion these terms may create. 
5.2 Juxtaposition of the terms ‘responsibility’ and ‘liability’ 
This section examines the legal concepts of responsibility and liability. 
                                                            
830 Johnstone 2015, op. cit., p. 265, citing D. Ong, “International Environmental Law’s “Customary” Dilemma: 
Betwixt General Principles and Treaty Rules”, The Irish Yearbook of International Law, 2006, vol. 1 (3), p. 21. 




Whereas the English text of the UNCLOS uses both terms,832 other authentic texts of the 
Convention refer to a single word to cover both ‘responsibility’ and ‘liability’.833 The 
discrepancy can be explained by the fact that the distinction between ‘responsibility’ and 
‘liability’ is unknown outside the common law legal system.834 According to the provisions of 
the UNCLOS, the term ‘responsibility’ is meant to designate a set of obligations incumbent 
upon the States Parties, while the term ‘liability’ refers to the consequences arising from a 
breach of those obligations.835 
Another possible approach to distinguish the concepts of ‘responsibility’ and ‘liability’ may be 
to draw the line between the obligations of States in public international law and the obligations 
at the private law level.836 
However, none of the mentioned approaches correspond to the ILC’s conception of the terms 
‘responsibility’ and ‘liability’. The ILC adopted an approach according to which both terms 
deal with the consequences of certain acts.837 Whereas the term ‘responsibility’ is used 
exclusively in connection with internationally wrongful acts, the term ‘liability’ denotes the 
legal consequences attached to injurious activities that are not deemed wrongful under 
international law.838 In other words, the ILC has attempted to make it clear that the 
responsibility of a State would arise when it has acted wrongfully under international law, while 
international liability in a situation in which the State has acted lawfully, but with a risk of 
causing damage.839 This conceptual distinction resulted in the segregation of the topic of State 
                                                            
832 UNCLOS, arts. 139, 235 (1) and 263. 
833 The Russian text refers to the term ‘ответственность’, ‘responsabilité’ in French, ‘responsabilidad’ in Spanish 
and ‘Haftung’ in German. See also Yearbook of the ILC, 1980, vol. II (Part One), Preliminary report on 
international liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law, prepared 
by Mr. R. Q. Quentin-Baxter, Special Rapporteur, Doc. A/CN.4/334 and Add.1 and 2, pp. 250-251, available at 
http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc_1980_v2_p1.pdf&lang=EFSR; Yearbook 
of the ILC, 1986, vol. II (Part One), Second report on international liability for injurious consequences arising out 
of acts not prohibited by international law, by Mr. J. Barboza. Doc. A/CN.4/402, available at 
http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc_1986_v2_p1.pdf&lang=EFSRA (last 
accessed January 2019); R. Lefeber, Transboundary Environmental Interference and the Origin of State Liability, 
The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996, pp. 13-14; ITLOS’s Advisory Opinion of 2011, para. 66. 
834 J. Barboza, The Environment, Risk and Liability in International Law, Martinus Nijhoff, 2010 p. 22. 
835 ITLOS’s Advisory Opinion of 2011, paras. 65 and 66. See also A. E. Boyle, “State Responsibility and 
International Liability for Injurious Consequences of Acts not Prohibited by International Law: a Necessary 
Distinction?”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1990, vol. 39, p. 9. 
836 Boyle 1990, op. cit., p. 9. 
837 Barboza 2010, op. cit., p. 23. 
838 Yearbook of the ILC, 1973, vol. II, Report of the ILC on the work of its twenty-fifth session (7 May - 
13 July 1973), Doc. A/9010/Rev.1, p. 169, available at 
http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc_1973_v2.pdf&lang=EFSR (last accessed 
January 2019). 
839 Yearbook of the ILC, 1977, vol. II (Part Two), Report of the ILC on the work of its twenty-ninth session (9 




responsibility (ARSIWA) from international liability (AP and PAL) – an approach that has been 
criticized in legal literature.840 
This thesis employs the distinction between ‘responsibility’ and ‘liability’ made by the ILC 
because, despite the criticism, that distinction is often used in case law and current legal 
literature, also in addressing the issue of environmental damage.841 In other words, this means 
that the term ‘responsibility’ is used where a State commits an internationally wrongful act:842 
for example, in a situation where a State authorizes exploitation of a shared hydrocarbon deposit 
unilaterally or does not comply with the provisional measures prescribed by a judicial body.843 
A State also bears responsibility for a failure to exercise its due diligence obligation to ensure 
that hydrocarbon activities are carried out in compliance with its international obligations, 
including the obligation to prevent significant harm to the (marine) environment as considered 
further in this Chapter. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in some parts of the following 
Chapters the notion ‘responsibility’ means an obligation (to do or not to do something) of a 
State or an inter-State body. For example, the phrase “State A and State B share responsibility 
for protection of the marine environment of the area X” implies that both State A and State B 
have obligations to protect the marine environment. This deviation from the definition of the 
term ‘responsibility’ used in Part III is due to the wording of a particular arrangement or 
agreement in which ‘responsibility’ means ‘obligation’. 
The term ‘liability’ is used to indicate a situation where a State has met its due diligence, but 
(environmental) damage has nevertheless happened – a duty to address such damage.844 The 
issue of international State liability is particularly relevant where the civil liability regime does 
not function optimally. Chapter 5.7 deals with State liability in the absence of a wrongful act. 
                                                            
http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc_1977_v2_p2.pdf&lang=EFSR (last 
accessed January 2019). See also AP, draft art. 1, commentary 6. 
840 See, for example, M. B. Akehurst, “International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not 
Prohibited by International Law”, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 1985, vol. 16, p. 8; Boyle 1990, 
op. cit., p. 14; L. De La Fayette, “The ILC and International Liability: a Commentary”, Review of European 
Community & International Environmental Law, 1997, vol. 6 (3), p. 324-327. See Chapter 1 concerning the 
ARSIWA, AP and PAL. 
841 See, for example, Scovazzi 2002, op. cit.; M. Fitzmaurice, “International Responsibility and Liability”, in: D. 
Bodansky, J. Brunnée and E. Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, Oxford 
University Press, 2008; Johnstone 2015, op. cit., Part 3. 
842 Chapter 5.3 discusses the elements of an internationally wrongful act.  
843 See Chapters 3 and 4 (e.g., Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire Judgment, Part X). 




5.3 Elements of international State responsibility 
The primary source governing the international responsibility of a State is the ARSIWA 
adopted by the ILC.845 Pursuant to draft article 1 of the ARSIWA, a State bears responsibility 
for an internationally wrongful act.846 The conduct of a State, whether by way of an action or 
omission, is to be qualified as an internationally wrongful act if two conditions are met.847 First, 
the conduct shall be attributable to the State under international law.848 Second, the conduct 
shall constitute a breach of an international obligation of the State,849 or, as the draft Articles 
set out, shall “not [be] in conformity with what is required” by the international obligation.850 
Therefore, for establishing international legal responsibility of a State both conditions must be 
satisfied. The absence of one of them results in a failure to generate the State’s responsibility. 
It is logical to assert that draft article 2 of the ARSIWA prescribes a determined sequence of 
steps for establishing international responsibility of a State. Prior to the determination of 
whether the State has breached its obligations under international law, first the question of 
whether an act is attributable to the State should be examined. Nevertheless, a number of 
commentators have observed that the two elements contained in draft article 2 could be 
inverted.851 In other words, it may be possible first to determine whether an act is contrary to 
what is required from a State, even if thereafter this act would not be attributable to the State.852 
However, judicial bodies usually address the question of attribution before dealing with the 
issue of breach.853 One possible explanation might be that it is relatively easier to reply to the 
first question than to the second. 
It is important to note that such elements as fault and damage have not been included in the 
ARSIWA.854 However, these elements can be required, depending on the content of an 
                                                            
845 See Chapter 1 on the authority of the ARSIWA. 
846 As underlined in Chapter 1 of this thesis, in Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire, the SC held that draft article 1 of the ARSIWA 
“reflects customary international law” (Ghana/Côte d'Ivoire Judgment, para. 558). 
847 ARSIWA, draft art. 2. 
848 Ibid., draft art. 2 (a).  
849 Ibid., draft art. 2 (b). 
850 Ibid., draft art. 12. 
851 B. Stern, “The Elements of an Internationally Wrongful Act”, in: J. Crawford, A. Pellet and S. Olleson (eds), 
The Law of International Responsibility, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 202. 
852 Ibid. Stern gives an example of the Bosnian Genocide case in which the ICJ followed such order.  
853 See, for example, ITLOS’s Advisory Opinion of 2015, para. 146; Arctic Sunrise, para. 201. 
854 The requirements of fault and attribution are usually described as ‘subjective’ elements of an internationally 
wrongful act, while the breach of an obligation and damage are characterized as ‘objective’ elements. It is worth 
noting that the distinction between objective and subjective elements was abandoned by the ILC. See ARSIWA, 




international obligation.855  For example, a State’s act constitutes genocide only if it is 
committed “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious 
group, as such …” (fault is to be established).856 Part III focuses on international environmental 
law where the presence of environmental harm is an essential (but not the only) requirement for 
triggering State responsibility that also affects the availability of remedies.857 Moreover, there 
must be a sufficient causal link between environmental damage and a wrongful act, which has 
been clearly reflected by the ICJ in its Judgment on compensation in the Costa Rica v. 
Nicaragua case.858 In other words, in the context of this thesis, it must be shown that a State’s 
failure to exercise due diligence caused damage to another State. 
Thus, an injured party (A) may invoke the international responsibility of a State (B) when: 
a. B has committed an internationally wrongful act, namely it has failed to exercise due 
diligence with respect to hydrocarbon activities; and  
b. A suffered (environmental) damage as a result of B’s failure to exercise due diligence. 
The following sections address these elements of State responsibility. Moreover, this Chapter 
explores two additional questions. The first question is whether A may trigger B’s responsibility 
in the absence of actual damage to the environment. The second question relates to the 
requirement of attribution. Given the fact that in the petroleum sector, a breach of an 
international obligation may originate not from acts of the State per se, but from acts of private 
entities, the question is in what circumstances private acts are attributable to the State. 
It is also important to bear in mind that the ARSIWA include defenses that preclude the 
wrongfulness of an act in certain situations.859 For example, if a defense of force majeure (e.g., 
an earthquake and subsequent tsunami that hit an installation resulted in marine environmental 
damage) can be established, no international State responsibility arises. 
5.4 The requirement of damage 
As indicated in the introduction to Part III, the emphasis in this Part is on damage to the 
environment. Environmental damage can be caused together with or without other types of 
                                                            
855 ARSIWA, draft art. 2, commentaries 9 and 10. 
856 Ibid., draft art. 2, commentary 3, referring to article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide, Paris, 9 December 1948, EIF: 12 January 1951, 78 UNTS 277. 
857 See Chapter 5.4. 
858 Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua): Compensation 
Owed by the Republic of Nicaragua to the Republic of Costa Rica, Judgment, 2 February 2018, Section II. 




damage (e.g., the Deepwater Horizon incident caused damage to persons and the 
environment).860 Hence, damage to the environment is a separate head of responsibility.861 
5.4.1 Environmental damage 
The term ‘environmental damage’ can be defined in different ways. A narrow definition of 
environmental damage is limited to damage to natural resources, such as air, water, soil, flora 
and fauna, and their interaction.862 A broader definition includes damage to natural resources 
and property that forms part of cultural heritage, such as historic sites and monuments.863 The 
ILC in its PAL offered a more extensive definition in which the “characteristic aspects of the 
landscape” are to be considered.864 
‘Environmental damage’ is not identical to ‘pollution damage’. Sands has observed that while 
the concept of ‘pollution’ provides some assistance in determining what constitutes 
‘environmental damage’, these terms are not necessarily interchangeable.865 Ong has cited a 
scenario of environmental damage without pollution per se (a ship crashes against a coral reef 
without actually polluting the surrounding marine environment), although acknowledging 
several difficulties associated with this scenario.866 In other words, Ong has attempted to show 
that environmental damage may be caused not only by pollution.867 At the same time, in the 
hydrocarbon sphere, environmental damage is tightly linked to pollution resulting from an 
escape of hydrocarbons. 
As in the case of ‘environmental damage’, there is no universally accepted definition of 
‘pollution’. For example, article 1 (4) of the UNCLOS defines ‘pollution of the marine 
environment’ as: 
the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine environment, 
including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources 
                                                            
860 See PAL, draft principle 2, commentary 11. 
861 PAL, draft principle 2; Costa Rica v. Nicaragua Compensation Judgment; D. M. Ong, “The Relationship 
between Environmental Damage and Pollution: Marine Oil Pollution Laws in Malaysia and Singapore”, in: M. 
Bowman and A. Boyle (eds), Environmental Damage in International and Comparative Law, Oxford University 
Press, 2002, p. 193. 
862 Sands et al., op. cit., p. 741; PAL, draft principle 2, commentary 20. See also ITLOS’s Advisory Opinion of 
2011, para. 179. The Tribunal held that damage within article 139 of the UNCLOS “would include damage to the 
Area and its resources constituting the common heritage of mankind, and damage to the marine environment”. 
863 De la Fayette 2002, op. cit., p. 149; Sands et al., op. cit., p. 741.  
864 PAL, draft principle 2 (commentaries 20-23 explain the reasons). See also De la Fayette 2002, op. cit., p. 149. 
865 Sands et al., op. cit., p. 741. 
866 Ong 2002 (b), op. cit., p. 194. 
867 Ibid., pp. 193-195. See also Birnie et al., International Law and the Environment, Oxford University Press, 3rd 




and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other 
legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities. 
This expansive definition serves as a baseline for States insofar as they usually include neither 
a definition of pollution nor a definition of environmental damage/degradation in arrangements 
and agreements dealing with shared hydrocarbons.868 A notable exception is the Nigeria-STP 
Treaty which largely repeats the definition of pollution given in the UNCLOS.869 
When discussing the issue of environmental damage, it is important to mention the ICJ’s 
Judgment on compensation in Costa Rica v. Nicaragua in which the Court for the first time 
dealt with a claim for compensation for environmental damage, that is, for “the impairment or 
loss of environmental goods and services” prior to recovery of the environment subject to the 
claim for compensation.870 Without analyzing this landmark Judgment in detail, some findings 
deserve mention. First, environmental damage caused by an internationally wrongful act 
triggers State responsibility.871 Secondly, there is no single methodology for the valuation of 
environmental damage under international law.872 Thirdly, a State may be entitled to 
compensation for costs and expenses incurred as a consequence of the wrongful act.873 
Fourthly, there must be a causal link between the wrongful act and environmental damage, 
including the costs and expenses claimed.874 These findings are relevant for future 
environmental damage claims, both within and outside the context of shared hydrocarbons. 
Another important aspect of the requirement of damage is that environmental damage must be 
“significant” to trigger State responsibility.875 As explained by the ILC, this threshold is 
                                                            
868 It is worth noting that there may be other applicable agreements outside these arrangements and agreements on 
shared hydrocarbons. See, for example, Chapter 7.6. 
869 Nigeria-STP Treaty, art. 1 (21). 
870 Costa Rica v. Nicaragua Compensation Judgment, para. 42. While Costa Rica identified 22 categories of 
environmental goods and services that had been impaired or lost as a result of Nicaragua’s unlawful activities, it 
claimed compensation only in respect of 6: “standing timber; other raw materials (fibre and energy); gas regulation 
and air quality; natural hazards mitigation; soil formation and erosion control; and biodiversity, in terms of habitat 
and nursery” (ibid., para. 55). See also PAL, draft principle 2, commentary 13. 
871 Ibid., para. 41. 
872 Ibid., para. 52. 
873 Ibid., para. 41. See also PAL, drat principle 2 (a) (iv) and (v). 
874 Ibid., paras. 34 and 89. 
875 The thresholds “significant’, “substantial” and “serious” are extensively discussed. The panel in Trail Smelter 
limited its considerations to activities, which cause injury of “serious consequence”. The threshold “seriously” was 
also reflected in the Lac Lanoux arbitration. The UNCLOS, in article 206, refers to harm that may cause 
“substantial pollution of or significant and harmful changes to the marine environment”. Article 290 of the 
UNCLOS refers to a risk of “serious harm to the marine environment”. There is a number of other legal instruments 
that use “significant”, “serious” and “substantial” (for example, AP, draft art. 2, commentary 6, footnotes 874 and 
875, and PAL, draft principle 2, commentary 1, footnotes 330 and 331). The ILC in its commentaries to the AP 
and PAL describes the term ‘significant’ as “something more than “detectable” but need not be at the level of 




designed to “prevent frivolous or vexatious claims”.876 While it is generally accepted that many 
hydrocarbon activities entail a risk of (significant) harm to the (marine) environment and, 
hence, States must exercise due diligence in relation to these activities (see Chapter 5.5),877 this 
does not mean that any environmental harm caused by hydrocarbon activities would 
automatically be “significant”. Significance of environmental damage should be considered in 
accordance with the circumstances of each case in question. Like the standard of due 
diligence,878 the “significant” damage threshold varies.879 For example, while the removal of 
trees in freshwater wetlands may reach the level of “significant” damage, it is not necessarily 
so in another geographical region.880 In the context of hydrocarbon activities, an incident 
involving a small quantity of oil may have more significant adverse effects on the environment 
than an incident involving larger quantities of oil: for example, in vulnerable maritime areas 
(e.g., the Arctic) or at distances relative to a coastline or maritime feature. 
The underlying issue here is the occurrence of environmental damage that is not at the level of 
“significant”.881 State A is not legally responsible for environmental damage caused to State B 
by State A’s hydrocarbon activities where this damage does not reach the “significant” damage 
threshold. State B is expected to tolerate minor adverse impacts on its environment.882 In this 
respect, the standard of due diligence plays an important role: for example, whether persons of 
State B injured by State A’s hydrocarbon activities may seek redress in the domestic courts of 
State A. In other words, States shall primarily focus on the issue of averting damage to the 
environment. A duty to prevent significant environmental damage is legally distinct from a duty 
to deal with harmful effects where such a damage has already occurred.883 
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et al., op. cit., pp. 743-744; Birnie et al., op. cit., pp. 186-188. 
876 PAL, draft principle 2, commentary 1. 
877 See, for example, Low 2012, op. cit., p. 55; Johnstone 2015, op. cit., p. 207. See also Chapter 5.1. 
878 See Chapter 5.5.2.3. 
879 AP, draft art. 2, commentary 7; PAL, draft principle 2, commentary 3. 
880 See, Costa Rica v. Nicaragua Compensation Judgment, para. 79. 
881 Another issue is whether significant environmental damage is compensable or not.  
882 PAL, draft principle 2, commentary 2. 
883 T. Scovazzi, “Some Remarks on International Responsibility in the Field of Environmental Protection”, in: M. 
Ragazzi (ed), International Responsibility Today: Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter, Martinus Nijhoff 




5.4.2 The causal nexus between environmental damage and a wrongful act 
There must be “a sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus” between a wrongful act and 
damage.884 As a general rule, the burden of proof rests on an injured party.885 In other words, 
in the context of this thesis, an injured party has to prove the existence of significant 
environmental damage and provide evidence demonstrating that this damage is a result of a 
State’s failure to discharge its due diligence obligation. In Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, the ICJ has 
acknowledged that there may be certain difficulties related to the issue of damage and causation, 
which must be dealt with in each concrete case.886 For example, the operator of the Montara 
platform rejects any causal link between the Montara oil spill and the decline in seaweed 
production of Indonesian farmers.887 It is also possible to envisage a scenario in which an 
injured State may face difficulties in identifying the source of environmental damage: for 
example, whether it originates from hydrocarbon activities with respect to shared oil and gas 
resources or with respect to other petroleum resources. 
5.4.3 State responsibility in the absence of (environmental) damage 
Although the occurrence of significant environmental damage is a central element for legal 
remedies, a State may be held responsible even in the absence of damage. In its Advisory 
Opinion, the SDC stated that damage is not a precondition for international State responsibility: 
“a State may be held liable under customary international law even if no material damage results 
from its failure to meet its international obligations”.888 At the same time, the SDC noted that 
there might be exceptions to this rule of customary international law. For example, in 
accordance with article 139 (2) of the UNCLOS, a sponsoring State is responsible only if it fails 
to carry out its obligations and there is damage which results from that failure.889 This exception 
however applies to activities in the Area. 
Thus, the presence of the requirement of damage depends on the content of the international 
obligation in question.890 For example, the establishment of a safety zone around an installation 
                                                            
884 Bosnian Genocide, para. 462. The ICJ has repeated that in the Guinea v. DRC and Costa Rica v. Nicaragua 
Compensation Judgments (paras. 14 and 32, respectively). See also ITLOS’s Advisory Opinion of 2011, para. 182. 
885 Costa Rica v. Nicaragua Compensation Judgment, para. 33. Nevertheless, the ICJ has noted that the burden of 
proof may rest on the respondent if he is in a better position to establish certain facts.  
886 Costa Rica v. Nicaragua Compensation Judgment, para. 34. See also Peel 2015, op. cit., pp. 68-75. 
887 See, for example, S. Zillman, “Montara oil spill: 15,500 Indonesian seaweed farmers take fight to Federal 
Court”, ABC News, 30 August 2017, available at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-08-30/montara-oil-spill-
indonesian-farmers-take-company-to-court/8857384 (last accessed January 2019). 
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in nonconformity with article 60 of the UNCLOS constitutes a wrongful act even in the absence 
of material damage to vessels.891 In other words, when considering the topic of environmental 
protection where a risk of harm to the environment is in focus, a State may bear responsibility 
when it fails to take appropriate preventive measures even if there is no physical impact on the 
environment.892 It is however important to emphasize that the legal consequences of the 
situations with and without actual environmental damage differ.893 For instance, in the situation 
of a failure to comply with the duty to carry out an EIA, the State would be under an obligation 
to cease the hydrocarbon activity in question until such an EIA is conducted.894 In the case of 
significant environmental damage, the State of origin may be under an obligation to make full 
reparation for such damage (e.g., compensation, which is one of the forms of reparation).895 It 
is however difficult to find State practice of invoking responsibility in the absence of actual 
environmental damage. A potentially injured party may use different forms to respond to a 
wrongful act, including diplomatic and other confidential channels.896 In other words, a State 
may request another State to cease a harmful hydrocarbon activity without proceedings before 
an international court or tribunal having begun. 
5.5 Establishing a State’s lack of due diligence 
States are the main bearers of rights and obligations in public international law.897 However, in 
certain circumstances, States need to involve other actors to exercise some elements of their 
authority. In the context of this research, States, by issuing permits to (state-owned, national 
and/or foreign) petroleum companies to conduct exploration and exploitation operations, are 
exercising their exclusive sovereign rights over the CS.898 Consequently, each coastal State 
must ensure that those exploration and exploitation operations are carried out in conformity 
with its primary international obligations. In this research, one of the key international 
environmental obligations is a State’s due diligence obligation to ensure that petroleum 
                                                            
891 See Arctic Sunrise, para. 206. It is however important to note that the Tribunal found no evidence that Russia 
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892 Johnstone 2015, op. cit., p. 203; Beckman 2015, op. cit., p. 156. See Chapter 5.5 in detail. 
893 Scovazzi 2005, op. cit., p. 212. See also ARSIWA, Part Two. 
894 ARSIWA, draft art. 30. 
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897 IOs are also duty-bearers. See N. Nedeski, Shared Obligations in International Law, Doctoral thesis, University 
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activities authorized by this State are such as to create no risk of significant harm to the (marine) 
environment. This section examines the content of this environmental obligation. 
The due diligence obligation to ensure a particular behavior of private actors does not only exist 
in the context of hydrocarbon activities. For example, a flag State is under an obligation to 
ensure that vessels flying its flag satisfy the safety at sea requirements and do not conduct IUU 
fishing in the EEZ of a third State.899 Similarly, under human rights law, a State must ensure 
that activities of non-state actors do not obstruct the realization of human rights.900 
Thus, for triggering international responsibility, it must be demonstrated that a State has not 
exercised its due diligence obligation to prevent significant environmental harm. In the context 
of the ARSIWA, the State’s failure to exercise due diligence may be considered an omission 
which means that this failure constitutes an internationally wrongful act.901 
5.5.1 The standard of due diligence and marine environmental protection 
It is generally accepted that under international law each State is obligated to ensure that 
activities within its jurisdiction and control do not cause significant harm to other States and to 
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.902 Chapter 2.6 considered this obligation in the 
context of unilateral activities with respect to shared hydrocarbons. As noted in Chapter 2.6, 
the obligation not to cause significant harm has been mainly developed with regard to the 
protection and preservation of the environment. One landmark case for the development of this 
obligation is the ICJ’s Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion.903 The Court declared that “[t]he 
general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect 
the environment of other States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of 
international law relating to the environment”.904 In Pulp Mills, the ICJ stated that every State 
is obligated to “use all the means at its disposal in order to avoid activities which take place in 
its territory, or in any area under its jurisdiction, causing significant damage to the environment 
of another State”.905 
                                                            
899 UNCLOS, art. 94. See also ITLOS’s Advisory Opinion of 2015, paras. 85-140. 
900 See, for example, W. Vandenhole, “Shared Responsibility of Non-State Actors: A Human Rights Perspective”, 
in: N. Gal-Or et al. (eds), Responsibilities of the Non-State Actor in Armed Conflict and the Market Place: 
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It is also important to mention the work of the ILC on the AP. The ILC noted that the obligation 
to prevent significant transboundary harm or minimize the risk thereof has been incorporated 
into a large number of international treaties concerning protection of the environment, including 
those dealing with the marine environment (in particular Part XII of the UNCLOS).906 The 
UNCLOS provides for a general duty to protect and preserve the marine environment while 
exploring and exploiting natural resources.907 That general duty applies to the entire marine 
environment, including undelimited maritime areas where States have agreed to conduct 
hydrocarbon activities in cooperation.908  In South China Sea, the Tribunal noted that this 
general duty is a positive obligation to “take active measures to protect and preserve the marine 
environment” and, at the same time, is a negative obligation not to degrade the marine 
environment.909 Further, the Tribunal stated that the content of the general duty to protect and 
preserve the marine environment under article 192 of the UNCLOS is informed by the 
subsequent provisions of Part XII, including article 194, and other applicable rules of 
international environmental law mentioned above in this section.910 The Tribunal in South 
China Sea also recalled the acknowledgment by the Tribunal in Iron Rhine that “States have a 
positive “duty to prevent, or at least mitigate” significant harm to the environment when 
pursuing large-scale construction activities”.911 
Article 194 of the UNCLOS imposes on States obligations to take all measures necessary to: 
(a) “prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from any source”, 
including offshore petroleum activities; and (b) “ensure that activities under their jurisdiction 
or control” are carried out so as not to “cause damage by pollution to other States and their 
environment, and that pollution […] does not spread beyond the areas where they exercise 
sovereign rights”.912 It is notable that in article 194, the UNCLOS does not use “significant” as 
                                                            
906 AP, draft art. 3, commentary 8, footnote 880. 
907 UNCLOS, arts. 192 and 193. 
908 See, for example, South China Sea, para. 940. It is important to bear in mind the applicability of the general 
duty to protect and preserve the marine environment in the context of unilateral hydrocarbon activities, particularly 
in undelimited maritime areas. See Chapter 2.6 in this regard. 
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(2007), para. 59, and Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pakistan v. India), Partial Award, 18 February 2013, 
PCA Award Series (2014), para. 451. The Tribunal in Iron Rhine also referred to other sources of international 
law and concluded that this duty “has now become a principle of general international law” (ibid.). 
912 UNCLOS, art. 194 (1) (2) (emphasis added). See also arts. 207-212. See Chapter 5.4.1 on the definition of 




the threshold.913 There is an obligation to ensure that (transboundary) pollution of the marine 
environment is prevented. 
Thus, under international law relating to the protection of the environment, States authorizing 
hydrocarbon activities in respect of shared resources are required to ensure that those activities 
do not cause pollution and other significant harm to their own (marine and coastal) 
environment, the environment of other States and of maritime areas beyond their national 
jurisdiction or control. The customary status of the obligation to prevent significant 
environmental harm means that all States are bound by this obligation. This obligation does not 
need to be explicitly incorporated into arrangements and agreements dealing with shared 
hydrocarbons to be binding on the contracting Parties. However, as examined further in this 
thesis, provisional arrangements and agreements on shared hydrocarbons often include the 
obligation to prevent pollution and other harm to the marine environment.914 
The obligation to ensure that hydrocarbon activities do not harm the (marine) environment can 
be characterized as an obligation of conduct and as a due diligence obligation. Recent decisions 
by international courts and tribunals have shaped this understanding of the obligation to 
ensure.915 This determination is also largely supported by legal scholars.916 
The standard of due diligence does not imply that pollution and other environmental harm must 
be totally eliminated,917 but means that a State authorizing any hydrocarbon activity must take 
all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of environmental harm.918 Thus, the State 
may be held responsible for its failure to take those preventive measures.919 Consequently, 
when dealing with the question of whether two States cooperating in respect of shared 
hydrocarbons may be jointly responsible under international law, it is necessary to analyze how 
the standard of due diligence is framed in the context of shared hydrocarbons. The next section 
explores the core elements of the due diligence standard that will subsequently assist in 
                                                            
913 Unlike in a number of other provisions, supra note 875. 
914 See Chapters 6 and 7 in detail. 
915 See, for example, Pulp Mills, para. 197; ITLOS’s Advisory Opinion of 2011, para. 110; ITLOS’s Advisory 
Opinion of 2015, paras. 129 and 148; South China Sea, para. 944 
916 See, for example, Lefeber, op. cit., p. 64; X. Hanqin, Transboundary Damage in International Law, Cambridge: 
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analyzing the design of due diligence in the context of shared hydrocarbons, which is the main 
factor leading to shared State responsibility.920 
5.5.2 The constituent components of due diligence 
This section deals with the question of what is required of a coastal State to meet its due 
diligence obligation. The due diligence measures, which shall be taken in the context of 
hydrocarbon activities, are divided into two main categories: before (measures to prevent 
environmental damage) and after damage (measures to address such damage). This section 
seeks to provide a full list of measures within these categories. While a number of measures are 
direct primary obligations of coastal States (for example, the obligation to conduct an EIA), 
they can also be considered relevant factors for meeting the standard of due diligence. 
5.5.2.1 Preventative measures 
There are a number of cases that provide some guidance on the key elements of the standard of 
due diligence. In Pulp Mills, the ICJ stated that “[the obligation to act diligently] is an obligation 
which entails not only the adoption of appropriate rules and measures, but also a certain level 
of vigilance in their enforcement and the exercise of administrative control applicable to public 
and private operators, such as the monitoring of activities undertaken by such operators, to 
safeguard the rights of the other party”.921 The ITLOS (including the SDC) has referred to this 
statement in its Advisory Opinions.922 Thus, three main “pillars” of due diligence are: (a) 
establishment of a regulatory framework; (b) enforcement of the existing regulatory framework; 
and (c) administrative control over activities.923 These three pillars are also the foundation of 
due diligence in the context of (cooperative) hydrocarbon activities. In addition, the SDC in its 
Advisory Opinion has stated that a (sponsoring) State would comply with due diligence if it 
paid attention to “plausible indications of potential risks” of an activity even where there is 
scientific uncertainty as to the scope and extent of these risks.924 
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Consequently, the first step in discharging due diligence obligations is the adoption of 
appropriate laws and regulations applicable to hydrocarbon activities.925 This step is 
particularly crucial for joint hydrocarbon activities carried out in an undelimited maritime area 
because this area is governed by two or more sets of sovereign rights of claimant States.926 As 
shown in Chapter 6, the establishment of a regulatory framework is indeed a primary measure 
taken by States in the context of disputed hydrocarbons. It does not however mean that the first 
step is less relevant in the context of transboundary hydrocarbons. The presence of the maritime 
boundary makes it easier for each State to satisfy the regulatory component of due diligence.927 
It is true that the content of the laws and regulations that shall be adopted by each State is left 
to be determined by this State. However, when adopting these regulations and laws, the State 
must also ensure that they are in conformity with its international, regional or bilateral 
commitments. As noted in Chapters 6 and 7, arrangements and agreements concluded by States 
with respect to shared hydrocarbons are usually designed in such a way to allow environmental 
protection measures to evolve together with environmental obligations of the States. In other 
words, the Parties do not need to amend their arrangements and agreements to accommodate 
changes in (international or regional) environmental standards and requirements. 
While the existence of appropriate laws and regulations is a necessary condition for complying 
with due diligence, a State must also establish enforcement mechanisms to secure compliance 
by licensees with the adopted laws and regulations (the second pillar of due diligence).928 A 
failure to implement the laws and regulations gives rise to the presumption that due diligence 
has not been adequately undertaken.929 As noted in commentary to the UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights, “[t]he failure to enforce existing laws […] is often a significant 
legal gap in State practice. […] Therefore, it is important for States to consider whether such 
laws are currently being enforced effectively, and if not, why this is the case and what measures 
may reasonably correct the situation”.930 Although this observation relates to the enforcement 
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928 See also UNCLOS, art. 214. 
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of the laws requiring business enterprises to respect human rights, the same true might also be 
applicable to environmental laws and regulations.  
The importance of enforcement mechanisms can be demonstrated by the example of the gaps 
that existed in Ecuador’s environmental legislation.931 In 1984, an environmental Agency was 
established within the Ministry of Energy and Mines. In 1988, the Agency notified oil 
companies operating in Ecuador that they were required by law to submit EIAs for approval 
before initiating any new exploratory or production activities. However, the absence of an 
enforcement provision concerning the EIA requirement contributed to a situation in which no 
company fully complied with this requirement.932 
Nowadays, it is generally accepted that hydrocarbon activities, including exploration and 
exploitation, require an EIA insofar as they pose a risk of harm to the (marine) environment.933 
Thus, each State has a duty to conduct an EIA934 prior to authorizing hydrocarbon activities.935 
Hence, an act of authorizing hydrocarbon activities without an adequate EIA can be considered 
wrongful (a breach of due diligence) which triggers international State responsibility.936 At this 
point, it is worth emphasizing that States rarely attempt to invoke the responsibility of other 
States in the absence of actual damage.937 For example, in its Request for provisional measures 
in Ghana/Côte d’Ivoire, Côte d’Ivoire pointed out that Ghana’s environmental legislation does 
not always meet “good oilfield practice”: in particular, development operations with respect to 
the Jubilee field commenced before Ghana had approved the development plan and before an 
environmental impact study was vetted by the competent authorities.938 Whereas this allegation 
had been put forward by Côte d’Ivoire in order to show that the conditions for the prescription 
of provisional measures under article 290 of the UNCLOS were met,939 the issue was not 
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discussed at the merits stage. As regards the concept of “good oilfield practice” (GOP), an 
obligation to apply GOP is usually imposed on licensees conducting petroleum operations. At 
the same time, a State’s function is to establish a set of standards that promote GOP in actual 
petroleum operations. There is no single definition of this concept. For example, the Timor Sea 
Boundary Treaty defines GOP as: 
practices and procedures employed in the petroleum industry worldwide by prudent and diligent operators  
under conditions and circumstances similar to those experienced in connection with the relevant aspects of 
[p]etroleum operations, having regard to relevant factors […].940 
As follows from this definition, GOP does not only include technology, but also best 
environmental practices (BEP) in order to minimize adverse effects of petroleum operations on 
the environment.941 However, the problem with this definition is the flexibility in determining 
of what counts as “good oilfield practice”.942 
One can cite other two examples of a State’s failure to exercise due diligence which resulted in 
environmental (and other) damage. The first example is the Social and Economic Rights Action 
Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria case before the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).943 In this case, the state-owned 
Nigerian National Petroleum Company and the Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (a 
subsidiary of Shell) were part of a consortium that had exploited oil reserves in Ogoniland 
located in Nigeria. The operations of the consortium had caused environmental degradation and 
serious health impacts on the people of Ogoniland resulting from the disposal of toxic waste 
into the local environment and waterways.944 The ACHPR pointed out that in the course of oil 
exploitation in Ogoniland (commenced in the 1950s and ceased in 1993), the (former) Nigerian 
Government had failed to exercise its due diligence obligation with respect to these activities. 
For instance, the Government had neither monitored the operations of the consortium nor 
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required oil companies to comply with standard safety procedures.945 The Government had not 
required the consortium to conduct EIAs or consult with local populations.946 
Another example related to offshore hydrocarbon activities is the Deepwater Horizon incident 
in the Gulf of Mexico. The Report of the National Commission, which investigated this 
incident, discloses that the US had failed to regulate and monitor hydrocarbon activities.947 
Thus, it could be argued that if the Deepwater Horizon oil spill had extended to the waters of 
Mexico, Mexico would have had legal grounds for invoking the US’s international 
responsibility.948 A recent report made by the Auditor General of Norway indicates that in a 
number of cases the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) has not carried out adequate 
supervision of petroleum operations on the Norwegian CS and has not applied its enforcement 
powers when it was necessary.949 There is no evidence of such an extensive study on the 
question of due diligence of States with respect to other pollution incidents, including the 
Montara incident.950 It has been only observed that Australia does not have legislation requiring 
environmental damage to be assessed nor compensated for.951 
The examples above show that the oversight of hydrocarbon activities is an important factor in 
implementing due diligence. If during monitoring it appears that a petroleum activity involves 
a risk of causing significant harm to the environment (or persons), States shall request the 
operator to suspend this activity until the risk is addressed. As discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, 
States usually include special provisions in arrangements and agreements dealing with shared 
hydrocarbon deposits according to which they are entitled to conduct inspections of 
hydrocarbon activities with respect to those deposits and cease harmful activities. 
It is interesting to note that in the literature there is the opinion that the State in which a 
petroleum company is incorporated or headquartered (“home State”) should also exercise 
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947 Report on the Deepwater Horizon Spill, supra note 811, Chapter 3, especially pp. 82-85. See in detail also A. 
Boyle, “Transboundary air pollution: a tale of two paradigms”, in: S. Jayakumar et al., Transboundary Pollution: 
Evolving Issues of International Law and Policy, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015, pp. 239-240. 
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949 Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse av Petroleumstilsynets oppfølging av helse, miljø og sikkerhet i 
petroleumsvirksomheten, Dokument 3:6 (2018–2019), 15 January 2019, 11 Vurderinger, available at 
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stricter-supervision-article14329-878.html (last accessed January 2019). 
950 See, for example, Report of the Montara Commission of Inquiry, June 2010, available at 
http://www.iadc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/201011-Montara-Report.pdf (last accessed January 2019).  




control (e.g., Norway’s control over environmental conduct of Equinor (former Statoil) or its 
subsidiaries operating overseas, for example, in Venezuela).952 However, this type of 
extraterritorial control is hardly possible and the main control is to be exercised by the (coastal) 
State where the petroleum company operates. The home State may play a role in addressing 
civil claims. For example, a Dutch court ruled that four Nigerian farmers might take their case 
against Shell over damage caused by Shell’s Nigerian subsidiary in the Netherlands (the issue 
of parent company liability).953 
Due diligence also includes the obligation to require licensees to have financial security in order 
to meet any damage, including environmental damage, which might arise out of petroleum 
activities.954 The conditions of such a security are usually set by the respective State. It is also 
worth noting that insurance companies may have their own limitations to cover (environmental) 
damage.955 
Another significant preventative (as well as remedial) step is the availability of legal recourse 
in the event of environmental damage.956 In other words, each State must ensure that persons, 
including persons outside its territory, who suffered damage may bring their claims for 
compensation in the courts of this State. For example, in the aftermath of the Montara incident, 
Indonesian seaweed farmers filed a class action against the operator in an Australian court.957 
Like the obligation to establish a civil liability regime, the obligation to provide civil remedy is 
an obligation of result meaning that States have considerable discretion regarding how these 
obligations operate. 
Article 199 of the UNCLOS requires States to adopt contingency plans for responding to 
pollution of the marine environment. States generally have in place national contingency plans 
for dealing with pollution originating from different sources, including pollution from offshore 
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954 PAL, draft principle 4 (3). 
955 See Chapter 5.7 for further consideration.  
956 UNCLOS, art. 235 (2); PAL, draft principle 6 (2) (3); ITLOS’s Advisory Opinion of 2011, para. 122. 
957 J. Topsfield, “Indonesian seaweed farmers launch class action over Montara oil spill”, The Sydney Morning 
Herald, 2 August 2016, available at https://www.smh.com.au/business/indonesian-seaweed-farmers-launch-class-




petroleum activities.958 In the context of shared hydrocarbons, the presence of joint plans of 
action is essential: while a jurisdictional issue is unsettled in an undelimited maritime area, a 
risk of transboundary pollution in the case of straddling hydrocarbons is relatively high. As 
discussed further in Chapters 6 and 7, States sharing hydrocarbon resources indeed develop 
joint contingency plans. 
5.5.2.2 Remedial measures 
The duty not to cause significant damage to the environment continues to apply where actual 
damage has occurred. States shall take active measures to mitigate and eliminate such damage. 
Moreover, States are required to ensure that damage does not extend beyond the areas where 
they exercise their sovereign rights.959 If there is a risk that other States or areas outside national 
jurisdiction may be affected by damage, the State of origin shall notify these States and 
competent IOs (e.g., RFMOs).960 
The standard of due diligence also includes a duty to punish private entities responsible for 
environmental damage.961 In this respect, States shall investigate incidents involving damage 
to the environment.962 An investigation should not only seek to identify the gravity of damage 
and the companies liable for it, but also to learn lessons and fill the existing gaps in the exercise 
of due diligence. It is however regrettable that, for example, in the aftermath of the Deepwater 
Horizon incident, the US has not significantly enhanced regulation, oversight or liability at the 
national level.963 The duty to punish is interlinked with other elements of due diligence such as 
the regime of civil liability and access of injured persons to administrative or judicial remedies. 
In the event of significant transboundary environmental damage, States should discuss the issue 
of compensation.964 The discussions do not automatically give rise to an obligation to 
compensate. 
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959 UNCLOS, arts. 194 (2) and 195. See Chapter 5.5.1. 
960 UNCLOS, art. 198; PAL, draft principle 5. 
961 R. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, “The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the International Responsibility of States”, 
German Yearbook of International Law, 1992, vol. 35, p. 38. See also Morgera 2009, op. cit., p. 35. 
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5.5.2.3 The evolving and flexible character of the due diligence standard 
The SDC in its Advisory Opinion stated that States must take into account the fact that the 
standard of due diligence varies.965 It may change over time: what is considered sufficiently 
diligent at one point in time may become not diligent enough at some point in the future.966 
Therefore, in order to act diligently, a State shall keep abreast of new scientific and 
technological developments.967 Consequently, it is important to review the adopted laws and 
regulations from time to time so as they are in line with the current requirements.968 The 
standard of due diligence may also change due to certain factors such as the type of activity (the 
exploitation phase requires a higher standard of due diligence than activities aimed at finding 
natural resources), the geographical location of the activity (for example, whether it is carried 
out in special climate conditions) and so forth.969 One of the factors in raising the level of due 
diligence is the occurrence of serious environmental damage: the standard of due diligence 
would not be the same before such damage and after it. A State should eliminate defects in 
exercising its due diligence obligation in relation to hydrocarbon operations if this has somehow 
contributed to environmental damage.  
The standard of due diligence should be stricter in the context of shared hydrocarbons because 
a risk of transboundary adverse effects on the (marine) environment is high.970 
Article 194 (1) of the UNCLOS refers to a State’s capabilities.971 This suggests that the due 
diligence standard of developed States should be higher than that of developing States. For 
example, developing States might have limited financial and human resources to monitor 
hydrocarbon activities within their jurisdiction. Matz-Lück and van Doorn have warned that the 
differentiation within the concept of due diligence entails a danger of “losing sight of the overall 
objective of specifying due diligence […]”, pointing to the phenomenon of “flag States of 
convenience”.972 The SDC has also noted the potential problem of “sponsoring States of 
convenience” and concluded that the general provisions of the UNCLOS apply equally to all 
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970 See Introduction to Part III. 
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developed and developing sponsoring States.973 At the same, it may appear unjustified to 
require developing States to apply a level of due diligence equal to developed States. As 
emphasized by the SDC, developed and developing States may be unequal in terms of scientific 
knowledge, technical capability and capacity.974 Thus, States dealing with the issue of shared 
hydrocarbons should take into account the differences between them. In other words, a more 
developed State should contribute to the exercise of due diligence to a larger degree than its 
neighbor because this State is in a better position to do that.975 
5.6 Attributing private conduct to a State 
In order to hold a State responsible for the commission of an internationally wrongful act, such 
an act shall amount to both a breach of an international obligation and be attributable to that 
State.976 International courts and tribunals rarely consider the issue of attribution in detail and, 
even if they do, that consideration has been limited.977 However, in the context of the current 
research, the issue of attribution is important. Private companies carry out exploration and 
exploitation activities. Coastal States generally call on companies owned by them to conduct 
hydrocarbon activities with respect to shared hydrocarbons.978 A State may also delegate the 
conduct of an EIA or the development of a contingency plan to a private entity (e.g., operator). 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the issue of attribution is especially relevant in undelimited maritime 
areas where States usually establish a joint body model to discharge many elements of their due 
diligence obligations. Peel has also stated that in a situation where environmental damage does 
not reach the “significant” threshold, an injured State may seek to attribute private conduct to 
a responsible State.979 
Therefore, this section looks at the question of when the conduct of private entities, including 
petroleum companies, is attributable to a coastal State.  
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977 For example, in the Arctic Sunrise case, the Tribunal concluded that all acts alleged by the Netherlands are 
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5.6.1 The bases of attribution 
Although the process of attribution at first glance seems to cause no difficulties, its application 
in practice is a complicated issue. The first complication lies in the term ‘State’. It is well known 
that a State is a fiction existing by the operation of law. Being unable to accomplish any act 
itself, the State normally acts by and through its agents and representatives.980 Thus, 
‘attribution’981 is the legal process, which establishes whether the conduct of a physical person 
can be regarded as an act of the State. 
The bases of attribution are enumerated in draft articles 4-11 of the ARSIWA. A State bears 
responsibility in the event when: 
 the act is committed by any organ exercising public powers;982 
 the conduct is performed by individuals or entities which are not organs of the State, but 
pursuant to internal law are called upon to exercise elements of governmental 
authority;983 
 the conduct is carried out by organs of one State placed at the disposal of another 
State;984 
 an State organ, a person or an entity exercising elements of governmental authority acts 
in excess of its authority or in contravention of instructions;985 
 individuals and entities act on the instruction of, or under the direction or control of, the 
State;986 
 elements of governmental authority are exercised in the absence of such authority and 
in circumstances  such as to call for the exercise of those elements of authority;987 
 the conduct is of an insurrectional or other movement that has become the new 
government of the State, or that has succeeded in establishing in a new State;988 and 
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 the State ‘acknowledges and adopts’ the conduct in question as its own, although that 
conduct is otherwise not attributable to the State.989 
Thus, notwithstanding the general rule that the acts of private individuals and entities are not 
attributable to the State under international law,990 the ARSIWA contain some exceptions under 
which responsibility of the State may be triggered through the acts of such actors. The next 
section looks at whether these exceptions are applicable in the context of hydrocarbon activities, 
resulting in attribution of the acts of private companies to a coastal State. 
5.6.2 State responsibility through the acts of private entities 
Draft article 4 of the ARSIWA provides that the conduct of any organ pertaining to the State 
apparatus shall be regarded as an act of that State under international law.991 In respect of 
exploration of the CS and exploitation of its natural resources, State organs play a primary role.  
In many countries, the functions of issuing licenses are assigned to the government. However, 
an act of permitting a hydrocarbon activity is not unlawful per se. There might, of course, be 
exceptions to that. For example, as noted above (and particularly in Chapter 3), a decision to 
authorize drilling operations in a disputed maritime area may constitute a violation of the duty 
to exercise restraint embedded in, inter alia, the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper under 
articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS and the obligation not to aggravate or extend a 
maritime boundary dispute. Authorizing an operation without an adequate EIA would also be 
a wrongful act. Furthermore, State organs usually conduct monitoring which is a relevant factor 
for exercising the State’s due diligence. 
At the same time, there are private companies that carry out hydrocarbon activities. They 
generally stand outside the formal structure of the State and can hardly be equated with State 
                                                            
989 Ibid., draft art. 11. 
990 When drafting the ARSIWA, the ILC envisaged the inclusion of a provision read as: “The conduct of a private 
individual or group of individuals, acting in that capacity, is not considered to be an act of the State in international 
law” (Yearbook of the ILC, 1972, vol. II, Fourth report on State responsibility, prepared by R. Ago, Doc. 
A/CN.4/264 and Add. l, p. 126, para. 146, available at 
http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc_1972_v2.pdf&lang=EFSR (last accessed 
January 2019). This provision was subsequently abandoned in the final version of the ARSIWA. See C. Ryngaert, 
“State Responsibility and Non-State Actors”, in: M. Noortmann, A. Reinisc and C. Ryngaert (eds), Non-state 
actors in international law, Hart Publishing, 2015, p. 163. 
991 In Bosnian Genocide, the ICJ held that this is a “well-established rule, one of the cornerstones of the law of 




organs within the meaning of draft article 4 of the ARSIWA. Even State ownership over a 
private company cannot automatically transform this company into an organ of the State.992 
Apart from draft article 4, the ARSIWA provide that the State may be held responsible for the 
conduct of a person or entity, even though it cannot be classified as an organ of the State. By 
virtue of draft article 5, an act of persons and entities empowered by internal law to exercise 
elements of the governmental authority can engage the responsibility of the State. Hence, it 
should be determined in what circumstances a petroleum company may fall under the scope of 
draft article 5 of the ARSIWA. 
It is unclear what “elements of the governmental authority” means. Although the commentary 
to draft article 5 avoids elaborating the meaning of this phrase, it nevertheless indicates some 
criteria that might assist in determining what “governmental authority” constitutes.993 One of 
the criteria is that the entity is formally empowered by the law of the State to exercise elements 
of governmental authority. This means that an act must be specifically authorized by the internal 
law as an exercise of public authority, not as part of general regulation.994 
It can hardly be assumed that a private company undertaking exploration and exploitation 
activities fits within the parameters set out in draft article 5 of the ARSIWA. Perhaps, in some 
situations, it could be argued that a company has been empowered to exercise elements of 
governmental authority: for example, where the company conducts an EIA or seabed-mapping 
activities related to the establishment of the outer limits of the CS in line the UNCLOS.995 
Chapter 6 will refer once again to draft article 5 of the ARSIWA when considering the question 
of whether joint inter-State bodies established in undelimited maritime areas might be regarded 
as exercising elements of governmental authority. 
Since the applicability of draft article 5 is questionable, an alternative base of attribution, dealt 
with in draft article 8, is subject to scrutiny. Draft article 8 stipulates another exception to the 
general rule of non-attribution of the conduct of private entities to a State. This draft article 
deals with two scenarios: first, where the private entity has acted under the instructions of the 
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State, and, second, where the entity has performed its act under direction or control of the 
State.996 Therefore, the question is whether and when petroleum companies can be considered 
as acting under the instruction, direction or control of coastal States. It is worth noting that one 
of these three elements of attribution is sufficient for triggering State responsibility.997 
Judicial consideration has particularly focused on the degree of control that is required for 
establishing attribution. A couple of cases to which the ARSIWA refer in order to cast light on 
this issue include the Nicaragua v. the US and Tadić cases.998 Nevertheless, the relevant degree 
of control has been elaborated differently in these cases. Commentary 4 to draft article 8 
underscores that the ICJ devised the ‘effective control’ standard in Nicaragua v. the US.999 
However, the commentaries to draft article 8 do not limit themselves to the level of control 
applied in this case. They contain a reference to the Tadić case in which the Appeals Chamber 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) rejected the ‘effective 
control’ approach and set out the ‘overall control’ standard.1000 Based on the commentaries, it 
therefore seems that the ILC has not opted in favor of any of the levels of State control. 
In its more recent case, Bosnian Genocide, the ICJ has revisited the decisions on the Nicaragua 
v. the US and Tadić cases, and the provisions of draft article 8 of the ARSIWA. The Court 
reproached the ICTY for its incursion into the field of law on State responsibility.1001 
Furthermore, the ICJ rejected application of the ‘overall control’ standard adopted in the Tadić 
case since it would have the effect of “broadening the scope of State responsibility well beyond 
the fundamental principle governing the law of international responsibility”.1002 The ICJ instead 
narrowed the ‘effective control’ standard initially articulated in Nicaragua v. the US. The Court 
applied the criterion of ‘complete control’.1003 Thus, while rejecting the ‘overall control’ 
proposed in Tadić, the ICJ has altered the ‘effective control’ provided in Nicaragua v. the US. 
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In the context of petroleum activities, one may assert that a State has ‘overall control’ over these 
activities carried out on its (claimed) CS. However, it is difficult to argue that the State has 
‘effective control’ or ‘complete control’ over each act committed in the course of hydrocarbon 
activities. Moreover, it can be questioned whether the mentioned degrees of control are 
appropriate to apply in the context of hydrocarbon activities. The relationship between the 
coastal State and private petroleum companies is quite distinctive from that, for example, 
existing between the State and private military contractors. Therefore, it is possible that a lower 
level of control can be adopted in relation to a case having a different factual matrix.1004 Indeed, 
the wording of draft article 8 of the ARSIWA leaves room for a flexible interpretation of the 
degree of control. It provides an either/or approach according to which an entity must act either 
on the instruction of, or under direction or control of, a State in order to attribute its conduct to 
the latter. 
However, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which a coastal State intentionally instructs an 
operator, or exercises direction or control over it, to do something that has an obvious risk of 
being inconsistent with the State’s international obligations: for example, to require the operator 
to use a technique which is harmful to the marine environment; to insist on the continuation of 
an operation which involves a risk of causing significant damage to persons or the environment; 
or to change the required breadth of a safety zone around an installation1005. On the contrary, 
where a State owns a petroleum company, this State usually uses its ownership as means to 
ensure that relevant regulations and laws are implemented. Of course, the actual coastal State-
private operator(s) nexus should be examined in each case. If a State has indeed used its 
ownership over the company as a tool to impact on the conduct, this may be a valid basis for 
attribution. However, as mentioned above, this scenario is improbable. Moreover, in case of 
foreign companies, the State’s ability to instruct, direct or control becomes even more limited. 
In other words, the focus should not be on the question of whether private conduct is attributable 
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to the State, but on the question of whether State’s responsibility is triggered by its failure to 
control adequately activities of private entities (as an element of due diligence).1006 
Thus, the issue of attribution may be relevant in some instances. However, these instances are 
interlinked with the establishment of a failure to exercise due diligence. 
5.7 International State liability 
As follows from the previous sections of this Chapter, a State bears responsibility for its failure 
to exercise due diligence with respect to private companies operating on the CS of that State. A 
logical conclusion is that if the State has met its due diligence obligation, it incurs no 
responsibility, even if another State has suffered significant (environmental) damage. However, 
there may be a situation where a licensee is exempted from civil liability in the case of 
environmental damage (e.g., because of force majeure)1007 or cannot cover damage (e.g., 
because damage significantly exceeds insurance coverage or the licensee falls into 
bankruptcy).1008 The probability of such a situation has also been considered by the SDC in the 
context of activities in the Area.1009 Thus, this raises the question of whether a “residual 
liability” does (or ought to) fall on the coastal State, which has exercised its due diligence, but 
under jurisdiction or control of which environmental damage has been caused by hydrocarbon 
activities and operators conducting these activities cannot meet civil liability in full. It is worth 
noting that if licensees have fully compensated damage, no question of residual State liability 
arises.1010 
The importance of the residual State liability question can be shown by the Montara incident 
example. One can envisage a scenario where Australia has acted diligently in the Timor Sea 
and the operator1011 for whatever reason cannot cover the alleged environmental damage caused 
to Indonesia. Thus, the issue is whether Australia can nevertheless be held liable for 
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environmental damage on the basis of its jurisdiction and control over the activity that caused 
this damage. This section considers that basis. 
5.7.1 The principle of residual State liability 
The ILC attempted to address the principle of residual State liability in the course of its work 
on the topic of International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not 
Prohibited by International Law.1012 Subsequently, this topic was divided into two parts: 
prevention and allocation of loss. As a result, the ILC adopted the AP and PAL.1013 The PAL 
emphasize that the draft Principles do not exclude the rules of State responsibility applicable in 
the scenario where the State has failed to exercise its due diligence.1014 Unlike the ARSIWA, 
the PAL deal with the scenario where the State has not committed a wrongful act.1015 The ILC 
noted that in the latter scenario liability primarily falls on an operator.1016 Nevertheless, the 
Commission (like the SDC) recognized that there might be a situation where an operator fails 
to provide prompt and adequate compensation. In this situation, the PAL contain a 
recommendation for the creation of industry funds at the national level (which is similar to the 
SDC’s proposal to the ISA to establish a trust fund).1017 In the event that the mentioned 
measures are not sufficient, the State is called upon to “ensure that additional financial resources 
are made available”.1018 Thus, draft principle 4 of the PAL clearly refers to the rule of residual 
State liability. 
However, the main obstacle here is the authority of the PAL in general and draft principle 4 in 
particular. The SDC did not recognize the PAL as an articulation of customary international 
law.1019 The ILC itself has underlined that the draft principles are intended “to contribute to the 
process of development of international law in this field”.1020 This indicates that the PAL are a 
product of progressive development, rather than of codification of existing customs.1021 This 
view can also be supported by the fact that the Commission entitled them “draft principles”, 
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1015 Ibid. 
1016 Ibid., general commentary, para. 8 and draft principle 4 (2). 
1017 Ibid., draft principle 4 (4). See also ITLOS’s Advisory Opinion of 2011, paras. 205 and 209. 
1018 Ibid., draft principle 4 (5). 
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instead of “draft articles”.1022 At the same time, the commentary to the PAL acknowledges that 
some draft principles or their aspects may reflect customary international law.1023 This opens 
up the question of whether residual State liability can be considered a rule of customary 
international law. 
While the imposition of strict liability on licensees, including the requirement of compulsory 
insurance covering any damage that may arise from their activities, is common practice of 
States,1024 the establishment of funds (or other additional financial security) by States to cover 
environmental damage not covered otherwise is uncommon in the petroleum industry.1025 
Examples of such funds are rare. For instance, the UK has established a compensation scheme 
according to which compensation for pollution damage may be sought from the Offshore 
Pollution Liability Association Ltd. (OPOL) when the operator is unable to pay.1026 At the same 
time, any fund has its own limitations. For example, Soyer has noted that in case of an incident 
similar to the Montara and Deepwater Horizon incidents, the compensation limit available 
under the OPOL will be inadequate.1027 Article 235 (3) of the UNCLOS imposes a weak duty 
on the States Parties with respect to the availability of additional financial security. Thus, draft 
principle 4 of the PAL partly reflects customary international law (in particular elements (2) 
and (3) of this draft principle). The principle of residual State liability does not yet have 
customary status.1028 
It is important to note that the principle of residual State liability is included in some liability 
regimes: for example, for nuclear damage and damage caused by space objects.1029 However, 
that circumstance does not make this principle a norm of customary international law: each 
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1025 Johnstone 2015, op. cit., p. 261.  
1026 Liability & Compensation for Pollution Damage, para. 7, available at 
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1029 See in detail Johnstone 2015, op. cit., pp. 250-260. See also L. A. de la Fayette, “New Approaches for 
Addressing Damage to the Marine Environment”, International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 2005, vol. 




regime mentioned above is “subject specific … [and] is binding on its own terms on its own 
States Parties”.1030 The principle of residual State liability may also be incorporated in the 
context of damage arising out of activities conducted in the Area. While rejecting the existence 
of residual sponsoring State liability (although noting that States had expressed different views 
on this issue), the SDC nevertheless left room for that.1031 Currently, the ISA is in the process 
of drafting regulations on exploitation of mineral resources in the Area. These draft regulations 
provide for the creation of a trust fund.1032 While the ISA has taken into account the SDC’s 
observation, the establishment (and the acceptance) by coastal States of some kind of residual 
guarantee in the event of environmental damage arising from offshore petroleum operations is 
unlikely. The attempt of Indonesia to deal with the issue of transboundary pollution did not alter 
the main rule according to which a State bears international responsibility only for its own 
failure to exercise due diligence, even though a hydrocarbon activity on its CS has resulted in 
transboundary damage to the (marine) environment.1033 
The absence of residual State liability leaves a large gap: (significant) environmental damage 
would be unremedied where the coastal (or sponsoring) State has acted with the requisite 
standard of due diligence and the operator is not liable or insolvent. Consequently, it means that 
the burden of environmental damage lies where it falls (other States or the international 
community as a whole).1034 Viewing this situation as inequitable, a number of organizations 
have suggested an approach to incorporate the principle of residual State liability into the 
standard of due diligence in the context of activities in the Area.1035 The SDC did not uphold 
this approach. As noted in Chapter 5.5, due diligence is not a static concept and a future case 
when an operator is not able to meet its liability for serious damage to the (marine) environment 
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may lead to a change of the due diligence standard. However, currently the principle of residual 
State liability is far from being an accepted element of due diligence. 
5.8 Shared State responsibility: an introduction 
Draft article 47 of the ARSIWA sets out the general principle applicable to situations where 
several States are engaged in the commission of an internationally wrongful act.1036 In such 
situations, an injured State may invoke the international responsibility of each State in relation 
to that wrongful act.1037 Nevertheless, the ARSIWA contain limited guidance on numerous 
issues related to the case of a plurality of responsible States (e.g., the issue of allocation of 
responsibility among multiple States which have committed wrongdoing). This has given rise 
to the emergence of the concept of shared international responsibility in the legal literature.1038 
The concept of shared international responsibility discussed in the legal literature is broader 
than that employed in the ARSIWA (and the ARIO). It covers the responsibility of several 
actors, including States and non-state actors, which have contributed to a single harmful 
outcome that is undesirable from the perspective of international law.1039 
Nollkaemper and Jacobs have distinguished two forms of shared international 
responsibility.1040 The first form is so-called “cooperative” shared responsibility, which refers 
to the responsibility of plural actors arising out of a concerted action. They cite some examples 
when cooperative shared responsibility may be triggered, such as coalition warfare, joint border 
patrols or assistance given by one State to another in committing of a wrongful act.1041 The 
second form of shared responsibility they have defined as “cumulative”, meaning that 
responsibility of multiple actors occurs when there is no concerted action. In other words, the 
latter form covers the situation(s) where several actors acting independently from each other 
contribute to a single harmful outcome. Examples of cumulative shared responsibility may 
include climate change caused by emissions from many States or damage to an international 
watercourse caused by two or more States adjacent to it. 
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The applicability of shared responsibility between States and other actors has been discussed in 
different contexts in the legal literature.1042 A number of legal scholars assert that cooperative 
shared responsibility might arise in the context of shared hydrocarbons.1043 However, they do 
not offer a detailed analysis of how the regime of shared responsibility would be operationalized 
in practice. For example, there are procedural hurdles and jurisdictional limitations for bringing 
a claim for shared responsibility of the State and private entities before the ICJ (and other 
international courts and tribunals).1044 Pursuant to article 34 (1) of the ICJ’s Statute, only States 
may be parties in a case brought before the Court. Furthermore, even in the situation of shared 
State responsibility, it may be difficult to bring all responsible States before a single judicial 
body.1045 As noted earlier, this thesis does not deal in detail with procedural aspects of shared 
responsibility. Neither does it focus on the topic of shared responsibility arising among States 
and private actors involved in hydrocarbon activities. Part III, below, examines the issue of 
shared State responsibility (namely, where two States share the responsibility for a wrongful 
act, that is for a breach of the standard of due diligence). 
The limited literature pointing to the likelihood of shared State responsibility in the context of 
shared hydrocarbons does not elaborate on the issue of shared State responsibility and pays no 
attention to the difference between the two scenarios of hydrocarbon resource sharing. 
However, these scenarios are conceptually different and, hence, aspects of shared State 
responsibility are likely to differ. For instance, in undelimited maritime areas, States usually 
create a joint entity (commission or authority) possessing a separate legal personality through 
which they act.1046 The legal literature does not consider the impact the existence of such a joint 
entity might have on the question of State responsibility. Low asks whether a joint entity can 
be regarded as an IO for the purpose of attribution of responsibility.1047 No answer is provided, 
however, in that discussion. Nevertheless, if a joint entity is indeed an IO,1048 it means that the 
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provisions of the ARIO regulate the responsibility of this entity and States can avoid the 
application of relevant rules of State responsibility. Another question is whether a joint entity 
is rather a common body exercising elements of governmental authority of the two States within 
the meaning of draft article 5 of the ARSIWA.1049 At the same time, in the context of 
transboundary hydrocarbons, the creation of a joint entity is not necessary.1050 Unlike in 
undelimited maritime areas, there is clarity as to the jurisdictional limits of each coastal State 
that casts doubt on the possibility of shared State responsibility. 
Chapters 6 and 7 of Part III examine whether shared State responsibility might indeed be 
triggered in the context of shared hydrocarbons and what practical difficulties may arise. As 
discussed earlier in this Chapter, States are responsible when they fail to take appropriate due 
diligence steps to ensure that offshore petroleum activities under their jurisdiction and control 
do not cause or create any risk of causing pollution and other significant harm to the 
environment, including the environment of other States and the environment of global common 
areas. Therefore, it is important to look at how due diligence is established in each individual 
instance of resource sharing. The components of due diligence identified in Chapter 5.5 will 
help in this analysis. 
5.9 Searching for a joint due diligence obligation 
The design of the standard of due diligence in the context of shared hydrocarbons is crucial for 
determining whether States cooperating with respect to those resources may share international 
legal responsibility for a failure to discharge their due diligence obligations. In other words, it 
must be established whether due diligence is a joint (‘shared’, ‘collective’ or ‘common’) 
obligation.1051 Recent contributions to the topic of shared obligations in international law have 
been made by Nedeski.1052 Nedeski has identified three main elements of a shared international 
obligation: there are (1) several duty-bearers (States and/or IOs) that (2) are bound to the same 
international obligation (3) pertaining to the same fact(s).1053 Further, Nedeski has drawn a 
distinction between indivisible and divisible shared international obligations and asserted that 
this distinction has important implications for the determination (as well as the content) of 
shared responsibility.1054 In her view, the structure of performance of a shared obligation from 
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the perspective of its bearers is the basis for such a distinction. An indivisible obligation can 
only be performed by all duty-bearers simultaneously to achieve a certain common result and, 
consequently, it is breached by all duty-bearers when this result is not achieved.1055 Under a 
divisible obligation, each duty-bearer shall perform its own share and, therefore, it is possible 
that while one duty-bearer breaches the obligation, the other duty-bearer fulfills the obligation 
by doing its share.1056 The relationship between the indivisible-divisible distinction and shared 
responsibility is that a violation of an indivisible obligation automatically gives rise to shared 
responsibility, whereas there is no such automatic relationship between a breach of a divisible 
obligation and a shared responsibility.1057 
Following Nedeski’s classification of shared obligations in international law,1058 only a small 
number of shared international obligations are of an indivisible character.1059 For example, in 
the context of this research, the shared obligation of State A and State B to establish an inter-
State administrative body upon entering into force the provisional arrangement between them 
can be characterized as an invisible obligation.1060 In other words, States A and B would bear 
shared responsibility when such a body is not established, even if State A had made a major 
contribution towards this goal, while State B took little meaningful action. Difficulties arise 
when applying the doctrinal categorization given by Nedeski to the (alleged) shared due 
diligence obligation to prevent environmental harm: does that prevent this obligation (or at least 
some components of due diligence) from having an indivisible nature?1061 
The emphasis in this thesis is on the question of whether the standard of due diligence is framed 
and exercised as a shared obligation in the situations of offshore petroleum resource sharing 
(Chapters 6 and 7), and not on the question as to which category this shared obligation belongs. 
In order to determine whether due diligence to prevent environmental harm constitutes a joint 
obligation in the context of shared hydrocarbons, it is important to analyze how the core 
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components of due diligence (namely, regulation and enforcement) are set: on whom are these 
powers incumbent? The elements of a shared obligation mentioned above will also assist in this 
analysis. Following the difference drawn between disputed and cross-border hydrocarbons, the 
standard of due diligence in undelimited maritime areas is considered separately from that 
established with respect to cross-border hydrocarbons, in Chapters 6 and 7, respectively. 
Thus, there is a close relationship between the determination of shared State responsibility and 
the way in which due diligence is framed and exercised in the context of shared hydrocarbons. 
5.10 Conclusions and observations 
The regime of State responsibility is general in character. Its rules apply to all areas of 
international law and to “the whole field of international obligations of States, whether the 
obligation is owed to one or several States, to an individual or group, or to the international 
community as a whole”.1062 This Chapter has examined the application of the rules of State 
responsibility to the situation of marine environmental harm, which results or may result from 
offshore hydrocarbon activities, with a particular emphasis on activities in respect of shared oil 
and gas resources. 
State responsibility in this research is primarily linked to an assessment of whether a coastal 
State has acted with necessary due diligence to prevent significant harm to the (marine) 
environment, regardless of its occurrence. However, despite the centrality of the concept of due 
diligence in international environmental law, the due diligence standard, which is to be 
exercised by States to comply with their environmental obligations, remains vague. This 
Chapter has sought to establish a minimum basic standard of due diligence required from 
coastal States in the hydrocarbon sector. The vagueness of the due diligence standard and other 
practical challenges (such as the issue of causation, a method of valuation and procedural 
hurdles) cause difficulties in bringing State responsibility claims in the context of harm to the 
environment. These difficulties are likely the reason why there is a small number of cases 
involving State responsibility. At the same time, the limited case law on this topic does not 
necessary preclude the existence of broader practice of applying State responsibility rules in the 
context of (potential) environmental harm.1063 
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Thus, relying on the findings of this Chapter, the way in which due diligence is framed in the 
context of shared hydrocarbons will be key in determining whether two coastal States may share 
international responsibility. The following Chapters of Part III consider as to how the standard 
of due diligence is designed in each scenario of oil and gas resource sharing. For this purpose, 









CHAPTER 6. DISPUTED HYDROCARBONS AND 
SHARED STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This Chapter examines whether shared State responsibility might arise in the context of 
cooperative hydrocarbon activities taking place in undelimited maritime areas and challenges 
related to the issue of shared State responsibility. As highlighted in Chapter 5, the question of 
whether States may share international responsibility for a harmful outcome (in particular for 
significant environmental harm) resulting from operations in respect of disputed hydrocarbons 
is tied to the issue of how the standard of due diligence is designed and exercised to manage 
these operations. The method of designing due diligence in disputed maritime areas is important 
because the exercise of sovereign rights and jurisdiction by multiple coastal States overlaps.1064 
This Chapter looks at how States frame the standard of due diligence in provisional 
arrangements concluded between them in order to undertake joint petroleum activities in 
undelimited maritime areas, by using the core components of due diligence identified in Chapter 
5.5. These provisional arrangements (also known as ‘joint development agreements’), as 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, are considered as satisfying the general duty to cooperate in 
respect of shared hydrocarbon resources and the specific requirement to cooperate stipulated 
by articles 74 (3) and 84 (3) of the UNCLOS. Many (in particular recent) provisional 
arrangements indeed include an express provision that they are intended to adhere to the latter 
requirement.1065 As noted in Chapter 3.3, interim arrangements can and do take many forms: 
formal agreements and treaties, memoranda of understanding, declarations and so forth. They 
also have different degrees of complexity, from relatively simple to quite complex 
arrangements. Each provisional arrangement has a specific set of features that distinguishes it 
from other provisional arrangements. For this reason, all relevant and available1066 
arrangements dealing with disputed hydrocarbons are examined separately in chronological 
order in this Chapter. Chapters 6.13 and 6.14 will provide general conclusions concerning the 
issue of shared State responsibility on the basis of an examination of this nature. Such an 
examination will also assist in understanding whether there has been any evolution in 
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addressing the issue of (marine) environmental protection since the adoption of the first interim 
arrangements in disputed areas prior to the UNCLOS, including the character of this evolution.  
The framework used below for examining each provisional arrangement will be largely the 
same. After a short description of the arrangement (a longer description of the arrangements is 
included in Chapter 1), the jurisdictional and institutional structures established by the Parties 
are discussed. The question of who exercises jurisdiction and control over the management of 
hydrocarbon activities in a disputed maritime area affects the determination of who bears 
international responsibility for a failure to discharge due diligence with respect to these 
activities. In addition to the arrangement itself, relevant regulatory instruments supplementing 
this arrangement are also considered in this Chapter. 
The Saudi Arabia-Kuwait Agreement of 1965 and the Joint Declaration between Argentina and 
the UK on offshore cooperation1067 are not examined in this Chapter. Although the Agreement 
between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait was initially concluded as an interim arrangement in an 
undelimited maritime area, a subsequent agreement signed in 2000 established a single 
maritime border between these States without prejudice to the regime of joint exploration and 
exploitation created by the former Agreement.1068 Hereby, the Agreement between Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait has been transformed into another form of cooperation with respect to 
hydrocarbon resources (i.e., in addition to the establishment of a maritime border), and therefore 
both agreements are subject to consideration in Chapter 7. The Joint Declaration between the 
UK and Argentina is left outside the scope of this thesis for a number of reasons. First, the Joint 
Declaration has a different origin than the arrangements reviewed below. The Joint Declaration 
was adopted as an attempt to deal with the sovereignty dispute between Argentina and the UK 
over the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas). As discussed in Chapter 3.2.3, there is uncertainty 
as to whether the obligations stemming from article 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS apply 
where neighboring States contest sovereignty over land territory or the legal status of a maritime 
feature. Therefore, it is unclear whether the Joint Declaration may be regarded as a provisional 
arrangement in the terms of the mentioned articles. Second, the Joint Declaration is not 
operational due to the divergent interpretations of the Parties regarding the spatial scope of 
hydrocarbon cooperation.1069 In 2007, Argentina notified the UK of its decision to terminate 
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the Joint Declaration.1070 Argentina repeatedly protests petroleum activities of the UK in the 
maritime areas adjacent to the Falkland Islands. Thus, the issue of unilateral hydrocarbon 
activities in undelimited maritime areas discussed in Chapter 3 is of greater importance to this 
dispute than the issue of shared State responsibility addressed in this Chapter.1071 
6.2 Japan and the Republic of Korea 
The jurisdiction model established by the Japan-S. Korea Agreement is complex. The JDZ was 
initially divided into nine subzones (Illustration No. 12).1072 Subsequently, the number of 
subzones was reduced to six “following surveys indicating that the likelihood of seabed 
hydrocarbons being present was limited”.1073 According to the Japan-S. Korea Agreement, each 
State shall authorize one or more licensees to conduct petroleum activities in each subzone.1074 
Licensees working in the same subzone are required to enter into an operating agreement that 
shall be approved by both Japan and S. Korea.1075 Through such an operating agreement, the 
licensees must designate an operator.1076 The regulatory framework applicable to exploration 
and exploitation of natural resources in a subzone is the laws and regulations of the Party whose 
licensee is designated as operator.1077 Thus, the adjoining subzone(s) within the JDZ may be 
governed by different sets of norms (e.g., where the operator of subzone V is a licensee 
authorized by S. Korea, while the operator of subzone VII works under a license issued by 
Japan). Moreover, a change of operator having a license of the other State would change the 
laws and regulations applicable in the subzone. Low has described the jurisdiction model 
created by Japan and S. Korea as “parallel”, “concurrent” and/or “alternating”.1078 Indeed, such 
a jurisdiction model can hardly ensure uniformity of the standards, including environmental 
standards, applicable to similar activities conducted within the JDZ. It can be argued that this 
is one reason why the Japanese-S. Korean model has not been widely used in undelimited 
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maritime areas.1079 It has also been observed that this model is perhaps only possible between 
Japan and S. Korea, which have legal systems not radically different from each other.1080 
Pursuant to article XXIV of the Japan-S. Korea Agreement, the Parties agreed to set up a Joint 
Commission (JC) “as a means for consultations on matters concerning the implementation of 
[the Japan-S. Korea Agreement]”. The JC consists of two national sections, each of which 
includes two members appointed by the respective Parties.1081 The Commission is empowered, 
inter alia, to recommend measures to be taken to improve the operation of the Japan-S. Korea 
Agreement and to settle disputes between licensees; to receive technical and financial reports 
of licensees; and to observe operations of operators and marine facilities necessary for 
conducting petroleum activities in the JDZ.1082 The JC has been described as being a weak 
body.1083 Indeed, the JC’s powers, including the function of observation, are limited and appear 
to exist to enable the Commission to make its recommendations to the Parties in order to 
improve the implementation of the Agreement.1084 The Parties are solely required to “respect 
to the extent possible” the JC’s recommendations.1085 Unfortunately, there is no information on 
the current (and past) work of the JC in the public domain that could refute the argument of its 
weak role in the management of the JDZ. 
The Japan-S. Korea Agreement includes a number of provisions relating to the protection of 
the marine environment. Under article XX, the Parties have committed themselves “to agree on 
measures to be taken to prevent collisions at sea and to prevent and remove pollution of the sea 
resulting from activities relating to exploration or exploitation of natural resources in the 
[JDZ]”. Such measures are listed in the Agreed Minutes to the Japan-S. Korea Agreement 
(Agreed Minutes in this section).1086 For example, in order to avoid collisions at sea, the Parties 
have agreed to mark installations, notify of their location and equip them with signals.1087 As 
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of the Deputy Director-General of the Asian Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Director-
General of the Petroleum Department of the Agency of Natural Resources and Energy of the Ministry of 
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Affairs and the Ministry of Energy and Resources”. 
1082 Ibid., art. XXV (1). 
1083 Miyoshi 1999, op. cit., p. 42. 
1084 Japan-S. Korea Agreement, art. XXV (2). 
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1086 Agreed Minutes to the Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea concerning Joint Development of 
the Southern Part of the Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two Countries, Seoul, 30 January 1974, 1225 UNTS 
127. 




regards the prevention and removal of pollution of the sea, each Party has agreed to take certain 
measures with respect to: i) wells and marine facilities where that Party has authorized licensees 
designated and acting as operators; or ii) vessels engaged in petroleum activities in the JDZ, 
which are flying under the flag of that Party.1088 For example, the Agreed Minutes provide an 
obligation to equip a well with a blowout preventer that meets specific requirements.1089 The 
Agreed Minutes also prohibit the discharge of oil and waste from marine facilities and vessels, 
with some exceptions.1090 
The Agreed Minutes state that “when large quantities of oil have been discharged from a ship 
or a marine facility, measures shall be taken promptly to prevent the spread of such pollution, 
to prevent the continued discharge of oil and to remove the discharge oil”.1091 A number of 
aspects make the scope of this provision uncertain. 
First, the term ‘discharge’ is not defined: does it mean any deliberate disposal of oil or 
accidental escape of oil? Second, the provision does not specify the threshold at which the total 
quantity of oil discharged is regarded as “large”.1092 Moreover, it seems that the duty to take 
measures is not triggered when the quantity of oil is lower than the “large” threshold. 
Nevertheless, under the current state of international law (the Japan-S. Korea Agreement was 
concluded in 1974), both Japan and S. Korea are required to deal with pollution, even if it is 
less than “large” discharge of oil.1093 Third, it is unclear who must take measures: is it the 
Parties, their licensees acting as operators or a combination thereof?1094 In the event that a 
discharge of oil occurs from an installation operated under a license granted by one Party (e.g., 
S. Korea), is the other Party (Japan) also obligated to take measures?1095 Based on the parallel 
jurisdiction model established pursuant to the Japan-S. Korea Agreement, it is reasonable to 
argue that the Party, which has authorized a concessionaire appointed as operator in a subzone 
where a discharge has occurred, shall take measures under the Agreed Minutes. Support for that 
may be found in section I c (II) of the Agreed Minutes, which imposes on one Party an 
obligation to inform the other Party of, inter alia, collisions at sea, discharge of large quantities 
of oil and the measures taken in respect of the latter. The obligation to inform does not, however, 
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apply to flag States whose vessels are involved in collisions or State that might be affected by 
pollution. 
The measures contained in the Agreed Minutes constitute an agreement between Japan and S. 
Korea.1096 Therefore, even if the Parties delegate to licensees the responsibility to take action, 
both Japan and S. Korea are legally responsible for ensuring that the pollution is minimized and 
eliminated.1097 The Agreed Minutes provide that either Party may take measures as are 
necessary to prevent and remove pollution of the sea when such measures are not yet taken or 
when this Party considers the taken measures insufficient.1098 The issue concerning the 
expenses incurred by the Party for the purpose of taking measures is likely to be addressed 
through consultations or the dispute settlement procedure established by the Japan-S. Korea 
Agreement.1099 
The Japan-S. Korea Agreement contains a provision according to which nationals of, or other 
persons residing in, either State that suffered damage resulting from exploration or exploitation 
activities in the JDZ may bring an action for compensation for such damage.1100 The action may 
be brought in the court of one of the Parties depending on where the damage has occurred, 
where the nationals or persons bringing the action are resident or which Party had authorized 
the licensee acting as the operator in the subzone.1101 It is worth noting that article XXI (1) of 
the Japan-S. Korea Agreement does not provide for the possibility of other subjects who are not 
nationals of, or resident in, Japan or S. Korea (e.g., a person having a third-State nationality or 
a third State that suffered damage as a result of hydrocarbon activities undertaken in the JDZ) 
to bring claims. However, as discussed in Chapter 5.5, both S. Korea and Japan are required to 
ensure that recourse is available in their legal systems in the event of pollution damage caused 
by licensees under their jurisdiction.1102 In other words, guided by the jurisdiction model in the 
JDZ, a third party, which suffered damage by pollution, may bring its claims in the courts of 
the Party whose licensee acts as operator in a subzone where an incident causing such damage 
has occurred. 
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Further, article XXI of the Japan-S. Korea Agreement stipulates that licensees working in the 
same subzone are jointly and severally liable for damage caused by “digging operations of 
seabed and subsoil, or discharging of mine water or used water”.1103 This raises the question as 
to who is liable for damage resulting from other types of hydrocarbon activities. It is likely that 
the rules of joint and several liability are applicable to all stages of hydrocarbon activities. The 
Japan-S. Korea Agreement does not include the option that the Party might cover damage in a 
scenario in which the licensees authorized by that Party cannot meet their liability in full. 
Thus, the Japan-S. Korea Agreement, and in particular the Agreed Minutes to this Agreement, 
addresses the issue of marine environmental protection in detail. This is surprising insofar as 
this instrument predates the adoption of the UNCLOS and its ratification by the two States (in 
1996). Japan and S. Korea employed a model of jurisdiction whereby coastal State jurisdiction 
is determined by operatorship in a particular subzone within the JDZ. This parallel jurisdiction 
model is unique and is not used in other undelimited maritime areas considered further in this 
Chapter. The Japanese-S. Korean model makes the existence of joint due diligence in the JDZ 
impossible because the State whose concessionaire acts as operator in a subzone regulates and 
enforces its laws and regulations in this subzone. Moreover, that State is primarily responsible 
for dealing with pollution in the subzone. As noted above, the JC plays no active role in 
exercising due diligence by the Parties. 
6.3 Saudi Arabia and Sudan 
Pursuant to the Saudi Arabia-Sudan Agreement, the Parties established a regime of joint 
development of natural resources in the Common Zone (CZ).1104 The CZ is a seabed area lying 
between the lines where the depth of the waters adjacent to each Party’s coast is under 1000 
metres (Illustration No. 27).1105 In the CZ, the Parties agreed to exercise “equal sovereign 
rights” with respect to natural resources, protect these rights and defend them against third 
parties.1106 It is important to emphasize that the regime of the CZ is aimed at developing 
minerals (e.g., polymetallic sulfides), rather than oil and gas resources.1107 
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The Parties established a Joint Commission (JC) to ensure the prompt and efficient exploitation 
of the CZ’s natural resources.1108 The JC consists of an equal number of representatives from 
each Party.1109 The JC has legal personality and extensive powers, including surveying and 
delimiting the CZ, undertaking studies concerning the exploration and exploitation of the CZ, 
considering and deciding on the applications for a licence or concession and organizing the 
supervision of activities at the production stage.1110 Although the Saudi Arabia-Sudan 
Agreement is silent on the issue of environmental protection, it is reasonable to conclude that 
the JC may issue regulations relating to the protection of the (marine) environment in the CZ 
because of its general regulatory powers.1111 However, the JC does not make publicly available 
detailed information about its work in general and, in particular, concerning the marine 
environment of the Red Sea. No regulations are publicly available. The absence of the 
regulatory framework may be explained by the fact that the Parties abandoned their projects 
due to the fall of metal prices in the 1980s.1112 As a result of rising prices, Saudi Arabia and 
Sudan recently restarted their operations in the Red Sea. In 2010, the JC awarded a 30-year 
licence to a Saudi Arabian company that had entered into a joint venture agreement with a 
Canadian mining company in respect of the Atlantis II deep-sea deposit.1113 These companies 
are currently in a contractual dispute.1114 From the information available, it is not clear whether 
the dispute concerns non-compliance with environmental obligations. 
Against the backdrop of (potential) growing activity in the Red Sea, many questions naturally 
now arise. The first question is how (future) benefits derived from mining activities in the CZ 
would be shared between Saudi Arabia and Sudan: on a 50:50 basis or whether Sudan, as a less 
developed State with limited access to the sea, would receive any preferential treatment when 
it comes to the allocation. Given the JC’s composition discussed above and subsequent State 
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practice examined in this Chapter, the equal apportionment is a more likely scenario.1115 
Nevertheless, in accordance with article XII of the Saudi Arabia-Sudan Agreement, in either 
scenario Saudi Arabia is entitled to get back the costs spent on the operation of the Commission. 
The second question relates to the protection of the marine environment. The existence of equal 
sovereign rights in the CZ (including equal representation in the JC) leads to the conclusion that 
the Parties have to protect and preserve the marine environment jointly. Saudi Arabia and Sudan 
have established their intent to do this through the JC. However, it is unknown whether the 
necessary regulatory framework exists or to what extent it incorporates the current status of 
international environmental law and takes into account the specific vulnerability of the Red 
Sea, or whether the Parties have created an ad hoc regime for protection of the environment in 
the CZ or merely apply their environmental standards and, if the latter, the environmental 
standards of which State are applicable. Although there is little information on the JC’s work, 
the Commission appears to be a powerful entity with a monitoring function (similar to the Joint 
Authorities established pursuant to the Malaysia-Thailand Agreement and Nigeria-STP Treaty 
examined below in this Chapter).1116 
The third question refers to a situation where pollution of the marine environment occurs in the 
CZ or spreads beyond this zone. It is unclear who must take action to mitigate and eliminate 
such pollution (i.e., the Parties and/or the JC). Even if the JC is empowered to deal with 
pollution, the Parties are not exempted from fulfilment of their environmental duties in case of 
the Commission’s inactivity or omissions (e.g., if the JC fails to notify other States which may 
be affected by pollution). It is also unclear which regime of civil liability applies. One can 
assume that private companies are to be held liable for damage as a result of pollution in 
accordance with the law of either Party. However, given Saudi Arabia’s dominant position, it 
could be argued that the law of Saudi Arabia prevails in the CZ, including its environmental 
standards and requirements when conducting mining activities. 
Thus, there is considerable uncertainty concerning many aspects of the Saudi Arabia-Sudan 
Agreement. One of the certain aspects is that the Parties give the JC a significant role in the 
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management of the CZ. In 2012, Saudi Arabia and Sudan concluded an agreement on the 
exploration of mineral resources in their territorial waters.1117 Insofar as this agreement is not 
publicly available, it remains hard to assess the JC’s role beyond the CZ. 
In the context of shared State responsibility, the JC’s extensive powers give rise to the question 
of whether the Commission may be solely responsible for (significant environmental) damage 
caused by, for example, a regulatory failure. As follows from the discussions in this section, it 
is apparent that Saudi Arabia and Sudan have framed their due diligence obligations in the CZ 
as a joint duty. However, the exercise of joint due diligence appears to be entrusted to the JC. 
Hence, Chapter 6.13 is devoted to the question of whether the existence of the JC may pose 
difficulties in triggering shared State responsibility. 
6.4 Malaysia and Thailand 
The Malaysia-Thailand MoU established a Joint Authority (MTJA) “for the purpose of the 
exploration and exploitation of the non-living natural resources of the sea-bed and subsoil” in 
the area of overlapping CS claims (JDA) for a period of 50 years starting from October 1979 
(Illustration No. 14).1118 11 years after the signing the Malaysia-Thailand MoU, the two 
countries concluded a supplementary agreement on the establishment and operation of the 
MTJA (Malaysia-Thailand Agreement).1119 Both Malaysia and Thailand enacted Acts 
concerning the MTJA (MTJA and TMJA Acts respectively) in order to give effect to the 
Malaysia-Thailand Agreement.1120 
The MTJA is governed by a Board consisting of two co-chairmen (one from each country) and 
twelve members appointed in equal number by the Governments of Malaysia and Thailand.1121 
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In addition, the MTJA has a management section that includes (Thai and Malaysian) staff 
covering technical, legal and financial aspects of petroleum operations in the JDA.1122 The 
MTJA has legal personality,1123 and the powers and functions, inter alia, to formulate policies 
for the JDA, to permit and control petroleum operations and to conclude transactions or 
contracts.1124 
Article IV of the Malaysia-Thailand MoU provides that the rights (with the enforcement 
powers) exercised by the Parties over fishing, navigation, prevention and control of marine 
pollution and other similar matters shall extend to the JDA and shall be recognized and 
respected by the MTJA. Thus, it does not seem that the MTJA is vested with environmental 
protection powers in the JDA.1125 In this respect, it is surprising that the principal regulatory 
framework (the MoU, Agreement and Acts) poorly addresses the environmental risks 
associated with petroleum operations. Only the Petroleum Regulations (MTJA PRs)1126 contain 
provisions through which the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment and 
the obligation to prevent pollution at all phases of petroleum operations are placed on 
contractors. For example, contractors are required to: (a) not to undertake their petroleum 
operations in “a manner that would interfere unjustifiably with navigation or fishing … or with 
the conservation of living resources of the sea;1127 (b) install blowout-preventer equipment and 
maintain it in good working conditions at all times;1128 (c) take all necessary precautions to 
prevent any pollution of the atmosphere or sea;1129 and (d) notify the MTJA of “any accident 
or incident arising from or in relation to petroleum operations that has resulted in a serious 
injury or loss of human life, or damage to properties or to the environment”.1130 For its part, the 
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MTJA has the power to inspect structures, installations and equipment in the JDA.1131 In other 
words, despite the fact that none of the mentioned regulatory instruments expressly make the 
MTJA responsible for protection of the marine environment within the JDA, the Authority in 
fact performs this function: it issues regulations and has the capacity to carry out inspections. 
At the same time, it is interesting to note that the MTJA has not adopted a complete code of 
environmental protection, but rather has incorporated environmental standards into technical 
regulations concerning petroleum operations. It is however unclear which Party’s 
environmental standards are taken as a basis (of course, if they are different). Although a 
detailed plan of action against pollution is not available, it is obvious that the MTJA will play 
a leading role in responding to pollution in the JDA. 
Thus, the MTJA is a powerful joint management body exercising the main elements of due 
diligence on behalf of Malaysia and Thailand in the JDA. The MTJA and TMJA Acts provide 
for the MTJA’s liability.1132 Further, the Acts stipulate that neither Malaysia nor Thailand 
incurs responsibility in respect of the MTJA’s liability.1133 Hereby, the Acts distinguish the 
responsibility of the States and the liability of the MTJA. The question is who bears 
responsibility/liability in the event of an incident causing harm to a third party where the cause 
is a failure of the MTJA to meet the requisite due diligence standard, which is delegated to it 
by the Parties. Chapter 6.13 examines whether the MTJA may indeed shield the Parties from 
incurring such a responsibility, in particular given that the members of the Authority’s Board 
are official representatives from both Governments. 
The MTJA runs a fund responsible for the incomes and expenses of the MTJA.1134 Moreover, 
there is a requirement to establish and manage a reserve fund within the fund according to “such 
terms and conditions as the Governments may jointly decide”.1135 Insofar as no information is 
publicly available on the reserve fund, one can postulate whether this fund would be used, for 
example, in the event when contractors are not able to cover damage caused. Although the 
existing regulatory framework is silent as to the (joint or several) liability of contractors 
operating in the JDA, they are liable for any damage arising out of their petroleum 
operations.1136 
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In the JDA, there is a line dividing civil and criminal jurisdiction of the Parties. Thailand 
exercises its jurisdiction on the northern side of this line and Malaysia on the southern side.1137 
It is worth noting that the dividing line is drawn for only civil and criminal jurisdictional 
purposes. Such jurisdictional division does not prejudice the sovereign rights of either Party in 
the JDA.1138 Logically, a claim for damage resulting from petroleum operations may be brought 
under the jurisdiction of the Party on whose side of the jurisdictional dividing line such damage 
has had its origin. The MTJA Act addresses the situation of how to determine which Party has 
jurisdiction over a platform or an installation straddling the jurisdictional dividing line. The 
determination shall be in accordance with “the principle of most substantial location”.1139 In 
other words, a platform or an installation mainly located in Thailand’s jurisdictional sector falls 
under the jurisdiction of Thailand. 
Thus, the model created by Malaysia and Thailand is characterized by the presence of a 
powerful joint body to which they have delegated authority with respect to environmental 
management, including regulation and control. As considered in the subsequent sections of this 
Chapter, such a model is also implemented in other geographical regions because it enables 
States to establish a uniform regime of environmental protection in an undelimited maritime 
area despite the existence of widely dissimilar legal systems (as is the case between Thailand 
and Malaysia and between Nigeria and STP, for example, dissimilar to the Japan-S. Korea 
example discussed in an earlier section of this Chapter) and disparities in resources and/or 
technical capabilities (as between Australia and Timor-Leste).1140 At the same time, States are 
not bound to follow one particular pattern in cooperation in respect of shared hydrocarbon 
resources.1141 The following section shows that Malaysia and Vietnam, two countries located 
in the same geographical region (i.e., the Gulf of Thailand), have adopted a completely different 
form of cooperation. 
In sum, one can conclude that Malaysia and Thailand exercise their due diligence obligations 
in the JDA jointly through the MTJA, with the exception of the exercise of civil and criminal 
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jurisdiction. Chapter 6.13 further discusses the extent to which the existence of the MTJA may 
affect the invocation of the shared State responsibility. 
6.5 Malaysia and Vietnam 
The Malaysia-Vietnam MoU regulates the exploration and exploitation of petroleum resources 
in an area of overlapping CS claims, named the ‘Defined Area’ (Illustration 15).1142 The 
Defined Area is also known as Block PM3 Commercial Arrangement Area (CAA). In 
accordance with the exchange of Diplomatic Notes bringing the Malaysia-Vietnam MoU into 
force, the MoU applies for a period of 40 years (i.e., until 2033), subject to any extensions or 
reviews, as both Parties may agree.1143 To date, the CAA remains highly productive.1144 
Pursuant to article 3 of the Malaysia-Vietnam MoU, Malaysia and Vietnam agreed to nominate 
their national corporations, PETRONAS and PETROVIETNAM respectively, to carry out 
petroleum activities in the CAA and placed a requirement on these corporations to reach a 
commercial arrangement, the terms and conditions of which are subject to the approval of both 
Parties. The commercial arrangement was concluded on 25 August 1993.1145 The arrangement 
established a Coordination Committee consisting of eight members (four members from each 
national corporation) to provide policy guidelines for the management of petroleum operations 
in the CAA.1146 Thus, under the Malaysian-Vietnamese model, the national petroleum 
companies are the primary actors and the Parties’ governments are not directly involved. 
It is important to note that although the Parties agreed to undertake petroleum activities jointly, 
PETRONAS in fact carries out all joint petroleum operations and remits to PETROVIETNAM 
its equal share of net revenue free of any taxes, levies or duties.1147 This has been explained by 
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pointing to the fact that Vietnam did not want to interfere with the existing PSCs signed by 
Malaysia before the conclusion of the arrangement and did not have an adequate petroleum law 
at that time.1148 The arrangement stipulates that the law applicable to petroleum operations in 
the CAA is the law of Malaysia.1149 Therefore, it is logical to suggest that the law of Malaysia 
also determines the requirements for protecting the marine environment of the CAA (e.g., 
EIA)1150 and the rules of civil liability. In other words, the Malaysian-Vietnamese model is a 
model where one State with oil and gas expertise governs all activities in the area of overlapping 
claims, while the other State’s participation is confined to revenue sharing.1151 Under this single 
State model, it is difficult to conclude that due diligence is of a shared character. Vietnam is not 
engaged in the management of the CAA and the presence of PETROVIETNAM in the CAA 
does not activate Vietnam’s due diligence. As discussed in Chapter 5.6, PETROVIETNAM is, 
for the purposes of international responsibility, regarded as a non-State entity, even though this 
company is owned by Vietnam. Moreover, the Coordination Committee is composed of 
petroleum industry representatives, rather than government officials. Thus, as follows from the 
foregoing, a failure of Malaysia to discharge its due diligence obligation, regardless of whether 
this failure has resulted in significant harm to a third party, can hardly be simultaneously 
attributable to Vietnam. 
6.6 Colombia and Jamaica 
The Colombia-Jamaica Treaty established a Joint Regime Area (JRA) in which, pending the 
final delimitation, the Parties agreed to manage, control, explore and exploit living and non-
living resources jointly.1152 Apart from economic activities with respect to resources of the JRA, 
the Parties may, inter alia, establish and use artificial islands, installations and structures, 
conduct marine scientific research, protect and preserve the marine environment and conserve 
living resources.1153 The use of the word ‘may’ makes the Parties’ obligation to protect and 
                                                            
May 2016, available at https://e.vnexpress.net/news/business/petrovietnam-petronas-extend-joint-upstream-oil-
and-gas-project-to-2027-3400121.html (last accessed January 2019). 
1148 Ibid. 
1149 Ibid. 
1150 See, for example, C. Briffett, J. Obbard and J. Mackee, “Environmental assessment in Malaysia: a means to 
an end or a new beginning?”, Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, 2004, vol. 22 (3), pp. 221-233. 
1151 See also Chapter 7.7.1 (Saudi Arabia and Bahrain use the same model. At the same time, unlike Malaysia and 
Vietnam, they have established a CS boundary between them). 
1152 Colombia-Jamaica Treaty, art. 3 (1). It is important to note that there are two maritime areas that are excluded 
from the JRA (Illustration No. 5).  




preserve the marine environment of the JRA very weak.1154 However, as considered in Chapter 
5, the current regime of marine environmental protection is stronger than “may” and applies 
even if a State is not a party to the UNCLOS (unlike Jamaica, Colombia is not a party). Further, 
the Treaty states that activities relating to exploration and exploitation of non-living resources, 
marine scientific research, protection and preservation of the marine environment are to be 
carried out on a joint basis agreed by Colombia and Jamaica.1155 There is information that the 
Parties reached an agreement on joint exploration of the JRA and the exchange of geological 
information.1156 However, the text of this agreement is not publicly available. 
In the JRA, each Party has jurisdiction over its nationals and vessels flying its flag and over 
which it exercises management and control under international law.1157 Moreover, the Parties 
have committed themselves to adopt measures in order to ensure that nationals and vessels of 
third States comply with the regulatory framework established in the JRA.1158 
According to article 4 of the Colombia-Jamaica Treaty, the Parties agreed to establish a Joint 
Commission (JC) consisting of two representatives (one from each Party), who can seek 
assistance from advisers. The main tasks of the JC are to elaborate: the modalities for 
implementing and undertaking activities mentioned above, the measures for ensuring the 
compliance of third States with the JRA’s regime, and to carry out any other functions that may 
be assigned to the Commission by the Parties.1159 All conclusions of the JC shall be made by 
consensus and are recommendations to the Parties, which become binding only when the Parties 
adopt them.1160 
Unfortunately, besides the Treaty, there is no publicly available information concerning the 
work of the JC, its products, additional regulatory instruments adopted by the Parties or the 
status of activities aimed at exploration and exploitation of petroleum resources of the JRA. It 
seems that Colombia and Jamaica are not particularly active in conducting petroleum activities 
in the JRA. This fact may be explained by a number of possible reasons: a low probability of 
                                                            
1154 This can also be supported by the Spanish text of article 3 (2) of the Treaty: “En el Area de Régimen Común 
las Partes pueden llevar a cabo las siguientes actividades” (emphasis added). 
1155 Ibid., art. 3 (3). It is important to note that the requirement to undertake jointly does not apply, for example, to 
exploration and exploitation of living resources. In other words, it means that each Party may carry out activities 
with respect to living resources unilaterally. In this respect, paragraph 5 should be taken into account. 
1156 “Jamaica and Colombia Sign Maritime Agreement”, Jamaica Informational Service, 5 November 2008, 
available at http://jis.gov.jm/jamaica-and-colombia-sign-maritime-agreement/ (last accessed January 2019). 
1157 Colombia-Jamaica Treaty, art. 3 (5). 
1158 Ibid., art. 3 (6). 
1159 Ibid., art. 4 (1). 




finding petroleum resources in the area, the Parties not being able to undertake petroleum 
activities and attract investors (there are many maritime boundary disputes between coastal 
States in the Caribbean Sea), or that the main interest of the Parties is the utilization of living 
resources of the JRA. 
Although the information concerning the JRA is very limited, a key feature of the Colombia-
Jamaica Treaty is that it places emphasis on the joint exercise of sovereign rights to explore and 
exploit and of the Parties’ obligations to protect and preserve the marine environment.1161 There 
is however uncertainty as to how the joint regime works in practice: for example, whether the 
JC may grant permits or carry out inspections in the JRA, or whether these powers are within 
the competence of the Parties or one Party. According to the JC’s functions set forth in article 
4 of the Colombia-Jamaica Treaty, it appears that the Commission plays an important role only 
at the stage of the regime’s emergence. Thus, the JC can be characterized as a weak-powered 
entity, similar to the Japanese-S. Korean JC. Against this background, it remains unclear which 
State’s (environmental) laws and regulations are applicable in the JRA. 
6.7 Nigeria and São Tomé and Príncipe 
In an area of overlapping claims to the EEZs, Nigeria and STP agreed to set up a joint 
development zone (JDZ) for the joint exploration and exploitation of petroleum and non-
petroleum resources (Illustration No. 18). This zone is managed by a Joint Development 
Authority (NSTPJDA)1162 headed by a Board consisting of four executive directors (two from 
each country and appointed by the respective Heads of State for a renewable period of six 
years).1163 Each member of the Board leads a specific department within the NSTPJDA. There 
are four departments: Finance and Administration Department, Commercial and Investment 
Department, Non-Hydrocarbon Resources Department and Monitoring and Inspection 
Department.1164 The Board hires the personnel of the NSTPJDA under terms and conditions 
approved by a Joint Ministerial Council (MC).1165 The Nigeria-STP Treaty states that the 
Authority shall have judicial personality and can contract, acquire and dispose of movable and 
                                                            
1161 Supra note 1155. 
1162 Official website: http://nstpjda.org (last accessed January 2019). The NSTPJDA is based in Abuja (Nigeria) 
with a liaison office in STP. 
1163 Nigeria-STP Treaty, art. 10.1. See, for example, the composition of the seventh Board at 
http://nstpjda.org/seventh-board/ (last accessed January 2019). 
1164 Ibid. 




immovable property and institute and be party to legal proceedings.1166 The Authority is tasked 
with conducting bidding rounds, entering into contracts on behalf of the two States, issuing 
regulations regarding all matters and exercising oversight and control of activities in the 
JDZ.1167 
Apart from the NSTPJDA, the institutional structure of the JDZ includes the MC.1168 The MC 
is comprised of eight ministers (four from each country)1169 and has authority to give directions 
to the NSTPJDA and approve contracts concluded between the Authority and contractors.1170 
The MC is also empowered to approve regulations prepared by the NSTPJDA.1171 
Article 3.3 of the Nigeria-STP Treaty provides that the Parties exercise their rights to explore 
and exploit resources of the JDZ through the Authority and the MC. The Nigeria-STP Treaty 
makes the Authority responsible for preservation of the marine environment, prevention and 
remedying of pollution.1172 The Authority is obligated to take all reasonable measures to ensure 
that economic activities in the JDZ do not pose “any appreciable risk of causing pollution or 
other harm to the marine environment”.1173 For example, the NSTPJDA is empowered to 
conduct inspections of petroleum operations in the JDZ.1174 Inspectors may order to cease any 
or all petroleum operations immediately in order to avoid an accident involving a danger to, or 
loss of, life or to protect the coastline or the other maritime interests of either Party, including 
fishing interests, against actual or potential pollution.1175 As noted above, the Monitoring and 
Inspection Department is one of the four departments of the NSTPJDA.1176 
The Nigeria-STP Treaty also requires the Parties, on the recommendation of the NSTPJDA, to 
agree on measures and procedures to prevent and remedy pollution resulting from economic 
activities in the JDZ.1177 In 2003, the Authority issued Petroleum Regulations (Nigeria-STP 
                                                            
1166 Ibid., art. 9.2. 
1167 Ibid., art. 9.6. 
1168 Ibid., part two. 
1169 Ibid., art. 6. There are Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ministers of Defense, Ministers responsible for oil sector 
and Ministers responsible for fisheries issues. See, for example, slide 6 at https://www.slideshare.net/EPetrilli/sao-
tome-principe-presentation (last accessed January 2019). 
1170 Ibid., art. 8.2. 
1171 Ibid., art. 21. 
1172 Ibid., art. 9.6 (o) and (iii). 
1173 Ibid., art. 38.1. 
1174 Ibid., art. 30.1. 
1175 Ibid., art. 30.5. See, also, Nigeria-STP PRs, regulation 3.3, note 1178. 
1176 See more at http://nstpjda.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Monitoring-and-Inspection.pdf (last accessed 
January 2019). 




PRs or Regulations) that contain environmental provisions.1178 The Regulations enable the 
Authority to make further regulations dealing with various matters.1179 The Nigeria-STP PRs 
provide that the Authority may grant exploration licenses, oil prospecting licenses, oil mining 
leases or production sharing contracts (PSCs) to companies incorporated or registered in 
Nigeria or STP.1180 Regulation 33.1 requires licensees, lessees and contractors to protect the 
environment in and in the vicinity of the area of their licenses, leases and contracts. They are 
also obligated to “adopt all practicable precautions… to prevent the pollution of sea areas” and, 
in the case of pollution, to “take prompt steps to control, terminate and remediate” to address 
such pollution.1181 
In the event that licensees, lessees or contractors do not take action necessary for the 
conservation and protection of the marine environment or do not remove pollution to the 
satisfaction of the Authority, the Authority may direct these entities to take such remedial 
action.1182 If they do not comply with the Authority’s direction, they are required to cover any 
costs incurred by the Authority in rectifying the matter.1183 Among the interim arrangements 
examined in this Chapter, the clause that makes the Authority an active actor in the protection 
of the marine environment and elimination of pollution is unique. 
The Nigeria-STP PRs impose liability on private entities operating in the JDZ. For example, 
regulation 26 states that if a licensee, lessee or contractor exercises its rights in a manner as to 
unreasonably interfere with any fishing rights granted by the Authority or either of the Parties, 
it shall pay compensation to any person injured by the exercise of such rights, the amount of 
which is to be determined by the Authority. Moreover, the Regulations require each holder of 
a licence, lease or PSC to have insurance on a strict liability basis and for an amount determined 
by the Authority in consultation with the relevant licensee, lessee or contractor.1184 
                                                            
1178 Nigeria-São Tomé and Príncipe Joint Development Authority Petroleum Regulations of 2003, available at 
https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/Petroleum%20Regulations%20for%20Joint%20Development%
20Authority.pdf (last accessed January 2019). As noted in Chapter 1, neither amendments to the Nigeria-STP PRs 
nor Environmental Regulations (both of 2015) are publicly available.  
1179 Nigeria-STP PRs, regulation 75. 
1180 Ibid., regulations 3.1 and 5. The difference between an exploration licence, an oil prospecting licence, an oil 
mining lease and a PSC is explained in regulations 6-9. 
1181 Ibid., regulation 33.3. 
1182 Ibid., regulation 35.2. 
1183 Ibid. 
1184 Ibid., regulation 73.1. Further, the regulation states that “the insurance shall cover expenses or liabilities or 
any other specified things arising in connection with the carrying out of petroleum operations and other activities 
associated with those operations in the area of the licence or lease, including expenses associated with the 




Neither the Nigeria-STP Treaty nor the Nigeria-STP Regulations explicitly provide a person 
who suffered damage resulting from petroleum activities in the JDZ with the right to bring an 
action for compensation. Article 42.1 of the Nigeria-STP Treaty could be interpreted as 
providing such a right.1185 However, the procedure is unclear. For example, can an action be 
brought against the Authority, taking into account its active role in the JDZ? The Nigeria-STP 
PRs, congruent with the Petroleum Mining Code between Australia and Timor-Leste,1186 
contain an indemnity provision. Regulation 28 stipulates that licensees, lessees or contractors 
shall “indemnify and keep harmless the Authority and its officers and employees (and their 
agents) against all actions, costs, charges, claims and demands whatsoever which may be made 
or brought by any third party in relation to any matter or thing done or purported to be done 
pursuant to these Regulations”. Thereby, the Nigeria-STP Regulations give the Authority a 
certain kind of immunity from legal action against it. 
The Nigeria-STP Treaty obligates the Parties to provide the Authority with information 
concerning levels of petroleum discharge and contamination they receive from contractors or 
inspectors.1187 Moreover, the Parties are required to inform the NSTPJDA (it is interesting to 
note that there is not an obligation of the Authority to inform the Parties) of the occurrence of 
such events as a spill or discharge of petroleum, and a collision at sea, including any measures 
taken.1188 Article 38.3 stipulates that these requirements are aimed at fulfilling the Parties’ 
obligations to monitor.1189 At the same time, as noted earlier, the Authority also has the 
monitoring function. Hence, it is unclear how this enforcement mechanism works in practice. 
The Nigeria-STP Treaty enables each Party to act independently in order to take enforcement 
or other measures with respect to actual or potential environmental harm.1190 Therefore, one 
may conclude that the Authority does not have effective means to combat pollution of the 
marine environment (unlike its ability to conduct inspections in the JDZ). 
It is notable that the requirement to notify neighboring States of a real or potential 
environmental harm arising from petroleum activities in the JDZ is not included in either the 
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1186 See Chapter 6.9 in this regard and supra note 1213. 
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Nigeria-STP Treaty or the Nigeria-STP PRs. While the obligation to notify does not need to be 
incorporated in a provisional arrangement and exists independently,1191 it is nevertheless 
desirable to deal with “the issue of who will notify whom of what and when”, particularly taking 
into account the model involving the establishment of a Joint Authority.1192 
In sum, Nigeria and STP have created a comprehensive regime of marine environmental 
protection in the JDZ in which the NSTPJDA has a primary role. The core elements of due 
diligence (namely, regulation and enforcement) are exercised by the Authority. At the same 
time, whereas the Authority largely acts independently when monitoring, pursuant to its 
mandate to do so, such independence is limited when it makes (and amends) regulations, which 
become binding only after the MC’s approval. Without commercial exploitation in the JDZ to 
date,1193 the Authority is also financially dependent on the Parties. The information available 
indicates that the NSTPJDA experiences problems with financing, and this has led to a 
reduction in the Authority’s staff.1194 It is however unclear how this situation affects the 
discharge of its functions. It is also unclear whether the Parties’ relevant authorities may step 
in in the event of the Authority’s inability to carry out its mandate (e.g., to inspect hydrocarbon 
activities in the JDZ). 
6.8 Thailand and Cambodia 
In the Thailand-Cambodia MoU, the Parties acknowledged the existence of an Overlapping 
Claims Area (OCA) in the Gulf of Thailand (Illustration No. 16).1195 They also agreed to delimit 
one part of the OCA and to negotiate a treaty for the joint development of hydrocarbons situated 
in the other part of the OCA (Joint Development Area or JDA).1196 In 2006, the Parties adopted 
a revenue sharing model similar to that employed by Japan and S. Korea.1197 The JDA was 
divided into a number of areas/blocks in which the Parties’ shares were different.1198 However, 
                                                            
1191 See Chapter 5. 
1192 Low 2012, op. cit., p. 69. 
1193 See Chapter 1. 
1194 See, for example, F. Mac-Leva, “Why Nigeria-Sao Tome JDA needs restructuring - Luis Prazeres”, DailyTrust, 
22 July 2017, available at https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/why-nigeria-sao-tome-jda-needs-restructuring-luis-
prazeres.html; B. Gradebo, “Crisis Hits Nigeria-Sao Tome and Principe Devt Authority”, Leadership, 24 
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1196 Ibid., art. 2. 
1197 V. Var, “Cambodia–Thailand Sovereignty Disputes: Implications for Cambodia’s Strategic Environment and 
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in 2009, Thailand unilaterally revoked the Thailand-Cambodia MoU for political reasons, a 
move was protested by Cambodia.1199 Currently, Cambodia and Thailand have resumed 
negotiations concerning the OCA with no outcome to date.1200 In the interim, both States have 
issued exploration and exploitation licenses to private companies in the OCA. 
Thus, unlike the existing provisional arrangements in the Gulf of Thailand (between Thailand 
and Malaysia and between Malaysia and Vietnam),1201 to date there is no common regime that 
governs the OCA. Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter 5, Thailand and Cambodia are required 
to prevent significant environmental harm that might arise from their unilateral petroleum 
activities authorized in the OCA.1202 It is also worth recalling that this requirement constitutes 
a rule of customary international law applicable regardless of whether a State is a party to the 
UNCLOS: Thailand and Cambodia signed the UNCLOS (in 1982 and 1983, respectively), but 
only the former State ratified the Convention (in 2011).1203 In this respect, it is interesting to 
note that while the Thailand-Cambodia MoU includes a provision, which may be viewed as a 
reference to articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS,1204 it does not deal with the issue of 
environmental protection at all. As noted in Chapter 5.6, environmental protection provisions 
do not need to be incorporated into the MoU (and any subsequent agreements between the 
Parties) to be binding on Thailand and Cambodia. At the same time, such provisions make it 
clear who is responsible for environmental protection. For example, if Thailand and Cambodia 
intend to repeat the model used by Japan and S. Korea, does it mean that coastal State 
jurisdiction will be determined based on which State has licensed the operator or which State 
has the larger revenue share in each area/block?1205 While one can speculate on the possible 
forms of the OCA’s cooperative management, no particular management regime has been 
established yet. Consequently, Thailand and Cambodia shall individually exercise their due 
                                                            
1199 Var 2017, op. cit., p. 164. 
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1201 See Chapters 6.4 and 6.5. 
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diligence obligations in this area, also taking into account the duty to exercise restraint 
considered in Chapter 3. 
6.9 Australia and Timor-Leste: the current and former regimes1206 
As indicated in Chapter 1, Australia and Timor-Leste reached a new maritime boundary treaty 
in the Timor Sea on 6 March 2018 (Timor Sea Boundary Treaty). This Boundary Treaty brings 
significant changes to the regime of cooperative hydrocarbon activities. The JPDA created 
under the TST will cease to exist once the Timor Sea Boundary Treaty enters into force and the 
former joint area will be attributed to Timor-Leste. The Timor Sea Boundary Treaty also deals 
with the management of the transboundary Greater Sunrise gas fields. The Greater Sunrise UA 
will terminate once the Boundary Treaty comes into effect.1207 Instead, the Boundary Treaty 
alters the apportionment ratio established previously under the Greater Sunrise UA (80:20 or 
70:30, dependent on which country any pipeline from the Greater Sunrise goes to)1208 and 
creates a Special Regime Area (SRA), which will govern activities with respect to the Greater 
Sunrise until their commercial depletion.1209 In the SRA, the Parties agreed to exercise their 
sovereign rights provided by article 77 of the UNCLOS jointly.1210 The exercise of jurisdiction 
within the SRA is regulated by article 16 of Annex B of the Timor Sea Boundary Treaty that is 
discussed below in this section. 
The changes also concern the institutional framework in the Timor Sea. The Timor Sea 
Boundary Treaty establishes a two-tiered structure, consisting of a Designated Authority (DA) 
and a Governance Board (GB).1211 The composition and powers of the GB are similar to a Joint 
Commission (JC) established under article 6 of the TST. The GB is comprised of one 
representative from Australia and two representatives from Timor-Leste.1212 The GB is 
empowered, inter alia, to provide strategic oversight over the SRA, approve a final Petroleum 
Mining Code (PMC) and any amendments to it, including amendments to the interim PMC, and 
approve a decision of the DA to enter into or terminate a PSC in respect of the Greater 
                                                            
1206 See also Chapter 7.1. 
1207 Timor Sea Boundary Treaty, art. 9. 
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Sunrise.1213 An innovation of the Timor Sea Boundary Treaty is the creation of a Dispute 
Resolution Committee, with limited powers to resolve certain disputes relating to the SRA and 
the Greater Sunrise’s development.1214 
The DA established pursuant to the TST continues to operate.1215 The National Petroleum and 
Minerals Authority of Timor-Leste (NPMA) acts as the DA on behalf of Australia and Timor-
Leste.1216 In other words, the DA is not a separate administrative body (as, for example, the DA 
in the context of the Nigeria-STP Treaty), but it is a public institute within the governmental 
structure of Timor-Leste.1217 The DA is responsible for the day-to-day regulation and 
management of petroleum activities in the SRA.1218 The DA has broad powers, especially in 
the field of environmental protection, including issuing regulations to protect the marine 
environment, monitoring compliance with these regulations, conducting inspections of 
facilities, ensuring that a contingency plan for responding to pollution is in place and 
investigating safety and environmental incidents in the SRA.1219 Thus, it is clear that Australia 
and Timor-Leste delegate their due diligence obligations to the DA.1220 
                                                            
1213 Ibid., Annex B, art. 7 (2)-(4). The interim PMC is available at 
http://web01.anpm.tl/webs/anptlweb.nsf/vwAll/Resource-
Petroleum%20Mining%20Code/$File/PMCtoCoM0602.pdf?openelement (last accessed January 2019). In this 
respect, it is important to note article 11 of Annex B of the Timor Sea Boundary Treaty: “[the interim PMC], 
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Interim%20Regulations%20issued%20under%20Article%2037%20of%20the%20Interim%20PMC/$File/JPDA
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1214 Ibid., Annex B, art. 8. See also Bankes 2018 (b), op. cit., pp. 1-23. 
1215 Ibid., Annex B, art. 6. 
1216 Ibid., Annex B, art. 6 (2). Autoridade Nacional do Petróleo e Minerais Timor-Leste (official website: 
http://www.anpm.tl/), functions on the basis of the Decree-Law No. 1/2016 of 9 February, available at 
http://web01.anpm.tl/webs/anptlweb.nsf/vwAll/Resource-ANPM%20Decree%20Law%20No.1-2016%20-
%20English%20Translation/$File/ANPM%20Decree%20Law%20No.%201-
2016%20English%20Translation.pdf?openelement (last accessed January 2019). This Decree-Law introduced 
some amendments into the Decree-Law No. 20/2008 of 19 June, available at 
http://web01.anpm.tl/webs/anptlweb.nsf/vwAll/Resource-ANP%20Decree%20Law%20No.20-
2008%20/$File/Decree-Law-2008-20-ANP%20decree%20law.pdf?openelement (last accessed January 2019). 
These Decree-Laws are likely to be amended once the Timor Sea Boundary Treaty enters into force. 
1217 Timor Sea Boundary Treaty, Annex B, art. 6 (2) (a); Decree-Law No. 1/2016 of 9 February, supra note 1216, 
Preamble and art. 1. 
1218 Timor Sea Boundary Treaty, Annex B, art. 6 (1). It is worth noting that the NPMA is also responsible for 
regulating and managing petroleum and mining activities in Timor-Leste in general.  
1219 Ibid., Annex B, art. 6 (3). See, for example, Section 15 of the interim PMC concerning inspections.  
1220 See also article 16 of Annex B of the Timor Sea Boundary Treaty, according to which “the Parties have agreed 





The delegation of due diligence to the DA raises the question of whether a failure to exercise 
this due diligence is attributable to the two States or only to Timor-Leste.1221 As noted above, 
the DA is a body closely tied to the Government of Timor-Leste. Logically, this means that any 
failure on the part of the DA is attributable to Timor-Leste under either draft article 4 or draft 
article 5 of the ARSIWA,1222 but does it also mean that such a failure is attributable to Australia? 
Unlike the TST and Greater Sunrise UA, the role of Australia in environmental protection has 
been decreased pursuant to the Timor Sea Boundary Treaty.1223 It is likely that the bulk of 
exploitation activities in respect of the Greater Sunrise will be on the Timor-Leste side of the 
CS boundary insofar as the larger portion of the resource lies on its side.1224 At the same time, 
pursuant to article 16 (1) (c) of Annex B, Australia, as well as Timor-Leste, is required to 
exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the UNCLOS with respect to “environmental 
protection, management and regulation” within the SRA.1225 However, while the Timor Sea 
Boundary Treaty explicitly states that the Parties must jointly exercise their rights to explore 
and exploit,1226 it seems that the environmental jurisdiction is to be exercised by each Party 
individually on the basis of the CS boundary. Article 16 (2) of Annex B stipulates that “the 
cooperative exercise of the jurisdictional competencies set out in paragraph 1”, including 
environmental competence, is allowed only in consultation between Australia and Timor-Leste. 
Nevertheless, as discussed above in this section, it is apparent that the Parties in fact exercise a 
number of jurisdictional competencies jointly through the DA.1227 These jurisdictional 
competencies include protection of the (marine) environment and safety of navigation in the 
SRA. In other words, both Australia and Timor-Leste are responsible for environmental conduct 
of the DA. 
The joint exercise of due diligence is already in place and will be transferred from the (former) 
JPDA to the SRA. As regards the JPDA, this area will principally fall within the CS of Timor-
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Leste.1228 According to Annex D of the Timor Sea Boundary Treaty, ongoing and planned 
petroleum activities continue under conditions or terms equivalent to those existed prior to entry 
into force of this Treaty.1229 The main change is that from the date of entry into force of the 
Boundary Treaty, Timor-Leste solely obtains all upstream revenue derived from petroleum 
activities with respect to the Bayu-Undan and Kitan fields,1230 which are almost depleted.1231 
The DA, as before, will exercise its authority over activities conducted in the former JPDA. 
Pursuant to article 2 (5) of Annex D of the Timor Sea Boundary Treaty, the DA is obligated to 
provide information to the GB on an annual basis regarding the petroleum operations, including 
decommissioning, and “any safety or environmental issues”. This provision allows Australia to 
keep an eye on the DA’s conduct. 
Article 10 of the Timor Sea Boundary Treaty is an interesting provision. According to this 
article, neither Party is entitled to claim compensation with respect to petroleum activities 
carried out in the Timor Sea as a result of, inter alia, the cessation of the JPDA and the SRA. 
The question is whether this provision applies in the context of a claim for compensation for 
transboundary environmental harm arising from petroleum activities. If so, one of the 
implications of the applicability of article 10 is that Australia cannot raise a claim for 
transboundary pollution of its marine environment originating from ongoing hydrocarbon 
activities within the former JPDA.1232 At the same time, it is worth noting that article 10 does 
not limit the possibility of nationals of either Party bringing an action for compensation and it 
does not affect potential claims of third States. The subsequent question is whether article 10 is 
also applicable to future activities with respect to undiscovered (or known, but currently 
undeveloped) petroleum deposits.1233 An affirmative answer to the questions posed seems to be 
unlikely for two reasons. First, the Timor Sea Boundary Treaty aims to address the issues 
                                                            
1228 Only a small strip of the JPDA will fall within the Australian CS (Illustration No. 11) 
1229 Timor Sea Boundary Treaty, Annex D, art. 1 (1) and (2). See also Exchange of Correspondence between 
Australia and Timor-Leste on Transitional Arrangements for Bayu-Undan and Kitan of 13 October 2017, available 
at https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2351 (last accessed January 2019). 
1230 Ibid., Annex D, art. 1 (3). Before Australia received 10 % in the JPDA under the TST. 
1231 See, for example, V. Menon, “Timor-Leste-Australia Maritime Boundary Treaty: Victory for Dili?”, RSIS 
Commentary, 27 March 2018, available at https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/CO18055.pdf 
(last accessed January 2019). Menon states that as the hydrocarbon resources in the Bayu-Undan and Kitan fields 
are drying up, “this may not amount to much revenue for Timor-Leste”.  
1232 The same true applies in the context of the future cessation of the SRA upon the depletion of the Greater 
Sunrise fields.  
1233 See, for example, R. Silva, “Timor-Leste and Australia Sign Landmark Maritime Boundary Treaty”, Linkedin, 
7 March 2018, available at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/timor-leste-australia-sign-landmark-maritime-
boundary-ricardo-silva/?trackingId=N5%2FFv2MPcfzgOAKhmsbc4A%3D%3D (last accessed January 2019). 
Silva notes that the conclusion of the Timor Sea Boundary Treaty will allow Timor-Leste to open up new areas 





concerning petroleum activities, which are underway in the JPDA, and not to deal with future 
petroleum activities of Timor-Leste. Second, as discussed in Chapter 5, under international law, 
each State may claim compensation for significant transboundary environmental harm caused 
by other States. The latter reason casts doubt on the reasonableness of the applicability of article 
10 in the environmental context. Support for the non-applicability of article 10 in the 
environmental context may also be found in the text of the comprehensive package agreement 
of 30 August 2017, which refers to “(no) compensation for past exploitation”.1234 In other 
words, article 10 by no means limits claims for environmental harm. 
Apart from the JPDA, some maritime areas outside the JPDA, which previously formed part of 
the Australian CS, now fall within the CS of Timor-Leste (Illustration No. 11). Thereby, 
existing petroleum activities in these maritime areas, including activities in respect of the 
Buffalo oil field, will be conducted under the jurisdiction of Timor-Leste. Article 4 of Annex 
D of the Timor Sea Boundary Treaty deals with this situation and states that the Buffalo will be 
subject to a new PSC to be entered into between Timor-Leste and the contractor on conditions 
equivalent to those in place under the jurisdiction of Australia. It is notable that the date of entry 
into force of such a PSC is decisive for the transfer of legal responsibility from Australia to 
Timor-Leste: prior to that date Australia bears responsibility, but after that date Timor-Leste 
bears responsibility.1235 
Going back to the issue of the cross-border Greater Sunrise fields, it is worth restating that the 
Parties undertake to jointly protect the maritime environment of the SRA. Nevertheless, the 
presence of the maritime boundary has certain consequences. For example, each State exercises 
civil jurisdiction on its side of the maritime boundary. Thus, a civil claim for damage resulting 
from petroleum activities in the SRA is to be brought under the jurisdiction of the State of 
origin. Unlike the TST, the Timor Sea Boundary Treaty does not provide for the choice of civil 
jurisdiction.1236 
Thus, despite the fact that the JPDA will cease to exist, the well-functioning cooperative 
management previously established in this area remains in place, but it will apply in the SRA. 
This means that the core preventative elements of due diligence (i.e., regulation and control) 
will still be exercised on a joint basis through the DA. The establishment of the maritime 
                                                            
1234 Comprehensive Package Agreement of 30 August 2017, available at 
https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2349 (last accessed January 2019), p. 2 (emphasis added). 
1235 Timor Sea Boundary Treaty, Annex D, art. 4 (5). See also art. 10 (b) and (c). 




boundary between the States will however affect the exercise of remedial elements of due 
diligence that are to be exercised separately. These peculiarities distinguish the regime 
governing the Greater Sunrise fields from other regimes created in relation to cross-border 
hydrocarbons and which are explored in Chapter 7. Moreover, the DA’s status is different from 
the status of many other inter-State management bodies considered in this Chapter.1237 This 
issue is further discussed in Chapter 6.13. 
6.10 Barbados and Guyana 
The Barbados-Guyana Treaty created a cooperation zone (CZ) in an area of overlap between 
the EEZs of the Parties and beyond the EEZ of any third State (i.e., T&T and Venezuela1238).1239 
In this zone, Barbados and Guyana have agreed to exercise “joint jurisdiction, control, 
management, development, and exploration and exploitation of living and non-living natural 
resources, as well as all other rights and duties established in the [UNCLOS]”.1240 This 
provision indicates the intention of the Parties to discharge the essential elements of due 
diligence on a joint basis. 
Article 6 (2) of the Barbados-Guyana Treaty states that the Parties’ exercise of joint jurisdiction 
over non-living resources shall be managed by a joint non-living resources commission and 
evidenced by an agreement in writing, including by way of an exchange of diplomatic notes. 
Article 6 (4) further underlines that if the Parties fail to reach such agreement in writing, neither 
of them can exercise its jurisdiction in the CZ. This clause is important because, to date, there 
has been no information made publicly available that the required agreement is concluded and 
that the Commission has been established.1241 Therefore, it is difficult to conclude as to how 
the cooperative regime governing the CZ works in practice. At the same time, one should keep 
in mind the Treaty’s strong emphasis on the joint character of due diligence that is likely to be 
delegated to the Commission.  
                                                            
1237 This is also not typical in the context of transboundary hydrocarbons. See Chapter 7.5. 
1238 Fietta and Cleverly, op. cit., p. 122. 
1239 Barbados-Guyana Treaty, Preamble, art. 2 and Annex I (Illustration No. 6). 
1240 Ibid., art. 1 (1) (emphasis added). Article 3 provides for joint civil and administrative jurisdiction.  
1241 The only available information is that in 2013, Barbados and Guyana signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
dealing with the joint jurisdiction over fisheries resources in the CZ, available at 
http://www.inewsguyana.com/guyanabarbados-to-work-jointly-in-overlapping-boundaries/ and 
http://demerarawaves.com/2013/10/05/guyana-barbados-to-negotiate-granting-of-joint-fishing-licences/ (last 




6.11 Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
In accordance with the Angola-DRC Agreement, the Parties have created a Common Interest 
Zone (CIZ) in an undelimited maritime area (Illustration No. 22).1242 The CIZ is a maritime 
corridor of 10 km where the Parties agreed to share revenue derived from activities regarding 
“existing or future leads, prospects and reservoirs”, regardless of the phase, equally.1243 The 
Angola-Congo Agreement includes a provision on the participation of the Parties’ national 
companies: Sonangol (Angolan) and Cohydro (Congolese).1244 In 2015, these companies 
reached a preliminary trade agreement, which is not available in the public domain.1245 The 
Angola-DRC Agreement does not deal with a significant number of important issues such as 
the exercise of criminal and civil jurisdiction, the establishment of an institutional structure, or 
environmental matters.1246 Moreover, there are also questions concerning the operation of the 
Agreement due to the circumstances mentioned below. 
In 2009, the DRC enacted a law defining its claimed maritime zones, including the CS beyond 
200 nm, in the Gulf of Guinea.1247 The DRC claims coastal State jurisdiction in a corridor that 
extends in a southwesterly direction from the coast (Illustration No. 28).1248 This corridor runs 
through an area where Angola has undertaken significant petroleum activities for many 
years.1249 It is interesting to note that the corridor claimed by the DRC does not overlap with 
the CIZ, except for a very small part of the eastern end of the CIZ.1250 In other words, the DRC 
does not claim sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the entire CIZ.1251 In 2013, Angola made a 
submission to the CLCS ignoring the DRC’s claims and recognizing only a small triangular 
                                                            
1242 Angola-DRC Agreement, art. 1. ‘CIZ’ is referred to in the Agreement as ‘ZIC’ (“Zone d'Intérêt Commun” in 
French). Prior to the Angola-DRC Agreement, the Parties reached a MoU in 2003 (in the files of the author). There 
is no indication that Angola and the DRC formalized or implemented the MoU before the Agreement (ibid.) 
1243 Ibid., arts. 2 and 3. 
1244 Ibid., arts. 5 and 6. 
1245 “Angola and DRC prepare joint oil exploration”, Macauhub, 29 January 2015, available at 
https://macauhub.com.mo/2015/01/29/angola-and-drc-prepare-joint-oil-exploration/ (last accessed January 2019). 
1246 See also D. Moudachirou, “Memorandum of Understanding between Angola and DRC as a Provisional 
Arrangement for their Maritime Boundaries Delimitation’s Dispute- Reality or Myth?”, Global Journal of Politics 
and Law Research, 2015, vol. 3 (4), pp. 101-102. 
1247 Law No. 09/2002 of 7 May 2009 delimiting the maritime areas of the DRC, available at 
http://www.marineregions.org/documents/cod_2009_law09.pdf (last accessed January 2019). 
1248 D. C. Smith, “Angola-Democratic Republic of the Congo”, Report No. 4-15, in: D. A. Colson and R. W. Smith 








shaped maritime area off the coast of the DRC established before the adoption of the 
UNCLOS.1252 The dispute between Angola and the DRC is still unresolved. 
The circumstances mentioned above give rise to questions regarding the viability of the CIZ 
and implications of the DRC’s recent claims for the management of this zone. The fact that the 
DRC does not claim sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the maritime area where the CIZ is 
located means that Angola solely exercises its sovereign rights and jurisdiction as coastal State 
in the CIZ under the UNCLOS. Pursuant to the Angola-DRC Agreement, Angola is only 
required to ensure the equal distribution of revenues and the participation of Cohydro in 
petroleum operations in the CIZ. Thus, the exercise of all components of due diligence 
discussed in Chapter 5 (to regulate, enforce, investigate and punish) falls on Angola. Therefore, 
it is hard to infer that the Parties share due diligence in the CIZ, and, accordingly, this leads to 
the conclusion that there is no situation of responsibility sharing in this instance. 
6.12 Mauritius and the Seychelles 
According to the Seychelles-Mauritius Treaty, these States have agreed on joint control, 
management, facilitation of the exploration of the CS in the JMA and the conservation, 
development and exploitation of its natural resources.1253 As clearly follows from the structure 
of the Seychelles-Mauritius Treaty and the wordings of its provisions, the TST has been taken 
as a basis for the Seychelles-Mauritius Treaty.1254 
The management regime created in the JMA mirrors the one established in the Timor Sea under 
the TST. It also consists of three administrative bodies: a Ministerial Council (MC), a Joint 
Commission (JC) and a Designated Authority (DA).1255 The provisions on the functions of these 
bodies also echo the relevant provisions in the TST. The MC consists of political representatives 
and considers relevant matters at a higher policy level.1256 The JC consists of an equal number 
                                                            
1252 Executive Summary of Angola’s Continental Shelf Submission, available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/ago69_2013/es_ago_en.pdf. See also notes of the DRC 
submitted to the CLCS of 11 April 2014 and 7 October 2015, available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/ago69_2013/1430662E.pdf and 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/ago69_2013/cod_re_ago_oct_2015e.pdf (last accessed 
January 2019). F. Misser, “DRC and Angola's Borders and barrels”, The Africa Report, 4 July 2014, available at 
http://www.theafricareport.com/Central-Africa/drc-and-angolas-borders-and-barrels.html (last accessed January 
2019). 
1253 Seychelles-Mauritius Treaty, art. 3 (b). The definition of the term ‘natural resources’ contains in article 1 of 
the Treaty. “JMA” means “joint management area” (see Chapter 1). 
1254 See Chapters 1 and 6.9 concerning the TST between Australia and Timor-Leste. 
1255 Seychelles-Mauritius Treaty, art. 4 (a). 




of commissioners appointed by Mauritius and the Seychelles in order to establish policies and 
regulations relating to natural resource activities in the JMA and oversee the work of the DA.1257 
The DA has legal personality and responsibility for day-to-day regulation and management of 
natural resource activities in the JMA.1258 
Currently, the Parties are in the process of setting up joint regulatory and institutional 
frameworks in the JMA. For example, negotiations concerning the location of the DA and its 
mandate are still ongoing.1259 At this stage, the JC, which is supported by a technical committee, 
is the main actor in creating regulations and standards dealing with various issues (e.g., marine 
scientific research, offshore safety, fiscal matters and the environment) and in authorizing 
seismic surveys in the JMA.1260 It is known that some regulatory instruments are already in 
place (including the Joint Fiscal and Taxation Code, the Offshore Petroleum Safety Code, the 
Model Petroleum Agreement, and the Environmental Code of Practice) and that, for instance, 
the Environmental Code of Practice incorporates a requirement of EIA prior to conducting 
seismic mapping (and, logically, other phases of petroleum operations described in Chapter 2.3) 
in the JMA.1261 However, none of the Codes applicable in the JMA are publicly available. While 
this circumstance significantly limits their analysis, it is apparent that such component of due 
diligence as regulation is a common competence of Mauritius and the Seychelles. It is also 
reasonable to expect that the cooperative exercise of other due diligence elements will be 
delegated to the DA, particularly taking into account the fact that the Seychelles-Mauritius 
model follows the (former) Timor Sea model.1262 To date, there is no information as to whether 
                                                            
1257 Ibid., art. 3 (c) and Annex C. 
1258 Ibid., art. 3 (d) and Annex D. 
1259 See, for example, Press release of the Joint Management Committee of the Mascarene Plateau, The Ministry 
of Finance, Trade & Economic Planning of the Republic of Seychelles, 28 October 2016, available at 
http://www.finance.gov.sc/press-releases/42/Press-release-of-the-Joint-Management-Committee-of-the-
Mascarene-Plateau (last accessed January 2019). 
1260 “Sharing maritime territory of Mascarene Plateau- Seychelles and Mauritius create common rules”, Seychelles 
News Agency, 22 May 2014, available at 
http://www.seychellesnewsagency.com/articles/545/Sharing+maritime+territory+of+Mascarene+Plateau-
+Seychelles+and+Mauritius+create+common+rules (last accessed January 2019). In January 2018, the JC signed 
an agreement with Spectrum Geo in view of collecting geological data in the JMA. “Extended Continental Shelf: 
Signature of agreement for geotechnical study”, Republic of Mauritius, 11 January 2018, available at 
http://www.govmu.org/English/News/Pages/Extended-Continental-Shelf-Signature-of-agreement-for-
geotechnical-study-.aspx (last accessed January 2019). As of January 2019, seismic surveys have not started yet. 
See “Seychelles, Mauritius hold high level talks”, National Information Services Agency, 10 January 2019, 
available at http://www.nation.sc/article.html?id=261893 (last accessed January 2019). 
1261 Ibid. See also “Seychelles, Mauritius reviewing joint management of Mascarene Plateau Region”, Seychelles 
News Agency, 14 May 2018, available at 
http://www.seychellesnewsagency.com/articles/9133/Seychelles%2C+Mauritius+reviewing+joint+management
+of+Mascarene+Plateau+Region (last accessed January 2019). 
1262 As discussed in Chapter 6.9, the model established in the Timor Sea will be changed once the Timor Sea 




the DA will be a separate inter-State entity or a body within the government of either Mauritius 
or the Seychelles (as discussed in Chapter 6.9, the latter example is established in the Timor 
Sea). 
The Seychelles-Mauritius Treaty, like the TST, includes one main article addressing the issue 
of marine environmental protection in the JMA. A number of paragraphs of article 12 of the 
Seychelles-Mauritius Treaty are almost identical to those incorporated in article 10 of the 
TST.1263 One notable aspect of the Seychelles-Mauritius Treaty is that it is aimed at protecting 
the environment and biodiversity of the seabed in the JMA,1264 insofar as the water column 
above the JMA’s seabed is the high seas. Nevertheless, the Treaty provides that the Parties may 
adopt measures concerning fishing activity in the waters above the JMA’s seabed “where such 
activity is having a direct impact upon, or poses a significant risk to, the natural resources of 
the seabed and subsoil in the JMA”.1265 It is reasonable to assume that this provision applies to 
fishing vessels or nationals of the Parties.1266 However, the text does not rule out a possibility 
of the Parties to take unilateral or cooperative action with respect to fishing by third States.1267 
Moreover, the Seychelles-Mauritius Treaty provides for the establishment of seabed marine 
protected areas,1268 although without identifying the consequences these types of areas would 
have for natural resource activities in the JMA. 
Similar to article 10 of the TST, article 12 of the Seychelles-Mauritius Treaty places an 
emphasis on cooperation in the prevention of pollution and other environmental harm that might 
arise from natural resource activities in the JMA.1269 Where pollution of the marine 
environment occurring in the JMA spreads beyond the limits of this area, article 12 requires the 
Parties to cooperate in “taking prompt and effective action to prevent, mitigate and eliminate 
such pollution in accordance with international best practices, standards and procedures”.1270 
Article 12 (f) of the Seychelles-Mauritius Treaty imposes liability on contractors conducting 
natural resource activities in the JMA. The wording of article 12 (f) (ii) implies that claims 
related to pollution of the marine environment can be brought in the court of either State. Insofar 
                                                            
1263 Paragraphs (a), (d), (e) and (f) of article 12 largely repeat paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) of article 10 of the 
TST.  
1264 Seychelles-Mauritius Treaty, art. 12 (a) - (c). 
1265 Ibid., art. 12 (b). 
1266 Mossop 2016, op. cit., p. 229. 
1267 Ibid. 
1268 Seychelles-Mauritius Treaty, art. 12 (c). 
1269 Ibid., art. 12 (a). 




as the Seychelles-Mauritius model is based on the one established in the Timor Sea, one can 
conclude that the regulatory framework adopted by the JC largely builds on the latter model, 
but it is adapted in accordance with the fact that the JMA covers the area of the CS beyond 200 
nm (for example, the DA is likely to be vested with the power to make payments and 
contributions under article 82 of the UNCLOS on behalf of the two States).1271 In other words, 
following the Timor Sea model, the civil liability of licensees would extend to any non-
environmental damage resulting from activities in the JMA and the Parties would include a 
provision relating to the immunity of the DA and/or the JC from all legal claims.1272 
The analysis in this section indicates that Mauritius and the Seychelles intend to exercise due 
diligence jointly in the JMA. At the same time, like many other regimes of cooperative 
management of disputed hydrocarbons examined in this Chapter, the Seychelles-Mauritius 
model is characterized by the delegation of due diligence to separate management bodies. The 
following section of this Chapter explores the impact these management bodies may have on 
the question of shared State responsibility. 
6.13 Shared State responsibility in the context of disputed 
hydrocarbons 
Based on the examination of the cooperative management regimes established to govern 
disputed hydrocarbons in different geographical regions, this section of Chapter 6 provides 
some key findings regarding the scenario of offshore oil and gas resource sharing and, in 
particular discusses whether shared State responsibility might arise in this scenario and what 
difficulties may be associated with triggering shared State responsibility. 
6.13.1 Different disputed maritime areas – similar (environmental) concerns: 
one pattern? 
The examples explored in this Chapter show that many neighboring coastal States have 
negotiated an interim solution allowing them to leave the maritime boundary dispute aside in 
order to commence petroleum operations in the disputed area. As noted in Chapter 3.3, States 
are not limited to one particular form of cooperation in the context of disputed hydrocarbons. 
At the same time, they face similar issues that have to be addressed when negotiating a 
                                                            
1271 See Chapter 3.7. It is interesting to note that the requirement to make payments and contributions is not 
reflected in the Seychelles-Mauritius Treaty. Nevertheless, the Parties, as the States Parties to the UNCLOS, are 
obligated to observe this requirement in implementing their cooperative model. 




provisional arrangement: for example, identification of the area covered by the provisional 
arrangement1273 and its jurisdictional status; determining a suitable formula for revenue 
sharing;1274 establishing the regulatory and institutional frameworks; the treatment of possible 
straddling hydrocarbon deposits;1275 environmental protection; and the duration of the 
provisional arrangement. The existence of similar issues does not however mean that these 
issues are dealt with consistently. For instance, the equal sharing of resource revenues and 
costs1276 or a multi-tiered institutional structure existing in one geographical area may be 
difficult to implement in another area. In any case, States negotiating a provisional arrangement 
will typically consider how other States have approached the issues at hand and whether their 
approaches can be applicable. Indeed, the examination of all available provisional arrangements 
in this Chapter has illustrated that a new arrangement usually incorporates some components 
of arrangements already concluded in other parts of the world. For example, several provisions 
of the Japan-S. Korea Agreement are repeated in the Nigeria-STP Treaty, the Nigeria-STP 
Treaty reproduces a number of elements of the Timor Gap Treaty (which was replaced by the 
TST), the Seychelles-Mauritius Treaty takes the TST as a basis and the Thailand-Cambodia 
MoU adopts a method of dividing the area of overlapping maritime claims similar to that used 
by Japan and S. Korea. 
Environmental protection is an important matter because each provisional arrangement enables 
activities involving a risk of causing environmental harm within and beyond the maritime area 
being claimed by two (or more) coastal States. As noted in the introduction to Part III, any 
pollution or other harm to the marine environment is transboundary by definition in the context 
of disputed hydrocarbons. When agreeing to exercise sovereign rights to explore the CS of a 
disputed area and exploit hydrocarbon resources situated in this area jointly, States must take 
into account their environmental obligations under international law.1277 Generally, they 
achieve that by incorporating a shared due diligence obligation to ensure that hydrocarbon 
activities in the disputed area are conducted so as not to cause harm to the (marine) environment 
into the provisional arrangement. It is worth noting that the model where only one coastal State 
must discharge due diligence (e.g., the Malaysian-Vietnamese and Angolan-Congolese models) 
is rare in disputed areas. Usually, due diligence is of a joint character which means that its core 
                                                            
1273 As noted in Chapter 3, the provisional arrangement may cover the entire area in dispute or only some parts of 
the disputed area. 
1274 See Chapter 4.4 in this respect. 
1275 See Chapter 4.2 in this respect. 
1276 Supra note 1274. 




components (namely, regulation and control) are to be exercised jointly by two States. Although 
it is logical to conclude that a failure to meet the standard of due diligence falls on both States 
and, hence, gives rise to shared State responsibility, the situation is complicated by the presence 
of joint management bodies (either a JC or a DA). The following section of this Chapter 
addresses the question raised in Chapter 5.8 of whether States can somehow avoid international 
responsibility by establishing a joint management body empowered to discharge the joint due 
diligence obligation.  
The analysis of provisional arrangements also indicates that currently States pay more attention 
than historically has been the case to marine environmental protection. However, recent 
provisional arrangements nonetheless elaborate on protection of the marine environment to 
varying degrees. The most detailed provisions on environmental protection are typically 
incorporated in provisional arrangements concluded between States having significant 
differences in their legal systems (including different environmental standards and 
requirements) and/or in capabilities and capacities. 
6.13.2 Is the joint management body model a shield against incurring shared 
State responsibility? 
Whereas there are a number of examples of weak joint bodies which merely facilitate 
discussions on important issues (e.g., the Japanese-S. Korean and Colombian-Jamaican JCs), 
usually States establish strong joint management bodies having legal personality and extensive 
regulatory and enforcement powers (e.g., the Saudi Arabian-Sudanese JC, the Thai-Malaysian 
Joint Authority, the DAs between Nigeria and STP, Australia and Timor-Leste, and Mauritius 
and the Seychelles). The question is whether States can avoid responsibility by creating such 
powerful administrative bodies. 
Chapter 5.8 raised the question of whether a joint management body may be regarded as an IO 
under the ARIO. If it is deemed so, States, which are members to an IO, do not normally bear 
international responsibility for failing through this organization to exercise due diligence.1278 
Such a failure is instead primarily attributable to the IO. Draft article 2 of the ARIO defines an 
IO as “an organization established by a treaty or other instrument governed by international law 
and possessing its own international legal personality”. Many joint bodies created pursuant to 
                                                            
1278 See, for example, C. Ryngaert and H. Buchanan, “Member State responsibility for the acts of international 
organizations”, Utrecht Law Review, 2011, vol. 7 (1), pp. 131-146; A. S. Barros, C. Ryngaert and J. Wouters (eds), 




provisional arrangements appear to fall under the ARIO’s definition.1279 However, even the 
status of an IO does not guard member States from being held responsible for acts of the IO. 
Part V of the ARIO lays down the criteria under which member States incur responsibility for 
the conduct of an IO. Arguably, the provisions of Part V are applicable insofar as every joint 
body has a close tie with both Parties and largely consists of their official representatives, 
usually including ministers for hydrocarbons. The Timorese-Australian DA is exceptional 
because it is not an external inter-State entity as is the case with other joint bodies, but it is an 
organ of the Government of Timor-Leste.1280 
At the same time, none of the provisional arrangements examined in this Chapter characterize 
joint bodies as IOs.1281 Moreover, their composition mentioned above elicits the question of 
whether these joint bodies are rather common organs of the States. In this case, a wrongful act 
of a common organ is simultaneously attributable to the States that created it.1282 The 
Administering Authority in Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru1283 and the Intergovernmental 
Commission in Eurotunnel1284 are usually referred to as examples of common organs.1285 The 
main feature distinguishing a common organ from an IO is the absence of legal personality 
which means that the common organ has no capacity to bear international obligations.1286 As 
noted earlier, many joint bodies existing in undelimited maritime areas have separate legal 
personality and, hence, are IOs rather than common organs. In this respect, it is interesting to 
note that commentary 2 to draft article 47 of the ARSIWA cites an example of “a joint authority 
responsible for the management of a boundary river” as a common organ. Such water resource 
management bodies (and even some rivers themselves) generally possess legal personality.1287 
Thus, the presence of legal personality may not prevent a joint body governing hydrocarbon 
                                                            
1279 Commentary 1 to draft article 2 of the ARIO states that the definition “outlines certain common characteristics 
of [an IO]” and “is not intended as a definition for all purposes”. 
1280 See Chapter 6.9. 
1281 There is only the GB-Senegal Agreement (see Chapter 7.7) that characterizes the joint body between the Parties 
as an IO. 
1282 ARSIWA, draft art. 6, commentary 3 and draft art. 47, commentary 2. 
1283 Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 26 June 1992, ICJ 
Reports 1992, para. 47. 
1284 Eurotunnel Arbitration (The Channel Tunnel Group Ltd & France-Manche SA v. United Kingdom & France), 
Partial Award, 30 January 2007, para. 179. 
1285 See Crawford 2013, op. cit., pp. 339-341; F. Messineo, “Attribution of Conduct”, in: A. Nollkaemper and L. 
Plakokefalos (eds), Principles of Shared Responsibility in International Law: An Appraisal of the State of the Art, 
Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 71-73; Nedeski 2017, op. cit., p. 23. 
1286 Ibid. 
1287 See, for example, River Basin Commissions and Other Institutions for Transboundary Water Cooperation: 
Capacity for Water Cooperation in Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia, United Nations, 2009, p. 29; Leb 
2013, op. cit., pp. 184-187; E. L. O'Donnell and J. Talbot-Jones, “Creating legal rights for rivers: lessons from 




activities from being considered as a common organ. In fact, joint bodies can be seen as a 
middle-ground between IOs and common organs: they have legal personality, but this 
personality is quasi-independent. The Parties to a provisional arrangement finance and form 
these joint bodies, which are subject to their decisions and are vulnerable in the event of a 
change in political relationships between the States. Therefore, one can conclude that States are 
not immune to the applicability of the rules on State responsibility by creating a separate inter-
State entity and delegating due diligence (or some decisive elements of due diligence) to that 
entity. In other words, a regulatory or enforcement failure on the part of a joint management 
body established under a provisional arrangement, which may result or has resulted in 
(environmental or other) harm to a third party, may give rise to shared State responsibility. 
As noted in the preceding section of this Chapter, there are ‘single State model’ examples 
(where only one State is responsible for exercising due diligence), though these examples are 
rare. Logically, the probability of shared State responsibility is excluded in the context of single 
State models because due diligence is neither framed nor exercised as a joint obligation. At the 
same time, the other State on whom the due diligence obligation is not incumbent (State B) 
usually obtains revenue derived from petroleum activities. Moreover, State B, like State A, 
claims sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the maritime area where those petroleum activities 
take place.1288 Accordingly, it is reasonable to expect from State B that it will observe State A’s 
exercise of due diligence, even though State B is not obligated to discharge due diligence 
obligations under the provisional arrangement. 
6.14 Conclusions and observations 
The key finding of this Chapter is that shared responsibility of States co-managing disputed 
hydrocarbons may arise. The basis for shared State responsibility is that the standard of due 
diligence is generally designed and exercised as a joint obligation arising from the cooperative 
exercise of the sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the same maritime area. This Chapter has 
also concluded that the establishment of a powerful joint inter-State body is unlikely to 
constitute a hurdle for incurring shared State responsibility. The outsourcing by States of due 
diligence does not exhaust their due diligence obligations. At the same time, the cooperation in 
respect of disputed hydrocarbons does not automatically trigger shared State responsibility. 
Each form of cooperation should be carefully analyzed in order to identify the specific form of 
                                                            




cooperation implemented in each instance. As shown in this Chapter, there are a number of 
examples where one single State manages hydrocarbon activities, which may be considered to 
rule out the situation of shared State responsibility. Nevertheless, the fact that State B receives 
revenue derived from those hydrocarbon activities will arguably affect the responsibility owed 
by State A to State B, although it is not clear to what extent. 
The conclusion concerning the likelihood of shared State responsibility in the context of 
disputed hydrocarbons is important, particularly in light of the fact that many neighboring States 
having competing claims to the same maritime area consider the possibility of creating some 
form of cooperative management of disputed petroleum resources. For reasons individual to 
each instance, not all States are able to find a suitable solution in each such instance and, hence, 
the discussions in Chapter 3 are of particular significance. 
It is interesting to note that in some JDZs covered by provisional arrangements that also deal 
with living marine resources (in addition to non-living resources) (e.g., the Jamaica-Colombia 
and Barbados-Guyana Treaties),1289 activities related to offshore oil and gas resources are much 
slower than in zones created primarily for the purpose of developing petroleum and/or other 
mineral resources. Nevertheless, this does not mean that these two heterogeneous goals in the 
context of resource exploitation cannot be simultaneously achieved, as was demonstrated to be 
possible, for example, under the Nigeria-STP regime. 
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that none of the provisional arrangements examined in this 
Chapter address the issue of environmental harm that might be discovered after the termination 
of these arrangements. While Australia and Timor-Leste have agreed on the maritime 
boundaries in the Timor Sea for the term to which the TST applies, other States may be unable 
to establish a maritime boundary before the provisional arrangement between them ceases to 
be in force. Logically, the rules existed under the provisional arrangement, including the regime 
of shared State responsibility, continue to apply in case of environmental harm discovered after 
its term has ended. When establishing a maritime boundary, it becomes clear which coastal 
State exercises sovereign rights and jurisdiction on each side of that boundary. However, it may 
not be entirely clear to what extent State A may be held responsible for significant 
environmental harm arising out of past cooperative petroleum operations with State B carried 
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out in a former JDZ, which now forms part of State B’s CS (as in the context of Australia-
Timor-Leste).1290 
  
                                                            









CHAPTER 7. TRANSBOUNDARY HYDROCARBONS 
AND SHARED STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 concluded that shared State responsibility may arise in a situation where two States 
cooperate on the management of disputed hydrocarbons.1291 This Chapter explores whether the 
same conclusion applies in the context of cross-border hydrocarbons.1292 Consequently, this 
Chapter looks at agreements concluded by neighboring States with respect to accumulations of 
hydrocarbons that (may) straddle an already established maritime boundary. These agreements 
are conceptually different from those considered in Chapter 6. While in those examples 
discussed in Chapter 6 where the States decided to put the delimitation dispute aside and instead 
agree to exercise their sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the disputed maritime area on a 
joint basis, in a situation with straddling hydrocarbons the limits of each State’s sovereign rights 
and jurisdiction are clearly defined. Each coastal State has sovereign rights and jurisdiction over 
the maritime areas appertaining to it under international law.1293 This aspect is reflected in all 
agreements dealing with transboundary hydrocarbons.1294 There is only the regime governing 
the management of the transboundary gas fields in the Timor Sea that creates a distinct model 
for the exercise of sovereign rights and jurisdiction. While Australia and Timor-Leste have 
declared the joint exercise of their sovereign rights to explore and exploit in the SRA, the 
exercise of jurisdiction is to be carried out individually, except for certain jurisdictional 
competencies (including jurisdiction with respect to environmental protection).1295 These 
features of the Timor Sea model caused by the presence of an already functioning (regulatory 
and institutional) framework were examined in Chapter 6.9, not in this Chapter. 
Generally, there is no particular need to establish a common regulatory and institutional 
framework for cross-border petroleum resources, as it exists in relation to hydrocarbons situated 
in disputed maritime areas. Each State adopts its own laws and regulations, and applies them to 
those hydrocarbon activities in respect of a transboundary reservoir that take place on its side 
                                                            
1291 As noted in Chapter 6, there are no examples of trilateral cooperation. 
1292 The words ‘cross-border’, ‘transboundary’ and ‘straddling’ are used interchangeably in this thesis. See Chapter 
2.2. 
1293 See also Chapter 2.3 in this respect. 
1294 See, for example, Markham UA, art. 24; UK-Norway Framework Agreement, art. 1.3; Cyprus-Egypt 
Framework Agreement, art. 7(1); Venezuela-T&T Framework Treaty, art. 18; the US-Mexico Agreement, art. 3. 




of the maritime boundary. States engage their national bodies and organs1296 to control the 
compliance of licensees with the applicable laws and regulations, and to combat pollution of 
the marine environment arising from hydrocarbon activities. This also means that each State 
shall apply its rules to hold licensees liable for any damage caused by hydrocarbon activities, 
including environmental damage. It is worth emphasizing that (in line with the standard of due 
diligence considered in Chapter 5) the legal systems of all States discussed below provide for 
civil liability, usually of operators, enforceable by civil remedy or other type of punishment.1297 
Despite the foregoing comments, this Chapter examines the issue of whether two States 
authorizing cooperative hydrocarbon activities with respect to a transboundary deposit may 
share the international responsibility in the course of those activities. As pointed out in Chapter 
5, there is the relationship between the design of due diligence in the context of shared 
hydrocarbons and the likelihood of shared State responsibility. Accordingly, all available 
agreements dealing with transboundary hydrocarbons are analyzed to answer the question of 
how they frame due diligence to prevent environmental harm: as a joint duty or as an individual 
duty of each State. Such agreements were introduced in Chapters 1 and 4 of this thesis and 
include agreements adopting a ‘framework’ approach to the issue of straddling petroleum 
deposits and agreements applicable to already discovered straddling fields, known as 
unitization agreements (UAs).1298 The due diligence components identified in Chapter 5.5 
(where regulation and enforcement, including oversight, are crucial) will guide in determining 
the character of due diligence in the context of cross-border hydrocarbons. 
Additional arrangements between licensees are not considered in this Chapter.1299 The focus is 
on States. However, for a complete understanding, it is important to outline the process put in 
place following the identification of a hydrocarbon field as transboundary.1300 Usually, a 
bilateral (framework or unitization) agreement requires the licensees working on both sides of 
                                                            
1296 See also Chapter 5.6. 
1297 Another question, outside the scope of this thesis, is whether each State’s civil liability regime is adequate to 
cover possible damages. 
1298 See also Chapters 4.2.6 and 4.2.7. At this point, it is important to emphasize that a number of the agreements 
on transboundary hydrocarbons examined in Chapter 7 have special features. Unlike the majority of the agreements 
in which the Parties apply their respective laws to hydrocarbon activities in respect of a cross-border field, the 
Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea Unitization Protocol provides for the applicability of a single State’s legal regime. In 
accordance with the Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea Unitization Protocol (arts. 4, 5 and 9), the law of Equatorial Guinea 
applies to hydrocarbon activities (even to those activities that are carried out on the Nigerian side of the delimitation 
line). The Angola-Congo Unitization Protocol deals with the unitization of transboundary hydrocarbon fields, 
without actually establishing maritime boundaries. 
1299 See Chapter 1.4. 




the maritime boundary to enter into an (unit) operating agreement between them (similar to a 
joint operating agreement regulating the relationship between several licensees operating in the 
same block within one State’s jurisdiction).1301 In accordance with such an operating 
agreement, which shall be submitted to the Parties for their approval, one of the licensees is 
designated as a unit operator.1302 The unit operator acts as an agent for all licensees involved in 
the exploration and exploitation of a transboundary petroleum field. The unit operator is bound 
by particular obligations, including the obligations to submit documentation (e.g., a 
development and decommissioning plan), inform of the exact position of facilities used for 
hydrocarbon activities and notify of pollution. The unit operator (together with other license 
holders) carries out hydrocarbon activities in a so-called ‘unit area’ that is always larger than 
the geographical and geological extension of a transboundary reservoir because the unit area is 
formed by the limits of the license blocks awarded by the States on both sides of the maritime 
boundary within which this reservoir lies.1303 
Agreements on transboundary hydrocarbons are typically silent on many other important issues 
aside from transboundary hydrocarbons, which are generally dealt with in other agreements 
between States. For example, cooperative measures to combat pollution originating from 
hydrocarbon activities undertaken under the jurisdiction of one of the States, regardless of 
whether these activities are in respect of a transboundary deposit or not, may be included in a 
separate agreement. This Chapter will look at some supplementary legal instruments existing 
outside the agreements on transboundary hydrocarbons because they may have implications for 
shared State responsibility in eliminating environmental harm.1304 
This Chapter also considers agreements creating joint development zones (JDZs) in addition to 
maritime boundaries.1305 Although these agreements are usually referred to as “joint 
development agreements” along with provisional arrangements concluded in undelimited 
maritime areas (Chapters 3.3 and 6),1306 they constitute a separate category whereby the limits 
of each coastal State’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction are determined. This circumstance has 
                                                            
1301 As noted in Glossary of Key Terms, some agreements define an agreement between the licensees as a 
‘unitization agreement’. It is also worth noting that there may be the same licensee(s) operating on both sides of 
the delimitation line, although this situation is uncommon. 
1302 Any change of the unit operator is also subject to prior approval by the States involved.   
1303 See, for example, the illustration given in Annex C of the Timor Sea Boundary Treaty. 
1304 See Chapter 7.6. 
1305 See Chapter 4 and Appendix I. 
1306 See, for example, Bastida et al., op. cit., Part III (B) (3); C. Schofield, “Blurring the Lines? Maritime Joint 
Development and the Cooperative Management of Ocean Resources”, Issues in Legal Scholarship, 2009, vol. 7 




an impact on how agreements establishing JDZs in conjunction with a maritime boundary are 
designed. Therefore, those agreements are discussed in this Chapter, separately from 
provisional arrangements existing in undelimited maritime areas. Joint zone agreements also 
differ from agreements on transboundary hydrocarbons. They apply to all hydrocarbon 
resources located within such zones on both sides of the boundary, not only to cross-border 
hydrocarbons. Insofar as the regimes created by joint zone agreements are different, these 
agreements are examined on an agreement-by-agreement basis in chronological order, focusing 
particularly on the character of due diligence (and, consequently, on the issue of shared State 
responsibility). In other words, the approach to examining joint zone agreements is similar to 
that employed in Chapter 6 of this thesis. When analyzing agreements concerning 
transboundary hydrocarbons, this Chapter applies an approach different from that used in 
relation to agreements and provisional arrangements that establish JDZs both in addition to and 
in the absence of maritime boundaries. It is easier to identify common patterns that exist in 
agreements dealing with transboundary hydrocarbons than in the case of the latter agreements 
and arrangements. 
Chapters 7.2-7.6 consider how the basic due diligence components are shaped and 
operationalized in the context of transboundary hydrocarbons. Chapter 7.7 focuses on the 
design of due diligence under joint zone agreements. Chapter 7.8 provides conclusions 
regarding the probability of shared State responsibility in the respective contexts. 
7.2 Is there a recognition of the joint due diligence obligation? 
Many agreements on transboundary hydrocarbons acknowledge that the Parties are required to 
protect and preserve the (marine) environment, and to prevent (environmental) damage that 
might result from hydrocarbon (mainly, exploitation) activities in respect of a transboundary 
field.1307 At this point, it is important to recall that these requirements do not need to be 
explicitly incorporated into an agreement to be binding on the Parties. As discussed in Chapter 
5, each coastal State is obligated to ensure that hydrocarbon activities on its CS, including 
hydrocarbon activities with respect to a transboundary deposit, are conducted so as not to cause 
significant environmental damage. It is worth noting that while each agreement primarily 
focuses on damage to the (marine) environment, including damage incurred from pollution,1308 
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agreements discussed in this Chapter. 




several agreements address other types of damage. For example, the UK-Norway Framework 
Agreement and the Canada-France Agreement refer to damage to “vessels or fishing gear”.1309 
This reflects a general understanding that the main risk associated with hydrocarbon activities 
is the risk of causing pollution or other harm to the marine environment.1310 
The key issue considered in this Chapter is whether the due diligence obligation to prevent 
environmental harm is shaped as a joint duty of two States exploring and exploiting a straddling 
hydrocarbon deposit. The emphasis in every agreement is on each Party’s individual due 
diligence obligation. However, some agreements contain indicators pointing to the joint 
character of due diligence in the context of transboundary hydrocarbons. For example, the UK-
Norway Framework Agreement, as well as the Frigg, Statfjord and Murchison UAs, require 
Norway and the UK, “jointly and severally”, to ensure that their hydrocarbon activities in 
respect of a cross-border reservoir do not cause “pollution of the marine environment or damage 
by pollution to the coastline, shore facilities or amenities, or damage to sensitive habitats or 
vessels or fishing gear of any country”.1311 The Venezuela-T&T Framework Treaty also 
stipulates that the Parties shall exercise their due diligence obligations “jointly and 
severally”.1312 Although other agreements on transboundary hydrocarbons place an emphasis 
on the individual character of due diligence (which means that each Party has to exercise its 
due diligence obligation separately), they include a number of tools (in particular enforcement 
tools) aimed at expanding the scope of this individual due diligence obligation to the other side 
of the maritime boundary.1313 The following sections of this Chapter discuss whether these 
factors evidence that due diligence in the context of transboundary hydrocarbons is of a shared 
nature. 
It is worth noting the Canada-France Agreement in particular. A notable feature of this 
Agreement is that it includes an additional commitment by each Party to ensure that its licensees 
are able to address any damage caused by hydrocarbon activities originating in its territorial sea 
or EEZ.1314 In other words, the Canada-France Agreement deals with damage in general and 
not only with damage arising out of hydrocarbon activities with respect to transboundary fields. 
                                                            
1309 UK-Norway Framework Agreement, art. 1.5 (4); Canada-France Agreement, art. 13 (1). See also Venezuela-
T&T Framework Treaty, art. 9.1, and Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea Protocol, art. 9. 
1310 See Chapter 5. 
1311 UK-Norway Framework Agreement, art. 1.5 (4); Frigg UA, art. 23; Statfjord and Murchison UAs, arts. 14. 
See supra note 1309. It is worth noting that the UAs do not include “damage to sensitive habitats”. 
1312 Venezuela-T&T Framework Treaty, art. 9.1. 
1313 See Chapters 7.3 and 7.4. 
1314 Canada-France Agreement, art. 13 (4). Article 16 (2) also obligates each Party to require its licensees to provide 




At the same time, non-inclusion of such a commitment in an agreement regarding 
transboundary hydrocarbons does not mean that the Parties are exempt from this commitment. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the standard of due diligence requires States to introduce a civil 
liability regime that allows addressing environmental damage.1315 Nonetheless, dissimilar to 
other similar agreements examined in this Chapter, the Canada-France Agreement explicitly 
reaffirms that commitment. 
7.3 Applicable laws and regulations 
The main rule of every agreement is that each Party applies its laws and regulations to govern 
hydrocarbon activities taking place on its side of the maritime boundary. In other words, each 
Party applies its own health, safety, environmental, labor, fiscal and other relevant standards. 
However, it may occur that the standards of State A differ from those established by State B. 
For example, the UK-Norway Report highlighted that Norway and the UK have developed 
different environmental standards under the framework of the OSPAR Convention1316 and that 
regulatory bodies issuing health and safety standards are distinct.1317 The situation may become 
more difficult where one State is a party to a regional or global convention, while the other 
State is not. For instance, the US is a party to the Espoo Convention, whereas Mexico is not.1318 
Therefore, many agreements on transboundary hydrocarbons address the possibility of the 
existence of dissimilar standards on both sides of the boundary. They require the Parties to 
encourage, where appropriate, the adoption of common health, safety and environmental (HSE) 
standards applicable to hydrocarbon activities with respect to a transboundary field or, at least, 
seek to ensure that their respective standards are compatible.1319 It is worth noting that none of 
the agreements considered in this Chapter provide for an absolute obligation on the Parties to 
                                                            
1315 As noted in Chapter 7.1, States have established such regimes.  
1316 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, Paris, 22 September 
1992, EIF: 25 March 1998, 2354 UNTS 67. 
1317 UK-Norway Report, op. cit., pp. 15 and 18. 
1318 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Espoo, 25 February 1991, EIF: 
10 September 1997, 1989 UNTS 309. The list of the Parties is available at 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-4-a&chapter=27&lang=en 
(last accessed January 2019). It is however important to note that the US and Mexico may be Parties to other 
global/regional arrangements. For example, they are the Parties to the Cartagena Convention (Convention for the 
Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region, Cartagena, 24 March 
1983, EIF: 11 October 1986, 1506 UNTS 157). The list of the Parties is available at 
http://www.cep.unep.org/cartagena-convention (last accessed January 2019). See Chapter 7.6 in this respect. 
1319 Frigg UA, arts. 8 and 17; Statfjord and Murchison UAs, arts. 5 and 15; UK-Norway Framework Agreement, 
art. 1.5 (2) (for example, in October 2012, the UK and Norway reached a MoU on health and safety interventions 
related to pipelines and offshore installations covered by Agreements between the UK and Norway, available at 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/aboutus/howwework/framework/mou/psamou.pdf (last accessed January 2019)); Canada-




put in place uniform standards. The Parties are obligated to strive to achieve such uniformity. 
The inclusion of that obligation is important, even though it does not completely exclude the 
presence of incompatible (environmental) standards. The Canada-France Agreement is more 
specific when dealing with the matter of EIA. It includes a commitment of the Parties to reach 
an additional administrative arrangement to assist them to perform their obligations under the 
Espoo Convention,1320 which has yet to be concluded. 
It is notable that a few agreements (e.g., Venezuela-T&T Framework Treaty) do not deal with 
the issue of dissimilar standards at all. One possible explanation might be that the States Parties 
to these agreements have developed similar HSE and other standards. The Nigeria-Equatorial 
Guinea Unitization Protocol is exceptional since it provides that hydrocarbon activities, even if 
they take place on the Nigerian side of the boundary, are subject to the laws and regulations of 
Equatorial Guinea.1321 This pragmatic approach is due to the fact that a relatively small portion 
of the cross-border Ekanga-Zafiro field is situated on the Nigerian side and, as of 2002, 
Equatorial Guinea had already established extensive production facilities in respect of its Zafiro 
portion.1322 
Thus, when considering the regulatory component of due diligence in the context of 
transboundary hydrocarbons, it is clear that the individual exercise of jurisdiction with respect 
to environmental regulation is a fundamental principle. This casts doubt on the joint character 
of due diligence and, hence, distinguishes the context of transboundary hydrocarbons from the 
context of disputed hydrocarbons in which the regulatory competence is principally exercised 
cooperatively.1323 At the same time, the analysis in this section shows that the States sharing a 
transboundary petroleum deposit share the burden of establishing an effective regulatory 
framework applicable to activities with regard to this deposit. 
7.4 Mutual enforcement mechanisms 
As discussed in Chapter 5.5, one of the pillars of the due diligence standard is that each State 
shall ensure that hydrocarbon activities within its jurisdictional limits are carried out in 
compliance with applicable HSE and other relevant standards. For this purpose, States shall 
                                                            
1320 Canada-France Agreement, art. 13 (3). 
1321 Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea Unitization Protocol, supra note 1298, art. 4. See also “Equatorial Guinea-Nigeria”, 
Report No. 4-9 (2), op. cit., p. 3626. 
1322 “Equatorial Guinea-Nigeria”, Report No. 4-9 (2), op. cit., p. 3626. 




establish enforcement mechanisms.1324 This section examines how enforcement mechanisms 
are set up in the context of transboundary hydrocarbons, which can serve as an indication of the 
(shared or individual) character of due diligence. 
Many agreements on transboundary hydrocarbons appear to reflect the shared nature of 
enforcement jurisdiction insofar as they provide one Party with the right to oversee exploitation 
activities conducted by the other Party with respect to a transboundary petroleum field.1325 In 
this regard, each Party is entitled to appoint inspectors.1326 In all agreements discussed in this 
Chapter, the mandate of those inspectors is elaborated on to varying degrees. While some 
agreements merely stipulate that the inspectors have to ensure that exploitation activities on 
both sides of the boundary are conducted in compliance with the HSE and other applicable 
standards,1327 other agreements develop this mandate further. The latter category of agreements 
includes, inter alia, the UK-Norway Framework Agreement and the US-Mexico 
Agreement.1328 These Agreements, however, formulate the powers of inspectors differently. 
In accordance with article 1.6 (3) of the UK-Norway Framework Agreement, an inspector of 
one Party may request an inspector of the other Party to exercise their mandate with respect to 
any installation located on the CS of the latter Party when circumstances require it.1329 For 
example, this provision might be triggered when a platform is not properly equipped with 
markings to prevent collisions at sea. Furthermore, article 1.6 (3) provides that in the event of 
disagreement between the inspectors or refusal of the inspector of one Party to take action at 
the request of the inspector of the other Party, the matter shall be referred to the competent 
authorities of the two Parties. 
Pursuant to article 1.6 (4) of the UK-Norway Framework Agreement, an inspector of either 
Party may order the immediate cessation of any or all hydrocarbon activities. It is notable that 
this provision does not address the situation where such a course is necessary or expedient to 
protect the marine environment against actual or potential pollution. It only provides that 
immediate cessation may be ordered to avoid “an incident involving risk to life or serious 
personal injury, whether the danger is immediate or not, or minimising the consequences of 
                                                            
1324 See Chapter 5.5. 
1325 See, for example, Markham UA, art. 11; UK-Norway Framework Agreement, art. 1.6; Norway-Iceland 
Agreement of 2008, art. 3 (11); Norway-Russia Treaty, Annex II, art. 1 (11); US-Mexico Agreement, art. 18. 
1326 Ibid. 
1327 For example, Cyprus-Egypt Framework Agreement, art. 6 (1). 
1328 This section also considers the Frigg, Statfjord, Murchison and Markham UAs. 
1329 It is worth noting that while the term ‘installation’ excludes pipelines, article 1.2 nevertheless provides that an 




such an incident”, and when “time and circumstances do not permit consultation between the 
[i]nspectors of the two Governments”.1330 Thereafter, the inspectors must report the order with 
an indication of the reasons to the competent authorities of both Parties who shall consult to 
consider the actions for resumption of petroleum activities.1331 
One can note that the provisions of the UK-Norway Framework Agreement on inspections are 
similar to those included in the Frigg UA.1332 At the same time, the provisions of the Statfjord 
and Murchison UAs addressing inspections are framed differently. While these provisions refer 
to “an imminent danger … of an accident involving serious pollution”, they do not empower 
inspectors to suspend activities.1333 The inspectors are only required to inform the persons in 
charge of an installation and the other Party of such a danger.1334 
Unlike the UK-Norway Framework Agreement, the US-Mexico Agreement provides that a risk 
of “significant damage to the environment” is one of the conditions under which a hydrocarbon 
activity posing such risk may be ceased.1335 Nevertheless, while in the UK-Norway Framework 
Agreement an inspector of either Party may issue a cessation order, the US-Mexico Agreement 
states that only an inspector who has jurisdiction over the activity can do so (upon the request 
of an inspector of the other Party).1336 A notable provision of article 18 (5) of the US-Mexico 
Agreement is that nothing prevents the right of each Party to authorize the resumption of the 
ceased activity.1337 In other words, it means that even if after consultations Party A considers 
an operation of Party B as being subject to suspension for the reasons set forth in article 18 (5), 
Party B may nevertheless restart this operation. Although it seems that Party B may resume the 
operation without taking action to deal with the environmental risk identified by Party A, such 
a resumption may be inconsistent with Party B’s primary duty to ensure that its operations do 
not entail significant harm to the (marine) environment.1338 
There are also agreements that do not contain provisions on inspections. Such agreements 
include the Canada-France Agreement and the Venezuela-T&T Framework Treaty. Whilst it is 
reasonable to expect that a subsequent (unitization) agreement is likely to incorporate the joint 
                                                            
1330 UK-Norway Framework Agreement, art. 1.6 (4). 
1331 Ibid. 
1332 Frigg UA, arts. 8 (3)-(4) (concerning installations) and 18 (concerning pipelines). 
1333 Statfjord and Murchison UAs, arts. 7 (2). The Markham UA includes the similar provision (Markham UA, art. 
11 (3)). 
1334 Ibid. 
1335 US-Mexico Agreement, art.18 (5). 
1336 Ibid. 
1337 Ibid. 




inspection regime, the Loran-Manatee UA (between Venezuela and T&T), for instance, is silent 
on this issue.1339 At the same time, it is interesting to note that while the Canada-France 
Agreement places a strong emphasis on the individual exercise of due diligence, the Venezuela-
T&T Framework Treaty states that the Parties must, “jointly and severally”, discharge their due 
diligence obligations.1340 It is however unclear how Venezuela and T&T intend to put this joint 
component into practice. In any case, the absence of inspection provisions in an agreement 
means that State A would not be able to monitor State B’s hydrocarbon operations since such 
powers are not given to State A. It is nevertheless important to bear in mind that each State is 
required to oversee oil and gas activities authorized on its side of the maritime boundary to meet 
its due diligence obligation.1341 
The agreements on transboundary hydrocarbons explain that a joint inspection regime is 
introduced to enable each Party to safeguard the interests related to environmental and other 
relevant matters.1342 In other words, the Parties share the interest in ensuring that hydrocarbon 
activities in the unit area do not entail significant harm, including harm to the marine 
environment. Such a common interest is understandable because activities take place close to 
(as well as along) the boundary and any (marine) environmental harm may transform into 
transboundary faster than in case of similar activities carried out at a considerable distance from 
this boundary. 
Apart from inspections, many agreements obligate each Party to provide the other Party with 
all relevant information concerning hydrocarbon operations in respect of a cross-border 
deposit.1343 The scope of information to be exchanged between the Parties is rarely determined. 
However, one can conclude that unlike inspections that are to be carried out mainly at the 
exploitation stage (the stage involving the construction and operation of installations and other 
facilities), information sharing is a constant process covering, inter alia, the exchange of 
geological data (subject to certain restrictions) and other information obtained from inspectors 
and/or licensees (e.g., information relating to contamination of the marine environment). As 
discussed in the next section of this Chapter, bodies created under the agreements on 
                                                            
1339 As noted above in this thesis, other UAs between Venezuela and T&T regarding the Kapok-Dorado and 
Manakin-Cocuina fields are not publicly available. 
1340 Supra note 1312. 
1341 This constitutes an important element of due diligence considered in Chapter 5. 
1342 See, for instance, Markham UA, art. 11 (2); UK-Norway Framework Agreement, art. 1.6 (1); Norway-Russia 
Treaty, Annex II, art. 1 (11); US-Mexico Agreement, art. 18 (2). 
1343 See, for example, UK-Norway Framework Agreement, art. 1.10; Venezuela-T&T Framework Treaty, art. 13; 




transboundary hydrocarbons are aimed at facilitating the exchange of information.1344 It is also 
important to note that whereas the exchange of information is generally compulsory, 
inspections constitute the right of either Party. The latter means that if State A resorts to its right 
to inspect, State B is required to provide access to facilities for the purpose of inspecting. 
Although mutual enforcement mechanisms, including the regime for joint inspections, are 
available in the context of transboundary hydrocarbons, their presence can hardly qualify the 
standard of due diligence as a joint obligation. In addition to the fact that the scope of the 
enforcement component on each side of the boundary differs, depending on the scale and type 
of petroleum operations (in particular, where all or most of exploitation activities are carried 
out on one side of the boundary), it implies a certain degree of flexibility (e.g., State A may 
have limited financial and/or human resources to conduct inspections on State B’s side). 
Nevertheless, the presence of such mutual enforcement tools is important because they are 
intended to ensure, inter alia, that the marine environment is adequately protected in the course 
of petroleum activities with respect to a straddling deposit. 
7.5 Institutional arrangements 
As noted in the introduction to this Chapter, the institutional framework applicable to 
transboundary hydrocarbons is not as complex as in the context of disputed hydrocarbons. 
While agreements dealing with transboundary accumulations of hydrocarbons create inter-State 
bodies, their primary function is to provide a means for ensuring consultation and exchange of 
information between the Parties on different issues (e.g., the issue of coordinated marine 
environmental protection) and a means for resolving disagreements without invoking other 
dispute settlement procedures.1345 These inter-State bodies are not empowered to issue laws and 
regulations, grant licenses or carry out inspections and they do not have legal personality.1346 
Such powers are to be exercised by each Party’s respective national organs. 
The agreements label the inter-State bodies differently. For example, the Frigg, Statfjord and 
Murchison UAs refer to a “Consultative Commission” consisting of six representatives (three 
from each Party).1347 The UK-Norway Framework Agreement sets up a “Framework 
                                                            
1344 See Chapter 7.5. 
1345 See, for example, UK-Norway Framework Agreement, art. 1.15; Norway-Russia Treaty, Annex II, art. 1 (13); 
US-Mexico Agreement, art. 14. 
1346 In the context of disputed hydrocarbons, such powers are usually given to inter-State bodies having separate 
legal personality. See Chapter 6.  




Forum”.1348 The Norway-Russia Treaty and US-Mexico Agreement mention a “Joint 
Commission”.1349 However, the bodies’ different titles have no impact on their functions as 
they are described above. 
Generally, an inter-State body is established with respect to a particular discovered cross-border 
deposit (and subsequently ceases to function upon the commercial depletion of that deposit and   
decommission of the facilities relating to it). Some agreements create an entity managing 
several detected and possible transboundary hydrocarbons. For instance, the Venezuela-T&T 
Framework Treaty establishes a joint Ministerial Commission (MC) consisting of the Ministers 
in the energy and hydrocarbon sector of each Party and which can include two other members 
of equivalent rank appointed by the Parties’ Governments.1350 The MC has overall 
responsibility for all issues relating to the exploration and exploitation of transboundary 
hydrocarbon fields.1351 The MC’s administrative body is a Steering Committee consisting of at 
least sex members (each Minister designates three members) and empowered to consider 
matters referred to it by the MC.1352 The Steering Committee may establish working groups for 
a cross-border hydrocarbon deposit and involve experts to advise on matters to be considered 
in the process of the implementation of the Framework Treaty.1353 The Framework Forum 
established under the UK-Norway Framework Agreement also operates on a permanent basis 
for a number of petroleum reservoirs.1354 
Many agreements do not specify the characteristics of the representatives to be appointed by 
the Parties to the inter-State bodies: whether they are to be technically qualified specialists 
or/and persons with a political mandate. Only a few agreements specify characteristics. For 
example, the Canada-France Agreement establishes a technical working group.1355 The Angola-
Congo Unitization Protocol sets up an Inter-State Unitization Management Body, which 
integrates a decision-making structure and a technical structure consisting of specialists from 
the two States.1356 It is important to underline that unlike other inter-State bodies created for the 
                                                            
1348 UK-Norway Framework Agreement, art. 1.15. 
1349 Norway-Russia Treaty, Annex II, art. 1 (13); US-Mexico Agreement, art. 14. 
1350 Venezuela-T&T Framework Treaty, art. 5.1. There are T&T’s Ministry of Energy and Energy Industries 
(http://www.energy.gov.tt/) and Venezuela’s Ministry for Petroleum (http://www.minpet.gob.ve/index.php/es-
es/).  
1351 Ibid., art. 5.3. 
1352 Ibid., art. 5.4. 
1353 Ibid., art. 5.6. For example, there is a working group for the transboundary Kapok-Dorado hydrocarbon 
reservoir (see Chapter 1). 
1354 UK-Norway Framework Agreement, art. 1.15. 
1355 Canada-France Agreement, art. 17. 




cooperative management of transboundary hydrocarbons, the Angola-Congo Body has broad 
powers, similar to those of the institutions established in undelimited maritime areas.1357 Hence, 
the issues considered in Chapter 6.13 are also relevant in the Angola-Congo context. 
Thus, the status of the inter-State bodies in the context of transboundary hydrocarbons is 
different from the status of the bodies created in disputed maritime areas. This fact has an impact 
on the issue of (shared) State responsibility. Insofar as there is no delegation of due diligence 
(or some due diligence components) to a separate legal entity, the question of whether a breach 
of due diligence by this entity is attributable to the States that established it (Chapter 6 addressed 
this question) is not the main one in the context of transboundary hydrocarbons. Instead, in the 
event of an incident causing significant environmental harm to a third party,1358 one must look 
at the extent to which States that share an accumulation of hydrocarbons have exercised their 
due diligence obligations to prevent such harm.1359 
7.6 Occurrence of environmental harm 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the standard of due diligence continues to apply after the occurrence 
of environmental harm. This section considers the regime established by States to address 
environmental harm arising out of exploration and exploitation operations (and other activities 
associated with those operations) with regard to a cross-border hydrocarbon reservoir because 
it may provide with indications as to whether remedial measures can lead to shared State 
responsibility. 
The issue of environmental damage is not merely hypothetical. One can cite an example of a 
pollution incident resulted from hydrocarbon operations with respect to the cross-border 
Statfjord field. In December 2007, a rupture of the loading hose on a loading system on the 
Statfjord field resulted in “the second largest oil spill (around 4,400 m3 of crude oil) from the 
petroleum activities on the Norwegian [CS]”.1360 In line with the requisite standard of due 
diligence, Norway investigated this oil spill incident and, in 2009, fined the operator of the 
                                                            
1357 Ibid. See also Chapter 6. Unfortunately, the text of the agreement establishing the Inter-State Unitization 
Management Body (dated 27 November 2002) is not publicly available. Some information is included in “Angola-
Republic of Congo”, Report No. 4-16, op. cit. This complex institutional framework may be explained by the fact 
that Angola and Congo have no boundary delimiting the CS between them (Angola-Congo Unitization Protocol, 
Preamble). 
1358 See Introduction to Part III. 
1359 See also Chapter 7.8. 
1360 PSA’s Investigation Report, March 2008, available at 
http://www.ptil.no/getfile.php/136470/Tilsyn%20på%20nettet/Granskinger/engelsk_granskingsrapport%20oljeut
slipp%20statfjord.pdf (last accessed January 2019). The first large oil spill was the blowout of the Bravo platform 




Statfjord field, Equinor (previously Statoil).1361 The oil spill did not reach the waters of other 
neighboring States, including the UK.1362 
The agreements on transboundary hydrocarbons examined in this thesis generally do not devote 
much attention to a scenario in which (marine) environmental damage has occurred. The 
possible premise for this is the acknowledgment of the Parties that the Party on whose side of 
the maritime boundary environmental damage has occurred shall deal with such damage and 
prevent its spreading beyond the limits of its jurisdiction.1363 The Statfjord example mentioned 
above supports that premise. Moreover, as noted in Chapter 7.1, there may be other applicable 
agreements providing for cooperative measures in case of environmental harm in general, 
including harm originating from petroleum activities in respect of a transboundary deposit. This 
section considers the role of these other applicable agreements in the context of transboundary 
hydrocarbons, particularly in triggering shared State responsibility. 
7.6.1 Other applicable agreements and their relevance 
Many agreements on transboundary hydrocarbons include cross-references to other applicable 
agreements. The Venezuela-T&T Framework Treaty provides that the Parties must require their 
licensees to implement “the relevant measures and procedures to prevent or remediate pollution 
of the marine environment, […], taking into account the respective applicable laws and the 
relevant international and regional standards, procedures, agreements and recommended 
practices and guidelines, in particular those promulgated by the Caribbean Environmental 
Programme of the [UNEP] and the [IMO]”,1364 including the Cartagena Convention and the 
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation 
(OPRC).1365 Apart from Venezuela and T&T, Mexico and the US are also Parties to the regional 
Cartagena Convention. According to this Convention, the Parties have committed themselves 
to carry out an EIA, notify other States that may be affected by pollution (as well as competent 
IOs), and cooperate in order to respond to pollution and develop rules in the field of liability 
and compensation for damage resulting from pollution.1366 The Cartagena Convention is 
                                                            
1361 Ibid. See also I. Eftestøl, “40.000 liter olje sluppet ut på Statfjord-feltet”, NRK, 8 October 2015, available at 
https://www.nrk.no/rogaland/oljeutslipp-pa-statfjord-feltet-1.12593245 (last accessed January 2019). Statoil was 
fined 25 mil. NOK. 
1362 Ibid. 
1363 See Chapter 7.1. 
1364 Venezuela-T&T Framework Treaty, art. 9.2. The official website of the Caribbean Environmental Programme 
of the UNEP: http://cep.unep.org/ (last accessed January 2019). 
1365 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, London, 30 November 
1990, EIF: 13 May 1995, 1891 UNTS 78. Venezuela and T&T are Parties to the OPRC. 




supplemented by three protocols, one of which deals with oil spill incidents (Oil Spills 
Protocol).1367 
The US-Mexico Agreement refers to the OPRC. In article 19 (3) of the US-Mexico Agreement, 
the Parties recognize the importance of their obligations with respect to oil pollution 
preparedness, response and cooperation, and agree to review the implementation of these 
obligations in light of activities in respect of transboundary hydrocarbon deposits. In addition, 
the US and Mexico have a bilateral agreement on cooperation regarding pollution of the marine 
environment by discharges of hydrocarbons and other hazardous substances,1368 according to 
which the Parties adopted a joint marine pollution contingency plan, known as the MEXUS 
Plan.1369 These documents provide for cooperative measures that each State shall take in dealing 
with a pollution incident that may affect the marine environment of the other State. While they 
do not apply to the gaps of the extended CS in the Gulf of Mexico,1370 nothing prevents the 
Parties to extend their application to these gaps through the MEXUSGULF Annex that 
supplements the MEXUS Plan by providing additional regional procedures in the Gulf of 
Mexico.1371 
The absence of explicit references to other relevant agreements does not mean that they are not 
to be observed. Many States Parties to agreements on transboundary hydrocarbons are also 
bound by other agreements dealing with their cooperation in responding to pollution incidents. 
For example, the UK and Norway, as well as other States bordering the North Sea, are Parties 
to the Bonn Agreement according to which they agree to cooperate in detecting and combating 
pollution of the North Sea by oil and other harmful substances.1372 Under the framework of the 
                                                            
1367 T&T, Venezuela, Mexico and the US have ratified the Oil Spills Protocol, available at 
http://www.cep.unep.org/cartagena-convention (last accessed January 2019). 
1368 Agreement of Cooperation between the United Mexican States and the United States of America Regarding 
Pollution of the Marine Environment by Discharge of Hydrocarbons and Other Hazardous Substances (US-Mexico 
Agreement of Marine Cooperation), Mexico City, 24 July 1980, EIF: 30 March 1981, 1241 UNTS 235. 
1369 Ibid., art 1. Joint Contingency Plan between the Secretariat of the Navy of the United Mexican States and the 
United States Coast Guard Regarding Pollution of the Maritime Environment by Discharges of Hydrocarbons and 
Other Hazardous Substances, Mexico City, 11 July 2017, available at http://www.glo.texas.gov/ost/spill-response-
resources/additionaldocs/mexusplan.pdf (last accessed January 2019). An earlier version of the MEXUS Plan (of 
2000) is available at http://www.slc.ca.gov/About/Prevention_First/2002/Environmental-MEXUSPLAN.pdf (last 
accessed January 2019). 
1370 US-Mexico Agreement of Marine Cooperation, supra note 1368, art. VII; MEXUS Plan, section 103. See also 
Chapter 1 regarding the western and eastern gaps of the extended CS in the Gulf of Mexico.   
1371 MEXUSGULF Annex was signed in 2012. Apart from the MEXUSGULF Annex, there is also the 
MEXUSPAC Annex adopted in 2003 and applicable to the Pacific Ocean. See in detail A. Ascencio-Herrera, “The 
Evolution of Mexico’s Marine National Contingency Plan”, in: A. Telesetsky et al. (eds), Marine Pollution 
Contingency Planning: State Practice in Asia-Pacific States, Brill, 2017, pp. 147-153. 
1372 Agreement between the Governments of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the European 
Union, the federal Republic of Germany, the French Republic, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of 




Bonn Agreement, Norway and the UK have developed a joint plan for counter pollution 
operations (NORBRIT Plan) in the maritime area extending to a distance of 50 nm on either 
side of the delimitation line.1373 In other words, the “co-operation corridor” established under 
the UK-Norway Framework Agreement falls within the geographical scope of the NORBRIT 
Plan.1374 The Canada-France Agreement also emphasizes the need to adopt a joint marine 
pollution contingency plan,1375 similar to the NORBRIT Plan or the MEXUS Plan mentioned 
above. 
There is only one example dealing with pollution incidents from activities in respect of 
transboundary hydrocarbons. The UK-Norway Guidelines outline a procedure in the event of a 
pollution incident on a transboundary hydrocarbon field. The Guidelines provide that the unit 
operator shall notify the competent authority of the Party that issued the license operation, 
regardless of on which side of the delimitation line the incident has occurred.1376 In other words, 
any pollution incident on the transboundary Flyndre field shall be reported to the UK, while on 
the Statfjord field it shall be reported to Norway.1377 It is interesting that the regulatory 
framework does not include the duty of the Party that received the notification of an incident to 
inform the other Party of such an incident. However, under international law, each State shall 
inform other States (regardless of whether they are flag, neighboring or distant coastal States) 
if the former has grounds to believe that pollution originating within its jurisdiction or control 
may affect the latter States.1378 
                                                            
in dealing with pollution of the North Sea by oil and other harmful substances, Bonn, 13 September 1983, EIF: 1 
September 1989, 1605 UNTS, registration number 28022, Preamble and art. 1. In 2001, the Bonn Agreement was 
amended by the Decision to enable the Accession of the Republic of Ireland to the Bonn Agreement. The amended 
text is available at 
https://www.bonnagreement.org/site/assets/files/1080/chapter29_text_of_the_bonn_agreement.pdf (last accessed 
January 2019). 
1373 The Norwegian Coastal Administration, International cooperation on oil spill preparedness, available at 
http://www.kystverket.no/en/EN_Preparedness-against-acute-pollution/Protection-against-acute-
pollution/International-cooperation/ (last accessed January 2019). 
1374 See Chapter 1 about the “co-operation corridor”.  
1375 Canada-France Agreement, art. 14 (1). 
1376 UK-Norway Guidelines, op. cit., section 4.4, p. 8. Chapter 7.1 explains the concept of unit operator. 
1377 As of November 2018, the unit operator of the Flyndre field is Maersk Oil UK Limited (the UK) and the unit 
operator of the Statfjord field is Equinor (Norway). See the map of these fields, op. cit. (Chapter 1). The competent 
authorities are the Norwegian Coastal Administration in Norway and the Maritime & Coastguard Agency in the 
UK (UK-Norway Guidelines, op. cit., section 4.4, p. 8). For example, in October 2015, Statoil notified the 
Norwegian Coastal Administration of oil pollution that occurred during loading from platform Statfjord A via OLS 
B loading buoy to shuttle tanker Hilda Knutsen (PSA’s Investigation Report, September 2016, available at 
http://www.ptil.no/investigations/investigation-of-oil-spill-from-statfjord-ols-b-article12339-893.html (last 
accessed January 2019)). According to that Report, the oil spill was broken down by wind and waves and naturally 
dispersed in the water column. 




Thus, the study in this section shows that there is no particular need to incorporate specific 
cooperative measures aimed at minimizing and eliminating actual environmental harm into 
agreements on transboundary hydrocarbons because these measures exist outside those 
agreements.1379 At the same time, the measures are not adapted to the issue of transboundary 
hydrocarbons. While it is desirable to develop a clear action plan in case of pollution and other 
environmental harm from a cross-border field (similar to that adopted between Norway and the 
UK), one could state that the existing measures are sufficient to address any harm. 
The study also shows that cooperative remedial measures are not automatically triggered in the 
context of transboundary hydrocarbons. The existence of the maritime boundary has an impact 
in that regard. Each State exercises jurisdiction with respect to actions or omissions occurred 
on its side of the boundary. However, it could be argued that shared State responsibility might 
arise in a situation where State B that, upon the request of State A, is engaged in (clean-up) 
operations addressing environmental harm occurred on State A’s side contributes to the 
commission of a wrongful act. In this situation, the key question will be whether the conduct of 
private contractors involved in those operations is attributable to State B (as well as to State A) 
under the provisions of the ARSIWA.1380 
7.7 Joint zone agreements 
This section considers whether shared State responsibility may arise in the context of joint zone 
agreements. The introduction to this Chapter explained why these agreements are examined on 
an agreement-by-agreement basis.1381 
7.7.1 Saudi Arabia and Bahrain 
The Saudi Arabia-Bahrain Agreement (1958) delimited the CS between the two States and 
established a maritime area called “Fasht bu Saafa Hexagon” (Hexagon), where the Parties 
agreed to share the revenues received from the exploitation of petroleum resources equally.1382 
                                                            
1379 Another example is Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the 
Arctic, Kiruna, 15 May 2003, EIF: pending, reproduced in K. Schönfeldt (ed), The Arctic in International Law 
and Policy, 2017, document No. 254, pp. 1251-1258. This Agreement covers the Barents Sea, including the 
maritime area where hydrocarbon deposit(s) straddling the delimitation line between Norway and Russia may be 
found.  
1380 See Chapter 5.6 in this respect. 
1381 Agreement between Libya and Tunisia, 8 August 1988 can also be listed among joint zone agreements. 
However, this Agreement is not publicly available and, consequently, its comprehensive consideration is not 
possible in this thesis. For some limited information concerning this Agreement, see Miyoshi 1999, op. cit., pp. 
34-35, and Bastida et al., op. cit., pp. 404-405.  




The Hexagon encompasses the giant Abu Sa’fah oil field (still producing), which had 
previously been contested by the two countries.1383 
The Saudi Arabia-Bahrain Agreement differs from other joint zone agreements examined in 
this Chapter because the Hexagon entirely lies on the Saudi Arabian side of the CS boundary 
(Illustration No. 25).1384 Saudi Arabia exercises its jurisdiction over the Hexagon on the 
condition that it pays Bahrain half of the net income.1385 In other words, Saudi Arabia applies 
its laws and regulations in the Hexagon, monitors hydrocarbon activities within this zone and 
responses to any pollution incident. Except for receiving its share, Bahrain is involved in neither 
making amendments to the regulatory framework nor the control over hydrocarbon activities 
conducted in the Hexagon. 
The question is whether Bahrain may also incur international responsibility for significant 
environmental harm caused to a third State (e.g., to Iran) through a failure of Saudi Arabia to 
exercise its due diligence obligation in respect of hydrocarbon activities in the Hexagon since 
Bahrain receives benefits from these activities. At this point, one could recall the single State 
models discussed in Chapter 6 and argue that Bahrain should develop certain tools to monitor 
the (non-)fulfillment of due diligence by Saudi Arabia, even if such tools are not explicitly 
provided.1386 If the fact that Bahrain obtains benefits from the Abu Sa’fah field can indeed be 
regarded as having an impact on the responsibility owed by Saudi Arabia to a third State, there 
is however uncertainty concerning the extent of this impact and the consequences attached to 
the non-establishment of necessary tools by Bahrain. 
7.7.2 Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
The Saudi Arabia-Kuwait Agreement of 1965 divided the neutral zone established long before 
that (in 1922) into two equal parts.1387 This Agreement provides that the area north of the 
dividing line is annexed to Kuwait as part of its territory, while the area south of that line is 
similarly annexed to Saudi Arabia as part of its territory.1388 Even though each Party exercises 
                                                            
1383 Schofield 2009, op. cit., pp. 5-6. 
1384 Saudi Arabia-Bahrain Agreement, art. 2. Initially, the Parties desired to delimit the Hexagon, but abandoned 
that. See A. A. El-Hakim, The Middle Eastern States and the Law of the Sea, Manchester University Press, 1979, 
p. 88.  
1385 Ibid. For example, in 2015, Bahrain obtained 150,942 bbl/d (of approximately 300,000 bbl/d) from the Abu 
Sa’fah field, available at https://fanack.com/fanack-energy/bahrain/ (last accessed January 2019). 
1386 See Chapter 6.13.2. 
1387 Saudi Arabia-Kuwait Agreement of 1965, art. 1. The challenges in the management of the neutral zone before 
1965 are explained by M. T. EL Ghoneimy, “The Legal Status of the Saudi-Kuwaiti Neutral Zone”, International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1966, volume 15 (3), pp. 690-717. 




“rights of administration, legislation and defense” over the area annexed to it, both Parties have 
“equal rights” with respect to natural resources of the entire Partitioned Neutral Zone (PNZ).1389 
Apart from the onshore PNZ mentioned above, there is also the offshore PNZ – a maritime area 
adjacent to the onshore PNZ (Illustration No. 26). While the Saudi Arabia-Kuwait Agreement 
of 1965 contains some provisions relating to the offshore PNZ,1390 an additional agreement 
concluded between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 2000 (Saudi Arabia-Kuwait Agreement of 
2000) supplements them.1391 The Saudi Arabia-Kuwait Agreement of 2000 establishes the 
limits of the offshore PNZ.1392 Similar to the onshore PNZ, the offshore PNZ is divided into 
two parts where the dividing line represents the maritime boundary between Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait.1393 In other words, it means that each Party exercises its coastal State jurisdiction on 
its own side of the dividing line.1394 Despite the existence of the dividing line within the offshore 
PNZ, the Parties agreed to exploit natural resources situated in this zone jointly.1395 
Under the Saudi Arabia-Kuwait Agreement of 1965, the Parties agreed to establish a “standing 
joint commission” (JC).1396 This Commission is to be composed of an equal number of 
representatives from each Party.1397 The JC’s mandate is quite limited. The JC is responsible, 
inter alia, for undertaking studies on projects for the exploitation of the PNZ’s natural 
resources; examining new permits, contracts and concessions in the PNZ and making 
appropriate recommendations in this respect to the Parties; concluding contracts and 
considering other matters referred to it by the Parties.1398 The JC is not empowered to monitor 
joint petroleum activities undertaken by the Parties in the (onshore and offshore) PNZ or 
                                                            
1389 Ibid., arts. 3 and 5. 
1390 Ibid., arts. 7 and 8. 
1391 Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the State of Kuwait concerning the submerged area 
adjacent to the divided zone, Kuwait, 2 July 2000, EIF: 31 January 2001, 2141 UNTS 251. 
1392 Ibid., arts. 2-4. 
1393 Ibid., art. 1. 
1394 The Saudi Arabia-Kuwait Agreement of 2000 expanded the jurisdiction of each Party initially established by 
the Saudi Arabia-Kuwait Agreement of 1965. The latter Agreement deals only with the rights of the Parties over 
the territorial waters adjacent to the onshore PNZ (Saudi Arabia-Kuwait Agreement of 1965, art. 7). 
1395 Saudi Arabia-Kuwait Agreement of 1965, art. 8 (2); Saudi Arabia-Kuwait Agreement of 2000, Annex I. 
1396 Saudi Arabia-Kuwait Agreement of 1965, art. 17. It is notable that article 19 of the Saudi Arabia-Kuwait 
Agreement of 1965 includes the word ‘committee’. A number of legal scholars also refer to the Saudi Arabia-
Sudan Committee. See, for example, Townsend-Gault 1988, op. cit., p. 150; B. Kwiatkowska, “Ocean Affairs and 
the Law of the Sea in Africa: Towards the 21st Century”, Marine Policy, 1993, vol. 17 (1), p. 29. This chapter 
uses the terms ‘commission’ and ‘committee’ as synonyms. 
1397 Ibid., art. 18. The number of representatives is to be agreed by the Ministers for Natural Resources in both 
countries, as well as the rules of procedure of the JC and the manner of securing the necessary appropriations for 
it. 




suspend them if necessary. Logically, these powers lie with national organs of Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait. The Saudi Arabia-Kuwait Agreement of 2000 is silent on the status of the JC. 
To date, the regime of joint exploitation has faced different challenges. For example, in October 
2014, Saudi Arabia halted operations with respect to the Al-Khafji oil field located in its part 
of the offshore PNZ for environmental reasons. In May 2015, production from the onshore Al-
Wafra oil field was shut down due to operating difficulties. Since 2016, the two Parties have 
discussed resumption of production from the mentioned fields.1399 To date, Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait reached a preliminary agreement to restart production only from the Al-Khafji field.1400 
In August 2017, a series of oil spills was detected in the waters of the Kuwaiti part of the 
offshore PNZ (that are the territorial sea of Kuwait).1401 It remains unclear as to what caused 
the spills. The investigation’s results are not publicly available. The possible sources that could 
have led to the spills include the building of an oil refinery by Kuwait, an old 50-kilometre 
pipeline running from the shared Al-Khafji oil field to the shore and an oil tanker navigating in 
the Persian Gulf.1402 The spills did not reach the waters of Saudi Arabia or Iran.1403 As a coastal 
State having jurisdiction over the maritime zone where the spills occurred, Kuwait undertook 
clean-up operations with the help of private entities. The available information does not allow 
conclusions as to whether Kuwait (or Saudi Arabia) has failed to exercise due diligence in the 
offshore PNZ. It has been only observed that Kuwait failed to inform public of the oil spills.1404 
It is notable that the Saudi Arabia-Kuwait Agreements of 1965 and 2000 are silent on the issue 
of marine environmental protection. However, the existence of the maritime border within the 
offshore PNZ means that each Party is required to take all necessary steps towards protection 
of the marine environment (see Chapter 5) in its part of this zone in order to meet the due 
                                                            
1399 See, for example, R. Boslego, “’Neutral Zone' Output is not Neutral for Crude Prices”, Seeking Alpha, 31 
March 2016, available at https://seekingalpha.com/article/3962412-neutral-zone-output-neutral-crude-prices (last 
accessed January 2019). 
1400 A. Henni, “New Terms to Govern Al-Khafji Joint Saudi-Kuwait Oil Field”, E&P, 16 August 2018, available 
at https://www.epmag.com/new-terms-govern-al-khafji-joint-saudi-kuwait-oil-field-1712821#p=1 (last accessed 
January 2019). 
1401 See, for example, J. Amos, “Satellite Imagery Reveals Scope of Last Week’s Oil Spill in Kuwait”, SkyTruth, 
15 August 2017, available at https://www.skytruth.org/2017/08/satellite-imagery-reveals-scope-of-last-weeks-
massive-oil-spill-in-kuwait/; G. Butt, “Kuwait: oil on troubled waters”, Petroleum Economist, 14 August 2017, 
available at http://www.petroleum-economist.com/articles/upstream/exploration-production/2017/kuwait-oil-on-
troubled-waters (last accessed January 2019). 
1402 Ibid. “Kuwait Cleans Up Oil Spill in Persian Gulf”, The Maritime Executive, 14 August 2017, available at 
https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/kuwait-battles-oil-spill-near-saudi-border (last accessed January 
2019). It is worth mentioning that Khafji Joint Operations (KJO) stated that that no oil leak had been observed in 
its operation area. 
1403 Saudi Arabia issued an emergency action plan to deal with potential effects of the spills. 
1404 “Environmentalists censure Kuwait media blackout on oil spill”, 13 August 2017, PressTV, 




diligence standard. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have established effective environmental 
protection regimes covering their parts of the offshore PNZ and the maritime zones beyond.1405 
It is hard to infer that due diligence in the offshore PNZ is of a joint character. Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia have to exercise their due diligence obligations individually in this zone. In other words, 
in case of environmental damage to a third State (e.g., to Iran) originating in the offshore PNZ, 
one must look at the extent to which the Party of origin has exercised its due diligence obligation 
in relation to hydrocarbon activities conducted in the part of the offshore PNZ appertaining to 
it. Nevertheless, this does not mean that one Party has no recourse when the other Party does 
not adequately exercise its due diligence with respect to joint hydrocarbon activities. For 
example, under the Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the 
Marine Environment from Pollution (which is also applicable to the offshore PNZ),1406 if 
Kuwait or Saudi Arabia fails to meet its due diligence obligations set forth in this Convention, 
the other State(s), including Iran, Bahrain and other sovereign States bordering the Persian Gulf, 
might have recourse to a judicial commission.1407 The Saudi Arabia-Kuwait Agreements do not 
provide Kuwait with the authority to monitor activities conducted in the Saudi Arabian part of 
the offshore PNZ and vice versa. 
Thus, it is difficult to conclude that due diligence in the offshore PNZ constitutes a joint 
obligation of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The main components of due diligence are to be 
exercised individually on the basis of the maritime boundary established by the Saudi Arabia-
Kuwait Agreement of 2000. 
7.7.3 France and Spain 
The France-Spain Convention created a joint zone (JDZ) straddling the CS boundary in the Bay 
of Biscay (Illustration No. 29).1408 Annex II of the France-Spain Convention establishes the 
specific procedure for granting licenses for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources 
                                                            
1405 See, for example, Low 2012, op. cit., pp. 60-62. She states that “the basic model for environmental regulation 
of petroleum exploration and production activities under the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia [Agreement of 1965] is 
effectively the same as that for the North Sea” (p. 62). It is important to note that since 2012, Kuwait enacted a 
new legislation on environmental protection (Law No. 42 of 2014), which has been amended by the Law No. 99 
of 2015. See A. Alharoun, “Kuwait: The case for protection”, International Counsel Bureau, June 2015, available 
at http://www.icbkuwait.com.kw/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/OT42_12-13_Kuwait-ICB.pdf (last accessed 
January 2019). 
1406 Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution, 
24 April 1978, EIF: 1 July 1979, 1140 UNTS 155. 
1407 Ibid., art. XXV. See also Low 2012, op. cit., pp. 61-62. 




in the JDZ.1409 There is no information publicly available on the status of current petroleum 
operations in the JDZ. 
Article 7 of the France-Spain Convention provides that the Parties “shall endeavour to ensure 
that the exploration of the [CS] of the Bay of Biscay and the exploitation of its natural resources 
do not adversely affect the ecological balance and the legitimate uses of the maritime 
environment, and they shall hold consultations to that end”. The key question here concerns the 
meaning of article 7. 
At first glance, it appears that article 7 enshrines the due diligence obligation that must be 
exercised separately by each Party on its side of the CS boundary, including its part of the JDZ. 
This also means that the standard of due diligence incorporated in article 7 is applicable not 
only to petroleum and mining activities conducted in the JDZ, but also to similar activities 
carried out outside that zone. The France-Spain Convention contains little information on the 
regime of management of the JDZ. This Convention primarily aims at establishing the maritime 
boundary between the Parties, rather than elaborating on the JDZ’s management regime. Other 
subsequent agreements relating to the JDZ, if any, are not publicly available.1410 
On the other hand, article 7 may be regarded as pointing to the joint nature of due diligence in 
the JDZ, which means that the States shall exercise their due diligence obligations not only 
individually, but also jointly, in this zone. However, as noted above in this section, the details 
of the management regime are unknown: for example, whether each State is vested with the 
power to supervise the other State’s resource activities within the JDZ or whether this power is 
delegated to an inter-State entity, if it exists. Therefore, it is not possible to analyze the design 
and operation of due diligence adequately. 
7.7.4 Norway and Iceland 
Norway and Iceland established a JDZ straddling the delimitation line between them 
(Illustration No. 2).1411 They also concluded a framework agreement dealing with possible 
transboundary hydrocarbon deposits extending across the delimitation line and/or the JDZ’s 
boundaries.1412 
                                                            
1409 Ibid., art. 3 and Annex II. 
1410 One cannot exclude that there is low commercial hydrocarbon potential in the JDZ. 
1411 See Chapter 1. 
1412 The categories of transboundary hydrocarbon deposits within the meaning of the Norway-Iceland Agreement 




The Norway-Iceland Agreement of 1981 makes it clear that each Party applies its laws and 
regulations relating to safety measures, protection of the environment and control of petroleum 
activities in its part of the JDZ.1413 Further, the Agreement states that the Parties shall consult 
if one Party is of the view that the laws and regulations of the other Party do not provide 
adequate protection (including environmental protection) when hydrocarbon activities are 
conducted in the JDZ.1414 If those consultations between the Parties prove to be fruitless, the 
issue shall be referred to a Conciliation Commission consisting of three members.1415 This 
provision largely relies on the former conciliation experience of Norway and Iceland.1416 
However, while the recommendations issued by the Conciliation Commission on the 
delimitation issue were promptly implemented by means of the Norway-Iceland Agreement of 
1981,1417 there is no guarantee that the same implementation will be successful in the case of 
recommendations addressing the inadequacy of the laws and regulations of one of the Parties 
(if there will be such a need at all). The recommendations are not binding on the Parties.1418 
The Parties shall “pay reasonable regard” to them during their further negotiations.1419 An 
important feature of the Norway-Iceland Agreement of 1981 is that it forbids the 
commencement or continuation of a petroleum operation in question until the Conciliation 
Commission delivers its recommendations.1420 
Article 9 of the Norway-Iceland Agreement of 1981 may be considered an indication that due 
diligence to protect the (marine) environment and prevent harm to it is of a joint character. The 
obligation to ensure adequate environmental regulation in the JDZ is framed as a cooperative 
duty of the Parties. This explicit emphasis on the cooperative regulatory competence 
distinguishes the Norwegian-Icelandic model from other models created pursuant to joint zone 
agreements examined in this Chapter. 
Petoro Iceland AS (Petoro), the company, which is established for the purpose of Norway’s 
participation in petroleum activities on the Icelandic CS and is owned by the Norwegian 
State,1421 and to whom all three licenses were issued by Iceland in the JDZ, acts on behalf of 
                                                            
1413 Norway-Iceland Agreement of 1981, arts. 5 (3) and 6 (2). 
1414 Ibid., art. 9 (1) (with a reference to article 10 of the Norway-Iceland Agreement of 1980, see Chapter 1). 
1415 Ibid. 
1416 See Chapter 1 in this respect. 
1417 Norway-Iceland Agreement of 1981, Preamble, para. 4. 
1418 Ibid., art. 9 (3). 
1419 Ibid. 
1420 Ibid., art. 9 (1). Article 9 provides that there must be “weighty grounds” to start or continue the operation in 
question. 
1421 See information available at the Brønnøysund Register Centre: 




Norway in the Icelandic part of the JDZ.1422 This is the case because pursuant to the Norway-
Iceland Agreement of 1981, each Party is entitled to participate with a share of 25-% in 
petroleum activities on the other side of the delimitation line.1423 According to the issued 
licenses, Petoro assumes all encumbrances and obligations of Norway under the license and the 
Norway-Iceland Agreement of 1981.1424 In other words, if Petoro, for example, considers that 
the due diligence measures taken by Iceland in its part of the JDZ are not sufficient to protect 
the marine environment, the procedure described above in this section is to be triggered. 
However, neither Party is obligated to participate in hydrocarbon operations on the other side 
of the delimitation line. Norway and Iceland shall express their desire to exercise the right of 
participation (either directly or through a legal person appointed by the Party wishing to 
participate (e.g., Petoro)).1425 Therefore, it is unclear how the Party that is not present in its 
neighbor’s part of the JDZ can monitor the hydrocarbon operations of the latter. As discussed 
above in this section, the obligation of Party A to ensure that Party B’s petroleum activities are 
conducted in a manner that provides protection to the environment (stemming from article 9 of 
the Norway-Iceland Agreement of 1981) is not linked to the presence of Party A in Party B’s 
part of the JDZ. The Norway-Iceland Agreement of 1981 does not incorporate provisions on 
inspections which Party A can carry out in the event where it does not exercise its participation 
right. Such provisions are included in the Norway-Iceland Agreement of 2008. However, these 
inspection provisions are only applicable to transboundary hydrocarbons, and not to other 
hydrocarbon resources situated within the JDZ.1426 Although the inspection provisions of the 
Norway-Iceland Agreement of 2008 are less detailed than those included in the UK-Norway 
Framework Agreement,1427 one may expect that they will be developed in a subsequent UA 
once a transboundary hydrocarbon deposit will be discovered. 
The Norway-Iceland Agreement of 1981 is silent on the topic of (marine) environmental harm 
in the JDZ. As noted in the introduction to this Chapter, the existence of the delimitation line 
means that each Party has to address environmental harm that has occurred in its part of the 
JDZ. Similar to other States (see Chapter 7.6), Norway, Iceland and a number of neighboring 
                                                            
1422 Licenses issued by Iceland in its part of JDZ, see Chapter 1. 
1423 Norway-Iceland Agreement of 1981, art. 5 (1) and 6 (1). 
1424 See, for example, License No. 2014/01, p. 1, available at https://nea.is/media/utgefin%20leyfi/licence-2014-
01-cnooc-eykon-petoro.pdf (last accessed January 2019). See also Chapter 5.6.2. 
1425 Agreed Minutes to the Norway-Iceland Agreement of 1981, see Chapter 1, paras. 5-8. Moreover, paragraph 7 
states that each Party may transfer its 25-% share, subject to prior consultation and in accordance with the national 
legislation of the Party that issued the license.  
1426 Norway-Iceland Agreement of 2008, art. 3 (11). See also supra note 1412. 




States concluded an agreement concerning their cooperation in dealing with pollution of the sea 
by oil or other harmful substances, which also covers the JDZ.1428 According to this agreement, 
each Party is required to notify other Parties of an incident involving substantial pollution and 
may request assistance in responding to such pollution.1429 Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 
5, each Party (Norway and Iceland) shall ensure that licensees operating on its CS (within and 
outside the JDZ) are able to cover any damage, including environmental damage, arising out of 
hydrocarbon activities. The licenses granted by Iceland in its part of the JDZ directly refer to 
the civil liability regime established by Iceland.1430 
The Norwegian-Icelandic model includes a strong cooperative regulatory component pointing 
to the shared character of due diligence in the JDZ. On the other hand, the enforcement 
component is poorly developed, in particular where one of the Parties does not exercise its right 
to take part in petroleum operations on the other side of the delimitation line. Consequently, the 
shared character of due diligence may be questioned. Nevertheless, the management regime 
established by Norway and Iceland in the JDZ is more joint-oriented than the regimes of other 
JDZs already discussed in this Chapter. 
7.7.5 Guinea-Bissau and Senegal 
The GB-Senegal Agreement established a maritime area (Area in this section) in which the 
Parties agreed to undertake joint fisheries, petroleum and mining activities (Illustration No. 
30).1431 Subsequently, the Parties signed a protocol to the GB-Senegal Agreement 
(Protocol),1432 which brought into operation the Management and Cooperation Agency 
(AGC).1433 
The GB-Senegal Agreement and Protocol are the result of many years of negotiations and 
arbitration between these States.1434 The joint regime established by the GB-Senegal Agreement 
                                                            
1428 Agreement between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden concerning Cooperation in Measures to 
Deal with Pollution of the Sea by Oil or Other Harmful Substances, Copenhagen, 29 March 1993, EIF: 16 January 
1998, 2084 UNTS 324. 
1429 Ibid., arts. 5 and 8. 
1430 See, for example, License No. 2014/01, supra note 1424, sections 18-20. 
1431 GB-Senegal Agreement, arts. 1 and 2. It is important to note that the territorial seas of both Parties are excluded 
from the Area. 
1432 Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Guinea-Bissau and the Republic of Senegal Concerning 
the Organization and Operation of the Management and Cooperation Agency Established by the Agreement of 14 
October 1993, Dakar, 12 June 1995, EIF: 21 December 1995, 1903 UNTS 66. 
1433 Official website of the AGC: http://agc-sngb.org/en/ (last accessed January 2019). The AGC is placed in 
Senegal, Dakar. 
1434 The negotiations between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau started in 1977. After 8 years of negotiations, the two 
States agreed, by an Arbitration Agreement dated 12 March 1985, to submit their dispute concerning the maritime 




has a mixed character. Within the Area, there is the line delimiting the CS between the Parties, 
while no such a line for the EEZ is in place.1435 This aspect appears to be reflected in the 
proportion in which living and non-living resources of the Area are allocated between the 
Parties.1436 It is interesting to note that the outer limit of the Area is not specified in the GB-
Senegal Agreement.1437 Therefore, whereas the Parties are limited by the distance of 200 nm 
measured from their baselines with respect to joint fisheries activities, nothing prevents the 
Parties from exploring and exploiting non-living resources of the Area’s CS beyond 200 nm 
jointly in the future.1438 
In accordance with article 8 of the GB-Senegal Agreement, the Agreement would be in force 
for a period of 20 years (until December 2015) and would be automatically renewable. 
However, in December 2015, GB refused to renew the Agreement (and the Protocol).1439 As of 
the end of 2018, the Agreement remains unrenewed. GB is not satisfied with the management 
regime of the Area (there is no information as to which aspects of the management the 
                                                            
delivered its Arbitral Award where the Tribunal declared that the Agreement concluded by an exchange of letters 
[between France and Portugal] on 26 April 1960 has the force of law with respect to the territorial sea, the 
contiguous zone and the CS, but does not have the force of law with respect to the EEZ. On 23 August 1989, 
Guinea-Bissau instituted proceedings against Senegal in respect of a dispute concerning the existence and the 
validity of the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989. The ICJ delivered its judgment on 12 November 1991 upholding 
the existence and the validity of the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989. Pending the ICJ’s decision, on 12 March 
1991, Guinea-Bissau filed an additional application requesting the ICJ to delimit “all the maritime territories 
appertaining respectively to Guinea-Bissau and Senegal”. In the ICJ’s Judgment of 12 November 1991 (ICJ 
Reports 1991, p. 53), the Court considered it “highly desirable that the elements of the dispute that were not settled 
by the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 be resolved as soon as possible, as both Parties desire” (paras. 67-68 of the 
ICJ’s Judgment of 12 November 1991). In the meantime, negotiations between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau 
continued, resulting in the GB-Senegal Agreement. In 1995, Guinea-Bissau withdrew its application and the case 
was removed from the ICJ’s list. See for the history of the dispute between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau, for 
example, I. Okafor-Yarwood, “The Guinea-Bissau–Senegal maritime boundary dispute”, Marine Policy, 
November 2015, vol. 61, pp. 284-290. See also the overview of the case at https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/82 (last 
accessed January 2019). 
1435 Ibid. At the same time, in other sources the CS boundary and the EEZ boundary between Senegal and GB 
coincide. See, for example, J. F. Intchama, D. Belhabib and R. J. Tomás Jumpe, “Assessing Guinea Bissau's Legal 
and Illegal Unreported and Unregulated Fisheries and the Surveillance Efforts to Tackle Them”, Frontiers in 
Marine Science, April 2018, figure 1, available at 
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fmars.2018.00079/full#h6 (last accessed January 2019). See also the 
map of the EEZ of GB at http://www.marineregions.org/eezdetails.php?mrgid=8471 (last accessed January 2019). 
One should not exclude the possibility that GB may contest the existence of the maritime boundaries in the Area. 
1436 GB-Senegal Agreement, art. 2. 
1437 Ibid., art. 1. At the same time, the outer boundary of the Area is included in the figures on the AGC’s website, 
supra note 1433. See also Illustration No. 30. 
1438 In September 2014, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Cabo Verde, The Cambia, Guinea, Mauritania and Sierra Leona 
made a joint submission to the CLCS. No recommendation is adopted at the time of writing. See, more, at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_wa7_75_2014.htm (last accessed January 
2019). To date, the Area’s boundaries represent a triangle (Illustration No. 30) with several blocks. 
1439 See, for example, “Pétrole-Pêche: La Guinée-Bissau suspend sa coopération en zone maritime frontalière avec 
le Sénégal”, Leral, 19 December 2015, available at https://www.leral.net/Petrole-Peche-La-Guinee-Bissau-





dissatisfaction of GB relates to) and desires to renegotiate its 15-% share derived from activities 
with respect to mineral and petroleum resources in the Area.1440 The GB-Senegal Agreement 
and Protocol contain no provision applicable in a scenario in which joint activities, including 
petroleum activities, continue to take place while these instruments are not renewed. As 
explained further in this section, this scenario is the current situation in the Area. As follows 
from the available information, Senegal and GB negotiate a new protocol.1441 Insofar as such a 
new protocol is not yet adopted, the regime established by the GB-Senegal Protocol to govern 
petroleum activities in the Area is subject to consideration in this section. 
The GB-Senegal Protocol sets up a complex institutional structure. The AGC is composed of 
the High Authority and the Secretariat.1442 The High Authority consists of the heads of the 
Parties or their Governments, or of persons delegated by them.1443 The main task of the High 
Authority is to formulate the general management and cooperation policies of the AGC.1444 The 
High Authority develops the regulatory framework for resource activities in the Area and must 
ensure that “prospecting, exploration and exploitation in the Area are carried out optimally, in 
accordance with good mining or petroleum practice, with care for the marine environment and 
for the preservation of fisheries resources”.1445 The Secretariat consists of the Secretary-General 
and their Deputy (they are natural persons), and both are appointed by the High Authority.1446 
The Secretary-General has the general executive and appropriate management power.1447 For 
example, the Secretary-General is responsible for organizing meetings of the High 
Authority,1448 providing additional rules and guidelines under the existing regulatory 
framework, establishing safe and restricted-access zones and requesting the assistance to 
prevent or combat pollution.1449 The Secretary-General represents the AGC in any judicial 
proceedings.1450 
                                                            
1440 G. E. Ndiaye, «A cause d’un malentendu qui dure depuis 3 ans Le pétrole brûle entre le Sénégal et la Guinée-
Bissau”, Rewmi, 8 March 2018, available at http://www.rewmi.com/a-cause-dun-malentendu-qui-dure-depuis-3-
ans-le-petrole-brule-entre-le-senegal-et-la-guinee-bissau.html; P. Melly, “Senegal and Guinea-Bissau deal faces 
domestic pressures”, Petroleum Economist, 17 October 2018, available at http://www.petroleum-
economist.com/articles/politics-economics/africa/2018/senegal-and-guinea-bissau-deal-faces-domestic-pressures 
(last accessed January 2019). 
1441 Ibid. 
1442 Protocol to the GB-Senegal Agreement, art. 7. 
1443 Ibid., art. 9. 
1444 Ibid., art. 10.2. 
1445 Ibid., art. 10.4-10.5 (emphasis added). 
1446 Ibid., arts. 10.3 and 11.1. 
1447 Ibid., art. 11.1. 
1448 Ibid., art. 9, para. 8. 
1449 Ibid., art. 11.4. 




The Protocol establishes the Enterprise that is a body through which the AGC carries out its 
functions.1451 The Enterprise is administered by a board consisting of from three to eleven 
members and a Directorate-General appointed by the board on the High Authority’s 
proposal.1452 The Directorate-General is vested with the administrative, organizational and 
management functions of the Enterprise.1453 The Enterprise is a public limited liability company 
owned by Senegal and GB.1454 
In accordance with article 16 of the Protocol, the Parties are required to cooperate with the AGC 
in order to protect the marine environment in the Area.1455 Article 23 elaborates this requirement 
and states that the Parties and the AGC shall “prevent or minimize pollution or any other type 
of degradation in the marine environment resulting from resource prospecting, exploration and 
exploitation activities in the Area”. In this respect, the AGC is obligated to lay down a 
regulatory framework for protection of the marine environment and adopt an emergency or 
management plan to combat pollution and any degradation.1456 Although there is no 
information as to whether the AGC has established the necessary guidelines and plans (these 
guidelines and plans shall be proposed by the Secretary-General and approved by the High 
Authority), it is likely that they are in place. Otherwise, as discussed in Chapter 5, it could be 
argued that the lack of adequate regulations constitutes a violation of the standard of due 
diligence. 
When looking at the design of the due diligence standard in the Area, one can note that some 
basic elements of this standard are to be exercised by the AGC, including the Enterprise, on 
behalf of the Parties. In addition to the regulatory powers (that complement the primary 
regulatory powers of the Parties examined further below in this section), the Agency is 
authorized to control resource activities in the Area.1457 Apart from prevention, the AGC is also 
responsible for combating “pollution or any disaster affecting the environment or [mineral, 
petroleum and fisheries] resources”.1458 The Parties, in turn, have a passive role in the case of 
pollution within the Area: they must assist the AGC when the Secretariat requests them to do 
                                                            
1451 Ibid., arts. 1.7 and 4, Title VI. 
1452 Ibid., art. 12. 
1453 Ibid. 
1454 Ibid., Summary, para. 6. 
1455 Article 16 of the Protocol also requires the Parties to cooperate with the AGC in other areas such as search and 
rescue, marine scientific research and surveillance. See also art. 5 (c) and arts. 17-22 of the Protocol. 
1456 Ibid., art. 23.2. The scope of the additional regulatory framework is regulated by article 11.4 (j) and (k). 
1457 Ibid., art. 11.4. See also arts. 5 and 10.5. 




so.1459 According to the Protocol, the Secretariat may directly involve other relevant actors.1460 
Thus, the AGC is a powerful body which is characterized as an IO in the Protocol.1461 This 
characteristic is uncommon. None of the provisional arrangements considered in Chapter 6 and 
none of the agreements examined in this Chapter use this type of characteristic in relation to 
the inter-State bodies they create. At the same time, there are doubts that the AGC by its own, 
without the involvement of the Enterprise (a company owned by Senegal and GB),1462 is able 
to fully perform its functions. It appears that the Agency has limited capacity, inter alia, to 
control petroleum operations in the Area in the absence of the Enterprise. The situation is further 
complicated by the refusal of GB to renew the Agreement and Protocol. This refusal could 
impact the AGC’s operation: for example, it could lead to a lack of funds to run the Agency.1463 
The implications of the refusal for the Enterprise are unclear. It is also not clear who exercises 
enforcement jurisdiction in the Area now: the AGC or national organs of one of the countries. 
Currently, exploration (not commercial exploitation) activities take place in the Area with the 
Enterprise’s participation.1464 This elicits the question of whether a shortcoming in monitoring 
of hydrocarbon activities on the part of the AGC, including the Enterprise, that caused 
significant environmental harm (for example, to a maritime area beyond the Area) gives rise to 
shared international responsibility of Senegal and GB or it is only attributable to the Agency 
or/and the Enterprise. When answering that question, it is necessary to refer to the discussions 
in Chapters 5.6.2 and 6.13.2 of this thesis. In other words, the existence of the Agency and the 
Enterprise does not rule out the emergence of shared State responsibility. At the same time, in 
light of the current situation in the Area, one cannot exclude that national organs of one of the 
Parties (presumably, organs of Senegal as explained further in this section) are involved in 
exercising the enforcement element of due diligence. 
It is interesting to note that the Parties have a more active role where pollution of the marine 
environment occurring in the Area spreads, or is likely to spread, beyond it. In this event, the 
Parties must cooperate (with each other, as well as with the AGC) to prevent, mitigate or 
                                                            
1459 Ibid. 
1460 Ibid., arts. 5 (c) and 11.4 (n). 
1461 Ibid., arts. 4 and 8. 
1462 Supra note 1454. 
1463 See Protocol to the GB-Senegal Agreement, art. 26. 
1464 See, for example, “CNOOC takes operatorship of West African block», 29 March 2017, available at 
https://www.offshoreenergytoday.com/cnooc-takes-operatorship-of-west-african-block/ (last accessed January 





eliminate such pollution.1465 Further, the Protocol provides that private companies working in 
the Area are liable for damage incurred by pollution and any form of degradation of the marine 
environment arising out of their operations.1466 It is not entirely clear to which Party’s civil 
liability regime article 23.3 of the Protocol refers. However, given the fact that the law of 
Senegal governs petroleum and mining activities in the Area,1467 one may conclude that the 
liability of companies is regulated by the legislation of Senegal.1468 Logically, in that case, an 
action for compensation for damage is to be brought in the court of Senegal.1469 
Thus, despite the fact that there is a line delimiting the CS between GB and Senegal in the 
Area,1470 the law of Senegal applies to non-living resource activities in the entire Area.1471 It is 
perhaps for this reason that the Protocol incorporates a mechanism under which GB might have 
an impact on the rules and regulations of Senegal.1472 Pursuant to article 24.3 of the Protocol, 
the High Authority may propose modifications or amendments to the Parties’ regulatory 
framework.1473 So, for example, if GB considers that the civil liability rules or standards for 
conducting an EIA established by Senegal are not adequate to address environmental risks 
associated with hydrocarbon activities, it may, through the High Authority, propose changes in 
that regard. Given the composition of the High Authority and its powers discussed above, any 
proposal is likely to be reflected in the legislation. 
The GB-Senegal example establishes a multi-layered model for discharging due diligence in 
the Area. While Senegal primarily exercises regulatory competencies in respect of hydrocarbon 
activities, the Agency’s regulatory powers are additional. Other due diligence measures are to 
be taken cooperatively through the Agency. 
7.8 Conclusions and observations 
This Chapter has examined the design of due diligence in the context of transboundary 
hydrocarbons in order to determine whether shared State responsibility might arise for a breach 
of the due diligence obligation. A number of features existing in the context of transboundary 
                                                            
1465 Protocol to the GB-Senegal Agreement, art. 23.1 (b). 
1466 Ibid., art. 23.3. Article 1.15 of the Protocol defines the term ‘company’ or ‘companies’. 
1467 Ibid., art. 24.1. Article 24.2 provides that the law of GB governs fisheries activities in the Area. 
1468 See also Model PSC, art. 4, available at http://agc-sngb.org/en/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/ResearchContract.pdf (last accessed January 2019). 
1469 At the same time, the Protocol does not rule out the possibility of injured persons to seek redress in the court 
of GB. 
1470 See supra notes 1434 and 1435. 
1471 Ibid., art. 24.1. 
1472 Consequently, Senegal may also affect the legislation of GB in the sphere of fisheries.  




hydrocarbons point to the joint nature of due diligence. These key features include the States’ 
commitments towards the establishment of uniform or compatible environmental (and other 
relevant) standards, the availability of reciprocal enforcement mechanisms, the creation of 
common bodies and the mutual approval of subsequent agreements between licensees operating 
on both sides of the maritime boundary. Moreover, the existence of cooperative due diligence 
is rational because a transboundary field lies in the CS of two States that share revenue derived 
from coordinated petroleum operations in respect of this field. 
On the other hand, there are some important aspects questioning that this joint nature of due 
diligence can be interpreted in a way that the standard of due diligence constitutes a joint 
obligation. First, the limited and diverse State treaty practice makes it difficult to arrive at any 
general conclusion that there is a specific legal rule requiring States to exercise their due 
diligence obligations jointly. Moreover, the available State practice in applying due diligence 
in the context of transboundary hydrocarbons does not appear to go beyond the individual 
exercise of this obligation. Second, the content and scope of each State’s standard of due 
diligence are different. In other words, while one State’s due diligence (namely, regulation and 
oversight) is primary, the other State plays a subsidiary role, mainly in the domain of 
monitoring. This second aspect contradicts one of the essential elements of a shared obligation 
which implies that several States are bound to an obligation having similar normative 
content.1474 
Furthermore, unlike many interim arrangements concluded in disputed maritime areas 
according to which a person who suffered damage arising from petroleum activities carried out 
in the JDZ may seek redress in either Party,1475 none of the agreements on transboundary 
hydrocarbons provide an injured person with an option to choose the jurisdiction in which his 
claim for compensation may be brought. This also does not support the notion of shared due 
diligence. That issue is particularly important when State A imposes certain restrictions (e.g., 
procedural or substantive hurdles) on the possibility of (natural or legal) persons of State B (or 
other States) to bring a claim for damage originating under State A’s jurisdiction and affecting 
these persons and/or their property. 
                                                            
1474 See Chapter 5.9. 




Thus, there are considerable doubts that due diligence in the context of transboundary 
hydrocarbons can be characterized as a joint legal obligation. The presence of the jurisdictional 
limits of each coastal State causes the main difficulty in drawing this conclusion. 
Thereby, the design and operation of due diligence in the context of cross-border hydrocarbons 
differs from that existing in undelimited maritime areas.1476 In other words, a failure of State A 
to exercise its due diligence obligation does not automatically trigger the responsibility of State 
B in the context of transboundary hydrocarbons. Nevertheless, there is the question concerning 
the implications in a situation where State B had exercised its rights to carry out inspections of 
petroleum operations conducted on State A’s side, but did that inadequately, which prevented 
State B from identifying State A’s lack of due diligence, in particular when this lack resulted in 
significant environmental harm to a third party. Although a State B’s omission may matter when 
dealing with the issue of shared State responsibility, such omission will affect State A’s 
responsibility minimally because State A’s exercise of due diligence, including its enforcement 
powers, is pivotal and is to be examined foremost. 
Similar to the context of transboundary hydrocarbons, one could hardly observe the existence 
of shared due diligence in the context of JDZs. It is notable that there are only a few examples 
of the practice creating joint zones in addition to maritime boundaries. This practice is not 
currently used and is unlikely to be a common form of cooperation with respect to hydrocarbons 
in the future (unlike unitization agreements). Whereas many joint zone agreements (mainly 
those that were concluded before the adoption of the UNCLOS) are not informative as to how 
the standard of due diligence is framed and implemented, the Norway-Iceland Agreement of 
1981 places particular emphasis on the cooperative exercise of regulatory competencies, but 
fails to establish mutual enforcement tools in the JDZ.1477 The GB-Senegal Protocol creates a 
sophisticated model for the exercise of due diligence. While the regulation-making powers are 
granted to one State (where Senegal has the primary regulatory powers in the petroleum sphere 
and the Agency has the additional regulatory powers), the monitoring powers are given to the 
Agency, including the Enterprise.1478 
In sum, there is little evidence indicating that due diligence can be qualified as a joint obligation. 
States shall individually exercise their due diligence obligations on the basis of the maritime 
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boundary between them. This calls into question the possibility of shared State responsibility 





























CHAPTER 8. MAIN FINDINGS OF THE THESIS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis has examined two research questions.1479 The first question concerned the rights and 
obligations of neighboring States with respect to shared offshore hydrocarbons under 
international law. The second question dealt with the issue of shared State responsibility: 
namely, whether States which have adopted a model of cooperation for shared offshore 
hydrocarbons can bear international shared responsibility for (marine) environmental harm that 
is caused, or is likely to be caused, to a third party by resource activities carried out (or not 
carried out) pursuant to this model. This Chapter summarizes the conclusions concerning those 
research questions. 
In addition to the findings directly related to the research questions, this thesis made 
supplementary contributions to other aspects relating to the law of shared hydrocarbons and the 
law of State responsibility in the context of (shared) hydrocarbons. For example, key legal terms 
and relevant concepts have been systematized and defined for a better understanding of the law 
of shared hydrocarbons.1480 Moreover, the thesis has set forth the core elements of the due 
diligence standard required from States in exercising their sovereign rights to explore the 
continental shelf and exploit hydrocarbon resources, including shared hydrocarbons.1481 
The findings of this research may be applicable to activities in respect of non-living resources 
other than hydrocarbons. However, the application of these findings in the context of seabed 
mining activities may have its own peculiarities for the reason that the physical characteristics 
of hydrocarbon and mineral resources differ (e.g., unlike hydrocarbons, solid minerals cannot 
migrate). 
8.2 The law of shared hydrocarbons 
This section provides conclusions as to which rules of international law govern the rights and 
obligations of neighboring coastal States in a shared hydrocarbon deposit. 
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8.2.1 The two types of shared hydrocarbons 
This thesis identified two categories of shared offshore hydrocarbons. The first category is 
hydrocarbons situated in areas of overlapping CS or/and EEZ claims.1482 The second category 
is hydrocarbons lying across the maritime boundaries of two or more coastal States and which 
are exploitable from either side. These hydrocarbon resources are shared in sense that two or 
more States (in most instances this concerns only two States) share sovereign rights over them. 
However, the aspects of sovereign rights’ sharing differ in each category. In the first category, 
the rights claimed by one State may more often lead to disagreement with the other State(s). In 
the second category, the rights to explore for and exploit a cross-border hydrocarbon field are 
generally undisputed.  
Arrangements and agreements concerning disputed and transboundary hydrocarbons usually 
reflect the shared nature of exploration and exploitation rights with respect to those resources. 
At the same time, the difficulty associated with the first category of shared hydrocarbons is that 
States may refuse to exercise their sovereign rights over (potential) disputed hydrocarbons 
jointly (e.g., State A considers State B’s claim as having no legal basis under international law). 
This difficulty does not commonly arise in the context of transboundary hydrocarbons. 
The fact that two coastal States share sovereign rights to explore for and exploit shared 
petroleum resources does not automatically imply that jurisdiction (both prescriptive and 
enforcement) over these resources is also exercised on a joint basis. While the cooperative 
exercise of jurisdiction is generally established in the context of disputed hydrocarbons,1483 
jurisdiction with respect to transboundary hydrocarbons is primarily exercised individually on 
the basis of the maritime boundary.1484 The effect of these forms of the exercise of jurisdiction 
on the determination of shared State responsibility is summarized further below. 
This thesis dealt not only with hydrocarbon deposits shared by two opposite or adjacent States 
within 200 nm, but also with shared hydrocarbons located in the extended CS (i.e., beyond 200 
nm). In the case of the extended CS, aside from the obligations  described below in this Chapter, 
States are also required to make payments or contributions in kind in relation to exploitation of 
hydrocarbon (and other non-living) resources situated in the extended CS, pursuant to article 
82 of the UNCLOS. The procedure for making payments or contributions in the context of joint 
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exploitation activities is currently undeveloped and may trigger many issues (e.g., when one of 
the cooperating States is exempt from making payments or contributions under article 82 (3) of 
the UNCLOS). To date, there are a number of examples of the cooperative management of both 
disputed and transboundary hydrocarbons on the extended CS.1485 However, the 
implementation of article 82 in these cooperative management regimes remains to be developed 
and was not subject to detailed examination in this thesis.  
This thesis also identified another (possible) type of shared hydrocarbons: hydrocarbon deposits 
straddling the boundary between the outer limit of a coastal State’s CS and the Area. Chapter 4 
considered this type, and looked at whether the rules codified in article 142 of the UNCLOS 
are applicable through referencing the analogy of a hydrocarbon field straddling the maritime 
boundary between two coastal States.1486 It is worth noting that the finding of hydrocarbon 
deposits of this type is unlikely owing to geomorphological characteristics; the detection of 
other straddling minerals is more likely. 
One of the key conclusions made in this thesis is that the scope of the rules applicable to shared 
hydrocarbons depends on what type of shared hydrocarbon resource is subject to consideration. 
The following sections elaborate on this conclusion. 
8.2.2 Cooperation 
Chapter 2 showed that the characterization of shared hydrocarbons as shared natural resources 
gives rise to the duty of States to cooperate in respect of these resources. At the same time, 
Chapter 2 also highlighted that each resource type falling under the concept of shared natural 
resources has its own features, which might affect, inter alia, the scope of cooperation between 
States sharing those natural resources. As emphasized in this thesis, the characteristics of each 
category under the framework of shared hydrocarbons have a certain impact on the scope of 
cooperation. Cooperation with respect to disputed hydrocarbons has been considered separately 
from cooperation with respect to transboundary hydrocarbons, in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, 
respectively. 
While the UNCLOS establishes no specific rule requiring coastal States to cooperate in respect 
of transboundary hydrocarbons, the requirement to cooperate with respect to disputed 
hydrocarbons is included in paragraph 3 of articles 74 and 83. Although a number of coastal 
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States have fulfilled the requirement to cooperate by entering into provisional arrangements in 
undelimited maritime areas,1487 this requirement does not in itself imply (neither has it evolved 
into) an obligation to reach an arrangement. States are required to negotiate in good faith with 
a view to concluding such an arrangement, if there is practical necessity for that.1488 For 
different reasons, many States have not been able to reach interim arrangements covering 
disputed areas. 
Even though the requirement to cooperate with respect to transboundary hydrocarbons is not 
explicitly enshrined in the UNCLOS, this requirement is extensively reflected in State 
practice.1489 The content of the requirement to cooperate in respect of transboundary 
hydrocarbons is similar to that existing in respect of disputed hydrocarbons: States shall strive 
to reach an agreement governing the cooperative management of a transboundary hydrocarbon 
reservoir. Nevertheless, the requirement to cooperate on transboundary hydrocarbons appears 
to be stronger than on disputed hydrocarbons. State practice (in particular, more recent practice) 
shows that there are no examples where States that agree in determining that a petroleum field 
extends across the maritime boundary between them1490 refuse to cooperate further and instead 
commence unilateral exploitation of this field. Of course, this determination does not then rule 
out subsequent challenges relating to the presence of a cross-border petroleum field in those 
instances. For example, States may disagree on the form of cooperation or on the initial 
apportionment of the field. 
The strength of the requirement to cooperate in the context of transboundary hydrocarbons can 
be explained by the fact that States share the understanding that each of them is entitled to a 
certain portion of a transboundary petroleum deposit.1491 There are also other reasons (e.g., 
efficiency of hydrocarbon production) which drive cooperation. Whereas the requirement to 
cooperate in the context of disputed hydrocarbons appears to be weaker than in the context of 
transboundary hydrocarbons, the implementation of this requirement in the former context is a 
more difficult process than in the latter context. Most of the cooperative management regimes 
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established in disputed maritime areas are complex, in particular those that involve States with 
different legal systems.1492 
The analysis of State practice does not allow the inference that the rule requiring cooperation 
with regard to shared hydrocarbons is a customary rule. In addition to the fact that the relevant 
State practice is far from being consistent, it is difficult to establish opinio juris (the belief of 
States that they are required to cooperate under international law) in this matter. While some 
provisional arrangements clearly stipulate that the requirement to cooperate (particularly, the 
one incorporated into articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS) is one of the reasons for their 
conclusion, many other arrangements and agreements on shared hydrocarbons, including 
delimitation treaties,1493 usually specify no legal motivation behind the inclusion of a clause 
requiring cooperation. It is also difficult to answer the question of whether the requirement to 
cooperate constitutes a regional customary rule. Nevertheless, one can observe that the practice 
of neighboring States located in a number of maritime areas (e.g., the North Sea, the Gulf of 
Guinea, the Gulf of Thailand and the Caribbean Sea) has developed towards cooperation to a 
larger degree than regional practice evidenced in other areas (e.g., the South China Sea and 
many parts of the Mediterranean Sea). 
One of the observations concerns JDZs created in addition to maritime boundaries.1494 The 
creation of these zones is not primarily linked to the issue of transboundary hydrocarbons. This 
form of cooperation has been driven by other factors than dealing with transboundary 
hydrocarbons, including the historical circumstances. Currently, the practice of establishing 
such JDZs is abandoned and is unlikely to be common in the future. 
8.2.3 Unilateralism 
As noted above, the requirement to cooperate with respect to disputed hydrocarbons is weaker 
than with respect to cross-border hydrocarbons. This is likely to be a reason why unilateral 
hydrocarbon activities in respect of the latter category are less common than unilateralism in 
disputed maritime areas. 
This thesis concludes that coastal States are required to exercise mutual restraint in disputed 
maritime areas. The requirement of restraint is derived from such general principles of 
international law as the principle of good neighborliness and the no-harm principle, as well as 
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the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper and the obligation not to aggravate or extend a 
(maritime boundary) dispute.1495 The key question is to what extent States shall exercise 
restraint in the context of hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
the test of permanent physical change to the marine environment developed by the Tribunal in 
Guyana v. Suriname is questionable and a State engaging in less invasive unilateral petroleum 
operations (for instance, seismic surveys) may also fall short of the requirement to exercise 
restraint. A State claiming that a unilateral petroleum operation undertaken by its neighbor is 
inconsistent with the requirement of restraint encapsulated in the obligation not to jeopardize 
or hamper under articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of the UNCLOS needs to substantiate the negative 
effect of such operation on the reaching of a maritime boundary agreement. In fact, in this 
author’s view, the preferable scenario in an area of overlapping maritime claims is the 
establishment of a (formal or informal) moratorium on the conduct of hydrocarbon activities in 
this area pending final delimitation or pending a provisional arrangement aimed at regulating 
such activities. Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter 3, neither the UNCLOS nor the relevant 
case law support the moratorium concept. Indeed, there are many examples where States 
dismiss the idea of a moratorium in an area in dispute and instead commence unilateral 
hydrocarbon activities. It clearly follows from the discussions in Chapter 3 that unilateral 
exploitation (which is aimed at appropriating petroleum resources and involves establishing 
facilities for this purpose) is not permissible in a disputed area under international law. 
As regards transboundary hydrocarbons, the requirement of restraint has been examined within 
the framework of the rule of capture. Chapter 4 concluded that the CS regime precludes the 
applicability of the rule of capture to transboundary hydrocarbons.1496 Neither does State 
practice support the rule of capture. Most of the existing agreements on transboundary 
hydrocarbons do not allow the Parties to proceed with unilateral exploitation of transboundary 
fields in the absence of an approved UA between them. These agreements generally require the 
Parties to submit a dispute to some form of third party dispute settlement mechanism for final 
decision. Only the US-Mexico example deviates from the general State practice by permitting 
unilateral exploitation when a UA cannot be reached.1497 
Chapter 4 questioned whether one State may prevent development of a transboundary field by 
refusing to cooperate (e.g., for environmental reasons or due to limited capacity). Nevertheless, 
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even in a scenario whereby State A proceeds with unilateral development of a cross-border 
deposit, State A shall be required to take into account that State B is also entitled to receive 
revenue derived from development of this deposit.1498 However, as noted above, there are no 
examples where States reject cooperation when an accumulation of hydrocarbons is 
transboundary in nature. Usually, hurdles are related to the question of apportionment and other 
issues (e.g., where installations and facilities are to be deployed). 
8.2.4 The principle of equitable apportionment 
The application of the principle of equitable apportionment is difficult in respect of both 
disputed and transboundary hydrocarbons. Despite the fact that State A and State B share 
sovereign rights to explore for and exploit disputed hydrocarbons, one State may be unwilling 
to cooperate with the other State because it considers the CS where these resources are located 
as appertaining solely to it. At the same time, once State A and State B agree to cooperate with 
respect to disputed hydrocarbons, the process of resource apportionment is not as nuanced as 
in the context of transboundary hydrocarbons. Disputed hydrocarbons are usually apportioned 
equally,1499 which reflects the principle of equality of their claimed rights to the same maritime 
area.1500 
Apportionment of transboundary hydrocarbons is a technical matter determined by reports 
made by experts appointed by States (or/and licensees) to accomplish this task.1501 The 
hydrocarbon volumes of a transboundary field are generally distributed in accordance with the 
proportions in which that field lies in each State’s jurisdiction.1502 There is only one exception 
to this apportionment rule: Norway gave preferable treatment to the interests and needs of 
Iceland in the JDZ, particularly when dealing with transboundary hydrocarbons extending 
beyond that zone.1503 Any disagreement regarding each State’s share in a transboundary 
reservoir may delay a development project. As discussed earlier, development is not possible 
until States reach an agreement on the terms of apportionment, which usually provides for the 
possibility of reapportionment. Thus, stemming from the legal principle in this regard, the 
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procedure of equitable apportionment of transboundary hydrocarbons is to be developed 
through relevant technical rules. 
8.2.5 Marine environmental protection and preservation 
International law requires States to protect and preserve the marine environment while 
exploring the CS and exploiting its hydrocarbon resources.1504 This requirement is applicable 
to all States carrying out hydrocarbon activities, even if those activities take place in maritime 
areas where States do not have legally established sovereign rights (through the procedure 
provided for in articles 15, 74 and 83 of the UNCLOS) and regardless of whether hydrocarbon 
activities are unilateral or joint.1505 
In the context of shared hydrocarbons, one of the important norms of international 
environmental law is a due diligence obligation of States to ensure that no significant harm 
(incurred by pollution) to the (marine) environment of other States and of maritime areas 
beyond national control results from their unilateral and joint hydrocarbon activities. This thesis 
mainly addressed the design of that due diligence obligation in situations where States have 
agreed to cooperate in conducting hydrocarbon activities with respect to disputed and cross-
border deposits. The following section summarizes the findings concerning this issue. 
The review of those provisional arrangements and agreements dealing with shared 
hydrocarbons indicates that States now pay more attention than historically had been the case 
to environmental concerns. As noted by Ong, this trend needs to be viewed against the 
background of increasing international and domestic environmental regulation of the petroleum 
industry.1506 It is however notable that provisional arrangements (in respect of disputed 
hydrocarbons) usually elaborate on the issue of marine environmental protection in more detail 
than framework and unitization agreements (in respect of cross-border hydrocarbons). This fact 
can be explained by the special legal status of an area in dispute.1507 
8.3 Shared hydrocarbons, shared State responsibility? 
This section details the conclusions on the question of whether cooperative management of 
shared hydrocarbons is one of the scenarios in which shared State responsibility might arise. 
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8.3.1 The circumstances under which any State bears international legal 
responsibility 
The examination of the issue of shared State responsibility started with consideration of the 
general conditions under which any coastal State bears responsibility in the context of 
hydrocarbon activities carried out on its CS. The fact that hydrocarbon activities take place on 
a State’s CS and have the potential to cause (significant) adverse effects on the marine 
environment does not automatically trigger State responsibility. State responsibility arises when 
a State has not met its primary obligations, one of which is the due diligence obligation to ensure 
that no significant harm to the (marine) environment results from hydrocarbon activities.1508 In 
other words, in order to invoke the responsibility of a State, it must be demonstrated that this 
State has failed to take all necessary and appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of 
significant (marine) environmental harm. The measures according to which one can determine 
whether a State has exercised its due diligence obligation in the management of hydrocarbon 
activities include: 
 adoption of a regulatory framework incorporating the State’s international and regional 
obligations and reflecting “good oilfield practice” which does not only refer to technical 
and economic aspects of petroleum operations, but also to environmental protection in 
order to minimize adverse effects of these operations on the environment (including 
EIA procedures and financial guarantees in the event of damage). The adopted laws and 
regulations are subject to review to ensure that they are in line with current 
environmental standards; 
 enforcement of the regulatory framework through different mechanisms. It is not 
sufficient to merely include environmental provisions in licenses or contracts. States 
shall play an active role in monitoring compliance of licensees with environmental 
standards: for example, to require licensees/operators to submit information concerning 
the status of hydrocarbon activities; to carry out inspections; to give instructions; to 
cease an activity if necessary or provide for other sanctions in case of non-compliance; 
to inform licensees of new technical and environmental standards; and to ensure their 
implementation; 
 availability of procedure to report and respond to incidents involving damage to the 
environment. Although licensees are the main actors to deal with environmental damage 
                                                            




and bear the costs of clean-up operations, States shall carefully control and assist in 
mitigating and eliminating such damage. States have to investigate incidents; 
 availability of legal recourse for compensation for damage; and 
 establishment of institutional framework to take the due diligence steps.1509 
Within the standard of due diligence, the focus is primarily on two pivotal components: (a) the 
regime of civil liability (usually of operators) as a guarantee that environmental damage arising 
out of petroleum activities will be addressed; and (b) the availability of remedies for natural 
and legal persons who have suffered damage. However, States have considerable discretion 
concerning the content and operation of these components (as well as other components of due 
diligence), taking into account their capabilities and circumstances. This fact may make it 
difficult to determine State responsibility. Moreover, as observed in Chapter 5, it may occur 
that even if a civil remedy against an operator is available, this operator is not liable or is unable 
to meet its liability. That situation becomes more complicated when a State has managed 
hydrocarbon activities on its CS with necessary due care, but environmental damage has 
nevertheless occurred. Under current international environmental law, the State bears no 
residual liability in such a situation.1510 Of course, the availability of additional financial 
security is desirable (as, for example, the OPOL in the UK), but this is far from a common trend 
among States. 
Damage is not necessary for triggering State responsibility. At the same time, the remedies 
available in instances where damage is and is not evidenced differ. Restitution (restoration of 
the environment) and compensation are available where damage caused by the State’s failure 
to exercise due diligence is incurred. Despite this apparent simplicity, the invocation of State 
responsibility is a complex process. There are many practical difficulties encountered in 
applying State responsibility rules in the environmental context: environmental damage is to be 
“significant”; the absence of a single method for the valuation of environmental damage; and 
difficulties in establishing causation and finding an appropriate body to address the issue of 
State responsibility for environmental damage. The limited international practice of triggering 
State responsibility, especially in the absence of actual environmental damage, does not provide 
a better clarification. All these challenges will inevitably arise in dealing with the question of 
shared State responsibility. 
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8.3.2 Invocation of shared State responsibility 
The likelihood of shared State responsibility is linked to the design of primary obligations in 
the context of cooperative management of shared hydrocarbons. If a primary obligation is 
framed as a joint obligation of two States, these States share the responsibility for a breach of 
that obligation. This thesis considered two contrasting scenarios of offshore oil and gas resource 
sharing in order to determine how the obligation to prevent harm to the marine environment is 
framed in each of those scenarios with reference to the core components of due diligence 
identified in Chapter 5.5.  
In the scenario of the sharing of disputed hydrocarbons, it has been shown that due diligence is 
generally formulated as a joint obligation. However, a difficulty in triggering shared State 
responsibility is that the fulfillment of this joint obligation usually lies on an inter-State body 
being an independent legal actor. Nevertheless, it does not mean that States cannot be held 
responsible for a failure of such a body to exercise due diligence. As discussed in Chapter 6, a 
typical inter-State body established under a provisional arrangement is 
organizationally/institutionally and financially tied with both States and this tie is even closer 
than the relationship between an IO and its member States. Therefore, the States cannot easily 
avoid their legal responsibility by delegating due diligence to a separate entity and an injured 
party may invoke shared State responsibility. 
The scenario of the sharing of cross-border hydrocarbons is a conceptually different scenario 
in which jurisdictional issues are settled. In this scenario, there is little evidence indicating that 
due diligence can be characterized as a joint obligation. Each State shall individually exercise 
its jurisdiction concerning marine environmental protection (regulation and enforcement) on 
the basis of the maritime boundary. In other words, each State must take all necessary measures 
to protect and preserve the marine environment, and to prevent pollution or other harm to the 
marine environment when authorizing petroleum operations on its side of the maritime 
boundary. Consequently, one State (State A) is the principal duty-bearer. The other State (State 
B) carries only a ‘subsidiary burden’ in discharging due diligence. As shown in Chapter 7, many 
agreements on transboundary hydrocarbons provide State B with limited authority (the scope 
of this authority varies) to monitor how State A governs petroleum operations on State A’s CS. 
However, this does not allow characterization of due diligence as a shared obligation. The same 




Thus, the scenario of offshore hydrocarbon resource sharing does not automatically give rise to 
shared State responsibility. While shared State responsibility may arise in the context of 
disputed hydrocarbons, the probability of such a situation is unlikely in the context of 
transboundary hydrocarbons. 
8.3.3 If there is shared State responsibility, then how should it be distributed? 
In the situation of shared State responsibility, one of the subsequent issues will concern the 
distribution of such responsibility among the responsible States. This elicits the question of 
whether each State’s responsibility share is to be linked to the ratio in which shared 
hydrocarbons are apportioned between those States.1511 
The reasonableness of the application of the apportionment ratio can be questioned, in particular 
where disputed hydrocarbons are not allocated equally.1512 For example, article 3.1 of the 
Nigeria-STP Treaty provides that the Parties share, in the proportion 60:40 in favor of Nigeria, 
“all benefits and obligations arising from development activities carried out in the [JDZ]” 
(emphasis added). At first glance, this provision can be viewed as applicable to the Parties’ 
(primary as well as secondary) obligations. Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter 6, the standard 
of due diligence in the context of disputed hydrocarbons is generally of a joint character, 
including the Nigeria-STP example. This implies that STP shall undertake all possible and 
reasonable due diligence measures to the same extent as Nigeria, without limiting itself to only 
40% of its capacity. Moreover, one can envisage a situation where State A having a smaller 
hydrocarbon volume than State B has made a major contribution to a wrongful act. While the 
60:40 proportion is relevant for sharing the costs associated with marine environmental 
protection (e.g., the Authority’s operational costs for this purpose), it seems inappropriate to 
apply this proportion in determining each State’s share in shared State responsibility. In other 
words, a failure to exercise due diligence may be equally attributable to the States, even though 
the resources are not equally allocated between them. At the same time, as noted in Chapter 
5.5.2.3, one State may be required to exercise a higher level of due diligence than its neighbor 
and, arguably, the unequal apportionment of hydrocarbon resources reflects their inequality in 
that regard.1513 
This thesis arrived at the conclusion that shared State responsibility is unlikely to arise in the 
context of transboundary hydrocarbons. However, if shared State responsibility might 
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nevertheless arise in that context, a similar question regarding the allocation of responsibility 
therefore emerges. It is worth noting that the bulk of exploitation operations on a transboundary 
hydrocarbon deposit usually take place on the CS of the State in whose jurisdiction the larger 
portion of that deposit lies, although this practice is quite limited to date. Consequently, the 
apportionment ratio serves as an essential indicator of which State is the leading actor in 
meeting the standard of due diligence and which State has a supplementary role in that regard. 
8.4 Some remaining issues 
As emphasized in the introduction to Part III, this thesis focused only on the question of shared 
international responsibility of two cooperating States towards a third party (e.g., a directly 
injured neighboring State or a State acting on behalf of the international community). At the 
same time, it is also interesting to consider the issue of one cooperating State’s responsibility 
owed to the other cooperating State, particularly in the event of significant harm to the (marine) 
environment. 
Arguably, the concept of shared State responsibility in the context of disputed hydrocarbons 
considerably limits the possibility of State A to bring a State responsibility claim against State 
B. One should also bear in mind the existence of single State models according to which only 
one State (State A) is required to exercise due diligence in the disputed area.1514 At the same 
time, it is likely that the fact of cooperation/involvement of State B will affect the extent of 
State A’s responsibility towards State B. 
In the context of cross-border hydrocarbons, it seems possible for State A to invoke State B’s 
responsibility for significant transboundary environmental harm caused by State B’s lack of 
due diligence. However, it could be argued that State A’s competencies (e.g., a State is usually 
entitled to monitor activities taking place on the other State’s CS) and the receipt of upstream 
revenue derived from petroleum activities in respect of a transboundary deposit will affect the 
determination of State B’s responsibility owed to State A. 
There are many procedural and jurisdictional hurdles surrounding the invocation of shared State 
responsibility before international judicial bodies: for example, (a) whether an injured State 
may bring a responsibility claim against two States; or (b) if an injured State has opted for 
invoking the responsibility of one of the States, how the latter State can also held the other 
                                                            




State(s) responsible (e.g., whether there is a need to institute additional proceedings or the issue 
may be addressed in the course of ongoing proceedings). 
In the academic literature, there is a view that States and private actors (the category also 
includes private petroleum companies) may share responsibility for a wrongful act.1515 The 
application of this type of shared responsibility remains to be examined in practice. 
8.5 Final remarks 
The central idea of this thesis is that there is a need to treat disputed hydrocarbons and 
transboundary hydrocarbons separately. The features specific to each category of shared 
hydrocarbons significantly affect the legal regime governing the rights and obligations of 
States, and the rules of (shared) State responsibility within this category. 
The issues discussed in this thesis are important and timely. It is not unfeasible to imagine an 
increase in the number of instances in which neighboring States are faced with situations in 
which one or more of the categories of shared hydrocarbons are identified. 
  
                                                            




APPENDIX I – LIST OF ARRANGEMENTS AND 
AGREEMENTS RELATING TO SHARED 
HYDROCARBON RESOURCES 
 
I.a Note to arrangements and agreements 
 
This Appendix includes a list of relevant and available arrangements and agreements 
concerning shared hydrocarbons: (a) provisional arrangements concluded in undelimited 
maritime areas for the purpose of exploring for and exploiting hydrocarbon resources located 
in these areas;1516 (b) agreements establishing joint development zones in addition to 
delimitation;1517 (c) framework agreements;1518 and (d) unitization agreements.1519 The 
arrangements and agreements within each category are systematized in chronological order. 
Each arrangement/agreement’s short title is indicated at the beginning of this thesis.1520 
As noted in Chapter 1, this thesis refers to delimitation agreements listed in the BIICL’s Report 
on Undelimited Maritime Areas.  
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I.b Provisional arrangements in undelimited maritime areas1521 
 
Full treaty title, place of conclusion, date of conclusion, date of entry into force (EIF), 
source, note where available 
Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea concerning Joint Development of the 
Southern Part of the Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two Countries, Seoul, 30 January 1974, 
EIF: 22 June 1978, 1225 UNTS 113 
Agreement between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and the 
Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia relating to the joint exploitation of the natural 
resources of the sea-bed and subsoil of the Red Sea in the Common Zone, Khartoum, 16 May 
1974; EIF: 26 August 1974, 952 UNTS 198 
Memorandum of Understanding between Malaysia and the Kingdom of Thailand on the 
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Illustration No. 1. “Co-operation corridor” between Norway and the UK in the North Sea 
Source: Report “Unlocking Value through Closer Relationships”, prepared by Pilot and 
Kon-Kraft groups, August 2002, p. 10, available at 
https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/kilde/oed/rap/2002/0005/ddd/pdfv/159318









Illustration No. 2. Joint Development Zone between Norway and Iceland (green lines). 
Source: “Iceland’s New Era of Offshore Exploration”, ArcticEcon, 14 January 2013, 
available at https://arcticecon.wordpress.com/2013/01/14/icelands-new-era-of-offshore-












Illustration No. 3. Maritime boundary between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea 
Source: R. Mattingsdal et al., “An updated map of structural elements in the southern 
Barents Sea,” Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2015, available at 
http://www.npd.no/Global/Norsk/2-Tema/Geologi/Strukturelementer/Poster-










Illustration No. 4. Hydrocarbon fields straddling the maritime boundary between 
Venezuela and Trinidad & Tobago 
Source: website of the Ministry of Energy and Energy Industries of the Government of 
the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, available at http://www.energy.gov.tt/about-us/the-










Illustration No. 5. Joint Regime Area between Jamaica and Colombia 
Source: Limits in the Seas, No- 125: Jamaica’s Maritime Claims and Boundaries, United 
States Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and 
Scientific Affairs, 5 February 2005, p. 5, available at 





   Illustration No. 6. Cooperation Zone established between Barbados and Guyana 
Source: Exclusive Economic Zone Co-operation Treaty between the State of Barbados 
and the Republic of Guyana concerning the exercise of jurisdiction in their exclusive 
economic zones in the area of bilateral overlap within each of their outer limits and 
beyond the outer limits of the exclusive economic zones of other States, London, 2 
December 2003, EIF: 5 May 2004, 2277 UNTS 209, available at 












Source: Steven Groves, “U.S. Accession to U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea 
Unnecessary to Develop Oil and Gas Resources”, Backgrounder, No. 2688, 14 May 
2012, available at https://www.heritage.org/report/us-accession-un-convention-the-law-
the-sea-unnecessary-develop-oil-and-gas-resources (last accessed January 2019) 











Illustration No. 8. Maritime boundary between Canada and France 
Source: C. Schofield and I. Townsend-Gault, “Extending the “Baguette”: France plays 













Illustration No. 9. (Former) Joint Petroleum Development Area between Australia and 
Timor-Leste and known petroleum fields in the Timor Sea 
Source: Report and Recommendations of the Compulsory Conciliation Commission 
between Timor-Leste and Australia on the Timor Sea, PCA Case No. 2016-10, 9 May 













Illustration No. 10. Maritime boundaries in the Timor Sea and the Greater Sunrise 
Special Regime Area (SRA) 
Source: Report and Recommendations of the Compulsory Conciliation Commission 
between Timor-Leste and Australia on the Timor Sea, PCA Case No. 2016-10, 9 May 












Illustration No. 11. The difference in the location of the JPDA and the new maritime 
boundaries in the Timor Sea 
Source: PCA’s Press Release, 6 March 2018, available at 










Illustration No. 12. Joint Development Zone (with IX subzones) between Japan and 
South Korea 
Source: Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea concerning Joint 
Development of the Southern Part of the Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two 
Countries, Seoul, 30 January 1974, EIF: 22 June 1978, 1225 UNTS 113, available at 











Illustration No. 13. Joint Development Zone between Japan and China 
Source: C. H. Schofield and I. Townsend-Gault, “Choppy waters ahead in “a sea of peace 
cooperation and friendship”?: Slow progress towards the application of maritime joint 









Illustration No. 14. Joint Development Area between Malaysia and Thailand 
Source: Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority’s website, 












Illustration No. 15. Joint Development Zone between Malaysia and Vietnam 
Source: T. L. McDorman, Report No. 5-19, “Malaysia-Vietnam”, in: J. I. Charney and 










Illustration No. 16. Overlapping claims area between Thailand and Cambodia   
Source: Report No. 5-24, “Cambodia-Thailand”, in: D. A. Colson and R. W. Smith 












Illustration No. 17. The overlap between the Malaysia-Thailand and Malaysia-Vietnam 
joint zones   
Source: H. Duong, Joint Development in the South China Sea, CogitASIA, 12 July 
2013, available at https://www.cogitasia.com/joint-development-in-the-south-china-sea/ 









Illustration No. 18. Joint Development Zone between Nigeria and São Tomé and 
Príncipe 
Source: Report No. 4-10, “Nigeria and São Tomé & Príncipe”, in: D. A. Colson and R. W. 









Illustration No. 19. Current division of the Joint Development Zone between Nigeria and 
São Tomé and Príncipe into blocks 
Source: Joint Development Authority’s website, available at 










Illustration No. 20. Maritime boundary between Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea 
Source: website of the Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons of the Republic of Equatorial 







Illustration No. 21. The Lianzi Unit Area between Angola and the Republic 
of the Congo 
Source: Chevron’s Press Release, “Chevron Announces First Production 
from the Lianzi Development Offshore the Republic of Congo and Angola”, 
2 November 2015, available at https://www.chevron.com/stories/chevron-
announces-first-production-from-the-lianzi-development-offshore-the-












Illustration No. 22. Common Interest Zone between Angola and the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo 
Source: D. C. Smith, “Angola-Democratic Republic of the Congo”, Report No. 4-15, in: 














Illustration No. 23. Joint Management Zone between Mauritius and the Seychelles (right, 
purple) and the potential maritime area for joint management between the Seychelles and 
Tanzania (left, yellow) 
Source: J. Mabrook and B. Bonnelame, “Seychelles, Mauritius to set up Mascarene 
Plateau headquarters”, Seychelles News Agency, 15 February 2016, available at 
http://www.seychellesnewsagency.com/articles/4600/Seychelles%2C+Mauritius+to+set+u






   
Illustration No. 24. Maritime boundaries between Cyprus, Egypt, Israel and Lebanon  
Source: E. Hazou, “Cyprus in talks with ENI-Total on Calypso timetable”, Tekmor 
Monitor, 2 April 2018, available at https://tekmormonitor.blogspot.com/2018/04/cyprus-in-










Illustration No. 25. “Fasht bu Saafa Hexagon” area between Saudi Arabia and 
Bahrain  
Source: Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Government of 












Illustration No. 26. Partitioned Neutral Zone (PNZ) between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
Source: J. Ghana, “Kuwait in discussions with Saudi Arabia on reviving shared field”, 
MEED, 18 October 2017, available at https://www.meed.com/kuwait-discussions-saudi-
arabia-reviving-shared-field/ (last accessed January 2019). The author edited the map in 












Illustration No. 27. Common Zone between Saudi Arabia and Sudan 
Source: “Deep-Sea Mining Remains out of Reach, for Now”, Stratfor Wordview, 13 
May 2016, available at https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/deep-sea-mining-














Illustration No. 28. Maritime corridor claimed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
 
Source: Information préliminaire à la Commission des Limites de Plateau Continental 
Conformement à l'article 76, paragraphe 8 de la Convention de Nationas Unies sur le Droit 
de la Mer, 1982, concernant la région du Golfe de Guinée, 7 May 2009, frontpage, 
available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/preliminary/cod2009information








Illustration No. 29. Joint zone between France and Spain in the Bay of Biscay 
Source: Convention between the Government of the French Republic and the Government 
of the Spanish States on the delimitation of the continental shelves of the two States in the 











Illustration No. 30. Joint Area between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau (which is 
currently divided into six blocks) 
Source: Senegal-Guinea-Bissau Management and Cooperation Agency’s website, 











Illustration No. 31. Cross-border hydrocarbon deposit between Mauritania and 
Senegal 
Source: Kosmos Energy, http://www.kosmosenergy.com/exploration-success-
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